

CAMBRIDGE GREEK AND LATIN CLASSICS

PLATO

ALCIBIADES

Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England

CAMBRIDGE GREEK AND LATIN CLASSICS

EDITED BY NICHOLAS DENYER

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EDITED BY  
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## PREFACE

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In preparing this book, I have incurred many debts. Lynne Broughton, as throughout our married life, has been tireless in providing support of all kinds. Colin Austin, Jacques Brunschwig, Antonio Carlini, Christopher Gill, Pamela Huby and David Johnson have generously given offprints, or access to work in progress. Paul Cartledge, James Clackson, Susan Daruvala, Roger Dawe, Coulter George, Eric Handley, Sarah Hawkins, Neil Hopkinson, Geoff Horrocks, Geoffrey Lloyd, Malcolm Schofield, David Sedley and Gisela Striker have each been kind enough to let me pick their brains about various points of detail. John Palmer very helpfully alerted me to comparisons and contrasts between Plato's Alcibiades and Xenophon's Euthydemus; Myles Burnyeat no less helpfully alerted me to the significance of Peperethus. As editors of this series, Pat Easterling, Richard Hunter and Ted Kenney have given much encouragement and advice. Doug Hutchinson, Robert Wardy and Emma Woolerton generously scrutinised drafts of the entire commentary. And my debt to members of seminars in Cambridge and Leeds is no less real for being acknowledged only in this general fashion. Thanks to all these people, this book has been so much improved that I suspect it would have been perfect had I always followed their advice; certainly none of them can be blamed for any faults that remain.

My debts go back much further. One afternoon many years ago, Dorothy Denyer nearly tore her arm from its socket while attempting to carry home a copy of LSJ that she had purchased for her schoolboy son. For that, and for much else, I dedicate this book to her.

*Trinity College, Cambridge*  
*August 2000*

N.C.D.



## ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES

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### PLATO

The page numbers of Stephanus' 1578 edition continue to be printed in the margins of editions and translations, and used for references to the text of Plato. References to the *Alcibiades* itself are given here simply in the form 123a4, where '123' is the number of a Stephanus page, 'a' the letter of a section within the page, and '4' the number of a line within the section. References to other works in the Platonic corpus are given here by title (sometimes abbreviated), Stephanus page number and section letter. The following abbreviations are used: *Alc. mi.* = *Alcibiades minor*, *Amat.* = *Amatores*, *Ap.* = *Apology*, *Chrm.* = *Charmides*, *Clit.* = *Clitophon*, *Cra.* = *Cratylus*, *Cri.* = *Crito*, *Ep.* = *Epistles*, *Euthd.* = *Euthydemus*, *Euthphr.* = *Euthyphro*, *Grg.* = *Gorgias*, *Hp. ma.* = *Hippias Major*, *Hp. mi.* = *Hippias Minor*, *La.* = *Laches*, *Lys.* = *Lysis*, *Mx.* = *Menexenus*, *Prm.* = *Parmenides*, *Phd.* = *Phaedo*, *Phdr.* = *Phaedrus*, *Phlb.* = *Philebus*, *Plt.* = *Politicus*, *Prt.* = *Protagoras*, *Rep.* = *Republic*, *Smp.* = *Symposium*, *Sph.* = *Sophist*, *Tht.* = *Theaetetus*, *Thg.* = *Theages*, *Tim.* = *Timaeus*

### OTHER ANCIENT AUTHORS AND WORKS

- Ael.* = Aelian; *VH* = *Varia historia*, *NA* = *Nature of animals*  
*Aesch.* = Aeschylus; *Ag.* = Agamemnon, *Ch.* = Choephoroi, *Pers.* = *Persians*, *Pr.* = *Prometheus bound*  
*Aeschin.* = Aeschines  
*And.* = Andocides  
*An. Pal.* = *Anthologia Palatina*  
*Antisth.* = Antisthenes  
*Apollod.* = Apollodorus  
*Ar.* = Aristophanes; *Ach.* = *Acharnians*, *Ec.* = *Ecclesiazousae*, *Kn.* = *Knights*, *Lys.* = *Lysistrata*, *Pl.* = *Plutus*, *Th.* = *Thesmophoriazousae*  
*Arist.* = Aristotle; *APr.* = *Prior analytics*, *Ath.* = *Constitution of Athens*, *EE* = *Eudemian ethics*, *EN* = *Nicomachean ethics*

*HA* = *Historia animalium*, *MM* = *Magna moralia*, *Met.* = *Metaphysics*, *Phil.* = *De philosophia*, *Pol.* = *Politics*, *Ptp.* = *Protreptic*, *Rh. Al.* = *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, *Rh.* = *Rhetoric*, *SE* = *Sophistici elenchi*

- Ath. = Athenaeus  
 Call. = Callimachus; *H.* = *Hymns*  
 Cic. = Cicero; *Div.* = *De divinatione*, *Tusc.* = *Tusculans*  
 Ctes. = Ctesias; *Pers.* = *Persica*  
 Demos. = Demosthenes  
 D.L. = Diogenes Laertius  
 D.S. = Diodorus Siculus  
 Eup. = Eupolis  
 Eur. = Euripides; *Alc.* = *Alcestis*, *Andr.* = *Andromache*, *El.* = *Electra*, *Heracl.* = *Heracidae*, *HF* = *Hercules furens*, *Hipp.* = *Hippolytus*, *IA* = *Iphigenia in Aulis*, *IT* = *Iphigenia in Tauris*, *Or.* = *Orestes*  
 Hdt. = Herodotus  
 Hes. = Hesiod; *Th.* = *Theogony*  
 Hipp. = Hippocrates  
 Hom. = Homer; *Il.* = *Iliad*, *Od.* = *Odyssey*  
 Hyp. = Hyperides; *Epit.* = *Epitaphios*  
 Isoc. = Isocrates; *Ep.* = *Epistles*  
 Lys. = Lysias  
 Men. = Menander; *Pk.* = *Perikeiromene*  
 Nep. = Cornelius Nepos; *Alc.* = *Alcibades*  
 Paus. = Pausanias  
 Pind. = Pindar; *O.* = *Olympians*, *P.* = *Pythians*, *N.* = *Nemeans*  
 Plin. = Pliny; *Nat.* = *Natural history*  
 Plu. = Plutarch; *Ages.* = *Agesilaus*, *Alc.* = *Alcibiades*, *Isoc.* = *Isocrates*, *Nic.* = *Nicias*, *Per.* = *Pericles*, *Sol.* = *Solon*, *Thes.* = *Theseus*  
 Sat. = Satyrus  
 Soph. = Sophocles; *OC* = *Oedipus at Colonus*, *OT* = *Oedipus tyrannus*  
 Th. = Thucydides  
 Theoc. = Theocritus  
 Thphr. = Theophrastus; *Char.* = *Characters*  
 Xen. = Xenophon; *Ages.* = *Agesilaus*, *An.* = *Anabasis*, *Ap.* =

*Apology*, *Ath. pol.* = *Constitution of Athens*, *Cyr.* = *Cyropaedia*,  
*HG* = *Historia Graeca*, *Lac.* = *Constitution of Sparta*, *Mem.*  
 = *Memorabilia*, *Oec.* = *Oeconomicus*, *Smp.* = *Symposium*

Sometimes the name of an ancient author is given in square brackets [ ], to indicate that a work transmitted under his name was in fact written by someone else. The absence of square brackets does not however indicate the authenticity of a work, but only that its authenticity does not, in that context, matter.

## COMPENDIA AND WORKS OF REFERENCE

- CCP* = Richard Kraut, ed., *The Cambridge companion to Plato* (Cambridge 1992)
- DK* = Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edn (Berlin 1964)
- FA* = Stephen Halliwell, 'Forms of address: Socratic vocatives in Plato', in Francesco de Martino and Alan H. Sommerstein, edd., *Lo spettacolo delle voci* (Bari 1995) 11 87–121
- FGH* = Felix Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leiden 1923–55)
- GFA* = Eleanor Dickey, *Greek forms of address from Herodotus to Lucian* (Oxford 1996)
- GP* = J. D. Denniston, *The Greek particles*, 2nd edn revised by K. J. Dover (Oxford 1954)
- HGP* = W. K. C. Guthrie, *A history of Greek philosophy* (Cambridge 1962–81)
- HoA* = Emily Kearns, *The heroes of Attica*, *BICS* Supplement 57 (London 1989)
- IEG* = M. L. West, *Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati* (Oxford 1971–72)
- LSJ* = H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek–English lexicon*, 9th edn revised by H. S. Jones (Oxford 1940)
- MT* = W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the moods and tenses of the Greek verb* (London 1889)
- PCG* = R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae comici Graeci* (Berlin 1983–)
- PMG* = D. L. Page, *Poetae melici Graeci* (Oxford 1962)

- SSR* = G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae* (Naples 1990)  
*TGF* = A. A. Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta* (Leipzig 1889)  
*TSZ* = Mary Boyce, *Textual sources for the study of Zoroastrianism*  
(Manchester 1984)

# INTRODUCTION

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## 1. ALCIBIADES

In 399 BC, Socrates was tried, convicted, sentenced to death, and executed. One of the charges was ‘he corrupts the young men’.<sup>1</sup> If anything could be used to substantiate this charge of corrupting the young men, it was Socrates’ association with the most spectacularly corrupted of them all, Alcibiades.<sup>2</sup>

Alcibiades’ beauty (104a), his courage (115d7n.), his high birth (104b), his wealth (104c), his rhetorical prowess (113d6–8n.), his ostentatious affectations (113e9n., 122c1n.), his Olympic victories (105b5–6n., 122d8n.), his debaucheries (127a6n.), and even his criminal escapades (106e8n. on νόκτωρ, 118e8n. on ἐγὼ οἴμαι αἴτιος), gave him a glamour that soon won him an influential place in Athenian politics. He entered adult life at about the start of the Peloponnesian War (123d6–7n.), the prolonged and destructive series of conflicts in which the Athenians set themselves against the Spartans, and, ultimately, against more or less all the other Greeks too. He was in his early thirties when, in 421 BC, the Athenians and the Spartans negotiated a peace. According to the treaty, the peace was to last for fifty years (Th. 5.18.3). Alcibiades was soon able to engineer a resumption of hostilities. Among the devices he used was an ingenious double-cross of a Spartan embassy to Athens (Th. 5.45); he here displayed a capacity for winning people’s trust, and a readiness to betray it, that were to remain with him throughout his life. The resumed hostilities gave him the opportunity of commanding Athenian and allied forces in the Peloponnese (Th. 5.52.2, 5.55.4, 5.84.1). He then incited, and was appointed a commander of, the massive expeditionary force that in 415 BC set out from Athens to conquer

<sup>1</sup> See 132a1n.; for the other charge, see 103a5–6n.

<sup>2</sup> Our main sources for public career of Alcibiades are Thucydides, 5.43 to the end, and Xenophon’s *Historia Graeca*, the beginning to 2.1. He is the subject of extant ancient *Lives*, by Nepos and Plutarch, and modern accounts by Hatzfeld (1951), Ellis (1989), and de Romilly (1995). His representation in fifth- and fourth-century Athenian literature is discussed by Gribble (1999).

Sicily (Th. 6.8.2, 6.15). He was recalled later that year, to face trial on charges of blaspheming by parodying the Eleusinian mysteries (113e9n.), perhaps the most sacred, and certainly the most secret, ritual of Athenian religion. On the voyage back to Athens, he jumped ship, and defected to Sparta. The Athenians sentenced him to death (105b2–3n.).

With Alcibiades on the Spartan side, the war started to go badly for the Athenians. On his advice (105b5–6n.), the Spartans took two important measures. They sent help to the Sicilians; and they established a permanent garrison at Decelea, high ground within view of Athens itself. The Athenian expedition to Sicily ended, two years after it had begun, in total and catastrophic defeat. The garrison at Decelea continued, until the end of the war, to deny the Athenians access to the major part of Attica: even while they could still leave the Piraeus by sea, by land they scarcely dared venture beyond the city walls.

These measures, as much as anything, were eventually to win the war for Sparta. The Spartan victory would in fact have come much sooner if Alcibiades had not defected a second time. In 412, he was with Spartan forces in the Aegean. They were there to take advantage of the rebellion that had broken out among Athens' reluctant satellites, emboldened by the defeat of the Sicilian expedition. Alcibiades' multiple intrigues (not least, a love affair with a Spartan queen: 121b8–c1n.) made the Spartans too decide to kill him; but just before the order for his execution came, he slipped away. After a period spent in further intrigues at the court of Tissaphernes, the local Persian governor, he joined the Athenian fleet then based at Samos, and soon became its leader.

The Athenian fleet was so successful under Alcibiades' leadership that in 407 he was able to return to Athens in glory. The charges of blasphemy were formally withdrawn; and, with him in the van, the Athenians were able to make their solemn procession to Eleusis by land for the first time since the Spartans had occupied Decelea. Elected to the unprecedented office of 'Universal Leader Plenipotentiary' (ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν ἀντοκράτωρ; cf. 105b2–3n., 120a5–6n.), he returned to the fleet. Shortly afterwards, he one day left a deputy in charge; the deputy disobeyed orders, gave battle to the Spartans at Notion, and lost (125d10–11n.).

Alcibiades once more separated himself from the Athenians. He retreated this time to a castle he had prepared overlooking the Hellespont. He made this his base for a little piracy, and yet more political intrigues (105b6–7n.). One day in 405, he observed from his castle a foolhardy deployment of the Athenian fleet. He advised them to redeploy. They refused, and their refusal led to their defeat at Aegospotami, the last sea-battle of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. *HG* 2.1.25–6). In 404, the year in which Athens finally surrendered to Sparta, he was killed by assassins in the pay of the Persians (105c1n.).

‘They long for him, they loathe him, they want to have him.’ Aristophanes (*Frogs* 1425) had thus described the Athenians’ attitude to Alcibiades in 405, during his second exile from the city. The Athenians continued to love and hate the memory of Alcibiades until well into the fourth century. Orators would try to make an association with Alcibiades both grounds for sympathy and grounds for hostility (Isoc. 16, Lys. 14, 15); both tactics no doubt stood a reasonable chance of success.

Even in their own lifetimes, Socrates and Alcibiades were already becoming the material of legend. It is therefore unsurprising that we have no detailed and reliable record of their association. We can however be sure that it was far more than a superficial acquaintance. For the defenders of Socrates never dared to deny that he and Alcibiades had been associates. Instead, their writings attempted to show that, in spite of his association with Alcibiades, Socrates was nevertheless not to blame for the misdeeds of Alcibiades’ dizzying career.

## 2. ΟΙ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ AND ALCIBIADES

Socrates never wrote a word of philosophy. In fact, he never wrote a word of anything very much, except that late in life he versified some of Aesop’s fables, and prefaced them with a proem to Apollo (*Phd.* 60c–d). To write philosophy was, in the time of Socrates, to proclaim one’s possession of some philosophical truth, and one’s authority to impart that truth to other people. Socrates insisted that he had no such proclamation to make. His philosophical wisdom, such as it was, consisted in an appreciation of his own ignorance (117b12–13n.). The chief philosophical service he could do for other people was therefore to encourage them too to appreciate their own

intellectual limits, and so start to take proper care of themselves (128a2–3n., 132c1–5n.). This he could do orally. But not even all oral genres were free from the pretensions to knowledge implicit in the written philosophical genres of the day. One could hardly give a long speech advising one's fellow citizens in the Assembly without pretending to know better than they did (106d1; cf. 106b1n., 107a13n., 107b6–7n.). Indeed, even asserting a philosophical point, rather than getting one's audience to assert philosophical points in response to one's questions, was liable to seem too grandiose (113b1n. on ἐγὼ μὲν ἦ ὁ ἐρωτῶν, 114e8–9n.). That left only one medium in which Socrates could philosophise: a humdrum conversation or δῖαλογος, in which his main rôle was to ask questions. This question-and-answer medium for philosophy came to be called 'dialectic'.

The followers of Socrates did not confine themselves to conversation. They philosophised in writing. To do so, they invented a new literary genre: written accounts of philosophical conversations between Socrates and others, or Σωκράτικοι λόγοι. Within this genre come most of the philosophical works of Plato and of Xenophon. But these extant Socratic dialogues are only part of what was once a much larger body of literature. Thus we hear tell of dialogues also by many other friends and followers of Socrates. Among them were the writings of (in alphabetical order): Aeschines, Alexamenus, Antisthenes, Aristippus, Cebes, Crito, Euclides, Glaucon, Phaedo, Simmias and Simon.<sup>3</sup>

Unlike the author of a treatise, the author of a dialogue need not present himself as having the philosophical authority that Socrates had disclaimed. For the author of a dialogue need not vouch for the truth of any statement made by any of his characters. The only exception to this is when one of the characters is the author himself, presented as playing the leading rôle in the conversation. But the first author of philosophical dialogues to give himself such a rôle seems to have been Aristotle (see e.g. Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 13.19.4, *Ad Quintum* 3.5.1). Earlier authors do not seem to have appeared in their own dialogues, save in such rôles as the young and naïve Xenophon of *Mem.* 1.3.9–13. Certainly, the nearest that Plato ever gets to taking

<sup>3</sup> The evidence for all these authors, such as it is, is gathered in *SSR*.



part in one of his own dialogues is in the *Apology*, where at 34a and 38b he puts his own name on lists of silent extras. No doubt the fact that the philosophical dialogue allows one to write philosophy, without claiming more authority on the subject than Socrates ever did, was the reason why Socrates' followers invented this genre.

The charges on which Socrates had been executed continued to be pressed after his death. In particular, a certain Polycrates wrote an *Accusation of Socrates*, making much of the connection between Alcibiades and Socrates, and asserting that Alcibiades had been Socrates' pupil.<sup>4</sup> Polycrates' *Accusation* goaded admirers of Socrates into replying on his behalf. This they did in various genres. Thus Lysias responded to Polycrates by writing an *Apology* or speech in Socrates' defence (*SSR* i.c. 137). Others wrote dialogues that represented Alcibiades and his dealings with Socrates. Thus Alcibiades was a minor character in Plato's *Protagoras*, and a major character in Plato's *Symposium* and, apparently, Phaedo's *Zopyrus* (122b2n., 123a2n.). Above all, there was a series of dialogues in which Alcibiades figured so prominently that they were actually named after him. We hear of dialogues called *Alcibiades* written by, among others, Aeschines (fr. 41–54 *SSR*), Antisthenes (fr. 198–202 *SSR*), Euclides (fr. 10 *SSR*) and Phaedo (fr. 8 *SSR*). Of all this series of dialogues, only two survive. Both are ascribed to Plato: the so-called *Alcibiades minor*, or *Lesser Alcibiades*, or *Alcibiades II*, in which Socrates and Alcibiades talk about prayer; and the so-called *Greater Alcibiades*, or *Alcibiades I*, which is the subject of this book, and which will here be called simply the *Alcibiades*.

### 3. THE *ALCIBIADES* AND PHILOSOPHICAL SEDUCTION

In the *Alcibiades*, Plato represents an attempt by Socrates to seduce Alcibiades. In several ways, his attempt follows a then standard pattern. Alcibiades is a youth, whose beauty is now starting to flower (131e). Socrates is an older man, who has been waiting for a suitable

<sup>4</sup> Isoc. 11.4–6; Polycrates wrote, we know from D.L. 2.39, some time after Athens' walls were rebuilt in 395–393.

moment to strike up a conversation (106a, 110b). The moment has now come, for the two of them are alone together, and able to speak intimately (118b). In return for Alcibiades' favours, Socrates offers him an educative experience that will make him, as he matures, a useful participant in political life (105e, 118b9n., 124b–c). There is some suggestive talk about undressing (132a–b) and gazing at the reflections in one another's eyes (132d–133b). By the end of the dialogue, Socrates' persistence gets some reward: Alcibiades promises at any rate to grant him what he wants (135e).

Nevertheless, this is no usual seduction. The beauty that attracts Socrates is a beauty not of body but of soul: Alcibiades' adolescent looks are fading, and it is his intellect that is now starting to flower (131c–d). The suitable moment for which Socrates has been waiting is the moment when the god who has charge of his life will allow him to speak to Alcibiades (103a, 105d–106a, 124c). The intimate remarks that Socrates makes to Alcibiades include a shocked reproof at his utter ignorance (118b), and the suggestion that, as he now is, he is fit only for slavery (135c). The education that Socrates offers Alcibiades will make him not merely a useful citizen of Athens, but fit to rule the world (105c–e, 124b). The suggestive talk about gazing into one another's eyes in fact suggests to Alcibiades an extremely proper policy of self-appraisal, conducted by contemplating God, and directed towards moral and intellectual self-improvement (133b–c). The promised reward for Socrates' persistence is simply that Alcibiades will adopt such a policy, and in particular will therefore start to care for justice (135e). For the practice into which Socrates is trying to seduce Alcibiades is philosophy, φιλοσοφία, or the love of wisdom.

Socrates' attempt to seduce Alcibiades may therefore seem rather pale by comparison with what we usually call seduction. The dialogue suggests however that things are the other way round. The other ἐρασταί of Alcibiades wanted only his body; but what Socrates wants is Alcibiades' soul, and that means Alcibiades himself (130c, 131c–e). Socrates therefore is the only serious seducer; for he alone is intent on intimacy with Alcibiades.

Philosophical seducers face a peculiar difficulty: there is no philosophical reasoning that they can expect to be effective. This is

because those who are already prepared to hear and act on philosophical reasoning are already philosophers, and so do not need to be seduced into philosophy. Aristotle (*Pth.* fr. 2) made this fact the starting point of an ingenious argument: if you deny that philosophy is worthwhile, then you are already engaged in philosophy, and so you must accept that philosophy is worthwhile after all. But this argument, precisely because it is already so philosophical, is better at reinforcing than at creating a commitment to philosophy.

There is no philosophical argument in the initial stages of Socrates' attempt to seduce Alcibiades. Indeed, at the very first stage, there is not even speech: Socrates has been stalking Alcibiades in silence for years before he ever utters a word to him (103a, 106a). Moreover, when Socrates does break his silence, it is to name Alcibiades' secret goal of world dominion (105a–c), and to claim that this goal is, in spite of Alcibiades' many advantages (104a–c), unattainable without the help of Socrates (105d–e). This strange silence, and even stranger speech, produce a faint stir of curiosity in an Alcibiades who is otherwise intellectually complacent (104d2–3n.). Only now is he prepared to listen to argument.

Socrates presents the argument dialectically, by asking Alcibiades some elementary questions about justice and expediency. Alcibiades will need to understand such matters if he is to give useful advice to his fellow citizens (106c–109c). However, his confused answers show that he suffers from the worst possible kind of ignorance: besides not understanding these things, he is confident that he does understand them (116e–118b). Moreover, those from whom Alcibiades might hope to learn (the public at large, his guardian the great statesman Pericles) are as ignorant as he is (110d–112d, 118b–119a).

This argument leaves Alcibiades unmoved. When someone is as aristocratically self-confident (119c1n.) as Alcibiades, it takes more than a mere demonstration of his ignorance to convince him that he needs to improve himself intellectually. Socrates therefore resorts to a new tactic for seducing Alcibiades into philosophy. In an extended speech, that invokes and inverts the clichés of Athenian rhetoric in praise of Athens (121b1–7nn., 122b5–6n.), he praises the kings of Sparta and Persia: they are Alcibiades' main rivals (119c–120d, 124b); they have all the advantages that Alcibiades has, and more

besides (120e–124a); Alcibiades' only hope of triumph is therefore to appreciate his limitations ('know himself'), and start taking the care of himself that will enable him to transcend them (124a–b).

Socrates' new tactic is risky: he exploits Alcibiades' vulnerability to rhetoric, stirs up his competitiveness, and appeals to his respect for breeding; he hopes to turn these things against themselves, so that Alcibiades will come to be a philosopher; yet the risk is that he will merely aggravate them instead. In consequence, if Socrates ever did use on Alcibiades the tactic he is represented as using here, that would give some support to the charge 'he corrupts the young men'. His defence would therefore have to be that, without running this risk, there can be no philosophical seduction of one who, like Alcibiades, has shown himself proof against all safer tactics; and that the potential benefit to the world, of a philosopher equipped with all of Alcibiades' resources, makes the risk worth running.

Socrates' risky tactic seems at first to succeed. When the dialectic restarts, after the bravura rhetoric in praise of the Spartan and Persian kings, it is with a new and contrite Alcibiades. Now that he accepts his need to take care of himself, he is alert, inquisitive, and prepared to co-operate with Socrates as he has never done before. They accordingly make brisk progress.<sup>5</sup> Soon, Alcibiades can be introduced to some fairly sophisticated philosophy: knowing and caring for himself means knowing and caring for his soul; and a soul can best know itself by contemplating its reflection in God, the finest of all intellectual mirrors (129a–133c). By the end of the dialogue Alcibiades is even acknowledging that his current state makes him unfit for anything more than slavery (135b–d), and professing his love, both for Socrates, and for justice (135d–e).

It was however notorious that Alcibiades turned out badly. Socrates' risky tactic for seducing the young man into philosophy must therefore be ultimately a failure. In consequence, along with all the marks of intellectual progress after the dialectic restarts, Plato also includes many indications that the seduction is not yet complete and maybe never will be. Alcibiades fails to seize intellectual opportunities (126d10n., 127c2–3n.); he continues to show tendencies to

<sup>5</sup> For marks of his progress, see 125e6–126a1nn., 127d6–8nn., 127e7n., 129d1–2n., 131e7–8n.

idleness (130c7n., 135e4n.) and evasion (127c10n., 130b10n., 131c11n., 135d9n.); and above all, he remains eager to adopt the prose style of sophistic rhetoric (124e7n., 125c4–5n., 126e4–5n., 129a5–6n.), even when he professes that he has now adopted the ways of Socrates (135d8–11nn.).

#### 4. LITERARY FORM AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONTENT

Because the arguments in the *Alcibiades* are presented in a drama of philosophical seduction, there are two ways in which they may be assessed. First, we may attempt to spell out, noting and clarifying any falsehoods and fallacies, the premisses both explicit and implicit, the sequence of argumentative steps taken from those premisses, and the conclusion to which they lead. Here our concern is with how good a reason the argument gives for accepting its conclusion, and whether a better reason can or should be found. Second, the arguments may be seen as so many different actions in a drama. Here our concern is with how the arguments fit into the unfolding plot, and help constitute the interplay, and sometimes even clash, between the two very different characters thereby represented.

We may of course assess in the first, ‘philosophical’, way any piece of reasoning, even if it is not presented in a dramatic dialogue. Likewise, we may assess in the second, ‘literary’, way any speeches in a dramatic dialogue, even if the dialogue contains no reasoning. When, however, we assess the arguments of the *Alcibiades*, or any other Platonic dialogue, these two kinds of assessment are not so sharply distinct. It would be futile to pass over, as aridly philosophical, the first kind of assessment, in the hope of proceeding immediately to the literary and dramatic riches that we can savour in the second. This is because we will not understand what is going on dramatically if we do not appreciate whether Socrates is offering Alcibiades a flawless proof, or a fallacious argument for a true conclusion, or something that from start to finish is no more than ingenious bamboozling. For when characters in a drama are suggesting and responding to arguments, such strictly logical features of their arguments reveal much of what those characters are like and the relationship between them.

It is not so futile to ignore the dramatic aspects of a Platonic dialogue, and use it simply as a quarry from which arguments can be mined, and subjected to the first and more narrowly philosophical sort of assessment. Indeed, precisely by presenting arguments through the mouths of dramatic characters who may be unable or unwilling to reason perfectly, rather than formulating them in his own person and giving them his own express endorsement, Plato frustrates idle readers who hope to take their philosophy on trust from him; instead, he forces us to focus, less on what he thinks about an issue, and more on the objective rights and wrongs of the issue itself. In consequence, Plato has already achieved one of his ends in giving a dramatic context to the arguments, if we ignore the context, scrutinise the arguments, and attempt, where we find them faulty, to do better ourselves. For one of Plato's ends in writing dramatic dialogue was to entice us into such philosophising.

Although a narrowly philosophical assessment of the *Alcibiades*' arguments is therefore not improper, such an assessment will nevertheless miss much of importance. This is not only because it misses the narrowly literary pleasures of contemplating Plato's dramatic craftsmanship, but also because it misses something philosophical too. For by its dramatic form, the *Alcibiades* takes philosophical stances above and beyond those that it represents its characters as taking when they formulate their arguments, and assert their conclusions.

In one respect, this is fairly straightforward. The dramatic context of the *Alcibiades*' arguments gives the nearest thing we have to Plato's own indication of what he takes their force to be. Some arguments, like the tricky ones in 113d–116d concluding that justice is expedient, are presented at a point in the drama when Alcibiades needs, more than anything else, to learn intellectual humility; for only then will he be ready to learn other things, such as, for example, the expediency of justice. Here the dramatic context indicates that the virtue claimed for the arguments is not that they prove justice to be expedient, but rather that they so intensify Alcibiades' confusion that even he will be brought to acknowledge it. Very different is the dramatic context of the superb argument in 129b–130e, which reasons that since Alcibiades is the controller of his body, and since his body

is controlled by his soul, Alcibiades is identical to his soul, and hence that he must take care of his soul if he is to take care of himself. At this point in the drama, Alcibiades has, for the moment, learnt intellectual humility; what he needs to learn now is precisely what the argument purports to teach him. The dramatic context therefore is tantamount to a claim that the argument is as close to a rigorous proof as Alcibiades is now capable of assimilating.

A second respect is more subtle. To write philosophical dialogues, rather than treatises (or for that matter commentaries), is to take a stance on how to write philosophy; and the stance is just as genuine as one taken by asserting 'The correct way to write philosophy is ...' Moreover, to write the *Alcibiades* in particular, which represents an exemplary philosopher at work, trying to seduce into philosophy someone who became the exemplary man of unscrupulous action, is to take a stance on further questions about the techniques and powers of philosophy, and its relation to other ways of life; and the stance is again just as genuine as one taken by asserting 'Philosophy is ...; the way to turn people into philosophers is ...; but this is likely to fail when ...' These questions about philosophy are themselves philosophical. For philosophy is unusual among intellectual disciplines in that questions about itself are a central part of its own subject matter – which is why Aristotle was able to argue 'If you deny that philosophy is worthwhile, then you are already engaged in philosophy.' These philosophical questions about philosophy ('What is philosophy?', 'How can someone become a philosopher?') are addressed by Plato throughout the drama in which he has Socrates try to seduce Alcibiades, even when he has his characters within the drama addressing other questions instead ('Is justice expedient?', 'Are human beings souls?'). We will miss the dialogue's answers to these philosophical questions about philosophy, if we bypass its literary form, in an attempt to go straight to its philosophical content.

## 5. DATE AND MOTIVE OF THE *ALCIBIADES*

We do not know when Plato wrote the *Alcibiades*. However, such indications as the text contains (see 116d8n., 121a5–b1n., 123b5–c1nn.) all support the guess that he wrote it at some time in the early 350s.

At this date, Plato would have been about seventy (he died, aged eighty, in 348). He was experiencing the definitive failure of some long-cherished dreams.

These dreams went back to 387, when Plato had first visited Sicily. There he met a young man called Dion, with whom he fell lastingly in love. Dion was then about twenty; as a kinsman of the tyrant of Syracuse, he came from the most powerful family in the most powerful city in the island; listening to Plato, a philosopher much older than himself, he resolved to devote himself to the life of virtue (*Ep.* 7.327a–b). In all these respects, he was like Alcibiades in our dialogue (104a, 123d, 127e1n., 135e). In another respect, he differed: Dion's devotion to philosophy lasted much longer. In 367, the old tyrant of Syracuse died, and was succeeded by his son Dionysius. Dion persuaded Dionysius to invite Plato to make another visit to Sicily. And Dion added his own encouragement to Plato to return: the accession of Dionysius, an impressionable young man with philosophical interests, gave, he wrote, some chance of realising Plato's vision of a perfectly happy society, one whose king was also a philosopher (*Ep.* 7.327b–328a; cf. *Rep.* 473c–e). With such hopes in mind, Plato went to Syracuse a second time. But, as *Rep.* 490e–495b explains, it is not easy to make a true philosopher-king, not even out of the most promising material; and Dionysius was not exactly that. For besides resembling the Alcibiades of our dialogue in being born to wealth and power, Dionysius resembled him also in that he too had been neglected by those responsible for his earlier education (118b–e, *Ep.* 7.332c–d). Dionysius was indeed eager to gain Plato's esteem, so eager that he banished Dion rather than share it with him, so eager that he insisted upon continuing to have Plato's company in Syracuse, but not so eager that he was prepared to take up the study of philosophy in earnest (*Ep.* 7.329b–330b; cf. 104d2–3n. on the intellectual laziness of Alcibiades). Plato had to endure perhaps two years of this frustration before he could return to Athens.

In 361, Plato was back once more in Syracuse. This third visit was a reluctant response to persistent urgings from both Dion and Dionysius. It was just possible, Plato finally decided, that a third visit could do some good; for there just might be some truth to the persistent reports that Dionysius was now serious about philosophy, and that he was making amazing progress in his study of the subject (*Ep.*



7.338b–340a). The third visit was, however, a disaster. Dionysius' philosophising turned out to be pretentious and superficial; in spite of Plato's efforts, the rift between Dion and Dionysius only grew wider; Plato was caught up in such a swirl of plots and mutinies that he felt himself fortunate to be able to leave Syracuse alive (*Ep.* 7.340a–350b). He was back in mainland Greece by the summer of 360; shortly afterwards, the dispute between his two philosophical pupils erupted into open war; though sympathetic to Dion, he refused to take sides (*Ep.* 7.350c–e).

There was an irritating addendum to Plato's experience in Syracuse. After his final return to Athens, he received reports that Dionysius had written a handbook expounding the central truths of philosophy. Plato was contemptuous, and expressed his contempt in *Ep.* 7.341b–e and 344d–345b. He and Dionysius had had only one conversation about such matters. Dionysius had pretended then that he had already picked up the most important points by hearsay. In consequence, he had learnt even less from the conversation than the little that he might have done. In fact, he had learnt nothing. For anyone with the slightest understanding of the subject would realise that the most important things in philosophy cannot be put into writing. People who tried to write such handbooks (and even if the reports about Dionysius were false, there were certainly others who had tried to write them) simply displayed their total ignorance, not only of the central truths of philosophy, but also of their own incompetence to deal with them. Plato described their total ignorance in a phrase borrowed from the famous inscription at Delphi: such people did not even 'know themselves' (*Ep.* 7.341b; cf. 124b, 129a, 132d–133c).

Back in Athens in the early 350s, Plato therefore had every cause to reflect on what can happen when an older philosopher tries to win for philosophy young men subject to all the temptations of political power. An obvious medium for such reflections was a dialogue in which the older philosopher Socrates tries to win the ambitious young Alcibiades. Naturally, in the course of such a dialogue, Plato might have to write something like an introductory philosophical handbook. That, however, would be all to the good; for it would display the only sort of philosophical handbook that could be written. If not even this could get the young man to take up philosophy seri-

ously and so equip himself for the proper exercise of political power, then there would be some excuse for Socrates' failure with Alcibiades; and there would also be some excuse for Plato's failure with Dion and Dionysius.

## 6. THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE *ALCIBIADES*

### (i) *Changing reputation*

In ancient times, no one ever doubted that Plato wrote the *Alcibiades*. This is not because the ancients casually described as 'Plato's' any work written in an approximately Platonic manner; on the contrary, several such works, of which the *Eryxias* and the *Axiochus* are typical extant examples, circulated under the description 'bastards' (νόθοι), to distinguish them from Plato's lawful offspring (D.L. 3.62). Nor is it because the ancients were unconcerned about what hand Plato actually had in works that they did ascribe to him. For example, Panaetius, the head of the Stoic school of philosophy in 129–109 BC, thought the *Phaedo* bogus (Asclepius, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, 90.23–6; *An. Pal.* 9.358); Aristoxenus, an influential Peripatetic philosopher of the fourth century BC, declared that Plato had plagiarised the bulk of the *Republic* from Protagoras (D.L. 3.37); and some people, whose names we do not know, thought Xenophon the author of the second and shorter dialogue named *Alcibiades* and transmitted to us as one of Plato's works (Ath. 11 506c). Nor was the absence of doubts about the authenticity of our *Alcibiades* due to any neglect of the dialogue. It was frequently read, and frequently cited under Plato's name (see Carlini (1964) 401–3). Some thought indeed that the *Alcibiades* deserved to be the first dialogue read by someone starting to read Plato (D.L. 3.62). By late antiquity, this had become the standard view: Socrates' attempt to get Alcibiades to enter the philosophical life was described as 'the gateway to the temple' of Plato's dialogues, and as containing 'the general, unitary and comprehensive outline of the whole of philosophy'.<sup>6</sup>

The *Alcibiades* maintained its place among Plato's dialogues

<sup>6</sup> See the commentaries of Olympiodorus 10.18–11.6, and Proclus 11.1–21.

unchallenged, until the early nineteenth century. Then Friedrich Schleiermacher (1836) 329 declared it to be 'very insignificant and poor, and that to such a degree, that we cannot ascribe it to Plato'. Schleiermacher's condemnation was immensely influential. The *Alcibiades* fell out of favour. From being the one dialogue read by anyone who had read any Plato at all, it passed out of the canon, and almost completely out of sight. What was until recently the standard English translation of Plato has room for the *Epinomis* and the *Twelfth Letter*, two works whose authenticity has been doubted ever since antiquity, but no room for the *Alcibiades*.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, in what may well become the standard English manual on Plato, only one passage from the *Alcibiades* is mentioned in the index; Herodotus and Thucydides, by comparison, rate eight mentions each.<sup>8</sup> One might expect that if the *Alcibiades* is so certainly not by Plato, then it would be discussed in works that attempt to cover the writings of other followers of Socrates; yet even there, it hardly gets a mention.<sup>9</sup>

(ii) *Frivolous arguments against authenticity*

This widespread disdain for the *Alcibiades* has had an unfortunate effect: people rarely feel the need to argue against its authenticity, and such arguments as they have presented are often weak to the point of frivolity. For example, the fact that the *Alcibiades*, but no other work by Plato, uses the rare and poetic words κρήγυος and ἄχραντος is cited as evidence against Platonic authorship.<sup>10</sup> But whether or not the *Alcibiades* is by Plato, its use of those words still calls for some explanation. The explanation is, of course, the special literary effects that the author was able to produce by using those

<sup>7</sup> Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, edd., *The collected dialogues of Plato* (New York 1961).

<sup>8</sup> *CCP* 543, 560.

<sup>9</sup> It gets no mention at all in G. C. Field, *Plato and his contemporaries* (London 1930). It gets one mention in Charles H. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic dialogue* (Cambridge 1996), in a throwaway reference to 'the pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades* I' (20). A few pages later, it is completely forgotten: 'Xenophon is the only Socratic author other than Plato whose works have been preserved' (30).

<sup>10</sup> And not just as slight evidence either: Heidel (1896) 68 n. 39 called the use of κρήγυος 'a most palpable sign of spuriousness'.

words as he did (see nn. on 111e2 and 114a1). Why should it be doubted that Plato himself might have produced just those effects in just those ways? The cause is an assumption that can scarcely survive being spelled out, the assumption that everything in a genuine work of Plato has a parallel in other genuine works of Plato. Indeed, arguments against the authenticity of the *Alcibiades* sometimes rely on the even less plausible assumption that everything in a genuine work of Plato has at least *two* parallels in other genuine works.<sup>11</sup>

No less implausible is quite the opposite assumption, that the very similarity of the *Alcibiades* to Plato's undisputed works is evidence against its authenticity. On this assumption rest arguments that the *Alcibiades* is 'too Platonic'.<sup>12</sup> It is of course true that any ancient writer who imitated Plato so successfully that his imitation deceived everyone until the nineteenth century, would have written something very like the real thing. It is true also that the *Alcibiades* is, if not the real thing, at least very like it. But that is hardly reason for calling the *Alcibiades* bogus. For nothing is so like the real thing as the real thing itself.

Weakest of all is the attempt to deny the authenticity of the *Alcibiades* on the basis of both these assumptions at once.<sup>13</sup> Of course, if

<sup>11</sup> Thus de Strycker (1942) 137 denies Platonic authorship on the grounds that ἔλκος (115b9) has only one Platonic parallel (*Laws* 877a); and Pavlu (1915) 23 denies it on the grounds that while the *Alcibiades* several times refers to Socrates' δαιμόνιον (103a, 105d–106a, 124c), no single other work, apart from the *Apology*, refers to it more than once. Oddly enough, de Strycker and Pavlu do not draw the conclusion that the *Laws* and the *Apology* are bogus, even though each contains a feature that, if the *Alcibiades* is bogus, has not even one parallel in the genuine works of Plato.

<sup>12</sup> The phrase is from Heidel (1896) 62; cf. 69: 'From the character of our dialogue we should naturally expect to find the imitations of particular passages from the works of Plato quite numerous, as attesting its author's minute acquaintance with his original.' The most recent formulation (not an outright endorsement) of such an argument is Gribble (1999) 261: 'it is precisely this closeness that has led many to suspect it'.

<sup>13</sup> One example of this approach is Gregory Vlastos, *Studies in Greek philosophy* (Princeton 1993) 1 292 n. 91, who complains both of the many similarities of the *Alcibiades* to Plato ('a plethora of echoes and regurgitations'), and of its differences, contrasting in particular the 'extraordinary, and extraordinarily favourable picture' of Persian royal education in 121c–122a with the unfavourable picture in *Laws* 694c–695b.

both its similarities to writings agreed to be by Plato, and its differences from them, may be assumed to show that it was written by someone else, then defenders of authenticity cannot succeed; for absolutely every feature of the *Alcibiades* is either a similarity to, or a difference from, writings agreed to be by Plato. Those who attempt to deny authenticity on the basis of both assumptions at once have therefore got themselves a game that they are bound to win. But that game is not worth playing.

(iii) *Stylometric tests*

Stylometry compiles statistics about linguistic usage. The hope of some stylometricians has been to compile statistics capable of distinguishing the work of Plato from the work of others.<sup>14</sup> For certain tasks of this sort, it is easy to find reliable statistics. Suppose, for example, that we wanted a stylometric test to distinguish the work of Plato from the work of monkeys playing with word-processors. We could then program a computer to sort out the Plato from the rest by relying on the fact that a monkey is more likely than Plato to produce runs of six consecutive consonants. It will take a far subtler stylometric test to determine the authorship of the *Alcibiades*. For the

<sup>14</sup> There are extremely valuable treatments of Platonic stylometry and its history by Paul Keyser in *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 2 (1991) 423–7 and 3 (1992) 58–74. The former is a review of a particularly thorough stylometric investigation: G. R. Ledger, *Re-counting Plato: a computer analysis of Plato's style* (Oxford 1989). Ledger calculated, for Plato and some works by six other writers of Attic prose, the percentage of words containing at least one alpha, the percentage of words whose penultimate letter is omega, and 35 other such quantities. Ledger found that if he took all 37 quantities into account, Isocrates happened to stand out, and so did Isaeus, but there was not much of a distinction between other authors; by ignoring all save 10 of these quantities, he was able to distinguish well between Xenophon and Plato, but the distinction between Isaeus and Isocrates was lost (115). Ledger's verdict on the *Alcibiades* was 'It seems astonishing that, if this work is spurious, the author should have had such success in matching the Platonic style as to be closer in many instances to genuine works than they are to each other' (144). Ledger, like other stylometricians, was interested not only in authenticity, but also in dating: on the basis of his stylometric tests, he dated the *Alcibiades* to the 390s (218).

alternative authors between which the test must distinguish are not Plato and a monkey, nor even Plato and someone whose style approximates to Plato's in the manner of the 'bastard' dialogues, but Plato and someone whose work was so similar that it managed to pass for centuries as the work of Plato himself. Can any stylometric test be relied on to make so subtle a distinction?

Some stylometric features belong to what we might call style in the narrow sense of the term. Such a feature helps give alert readers their impression of what they actually call the style in which a text is written. For example, alert readers can perceive that a text is written in a jerky style marked by lots of short sentences; stylometry can measure just how short the sentences are. Features of this kind can be varied at will by skilful stylists. In respect of such features at least, we have little reason to assume that Plato's writing will be homogeneous, and even less to think that it will be inimitable by a stylist as skilful as any imitator who produced the *Alcibiades* would have had to be, to produce so close a likeness. In consequence, we cannot determine the authorship of the *Alcibiades* by compiling statistics about such features.

Other stylometric features make no impression on the perceptions of an alert reader. An example is the ratio of sentences containing a pair of alphas between which is an even number of iotas, to sentences containing a pair of etas between which is an odd number of taus. Such a feature will not be noticed and controlled even by careful stylists; for no author is going to think that a ratio of about 0.85 has become an irritating mannerism that must be abandoned, and no imitator is going to think this ratio a distinctive mannerism that must be copied. It is therefore stylometric features of this kind that would have to be invoked in any stylometric test to decide whether Plato or an ingenious imitator wrote the *Alcibiades*.

There are enormously many stylistic features of this kind. Just think of the changes that could be rung on the alpha/iota/eta/tau measurement alone. How are we to tell which, if any, of these features can be used to settle the authorship of the *Alcibiades*? The difficulty here is that we cannot rely on our intuitive sense of what is characteristically Platonic; for if something strikes us as characteristically Platonic, then it is likely to have struck an ingenious imitator

also as characteristically Platonic, and therefore to have been imitated. The only features usable in a stylometric test to settle the authorship of the *Alcibiades* will therefore not seem, to our uninstructed intuition, at all relevant to the distinction between genuine Plato and plausible pastiche; until we can instruct our intuition, any feature that is in fact usable will look indistinguishable from features whose presence or absence is entirely meaningless.

There is one straightforward technique for going beyond the deliverances of uninstructed intuition. We might find that a stylometric feature is present in some but not all works agreed to be by Plato; and in such a case, we will learn that nothing can be shown about the authenticity of the *Alcibiades* from its having or lacking the feature. This technique, however, can show only that a feature is *not* usable in a test of authenticity. It cannot show that a feature *is* usable; for even if a feature is found to be present in all works agreed to be by Plato, that may be no more than coincidence. Indeed, since there are so many stylometric features, we should expect there to be such coincidences if the presence or absence of these features is entirely accidental. Moreover, even if the presence of a feature in all works agreed to be by Plato is no coincidence, it may be present in them all for some reason other than that they are all by Plato himself, rather than an ingenious imitator. The reason might be, for example, that they are all mature works, rather than juvenilia; or again, that they are all written in Attic, rather than Doric. How are we to rule out such possibilities, and establish that a feature found in all works agreed to be by Plato can be used to distinguish genuine Plato from plausible pastiche?

Suppose we had large supplies, both of what we knew to be genuine Plato, and of what we knew to be Platonic pastiche so plausible that, like the *Alcibiades*, it was capable of passing unchallenged for centuries as the real thing. With such supplies, we could validate a stylometric test for distinguishing genuine Plato from plausible pastiche. For we could check that the test was persistently successful at drawing the distinction in case after case where we already knew how to draw it. In such circumstances, even if we still did not understand why the test was working, we could become ever more confident that it would continue to work when applied to the *Alcibiades*. This per-

sistent success is the only thing that could validate our test. For nothing else could show that the seemingly meaningless features used in the test are in fact more meaningful than they seem. Yet this, the only way of validating our test, is not open to us. For we do not have, and never will have, adequate supplies of what we know to be thoroughly plausible pastiche of Plato. Indeed, it is far from clear that we have adequate supplies of what we know to be genuine Plato; for if antiquity went wrong in ascribing the *Alcibiades* to Plato, then it is far from clear when we should trust its ascription to Plato of other works. And so, whatever their other interest, stylometric studies cannot tell us whether or not Plato wrote the *Alcibiades*.

(iv) *The standard chronology of Plato's dialogues*

The most serious difficulty for defenders of the authenticity of the *Alcibiades* is the difficulty of fitting the dialogue into what is nowadays the most widely accepted account of Plato's literary career. This account begins from the fact that the dialogues of Plato fall into three clusters. The *Euthyphro* would be a typical member of the first cluster. Such dialogues are usually short, simple and easy to read; in them Socrates typically discusses some ethical question with an interlocutor whom he reduces to bafflement or ἀπορία. Next is a cluster of which the *Phaedo* would be typical. Dialogues in this cluster are more ambitious in all sorts of ways: they are longer; they often use more sophisticated literary devices like extended myths, and conversations presented within the frame of other conversations; they discuss not only ethics but other subjects too; and they have Socrates expounding some positive doctrines rather than merely baffling his interlocutors. The *Sophist* would be typical of the last cluster. Such dialogues are without the literary charm of those in the first and second clusters; their manner can be extremely didactic; the dialogue structure often has the air of being a mere formality; Socrates often has only a small part, and sometimes no part at all; the argument can get extremely knotty and austere.

These three clusters are moreover not solely a matter of the broad stylistic features we have been listing; for they correlate also with some subtler features traceable by stylometry. For example, in the



306 pages of the first cluster, only once does someone give the eager response τί μὴν; ('Why, of course'); people do this frequently in the second cluster (about once every 13 pages), and very frequently in the third (about once every 8). With ἢ οὐ; ('Isn't that so?'), prodding people to assent to a point that has just been put, the position is the opposite: it is very frequent in the first cluster (about once every 10 pages), fairly frequent in the second (about once every 23), and rare in the third (about once every 205). As for the one-word sentence δῆλον ('Yes, obviously'), this is at its most frequent in the second cluster (about once every 24 pages); it occurs rarely in the third (about once every 93), and not at all in the first.<sup>15</sup>

The most widely accepted account of Plato's literary and philosophical career says that these clusters are not only stylistic, but also chronological. Plato's career, on this account, fell into three phases: in the first, he wrote the dialogues in the first cluster (the 'early dialogues'); he then wrote (in his 'middle period') the dialogues in the second cluster; and only after this did he start on the dialogues in the third and final cluster (the 'late dialogues'). This standard chronology is moreover, as befits its origins in the nineteenth century, linked with a theory about the progress, growth, evolution or development of Plato's thought, from its simple beginnings to its complex final form. The link is made by the assumption that, when Plato wrote a dialogue, he expressed in it the main themes of his then current philosophical thought: the narrowly ethical focus, for example, of dialogues in the first cluster is, on this assumption, due to their being written at dates when Plato was not having thoughts about any subject other than ethics. All these dates, the developmental theory goes, would have been early in Plato's career; for once he started to think about other subjects too, he would have started to write dialogues about them, and (a point that distinguishes the developmental theory from the incontestable assumption that, over a long life, Plato

<sup>15</sup> Pages here are pages of Stephanus' edition of Plato. The averages have been computed from figures given in Leonard Brandwood, *The chronology of Plato's dialogues* (Cambridge 1990) 58–9. The assignment of dialogues to the three clusters is that which *HGP* iv 50 says 'may be taken as representative of the generally accepted conclusions'.

would have changed) he would never have gone back to thinking and writing in the simpler manner of his earlier work.<sup>16</sup>

If this account of Plato's literary career is correct, when could he have written the *Alcibiades*? There is no satisfactory answer. The *Alcibiades* has affinities to each of the three clusters. For example, in the manner of an 'early' dialogue, 106c–116e represents Socrates reducing an interlocutor to bafflement by relentless questioning about ethics. This passage contains seven of the dialogue's eight occurrences of the 'early' ἦ οὐ;, but not a single occurrence of the 'middle' one-word sentence δῆλον, or the 'late' τί μήν; Socrates' long bravura display at 121a–124b is akin rather to his occasional extended performances in the dialogues of the 'middle period'. After this bravura display, the dialectic resumes, and proceeds far more rapidly and productively than before. It soon shifts into a style that is 'middle', or even 'late'. This passage contains both of the dialogue's occurrences of the 'middle' δῆλον, and all of its five occurrences of the 'late' τί μήν; Moreover, Socrates here expounds some positive metaphysical doctrines in an austere didactic style (128a–130c, 132c–133c). For reasons of this kind, the *Alcibiades* does not fit into any of the three periods in which Plato wrote, according to the standard chronology. Indeed, since it would straddle all three periods, it cannot even, like the *Meno* and the *Parmenides*, be dated at the turning point between two of them. So if the standard chronology is correct, then the *Alcibiades* is, in part or in whole, bogus.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> See Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates: ironist and moral philosopher* (Cambridge 1991) 45–106 for an authoritative developmentalist account of differences between 'early' and 'middle' dialogues. At the heart of these differences, Vlastos sets Plato's acquisition of beliefs in the eternity of the soul, and in transcendent Forms (126a5–6n., 129b1n.). There is no comparably authoritative developmentalist account of the transition from 'middle' to 'late' dialogues. This is because there is no sharp consensus on what modifications to the philosophy of the middle period are required by the objections to it that Socrates encounters in the *Parmenides* (at, oddly enough, the supposed outset of his intellectual career).

<sup>17</sup> Perhaps only in part, because the standard chronology is consistent with the suggestion of Clark (1955) 240 that Theaetetus, or some other close associate of Plato's, well read in his 'early' and 'middle' works, wrote the first two-thirds of the *Alcibiades*, and then died, leaving the dialogue to be completed by Plato himself, in his 'late' period.

If the standard chronology is correct ... But is it? Chronologies based on a supposed pattern of progressive development from simple to sophisticated are much more hazardous than they looked in their nineteenth-century heyday.<sup>18</sup> In any case, since the standard chronology for Plato was not itself formulated until the late nineteenth century, after the *Alcibiades* had been excluded from the canon of Plato's authentic works, we cannot, without begging the question, simply assume the correctness of the standard chronology in an argument to show that the *Alcibiades* deserves to be excluded. Moreover, there is no positive reason to believe the standard chronology correct. The three clusters into which it divides Plato's dialogues are indeed genuine enough. It is, for example, no accident that dialogues like the *Euthyphro* make splendid set texts for beginners, that those like the *Phaedo* are ideal for somewhat more advanced students, and that those like the *Sophist* are better not approached until later still in a student's education. But the fact that Plato's works are best approached in a certain order does nothing to show that this was the order in which they were written. We have not the slightest reason to believe that, for example, only during one period of his career, the 'middle period', was Plato able to write in the manner of the second cluster of dialogues, and that during this period he was unable to write in the manners of the first and the third. On the contrary, we know from the variety displayed within the *Symposium* that Plato had a command of many different manners when he wrote that dialogue. We may infer that at other times, too, he had such a command and might readily have used it.<sup>19</sup> And in

<sup>18</sup> See A. F. Garvie, *Aeschylus' Supplices: play and trilogy* (Cambridge 1969). The *Supplices* is in various ways the simplest play of Aeschylus to survive. For this reason, it was taken to be the earliest. Then a notice of its first production was discovered, and this proved the developmentalist dating to be wildly wrong.

<sup>19</sup> Not everyone would agree. Here is *CCP* 113, on a suggestion that late in life Plato might so have used his control over how often he admitted hiatus (a word ending with a vowel, followed immediately by a word starting with one) that we cannot, from statistics about hiatus, draw inferences about dating: 'This is to attribute to an elderly philosopher a fickle attitude, which is hardly compatible with the character of one who in his works emphasizes the importance of rational, consistent behaviour.' In other words, rationality requires us to make it easy to date our writings by their style.

any case, even if Plato had no more control over his manner of writing than he had over the seasons, that still would not make similarity of manner mean similarity of date; for two winters can be many years apart. We therefore have good reason to doubt that, in Plato's works, the manner in which they are written correlates with their date of composition. Hence we may reject the argument that the *Alcibiades* contains indications of too many different dates to be genuine.

There remains the question: why should Plato have wished to mix in the *Alcibiades* elements of all three different literary manners? There is a simple and obvious answer. Plato wished to show Socrates taking Alcibiades from his original and quite unphilosophical condition to a condition in which he is prepared, at least for the moment, to do some fairly serious philosophising. These intellectual changes in Alcibiades, and in the sorts of conversation he is able to cope with, are reflected in the changes of literary manner, from 'early', through 'middle', to 'late'.

(v) *The difference that authenticity makes*

If the *Alcibiades* is authentically Platonic, then we need of course to abandon the conceptions, or misconceptions, of it and of Plato that made it seem bogus. These conceptions often concern small details. When they do, they have been treated piecemeal in the commentary. The result is some notes of a length that might otherwise have been unnecessary, and that would have been even longer if they had fully cited the scholars whose misconceptions occasioned them. Sometimes, however, these conceptions concern larger matters. Above all, just as the most considerable argument against the authenticity of the *Alcibiades* was that based on the standard chronology for Plato's dialogues, so too, the most considerable consequences of its authenticity are those for that chronology.

The standard chronology must, in large part, be abandoned, if we can no longer accept those elements of it which depend on the assumption that the threefold clustering of dialogues has developmental and chronological significance. We can of course still count ourselves as, for example, knowing (on the strength of the summary of *Republic* 369–472 in *Timaeus* 17c–19b) that much of the *Republic*

had certainly been conceived, and in all likelihood executed, before the *Timaeus* was finished. But we cannot, for example, combine this with the fact that the *Phaedo* belongs in the second cluster with the *Republic*, and thereupon infer that the *Phaedo* too came before the *Timaeus*.

Abandoning the standard chronology, and its associated theory of development, allows some changes to how we read Plato. We need no longer insist on dividing Plato's works into three bodies of literature, each tightly united internally, and sharply distinguished from the other two, by the philosophy that it is expounding. We are at liberty instead to treat the whole of Plato's works as more of a single body, all parts of which are loosely united with one another. We can in consequence allow more readily for philosophical diversity within a single cluster of dialogues. For example, we need not insist on being more puzzled by the contrasting attitudes to the immortality of the soul in *Symposium* 206a–208b and *Phaedrus* 245c–e (both 'middle' dialogues) than we are by the similar contrast between *Apology* 40c–42a and *Republic* 608c–611b (one 'early', one 'middle'). Likewise, we can allow more readily for philosophical similarity between different clusters. For example, when the 'early' *Euthyphro* 6e, the 'middle' *Republic* 540a, and the 'late' *Timaeus* 28a, all remark that Forms (126a5–6n., 129b1n.) are the *παρδείγματα*, or models, against which other things are to be assessed, we are at liberty to see a single conception of Forms behind the remark, even though the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* say several further things about Forms that are not said in the *Euthyphro*. In general, we need not suppose that what characters in a dialogue say about a topic is a full, or even a partial, report of Plato's own views about that topic at the time of writing. We therefore need not explain similarities or differences between dialogues by postulating continuities or changes in Plato's thought. We can allow that what Plato makes his characters say depends also or instead on who is being made to speak, to which audience, and with what motives; and we can attempt to explain in these terms the similarities and differences between his various works.<sup>20</sup> It should not however

<sup>20</sup> The commentary attempts to give such explanations in 106d4–5n. (on how Plato expresses the contrast between being taught by others and finding out for oneself), 106d6n. (on who might be expected to know the doctrine of

take acceptance of the *Alcibiades* to make us realise these things. For they are anyway implicit in the fact that Plato's philosophical works are dialogues, not diaries.

## 7. TEXTUAL TRANSMISSION

Our principal direct evidence for the text of the *Alcibiades* comes from six manuscripts of the entire work, written at various times between the ninth and the twelfth centuries, and apparently independent, both of one another, and of any other manuscript now surviving. In a few short passages there is further direct evidence, in the form of fragments from two more manuscripts of the entire work, written in the second century AD. In many passages, the direct evidence of these eight manuscripts is supplemented by indirect evidence: quotations and paraphrases of parts of the text, mainly in ancient commentaries and anthologies. The publications of Antonio Carlini, to which I owe my own knowledge of this evidence, report it all in full detail.<sup>21</sup> The present edition passes over in silence most of the variant readings to be found in our evidence, except when the text I have printed is more than usually likely to be inaccurate, and in a more than usually significant way. Even then, the evidence for the text is given in a ruthlessly summary form.

The following abbreviations are used in the notes at the foot of the text:

- D The only reading found in the manuscripts that provide our direct evidence for the text.

Recollection), 116b7n. (on whether or how 'getting good things' makes us happy), 117d8–9n. (on contrasts between opinion and ignorance), 120d12–e1n. (on who are naturally well-endowed), 129d4–5n. (on how familiar is the idea that the parts of the body are *ὄργανα* or tools), 129e8n. (on the contrast between using oneself and a soul using a body), 130d6n. (on when one seeks definitions), and 134e8–9n. (on the contrast between what one wants and what one thinks good).

<sup>21</sup> Carlini (1964) gives a full report of the six medieval manuscripts and the indirect evidence. Carlini also edited the fragments of the two ancient manuscripts in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini*, Part 1, Volume 1\*\*\* (Florence 1999) 33–40.

- d One of two or more readings found in the manuscripts that provide our direct evidence for the text.
- i A reading found in the quotations, or suggested by the paraphrases and allusions, that provide our indirect evidence for the text.
- c A reading found neither in our direct nor in our indirect evidence, but conjectured out of dissatisfaction with the readings found there.

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# ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ



# ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ

## ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ

Σ. ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἶμαί σε θαυμάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος **103**  
ἐραστής σου γενόμενος τῶν ἄλλων πεπαυμένων μόνος οὐκ  
ἀπαλλάττομαι, καὶ ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι δι' ὄχλου ἐγένοντό σοι  
διαλεγόμενοι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσεῖπον. τού-  
του δὲ τὸ αἷτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ τι δαιμόν- **5**  
ιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ. νῦν  
δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελήλυθα· εὖελπῖς **b**  
δ' εἰμὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιώσεσθαι αὐτό. σχεδὸν οὖν  
κατανενόηκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ σκοπούμενος ὥς πρὸς  
τοὺς ἐραστὰς ἔσχες· πολλῶν γὰρ γενομένων καὶ μεγα-  
λοφρόνων οὐδεὶς ὃς οὐχ ὑπερβληθεὶς τῷ φρονήματι ὑπὸ **5**  
σοῦ πέφευγεν. τὸν δὲ λόγον, ὦι ὑπερπεφρόνηκας, ἐθέλω **104**  
διελθεῖν. οὐδενὸς φῆις ἀνθρώπων ἐνδεὴς εἶναι εἰς οὐδέν· τὰ  
γὰρ ὑπάρχοντά σοι μεγάλα εἶναι, ὥστε μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι,  
ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀρξάμενα τελευτῶντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν. οἶει  
γὰρ δὴ εἶναι πρῶτον μὲν κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος – καὶ **5**  
τοῦτο μὲν δὴ παντὶ δῆλον ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐ ψεύδῃ – ἔπειτα νεα-  
νικωτάτου γένους ἐν τῇ σεαυτοῦ πόλει, οὔσῃ μεγίστη  
τῶν Ἑλληνίδων, καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρὸς πατρός τέ σοι φίλους **b**  
καὶ συγγενεῖς πλείστους εἶναι καὶ ἀρίστους, οἱ εἴ τι δέοι  
ὑπηρετοῖεν ἄν σοι, τούτων δὲ τοὺς πρὸς μητρὸς οὐδὲν  
χείρους οὐδ' ἐλάττους. συμπάντων δὲ ὧν εἶπον μείζω οἶει **5**  
σοι δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου, ὃν ὁ πατήρ  
ἐπίτροπον κατέλιπε σοί τε καὶ τῷ ἀδελφῷ· ὃς οὐ μόνον ἐν  
τῇδε τῇ πόλει δύναται πράττειν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ἀλλ' ἐν  
πάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ μεγά-  
λοις γένεσιν. προσθήσω δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν πλουσίων· δοκεῖς δέ **c**  
μοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἥκιστα μέγα φρονεῖν. κατὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα  
σὺ τε μεγαλαυχούμενος κεκράτηκας τῶν ἐραστῶν ἐκεῖνοί τε  
ὑποδεέστεροι ὄντες ἐκρατήθησαν, καὶ σε ταῦτ' οὐ λέληθεν·  
ὅθεν δὴ εὔ οἶδα ὅτι θαυμάζεις τί διανοούμενός ποτε οὐκ **5**

ἀπαλλάττομαι τοῦ ἔρωτος, καὶ ἦντιν' ἔχων ἐλπίδα ὑπομένω τῶν ἄλλων πεφευγόντων.

- d** A. καὶ ἴσως γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι σμικρόν με ἔφθης. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι ἐν νῶι εἶχον πρότερός σοι προσελθὼν αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἐρέσθαι, τί ποτε βούλει καὶ εἰς τίνα ἐλπίδα βλέπων ἐνοχλεῖς με, ἀεὶ ὅπουπερ ἂν ὦ ἐπιμελέστατα  
**5** παρών· τῶι ὄντι γάρ θαυμάζω ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἡδιστ' ἂν πυθοίμην.

Σ. ἀκούσῃ μὲν ἄρα μου, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, προθύμως, εἴπερ, ὡς φῆις, ἐπιθυμεῖς εἰδέναι τί διανοοῦμαι; καὶ ὡς ἀκουσομένωι καὶ περιμενοῦντι λέγω;

- 10** A. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

- e** Σ. ὅρα δὴ· οὐ γάρ τοι εἴη ἂν θαυμαστὸν εἰ, ὥσπερ μόγισ ἡρξάμην, οὕτω μόγισ καὶ παυσάιμην.

A. ὠγαθὲ λέγε· ἀκούσομαι γάρ.

- Σ. λεκτέον ἂν εἴη. χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἄνδρα οὐχ  
**5** ἦττονα ἐραστῶν προσφέρεσθαι ἐραστῇ, ὅμως δὲ τολμητέον φράσαι τὴν ἐμὴν διάνοιαν. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, εἰ μὲν σε ἐώρων ἃ νυνδὴ διῆλθον ἀγαπῶντα καὶ οἰόμενον δεῖν ἐν τούτοις καταβιῶναι, πάλαι ἂν ἀπηλλάγμην τοῦ ἔρωτος,  
**105** ὡς γε δὴ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω· νῦν δ' ἔτερ' αὖ κατηγορήσω διανοήματα σὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν σέ, ὦι καὶ γνώσῃ ὅτι προσέχων γέ σοι τὸν νοῦν διατετέλεκα. δοκεῖς γάρ μοι, εἴ τίς σοι εἴποι θεῶν· “ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, πότερον βούλει ζῆν ἔχων ἢ νῦν ἔχεις,  
**5** ἢ αὐτίκα τεθνάναι εἰ μὴ σοι ἐξέσται μείζω κτήσασθαι;” δοκεῖς ἂν μοι ἐλέσθαι τεθνάναι· ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐπὶ τίνι δὴ ποτε ἐλπίδι ζῆις; ἐγὼ φράσω. ἡγῆι, ἐὰν θᾶπτον εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων  
**b** δῆμον παρέλθῃς – τοῦτο δ' ἔσεσθαι μάλα ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν – παρελθὼν οὖν ἐνδειξεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ἄξιος εἶ τιμᾶσθαι ὡς οὔτε Περικλῆς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐνδειξάμενος μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ  
**5** πόλει, ἐὰν δ' ἐνθάδε μέγιστος ᾦς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλληνσι, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐν Ἑλλησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρ-

104d4 ὅπουπερ i: ὅπου D      104d8 εἰδέναι i: εἰδέναι καὶ ἀκούσαι d: εἰδέναι ἀκούσαι d

βάροις, ὅσοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν ἡπείρωι. καὶ εἰ αὖ  
 σοι εἴποι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος θεὸς ὅτι αὐτοῦ σε δεῖ δυναστεύειν ἐν  
 τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, διαβῆναι δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν οὐκ ἐξέσται σοι **c**  
 οὐδὲ ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ πράγμασιν, οὐκ ἂν αὖ μοι δοκεῖς  
 ἐθέλειν οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτοις μόνοις ζῆν, εἰ μὴ ἐμπλήσεις τοῦ σοῦ  
 ὀνόματος καὶ τῆς σῆς δυνάμεως πάντας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν  
 ἀνθρώπους· καὶ οἷμαί σε πλήν Κύρου καὶ Ξέρξου ἡγεῖσθαι **5**  
 οὐδένα ἄξιον λόγου γεγονέναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχεις ταύτην τὴν  
 ἐλπίδα, εὖ οἶδα καὶ οὐκ εἰκάζω. ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποις, ἅτε  
 εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, “τί δὴ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐστί  
 σοι πρὸς λόγον;” ἐγὼ δὲ σοί γε ἐρῶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ Κλεινίου **d**  
 καὶ Δεινομάχης. τούτων γάρ σοι ἀπάντων τῶν δια-  
 νοημάτων τέλος ἐπιτεθῆναι ἄνευ ἐμοῦ ἀδύνατον· τοσαύτην  
 ἐγὼ δύναμιν οἶμαι ἔχειν εἰς τὰ σὰ πράγματα καὶ εἰς σέ, διὸ  
 δὴ καὶ πάλαι οἶομαί με τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἔαν διαλέγεσθαι σοι, **5**  
 ὃν ἐγὼ περιέμενον ὀπηνίκα ἑάσει. ὥσπερ γὰρ σὺ ἐλπίδας  
 ἔχεις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι αὐτῇ παντὸς ἄξιος εἶ, ἐν- **e**  
 δειζάμενος δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ παραυτίκα δυνήσεσθαι, οὕτω  
 καὶ γὰρ σοὶ ἐλπίζω μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐνδειζάμενος  
 ὅτι παντὸς ἄξιός εἰμὶ σοι καὶ οὔτε ἐπίτροπος οὔτε συγγενῆς  
 οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς παραδοῦναι τὴν δύναμιν ἧς ἐπι- **5**  
 θυμείς πλήν ἐμοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι. νεωτέρωι μὲν οὖν  
 ὄντι σοι καὶ πρὶν τοσαύτης ἐλπίδος γέμειν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ,  
 οὐκ εἶα ὁ θεὸς διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ μάτην διαλεγοίμην. νῦν **106**  
 δ' ἐφῆκεν· νῦν γὰρ ἂν μου ἀκούσαις.

Α. πολὺ γέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν ἀτοπώτερος αὖ  
 φαίνοι, ἐπειδὴ ἥρξω λέγειν, ἢ ὅτε σιγῶν εἶπου· καίτοι σφό-  
 δρα γε ἦσθ' ἰδεῖν καὶ τότε τοιοῦτος. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ταῦτα **5**  
 διανοοῦμαι ἢ μή, ὡς ἔοικε, διέγνωνκας, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ φῶ, οὐδὲν  
 μοι ἔσται πλέον πρὸς τὸ πείθειν σε. εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ ὅτι μά-  
 λιστα ταῦτα διανενόημαί, πῶς διὰ σοῦ μοι ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ  
 σοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο; ἔχεις λέγειν;

105d1 λόγον c: λόγον ὃν ἐφησθα ἐρεῖν, διὸ ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀπαλλάττηι D 105e1–  
 2 ἐνδείξασθαι . . . δυνήσεσθαι not in d 105e2 δὲ i: δὲ ὅτι d

- b** Σ. ἄρ' ἐρωτᾷς εἴ τιν' ἔχω εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρόν, οἷους δὴ ἀκούειν εἶθισαι; οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμόν· ἀλλ' ἐνδείξασθαι μὲν σοι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οἷός τ' ἂν εἶην ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, ἐὰν ἐν μόνον μοι ἐθέλῃς βραχὺ ὑπηρετῆσαι.
- 5** Α. ἀλλ' εἴ γε δὴ μὴ χαλεπὸν τι λέγεις τὸ ὑπηρετήμα, ἐθέλω.
- Σ. ἢ χαλεπὸν δοκεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα;
- Α. οὐ χαλεπόν.
- Σ. ἀποκρίνου δὴ.
- 10** Α. ἐρώτα.
- Σ. οὐκοῦν ὡς διανοοῦμένου σου ταῦτα ἐρωτῶ, ἃ φημί σε διανοεῖσθαι;
- c** Α. ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, οὕτως, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι καὶ ἐρεῖς.
- Σ. φέρε δὴ· διανοῇ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, παρίεναι συμβουλευέσων Ἀθηναίοις ἐντὸς οὐ πολλοῦ χρόνου· εἰ οὖν μέλλοντός σου ἵεναι ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα λαβόμενος ἐροίμην· “ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τίνος Ἀθηναῖοι διανοοῦνται βουλεύεσθαι, ἀνίστασαι συμβουλευέσων; ἄρ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ ὧν σὺ ἐπίστασαι βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι;” τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;
- d** Α. εἴποιμ' ἂν δήπου· “περὶ ὧν οἶδα βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι.”
- Σ. περὶ ὧν ἄρ' εἰδὼς τυγχάνεις, ἀγαθὸς σύμβουλος εἶ.
- Α. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
- Σ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μόνον οἶσθα, ἃ παρ' ἄλλων ἔμαθες ἢ
- 5** αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρες;
- Α. ποῖα γὰρ ἄλλα;
- Σ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἂν ποτε ἔμαθές τι ἢ ἐξηῦρες μῆτε μανθάνειν ἐθέλων μῆτ' αὐτὸς ζητεῖν;
- Α. οὐκ ἔστιν.
- 10** Σ. τί δέ; ἠθέλησας ἂν ζητῆσαι ἢ μαθεῖν ἃ ἐπίστασθαι ὦιον;
- Α. οὐ δῆτα.
- e** Σ. ἃ ἄρα νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, ἦν χρόνος ὅτε οὐχ ἡγοῦ εἰδέναι;

106b7 ἦ c: εἰ D, i



A. ἀνάγκη.

Σ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἅ γε μεμάθηκας σχεδόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα· εἰ δέ τι ἐμὲ λέληθεν, εἰπέ. ἔμαθες γὰρ δὴ σύ γε κατὰ μνήμην τὴν ἐμὴν γράμματα καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐλεῖν γε ἤθελες μαθεῖν. ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἅ σὺ ἐπίστασαι, εἰ μή πού τι μανθάνων ἐμὲ λέληθας· οἶμαι δέ γε, οὔτε νύκτωρ οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐξιών ἐνδοθεν.

A. ἀλλ' οὐ πεφοίτηκα εἰς ἄλλων ἢ τούτων.

10

Σ. πότερον οὖν, ὅταν περὶ γραμμάτων Ἀθηναῖοι βουλεύονται, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν, τότε ἀναστήσει αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσων;

A. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Σ. ἀλλ' ὅταν περὶ κρουμάτων ἐν λύραι;

5

A. οὐδαμῶς.

Σ. οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ περὶ παλαισμάτων γε εἰώθασι βουλεύεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίαι.

A. οὐ μέντοι.

Σ. ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος βουλεύονται; οὐ γάρ που ὅταν γε περὶ οἰκοδομίας.

A. οὐ δῆτα.

Σ. οἰκοδόμος γὰρ ταῦτά γε σοῦ βέλτιον συμβουλεύσει.

A. ναί.

b

Σ. οὐδὲ μὴν ὅταν περὶ μαντικῆς βουλεύονται;

A. οὔ.

Σ. μάντις γὰρ αὖ ταῦτα ἄμεινον ἢ σύ.

A. ναί.

5

Σ. ἐάν τέ γε σμικρὸς ἢ μέγας ᾖ, ἐάν τε καλὸς ἢ αἰσχρὸς, ἔτι τε γενναῖος ἢ ἀγεννής.

b7

A. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

b11

Σ. ἀλλ' ἐάντε πένης ἐάντε πλούσιος ᾖ ὁ παραινῶν, οὐδὲν διοίσει Ἀθηναίοις ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλεύονται, πῶς ἂν ὑγιαίνοιεν, ἀλλὰ ζητήσουσιν ἰατρὸν εἰ-  
ναι τὸν σύμβουλον.

c2

107b11–c2 πῶς . . . σύμβουλον after b7 ἀγεννής c: after b10 πλουτοῦντος D

- b8** A. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
Σ. εἰδότος γὰρ οἶμαι περὶ ἐκάστου ἢ συμβουλή, καὶ οὐ
- b10** πλουτοῦντος.
- c3** A. εἰκότως γε.  
Σ. ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος σκοπῶνται, τότε σὺ ἀνιστάμενος
- 5** ὡς συμβουλευσῶν ὀρθῶς ἀναστήσῃ;  
A. ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώκρατες.  
Σ. τῶν περὶ ναυπηγίας λέγεις, ὁποίας τινὰς χρή αὐτοῦς  
τάς ναῦς ναυπηγεῖσθαι;  
A. οὐκ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
- 10** Σ. ναυπηγεῖν γὰρ οἶμαι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. τοῦτ' αἴτιον ἢ  
ἄλλο τι;  
A. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.
- d** Σ. ἀλλὰ περὶ ποίων τῶν ἑαυτῶν λέγεις πραγμάτων  
ὅταν βουλευῶνται;  
A. ὅταν περὶ πολέμου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ περὶ εἰρήνης ἢ  
ἄλλου του τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων.
- 5** Σ. ἄρα λέγεις ὅταν βουλευῶνται πρὸς τίνας χρή εἰρήνην  
ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τίσιν πολεμεῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον;  
A. ναί.  
Σ. χρή δ' οὐχ οἷς βέλτιον;  
A. ναί.
- e** Σ. καὶ τόθ' ὁπότε βέλτιον;  
A. πάνυ γε.  
Σ. καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἄμεινον;  
A. ναί.
- 5** Σ. εἰ οὖν βουλεύοιντο Ἀθηναῖοι τίσιν χρή προσπαλαίειν  
καὶ τίσιν ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον, σὺ ἄμεινον ἢ  
συμβουλευοῖς ἢ ὁ παιδοτρίβης;  
A. ὁ παιδοτρίβης δήπου.  
Σ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν πρὸς τί ἂν βλέπων ὁ παιδοτρίβης
- 10** συμβουλεύσειεν οἷς δεῖ προσπαλαίειν καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὁπότε  
καὶ ὄντινα τρόπον; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ἄρα τούτοις δεῖ  
προσπαλαίειν οἷς βέλτιον, ἢ οὐ;

107e5 Ἀθηναῖοι d:] .. αν d      107e9 τί ἂν c: τί D

- A. ναί.  
 Σ. ἄρα καὶ τοσαῦτα ὅσα ἄμεινον; **108**  
 A. τοσαῦτα.  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε ὅτε ἄμεινον;  
 A. πάννυ γε.  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν αἰδοντα δεῖ κιθαρίζειν ποτὲ πρὸς 5  
 τὴν ὠιδὴν καὶ βαίνειν;  
 A. δεῖ γάρ.  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν τότε ὁπότε βέλτιον;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. καὶ τοσαῦθ' ὅσα βέλτιον; **10**  
 A. φημί.  
 Σ. τί οὖν; ἐπειδὴ βέλτιον μὲν ὠνόμαζες ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις,  
 τῷ τε κιθαρίζειν πρὸς τὴν ὠιδὴν καὶ τῷ προσπαλαίειν, τί **b**  
 καλεῖς τὸ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τὸ ἐν τῷ  
 παλαίειν καλῶ γυμναστικόν· σὺ δ' ἐκεῖνο τί καλεῖς;  
 A. οὐκ ἐννοῶ.  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐμὲ μιμεῖσθαι. ἐγὼ γάρ που ἀπεκρινάμην 5  
 τὸ διὰ παντὸς ὀρθῶς ἔχον, ὀρθῶς δὲ δήπου ἔχει τὸ κατὰ  
 τὴν τέχνην γιγνόμενον· ἢ οὐ;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. ἢ δὲ τέχνη οὐ γυμναστικὴ ἦν;  
 A. πῶς δ' οὐ; **10**  
 Σ. ἐγὼ δ' εἶπον τὸ ἐν τῷ παλαίειν βέλτιον γυμναστι- **c**  
 κόν.  
 A. εἶπες γάρ.  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς;  
 A. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. **5**  
 Σ. ἴθι δὴ καὶ σὺ – πρέποι γὰρ ἄν που καὶ σοὶ τὸ καλῶς  
 διαλέγεσθαι – εἶπε πρῶτον τίς ἡ τέχνη ἧς τὸ κιθαρίζειν καὶ  
 τὸ αἰδεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐμβαίνειν ὀρθῶς; συνάπασα τίς καλεῖται;  
 οὐπῶ δύνασαι εἰπεῖν;  
 A. οὐ δῆτα. **10**  
 Σ. ἀλλ' ὧδε πειρῶ· τίνες αἱ θεαὶ ὧν ἡ τέχνη;

108a5 τὸν αἰδοντα c: τὸ αἰδοντα d: αἰδοντα d

- A. τὰς Μούσας, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;
- d** Σ. ἔγωγε. ὅρα δὴ· τίνα ἅπ' αὐτῶν ἐπωνυμίαν ἢ τέχνην ἔχει;
- A. μουσικὴν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.
- Σ. λέγω γάρ. τί οὖν τὸ κατὰ ταύτην ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον
- 5** ἐστίν; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐγὼ σοι τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τὴν γυμναστικήν, καὶ σὺ δὴ οὖν οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τί φῆις; πῶς γίγνεσθαι;
- A. μουσικῶς μοι δοκεῖ.
- Σ. εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν βέλτιον καὶ
- e** τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην ἄγειν, τοῦτο τὸ βέλτιον τί ὀνομάζεις; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐφ' ἐκάστωι ἔλεγες τὸ ἄμεινον ὅτι μουσικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐτέρωι ὅτι γυμναστικώτερον, πειρῶ δὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα λέγειν τὸ βέλτιον.
- 5** A. ἀλλ' οὐ πάνυ τι ἔχω.
- Σ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρὸν γε εἰ μὲν τίς σε λέγοντα καὶ συμβουλευόντα περὶ σιτίων ὅτι βέλτιον τόδε τοῦδε καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσοῦτον, “ἐπειτα” ἐρωτήσκειν “τί τὸ ἄμεινον λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδης;” περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινότερον – καίτοι οὐ προσποιῇ γε ἰατρὸς εἶναι – περὶ δὲ οὗ
- 109** προσποιῇ ἐπιστήμων εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύσεις ἀνιστάμενος ὡς εἰδώς, τούτου δ', ὡς ἔοικας, πέρι ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ αἰσχυνῇ; ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανεῖται;
- 5** A. πάνυ γε.
- Σ. σκόπει δὴ καὶ προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν πρὸς τί τείνει τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην τε ἄγειν ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν οἷς δεῖ;
- A. ἀλλὰ σκοπῶν οὐ δύναμαι ἐννοῆσαι.
- Σ. οὐδ' οἶσθα, ἐπειδὴν πόλεμον ποιῶμεθα, ὅτι ἐγκα-
- 10** λοῦντες ἀλλήλοις πάθημα ἐρχόμεθα εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ ὀνομάζοντες ἐρχόμεθα;
- b** A. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἐξαπατῶμενοί τι ἢ βιαζόμενοι ἢ ἀποστερούμενοι.

108e2 τὸ ἄμεινον i: τῷ ἀμείνονι D  
εἶται d: φαίνεται d: φανεῖναι d

109a4 αἰσχυνῇ c: αἰσχύνῃ D φαν-

Σ. ἔχε· πῶς ἕκαστα τούτων πάσχοντες; πειρῶ εἰπεῖν τί διαφέρει τὸ ὦδε ἢ ὦδε.

Α. εἰ τὸ ὦδε ἢ ὦδε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δικαίως ἢ 5 ἀδίκως...

Σ. αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

Α. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε διαφέρει ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν.

Σ. τί οὖν; Ἀθηναίοις σὺ πρὸς ποτέρους συμβουλεύσεις πολεμεῖν, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἢ τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας; 10

Α. δεινὸν τοῦτό γε ἐρωτᾷς· εἰ γὰρ καὶ διανοεῖται τις ὡς 15 δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας πολεμεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειέν γε.

Σ. οὐ γὰρ νόμιμον τοῦθ', ὡς ἔοικεν.

Α. οὐ δῆτα. 5

Σ. οὐδέ γε καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι. πρὸς ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ σὺ τοὺς λόγους ποιήσῃ;

Α. ἀνάγκη.

Σ. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἡρώτων βέλτιον πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ μή, καὶ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ μή, τὸ 10 δικαιότερον τυγχάνει ὄν; ἢ οὐ;

Α. φαίνεται γε.

Σ. πῶς οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ; πότερον σαυτὸν λéléθας 15 ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο, ἢ ἐμὲ ἔλαθες μανθάνων καὶ φοιτῶν εἰς διδασκάλου ὅς σε ἐδίδασκε διαγιγνώσκειν τὸ δικαιοτέρον τε καὶ ἀδικώτερον; καὶ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος; φράσον καὶ ἐμοί, ἵνα αὐτῶι φοιτητὴν προξενήσῃς καὶ ἐμέ. 5

Α. σκώπτεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σ. μὰ τὸν Φίλιον τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σόν, ὃν ἐγὼ ἤκιστ' ἂν ἐπιπορκήσαιμι· ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔχεις, εἰπὲ τίς ἐστιν.

Α. τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; οὐκ ἂν οἶε με ἄλλως εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν 10 δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων;

Σ. ναί, εἴ γε εὐροῖς.

Α. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν εὐρεῖν με ἡγήῃ;

109b5 εἰ D, i: ἢ c ὦδε ἢ ὦδε c: ὦδε D 109b6 ἀδίκως i: τὸ ἀδίκως D  
109c6 σὺ c: σὺ τὸ δίκαιον d: σὺ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν d 109d7 μὰ D, i: οὐ  
μὰ i

- 5 Σ. καὶ μάλα γε, εἰ ζητήσῃς.  
 Α. εἴτα ζητῆσαι οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με;  
 Σ. ἔγωγε, εἰ οἰηθείης γε μὴ εἰδέναι.  
 Α. εἴτα οὐκ ἦν ὅτ' εἶχον οὕτως;
- 110 Σ. καλῶς λέγεις. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ὅτε οὐκ ὦιου εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα; φέρε, πέρυσιν ἐζήτεις τε καὶ οὐκ ὦιου εἰδέναι; ἢ ὦιου; καὶ ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα μὴ μάτην οἱ διάλογοι γίνωνται.
- 5 Α. ἀλλ' ὦιμην εἰδέναι.  
 Σ. τρίτον δ' ἔτος καὶ τέταρτον καὶ πέμπτον οὐχ οὕτως;  
 Α. ἔγωγε.  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρὸ τοῦ παῖς ἦσθα. ἦ γάρ;  
 Α. ναί.
- 10 Σ. τότε μὲν τοίνυν εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ὦιου εἰδέναι.  
 Α. πῶς εὖ οἶσθα;
- β Σ. πολλάκις σοῦ ἐν διδασκάλων ἤκουον παιδὸς ὄντος καὶ ἄλλοθι, καὶ ὁπότε ἀστραγαλίζοις ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ παιδιὰν παίζοις, οὐχ ὥς ἀποροῦντος περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ μάλα μέγα καὶ θαρραλέως λέγοντος περὶ ὅτου τύχοις
- 5 τῶν παίδων ὥς πονηρός τε καὶ ἄδικος εἶη καὶ ὥς ἀδικοῖ· ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω;  
 Α. ἀλλὰ τί ἔμελλον ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁπότε τίς με ἀδικοῖ;  
 Σ. σὺ δ' εἰ τύχοις ἀγνοῶν εἴτ' ἀδικοῖο εἴτε μὴ τότε, λέγ-
- 10 εις, τί σ' ἐχρῆν ποιεῖν;  
 c Α. μὰ Δι' ἀλλ' οὐκ ἠγνόουν ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἐγίνωσκον ὅτι ἡδικοῦμην.  
 Σ. ὦιου ἄρα ἐπίστασθαι καὶ παῖς ὢν, ὥς ἔοικε, τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα.
- 5 Α. ἔγωγε· καὶ ἠπιστάμην γε.  
 Σ. ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ ἐξευρών; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν ὧι γε ὦιου εἰδέναι.  
 Α. οὐ δῆτα.

110b10 σ' ἐχρῆν i: σε χρῆ D

110c6 ποίῳ i: ὁποίῳ D

Σ. πότε οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ἤγοῦ; σκόπει· οὐ γὰρ εὐρήσεις τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.

10

A. μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶσθα ἔχω γ' εἰπεῖν.

Σ. εὐρὼν μὲν ἄρ' οὐκ οἶσθα αὐτά.

d

A. οὐ πάνυ φαίνομαι.

Σ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄρτι γε οὐδὲ μαθὼν ἔφησθα εἰδέναι· εἰ δὲ μήθ' ἡὔρες μήτ' ἔμαθες, πῶς οἶσθα καὶ πόθεν;

A. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοῦτό σοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρινάμην, τὸ φά- 5  
ναι εἰδέναι αὐτὸς ἔξευρών.

Σ. τὸ δὲ πῶς εἶχεν;

A. ἔμαθον οἶμαι καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Σ. πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ἤκομεν λόγον. παρὰ τοῦ; φράζε-  
κάμοί.

10

A. παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν.

e

Σ. οὐκ εἰς σπουδαίους γε διδασκάλους καταφεύγεις εἰς  
τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναφέρων.

A. τί δέ; οὐχ ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι οὗτοι;

Σ. οὐκ οἶμαι τὰ πεττευτικά γε καὶ τὰ μή· καίτοι φαυλό- 5  
τερα αὐτὰ οἶμαι τῶν δικαίων εἶναι. τί δέ; σὺ οὐχ οὕτως  
οἶει;

A. ναί.

Σ. εἴτα τὰ μὲν φαυλότερα οὐχ οἶοί τε διδάσκειν, τὰ δὲ  
σπουδαιότερα;

10

A. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἄλλα γοῦν πολλὰ οἶοί τ' εἰσὶν δι-  
δάσκειν σπουδαιότερα τοῦ πεττεύειν.

Σ. ποῖα ταῦτα;

A. οἷον καὶ τὸ ἐλληνίζειν παρὰ τούτων ἔγωγ' ἔμαθον, 111  
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν ἑμαυτοῦ διδασκαλόν, ἀλλ' εἰς τοὺς  
αὐτοὺς ἀναφέρω οὓς σὺ φῆις οὐ σπουδαίους εἶναι διδασκά-  
λους.

Σ. ἀλλ', ὦ γενναῖε, τούτου μὲν ἀγαθοὶ διδασκαλοὶ οἱ 5  
πολλοί, καὶ δικαίως ἐπανόις ἂν αὐτῶν εἰς διδασκαλίαν.

110eg οἶοί τε i: οἶοι D 111a6 ἐπανόις ἂν αὐτῶν εἰς διδασκαλίαν c: ἐπαι-  
νοῖντ' ἂν αὐτῶν εἰς διδασκαλίαν d: ἐπαινοῖντ' ἂν αὐτὸν εἰς διδασκαλίαν d:  
ἐπαινοῖτ' ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ διδασκαλία i

A. τί δῆ;

Σ. ὅτι ἔχουσι περὶ αὐτὸ ἅ χρη τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς διδασκάλους ἔχειν.

10 A. τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

Σ. οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι χρη τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν ὅτιοὺν αὐτοὺς πρῶτον εἰδέναι; ἢ οὐ;

A. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Σ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς εἰδότας ὁμολογεῖν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ μὴ διαφέρεσθαι;

5 A. ναί.

Σ. ἐν οἷς δ' ἂν διαφέρωνται, ταῦτα φήσεις εἰδέναι αὐτούς;

A. οὐ δῆτα.

Σ. τούτων οὖν διδάσκαλοι πῶς ἂν εἶεν;

10 A. οὐδαμῶς.

Σ. τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοι διαφέρεσθαι οἱ πολλοὶ ποῖόν ἐστι

c λίθος ἢ ξύλον; καὶ ἐάν τινα ἐρωτᾷς, ἄρ' οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὁρμῶσιν ὅταν βούλωνται λαβεῖν λίθον ἢ ξύλον; ὡσαύτως καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τοιαῦτα· σχεδὸν γάρ τι μανθάνω τὸ ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις·  
5 ἢ οὐ;

A. ναί.

Σ. οὐκοῦν εἰς μὲν ταῦθ', ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀλλήλοις τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἰδίαι, καὶ δημοσίαι αἱ πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν αἱ μὲν ταῦθ' αἱ δ' ἄλλα

10 φάσκουσai;

A. οὐ γάρ.

Σ. εἰκότως ἂν ἄρα τούτων γε καὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶεν ἀγαθοί.

d A. ναί.

Σ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν βουλοίμεθα ποιῆσαί τινα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰδέναι, ὀρθῶς ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν εἰς διδασκαλίαν τούτων τῶν πολλῶν;

5 A. πάνυ γε.

Σ. τί δ' εἰ βουληθεῖμεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι ἄνθρωποι



εἰσιν ἢ ποῖοι ἵπποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν δρομικοὶ τε καὶ μῆ; ἄρ' ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦτο ἱκανοὶ διδάξαι;

Α. οὐ δῆτα.

Σ. ἱκανὸν δέ σοι τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστανται οὐδὲ κρήγυοι διδάσκαλοι εἰσιν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν;

Α. ἔμοιγε.

Σ. τί δ' εἰ βουληθεῖμεν εἰδέναι, μὴ μόνον ποῖοι ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ὅποιοι ὑγιεινοὶ ἢ νοσώδεις; ἄρ' ἱκανοὶ ἂν ἤμῃν ἦσαν διδάσκαλοι οἱ πολλοί;

Α. οὐ δῆτα.

Σ. ἦν δ' ἂν σοι τεκμήριον ὅτι μοχθηροὶ εἰσι τούτων διδάσκαλοι, εἰ ἑώρας αὐτοὺς διαφερομένους;

Α. ἔμοιγε.

Σ. τί δὲ δῆ; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσί σοι ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλοις;

Α. ἥκιστα νῆ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σ. τί δέ; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν διαφέρεισθαι;

Α. πολὺ γε.

Σ. οὐκ οἶμαι γε πώποτε σε ἰδεῖν οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι σφόδρα οὕτω διαφερομένους ἀνθρώπους περὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ μῆ, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἀποκτείνυναι ἀλλήλους.

Α. οὐ δῆτα.

Σ. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ἔγωγ' οἶδ' ὅτι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἑώρακας, ἀκήκοας γοῦν ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ Ὀμήρου· καὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας γὰρ καὶ Ἰλιάδος ἀκήκοας.

Α. πάντως δῆπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σ. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα ποιήματά ἐστι περὶ διαφορᾶς δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων;

Α. ναί.

Σ. καὶ αἱ μάχαι γε καὶ οἱ θάνατοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφώραν τοῖς τε Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Τρωσὶν ἐγένοντο, καὶ τοῖς μνηστῆρσι τοῖς τῆς Πηνελόπης καὶ τῷ Ὀδυσσεΐ.

Α. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σ. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Τανάγραι Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἀποθανοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον ἐν Κορωνεαῖσι, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ Κλεινίας ἐτελεύτησεν, οὐδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς ἄλλου ἢ διαφορὰ ἢ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου τοὺς θανάτους καὶ τὰς μάχας πεποίηκεν· ἦ γάρ;

Α. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

δ Σ. τούτους οὖν φῶμεν ἐπίστασθαι περὶ ὧν οὕτως σφόδρα διαφέρονται, ὥστε ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἀλλήλοις τὰ ἔσχατα σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐργάζονται;

Α. οὐ φαίνεται γε.

5 Σ. οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς τοιούτους διδασκάλους ἀναφέρεις οὕς ὁμολογεῖς αὐτὸς μὴ εἰδέναι;

Α. ἔοικα.

Σ. πῶς οὖν εἰκός σε εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, περὶ ὧν οὕτω πλανᾷ καὶ οὔτε μαθὼν φαίνει παρ' οὐδενὸς οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐξευρών;

10 Α. ἐκ μὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις οὐκ εἰκός.

ε Σ. ὁρᾷς αὖ τοῦθ' ὥς οὐ καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδης;

Α. τὸ ποῖον;

Σ. ὅτι ἐμὲ φῆις ταῦτα λέγειν.

Α. τί δέ; οὐ σὺ λέγεις ὥς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων;

Σ. οὐ μέντοι.

Α. ἀλλ' ἐγώ;

Σ. ναί.

Α. πῶς δῆ;

10 Σ. ὥδε εἴσῃ. ἐάν σε ἔρωμαι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ δύο πότερα πλείω ἐστί, φήσεις ὅτι τὰ δύο;

Α. ἔγωγε.

Σ. ποσῶι;

Α. ἐνί.

15 Σ. πότερος οὖν ἡμῶν ὁ λέγων ὅτι τὰ δύο τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐνὶ πλείω;

112e4 οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι i: συνεπίσταμαι D

- A. ἐγώ.  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἡρώτων, σὺ δ' ἀπεκρίνου;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. περὶ δὴ τούτων μὲν ἐγὼ φαίνομαι λέγων ὁ ἐρωτῶν, **113**  
 ἢ σὺ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;  
 A. ἐγώ.  
 Σ. τί δ' ἂν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔρωμαι ποῖα γράμματα Σωκράτους,  
 σὺ δ' εἴπηις, πότερος ὁ λέγων; **5**  
 A. ἐγώ.  
 Σ. ἴθι δὴ, ἐνὶ λόγῳ εἰπέ· ὅταν ἐρώτησίς τε καὶ ἀπό-  
 κρισις γίγνηται, πότερος ὁ λέγων, ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ὁ ἀποκρινό-  
 μενος;  
 A. ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. **10**  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν ἄρτι διὰ παντὸς ἐγὼ μὲν ἢ ὁ ἐρωτῶν; **b**  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. σὺ δ' ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;  
 A. πάννυ γε.  
 Σ. τί οὖν; τὰ λεχθέντα πότερος ἡμῶν εἴρηκεν; **5**  
 A. φαίνομαι μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων  
 ἐγώ.  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν ἐλέχθη περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὅτι Ἀλκι-  
 βιάδης ὁ καλὸς ὁ Κλεινίου οὐκ ἐπίσταιτο, οἷοιτο δέ, καὶ  
 μέλλοι εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἐλθὼν συμβουλευσεῖν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ **10**  
 ὧν οὐδὲν οἶδεν; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν;  
 A. φαίνεται. **c**  
 Σ. τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἄρα συμβαίνει, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη· σοῦ  
 τάδε κινδυνεύεις, οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι, οὐδ' ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ  
 ταῦτα λέγων, ἀλλὰ σὺ, ἐμὲ δὲ αἰτιᾷ μάτην. καὶ μέντοι καὶ  
 εὔ λέγεις. μανικὸν γὰρ ἐν νῶι ἔχεις ἐπιχείρημα ἐπιχειρεῖν, ὦ **5**  
 βέλτιστε, διδάσκειν ἃ οὐκ οἶσθα, ἀμελήσας μανθάνειν.  
 A. οἶμαι μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀλιγάκις Ἀθηναίους βου- **d**  
 λεύεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας πότερα δικαιότερα ἢ  
 ἀδικώτερα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἡγοῦνται δῆλα εἶναι, ἐά-  
 113a4 ἔρωμαι i: ἐρῶ καὶ D: ἐρωτῶ καὶ i 113b1 παντὸς d: παντὸς τοῦ  
 λόγου d

σαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὁπότερα συνοίσει πράξ-  
 5 ασιν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά οἶμαι ἐστὶν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμ-  
 φέροντα, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς δὴ ἐλυσιτέλησεν ἀδικήσασι μεγάλα  
 ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἑτέροις γε οἶμαι δίκαια ἐργασασμένοις οὐ  
 συνήνεγκεν.

e Σ. τί οὖν; εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἕτερα μὲν τὰ δίκαια τυγχάνει  
 ὄντα, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα, οὐ τί που αὖ σὺ οἶει ταῦτ'  
 εἰδέναι ἃ συμφέρει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δι' ὅτι;

5 Α. τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰ μὴ με αὖ ἐρήσῃ παρ'  
 ὅτου ἔμαθον ἢ ὅπως αὐτὸς ἤυρον.

Σ. οἷον τοῦτο ποιεῖς. εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις, τυγχάνει δὲ  
 δυνατόν ὃν ἀποδείξαι δι' οὐπερ καὶ τὸ πρότερον λόγου,  
 οἶει δὴ καινὰ ἅττα δεῖν ἀκούειν ἀποδείξεις τε ἕτερας, ὥς  
 τῶν προτέρων οἷον σκευαρίων κατατετριμμένων, καὶ οὐ-  
 10 κέτ' ἂν σὺ αὐτὰ ἀμπίσχοιο, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι τεκμήριον κα-  
 114 θαρὸν καὶ ἄχραντον οἴσῃ. ἐγὼ δὲ χαίρειν ἐάσας τὰς σὰς  
 προδρομὰς τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἥττον ἐρήσομαι πόθεν μαθὼν  
 αὖ τὰ συμφέροντ' ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος.  
 καὶ πάντ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερον ἐρωτῶ μιᾷ ἐρωτήσῃ. ἀλλὰ  
 5 γὰρ δῆλον ὥς εἰς ταῦτόν ἤξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις ἀποδείξαι οὐθ'  
 ὥς ἐξευρὼν οἴσθα τὰ συμφέροντα οὐθ' ὥς μαθὼν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ  
 τρυφᾷς καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν ἡδέως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσαιο λόγου,  
 τοῦτον μὲν ἔω χαίρειν, εἴτ' οἴσθα εἴτε μὴ τὰ Ἀθηναίοις συμ-  
 10 φέροντα· πρότερον δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντ' ἢ  
 ἕτερα, τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας; εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ  
 ἐγὼ σέ· εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξελθε.

Α. ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ οἷός τ' ἂν εἶην, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σέ  
 5 διελεῖν.

Σ. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, ἐμὲ ἐκκλησίαν νόμισον καὶ δῆμον· καὶ  
 ἐκεῖ τοί σε δεήσῃ ἕνα ἕκαστον πείθειν. ἦ γάρ;

Α. ναί.

c Σ. οὐκοῦν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνα τε οἷόν τε εἶναι κατὰ μόνας  
 πείθειν καὶ συμπόλλους περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῇ, ὥσπερ ὁ γραμμα-  
 τιστῆς ἕνα τε ἐπειθέν που περὶ γραμμάτων καὶ πολλούς;

114c3 τε ἐπειθέν που d: τέ που πείθει d: τε πείθει που d

Α. ναί.

Σ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς ἓνα τε καὶ πολ- 5  
λοὺς πείσει;

Α. ναί.

Σ. οὗτος δ' ἔσται ὁ εἰδώς, ὁ ἀριθμητικός;

Α. πάνυ γε.

Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ἄπερ καὶ πολλοὺς οἷός τε πείθεις εἷ, 10  
ταῦτα καὶ ἓνα;

Α. εἰκός γε.

Σ. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι ἂ οἶσθα.

Α. ναί.

Σ. ἄλλο τι οὖν τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν τῷ d  
δήμῳ ῥήτορος ὁ ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε συνουσίᾳ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀθ-  
ρόους πείθει τὰ αὐτά, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἓνα;

Α. κινδυνεύει.

Σ. ἴθι νῦν· ἐπειδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται πολλοὺς τε καὶ 5  
ἓνα πείθεις, ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐμμελέτησον καὶ ἐπιχείρησον ἐπιδείξαι  
ὡς τὸ δίκαιον ἐνίστε οὐ συμφέρει.

Α. ὑβριστὴς εἷ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σ. νῦν γοῦν ὑφ' ὕβρεως μέλλω σε πείθεις τάναντία οἷς 10  
σὺ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις.

Α. λέγε δή.

Σ. ἀποκρίνου μόνον τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

Α. μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς λέγε. e

Σ. τί δ'; οὐχ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλει πεισθῆναι;

Α. πάντως δήπου.

Σ. οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγεις ὅτι ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, μάλιστ' ἂν εἷης 5  
πεπεισμένος;

Α. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σ. ἀποκρίνου δή· καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς σὺ σαυτοῦ ἀκούσης  
ὅτι τὰ δίκαια καὶ συμφέροντά ἐστιν, ἄλλῳ γε λέγοντι μὴ  
πιστεύσης.

Α. οὔτοι, ἀλλ' ἀποκριτέον· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶομαι 10  
βλαβήσεσθαι.

Σ. μαντικός γὰρ εἷ. καὶ μοι λέγε· τῶν δικαίων φῆις ἓνια 115  
μὲν συμφέρειν, ἓνια δ' οὐ;

- A. ναί.  
 Σ. τί δέ; τὰ μὲν καλὰ αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δ' οὐ;  
**5** A. πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;  
 Σ. εἴ τις ἤδη σοι ἔδοξεν αἰσχροῖα μὲν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν.  
 A. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ;  
 A. ναί.  
**10** Σ. τί δ' αὖ τὰ καλὰ; πότερον πάντα ἀγαθὰ, ἢ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ' οὐ;  
 A. οἶομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνια τῶν καλῶν κακὰ εἶναι.  
 Σ. ἢ καὶ αἰσχροῖα ἀγαθὰ;  
**15** A. ναί.  
**b** Σ. ἄρα λέγεις τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πολλοὶ ἐν πολέμῳ βοηθήσαντες ἐταίρῳ ἢ οἰκείῳ τραύματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀπέθανον, οἱ δ' οὐ βοηθήσαντες, δέον, ὑγιεῖς ἀπῆλθον;  
 A. πάνυ μὲν οὔν.  
**5** Σ. οὐκοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σῶσαι οὓς ἔδει, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· ἢ οὐ;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. κακὴν δέ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ ἔλκη· ἢ γάρ;  
**10** A. ναί.  
**c** Σ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἢ ἀνδρεία, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ θάνατος;  
 A. πάνυ γε.  
 Σ. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ ταυτόν γ' ἐστὶ καλὸν καὶ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς φίλοις βοηθεῖν;  
**5** A. οὐ φαίνεται.  
 Σ. ὅρα τοίνυν εἰ, ἦι γε καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνταῦθα. κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν γὰρ ὡμολόγεις καλὸν εἶναι τὴν βοήθειαν· τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ σκόπει, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν; ὥδε δὲ σκόπει· πότερ' ἂν δέξαιό σοι εἶναι,  
**10** ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ;  
 A. ἀγαθὰ.  
**d** Σ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μέγιστα μάλιστα;

- A. μάλιστα.  
 Σ. καὶ ἥκιστα τῶν τοιούτων δέξαιο ἂν στέρεσθαι;  
 A. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
 Σ. πῶς οὖν λέγεις περὶ ἀνδρείας; ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ 5  
 δέξαιο στέρεσθαι;  
 A. οὐδὲ ζῆν ἂν ἐγὼ δεξαίμην δειλὸς ὢν.  
 Σ. ἔσχατον ἄρα κακῶν εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ δειλία.  
 A. ἔμοιγε.  
 Σ. ἐξ ἴσου τῷ τεθνάναι, ὥς ἔοικε. 10  
 A. φημί.  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν θανάτῳ τε καὶ δειλίᾳ ἐναντιώτατον ζῶῃ καὶ  
 ἀνδρείᾳ;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. καὶ τὰ μὲν μάλιστ' ἂν εἶναι βούλοιο σοι, τὰ δὲ e  
 ἥκιστα;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. ἄρ' ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄριστα ἡγήῃ, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα;  
 A. πάννυ γε. 5  
 Σ. ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄρα σὺ ἡγήῃ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι κἂν τοῖς  
 κακίστοις θάνατον;  
 A. ἔγωγε.  
 Σ. τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις, ἧ μὲν καλόν,  
 κατ' ἀγαθοῦ πράξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας, καλὸν αὐτὸ προσ- 10  
 εῖπας;  
 A. φαίνομαί γε.  
 Σ. κατὰ δὲ κακοῦ πράξιν τὴν τοῦ θανάτου κακόν;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν ὧδε δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἐκάστην τῶν 15  
 πράξεων· εἴπερ ἡ κακὸν ἀπεργάζεται κακὴν καλεῖς, καὶ ἡ  
 ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὴν κλητέον. 116  
 A. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.  
 Σ. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἡ ἀγαθὸν, καλόν· ἡ δὲ κακόν, αἰσχρόν;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. τὴν ἄρ' ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοήθειαν λέγων 5

115d2 A. μάλιστα c: not in D

115e5–7 πάννυ ... θανατόν i: not in D

καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακὴν δέ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἢ εἰ προσεῖπες αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μὲν, κακὴν δέ.

A. ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σ. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν καλῶν, καθ' ὅσον καλόν, κακόν, οὐδὲ  
**10** τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καθ' ὅσον αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν.

**b** A. οὐ φαίνεται.

Σ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὧδε σκέψαι. ὅστις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει;

A. ναί.

**5** Σ. οἱ δ' εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες;

A. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Σ. οὐκοῦν εὐδαίμονες δι' ἀγαθῶν κτήσιν;

A. μάλιστα.

Σ. κτῶνται δὲ ταῦτα τῷ εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν;

**10** A. ναί.

Σ. τὸ εὖ ἄρα πράττειν ἀγαθόν;

A. πῶς δ' οὐ;

Σ. οὐκοῦν καλὸν ἢ εὐπραγία;

A. ναί.

**c** Σ. ταῦτόν ἄρα ἐφάνη ἡμῖν πάλιν αὖ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν;

A. φαίνεται.

Σ. ὅτι ἂν ἄρα εὕρωμεν καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν εὐρήσομεν ἔκ  
**5** γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου;

A. ἀνάγκη.

Σ. τί δέ; τὰ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρει ἢ οὐ;

A. συμφέρει.

Σ. μνημονεύεις οὖν περὶ τῶν δικαίων πῶς ὠμολογήσα-  
**10** μεν;

A. οἶμαί γε τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας ἀναγκαῖον εἶ-  
 ναι καλὰ πράττειν.

Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθὰ;

A. ναί.

**d** Σ. τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρειν;

A. ναί.

Σ. τὰ δίκαια ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, συμφέροντά ἐστιν;



Α. ἔοικεν.

Σ. τί οὖν; ταῦτα οὐ σὺ ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁ ἐρωτῶν; **5**

Α. φαίνομαι, ὥς ἔοικα.

Σ. εἰ οὖν τις ἀνίσταται συμβουλευσων εἴτε Ἀθηναίοις εἴτε Πεπαρηθίοις, οἰόμενος γινώσκειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, φήσει δ' εἶναι τὰ δίκαια κακὰ ἐνίοτε, ἄλλο τι ἢ καταγελώης ἂν αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδήπερ τυγχάνεις καὶ σὺ λέγων **e** ὅτι ταῦτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντα;

Α. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε οὐδ' ὅτι λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι· τοτὲ μὲν γάρ μοι ἕτερα δοκεῖ σοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, τοτὲ δ' ἄλλα. **5**

Σ. εἴτα τοῦτο, ὦ φίλε, ἀγνοεῖς τὸ πάθημα τί ἐστιν;

Α. πάνυ γε.

Σ. οἶε ἂν οὖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῶι σε “δύο ὀφθαλμούς ἢ τρεῖς ἔχεις;” καὶ “δύο χεῖρας ἢ τέτταρας;” ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλα, ἢ **10** αἰεὶ τὰ αὐτά;

Α. δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγε ἤδη περὶ ἔμαντοῦ, οἴμαι μέντοι τὰ **117** αὐτά.

Σ. οὐκοῦν ὅτι οἶσθα; τοῦτ' αἵτιον;

Α. οἴμαι ἔγωγε.

Σ. περὶ ὧν ἄρα ἄκων τάναντία ἀποκρίνηι, δῆλον ὅτι **5** περὶ τούτων οὐκ οἶσθα.

Α. εἰκός γε.

Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ μὴ ἀποκρινόμενος φῆις πλανᾶσθαι; εἴτα οὐ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ **10** τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾷ;

Α. ἔμοιγε. **b**

Σ. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει· ἐπειδάν τις τι μὴ εἰδῇ, ἀναγκαιὸν περὶ τούτου πλανᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν;

Α. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Σ. τί οὖν; οἶσθα ὄντινα τρόπον ἀναβήσῃ εἰς τὸν οὐρ- **5** ανόν;

Α. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Σ. ἦ καὶ πλανᾶταί σου ἡ δόξα περὶ ταῦτα;

- A. οὐ δῆτα.
- 10 Σ. τὸ δ' αἴτιον οἶσθα ἢ ἐγὼ φράσω;  
A. φράσον.  
Σ. ὅτι, ὦ φίλε, οὐκ οἶει αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὐκ ἐπιστ-  
άμενος.
- c A. πῶς αὖ τοῦτο λέγεις;  
Σ. ὄρα καὶ σὺ κοινῇ. ἃ μὴ ἐπίστασαι, γιγνώσκεις δὲ ὅτι  
οὐκ ἐπίστασαι, πλανᾷ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; ὥσπερ περὶ ὄψου  
σκευασίας οἶσθα δήπου ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα;
- 5 A. πάνυ γε.  
Σ. πότερον οὖν αὐτὸς περὶ ταῦτα δοξάζεις ὅπως χρή  
σκευάζειν καὶ πλανᾷ, ἢ τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐπιτρέπεις;  
A. οὕτως.
- d Σ. τί δ' εἰ ἐν νηϊ πλείους; ἄρα δοξάζοις ἂν πότερον χρή  
τὸν οἶακα εἶσω ἄγειν ἢ ἔξω, καὶ ἅτε οὐκ εἰδὼς πλανῶιο ἂν,  
ἢ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἂν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοις;  
A. τῷ κυβερνήτῃ.
- 5 Σ. οὐκ ἄρα περὶ ἃ μὴ οἶσθα πλανᾷ, ἅνπερ εἰδήεις ὅτι  
οὐκ οἶσθα;  
A. οὐκ ἔοικα.  
Σ. ἐννοεῖς οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα ἐν τῇ πράξει διὰ  
ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιάν ἐστι, τὴν τοῦ μὴ εἰδότα οἶεσθαι εἰδέ-  
10 ναι;  
A. πῶς αὖ λέγεις τοῦτο;  
Σ. τότε που ἐπιχειροῦμεν πράττειν, ὅταν οἰώμεθα εἰδέ-  
ναι ὅτι πράττομεν;  
A. ναί.
- e Σ. ὅταν δέ γέ πού τινες μὴ οἶωνται εἰδέναι, ἄλλοις  
παραδιδόασιν;  
A. πῶς δ' οὐ;  
Σ. οὐκοῦν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μὴ εἰδόντων ἀναμάρτητοι  
ζῶσι διὰ τὸ ἄλλοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιτρέπειν;  
5 A. ναί.  
Σ. τίνες οὖν οἱ ἀμαρτάνοντες; οὐ γάρ που οἱ γε εἰδότες.  
A. οὐ δῆτα.

Σ. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐθ' οἱ εἰδότες οὐθ' οἱ τῶν μὴ εἰδόντων εἰ- **118**  
δότες ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν, ἢ ἄλλοι λείπονται ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες,  
οἰόμενοι δ' εἰδέναι;

Α. οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὗτοι.

Σ. αὕτη ἄρα ἡ ἄγνοια τῶν κακῶν αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονεί- **5**  
διστος ἀμαθία;

Α. ναί.

Σ. οὐκοῦν ὅταν ᾖ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα, τότε κακουργο-  
τάτη καὶ αἰσχίστη;

Α. πολύ γε. **10**

Σ. τί οὖν; ἔχεις μείζω εἰπεῖν δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ  
ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμφερόντων;

Α. οὐ δῆτα.

Σ. οὐκοῦν περὶ ταῦτα σὺ φῆις πλανᾶσθαι;

Α. ναί. **15**

Σ. εἰ δὲ πλανᾷ, ἄρ' οὐ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὅτι οὐ **b**  
μόνον ἀγνοεῖς τὰ μέγιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐκ εἰδὼς οἶει αὐτὰ εἰ-  
δέναι;

Α. κινδυνεύω.

Σ. βαβαῖ ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, οἷον πάθος πέπονθας· ὃ **5**  
ἐγὼ ὀνομάζειν μὲν ὀκνῶ, ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν,  
ῥητέον. ἀμαθία γὰρ συνοικεῖς, ὦ βέλτιστε, τῇ ἐσχάτῃ, ὥς  
ὁ λόγος σου κατηγορεῖ καὶ σὺ σαυτοῦ· διὸ καὶ αἵττις ἄρα  
πρὸς τὰ πολιτικά πρὶν παιδευθῆναι. πέπονθας δὲ τοῦτο οὐ  
σὺ μόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πραττόντων τὰ τῆσδε **10**  
τῆς πόλεως, πλὴν ὀλίγων γε καὶ ἴσως τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου **c**  
Περικλέους.

Α. λέγεται γέ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομά-  
του σοφὸς γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς καὶ σοφοῖς συγγεγονέ-  
ναι, καὶ Πυθοκλείδῃ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρῃ· καὶ νῦν ἔτι τηλι- **5**  
κοῦτος ὢν Δάμῳ συνέστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα.

Σ. τί οὖν; ἤδη τιν' εἶδες σοφὸν ὁτιοῦν ἀδυνατοῦντα  
ποιῆσαι ἄλλον σοφὸν ἅπερ αὐτός; ὥσπερ ὅς σε ἐδίδαξεν

118a5–6 αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία D: αἰτία c

- γράμματα, αὐτός τ' ἦν σοφὸς καὶ σὲ ἐποίησε τῶν τε ἄλλων  
**10** ὄντιν' ἐβούλετο· ἦ γάρ;  
 Α. ναί.
- d** Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ὁ παρ' ἐκείνου μαθὼν ἄλλον οἶός τε  
 ἔσῃ;  
 Α. ναί.  
 Σ. καὶ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδοτρίβης ὡσαύτως;  
**5** Α. πάνυ γε.  
 Σ. καλὸν γὰρ δήπου τεκμήριον τοῦτο τῶν ἐπισταμένων  
 ὅτιοῦν ὅτι ἐπίστανται, ἐπειδὴν καὶ ἄλλον οἶοί τ' ὥσιν  
 ἀποδείξαι ἐπιστάμενον.  
 Α. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
- 10** Σ. τί οὖν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν Περικλῆς τίνα ἐποίησεν σοφόν,  
 ἀπὸ τῶν ὑέων ἀρξάμενος;  
**e** Α. τί δ' εἰ τῷ Περικλέους ὑεῖ ἡλιθίῳ ἐγενέσθην, ὦ  
 Σώκρατες;  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ Κλεινίαν τὸν σὸν ἀδελφόν;  
 Α. τί δ' ἂν αὖ Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον;  
**5** Σ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν Κλεινίας μὲν μαινεται, τῷ δὲ Περικλέους  
 ὑεῖ ἡλιθίῳ ἐγενέσθην, σοὶ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀναθῶμεν, δι' ὅτι σὲ  
 οὕτως ἔχοντα περιορᾷ;  
 Α. ἐγὼ οἶμαι αἴτιος οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.
- 11g** Σ. ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων δοῦλον ἢ  
 ἐλεύθερον εἶπε ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συν-  
 ουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔχω σοι εἰπεῖν  
 διὰ τὴν Ζήνωνος Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου καὶ Καλλίαν  
**5** τὸν Καλλιάρχου, ὧν ἕκαστος Ζήνωνι ἑκατὸν μνᾶς τελέσας  
 σοφός τε καὶ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν.  
 Α. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔχω.  
 Σ. εἶεν· τί οὖν διανοῇ περὶ σαυτοῦ; πότερον ἔαν ὥς νῦν  
 ἔχεις, ἢ ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιῆσθαι;  
**b** Α. κοινὴ βουλή, ὦ Σώκρατες. καίτοι ἐννοῶ σου εἰπ-  
 όντος καὶ συγχωρῶ· δοκοῦσι γάρ μοι οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως  
 πράττοντες ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων ἀπαίδευτοί εἶναι.

11gb1 κοινή βουλή d, i: κοινή βουλή d

Σ. εἴτα τί δὴ τοῦτο;

Α. εἰ μὲν που ἦσαν πεπαιδευμένοι, ἔδεῖ ἂν τὸν ἐπιχειρ- 5  
οῦντα αὐτοῖς ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι μαθόντα καὶ ἀσκήσαντα ἴε-  
ναι ὡς ἐπ' ἀθλητάς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ οὗτοι ἰδιωτικῶς  
ἔχοντες ἐληλύθασιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, τί δεῖ ἀσκεῖν καὶ  
μανθάνοντα πράγματα ἔχειν; ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι τούτων  
τῇ γε φύσει πάνυ πολὺ περιέσομαι. c

Σ. βαβαῖ, οἶον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοῦτ' εἴρηκας· ὡς ἀνάξιον τῆς  
ιδέας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν σοι ὑπαρχόντων.

Α. τί μάλιστα καὶ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σ. ἀγανακτῶ ὑπὲρ τε σοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑμαυτοῦ ἔρωτος. 5

Α. τί δὴ;

Σ. εἰ ἡξίωσας τὸν ἀγῶνά σοι εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐνθάδε  
ἀνθρώπους.

Α. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τίνας μὴν;

Σ. ἄξιον τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἄνδρα οἰόμενον μεγα- d  
λόφρωνα εἶναι.

Α. πῶς λέγεις; οὐ πρὸς τούτους μοι ὁ ἀγών;

Σ. ἄρα κἄν εἰ τριήρη διενοοῦ κυβερνᾶν μέλλουσιν ναυ- 5  
μαχεῖν, ἥρκει ἂν σοι τῶν συνναυτῶν βελτίστῳ εἶναι τὰ κυ-  
βερνητικά, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν ὧιου ἂν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ἀπέβλεπες  
δ' ἂν εἰς τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνταγωνιστάς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς νῦν εἰς  
τοὺς συναγωνιστάς; ὧν δήπου περιγενέσθαι σε δεῖ τοσοῦ-  
τον ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καταφρονη- e  
θέντας συναγωνίζεσθαι σοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, εἰ δὴ τῷ  
ὄντι γε καλόν τι ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι διανοῇ καὶ ἄξιον  
σαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς πόλεως.

Α. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διανοοῦμαι γε. 5

Σ. πάνυ σοι ἄρα ἄξιον ἀγαπᾶν εἰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν  
βελτίων εἶ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἡγεμόνας  
ἀποβλέπειν ὅποτε ἐκείνων βελτίων γέγονας, σκοποῦντα  
καὶ ἀσκοῦντα πρὸς ἐκείνους;

Α. λέγεις δὲ τίνας τούτους, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σ. οὐκ οἶσθα ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις τε καὶ τῷ 120

119c5 σοῦ i: τοῦ σοῦ D

119e6 στρατιωτῶν D: συστρατιωτῶν c

μεγάλωι βασιλεῖ πολемоῦσαν ἐκάστοτε;

A. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

- 5 Σ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐν νῶι ἔχεις ἡγεμῶν εἶναι τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως, πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέας καὶ τοὺς Περσῶν τὸν ἀγῶνα ἡγούμενός σοι εἶναι ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡγοῖο;

A. κινδυνεύεις ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

- Σ. οὐκ, ὦγαθέ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Μειδίαν σε δεῖ τὸν ὀρτυγο-  
**b** κόπον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους – οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἔτι τὴν ἀνδραποδῶδη, φαῖεν ἂν αἱ γυναῖκες, τρίχα ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπ’ ἀμουσίας καὶ οὐπω ἀποβεβληκότες, ἔτι δὲ βαρβαρίζοντες ἐλη-  
 5 λύθασι κολακεύοντες τὴν πόλιν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄρξοντες – πρὸς τούτους σε δεῖ, οὐσπερ λέγω, βλέποντα σαυτοῦ δὴ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ μήτε μανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήσεως ἔχεται, μέλλοντα τοσοῦτον ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, μήτε ἀσκεῖν ὅσα δεῖται ἀσκήσεως,  
**c** καὶ πᾶσαν παρασκευὴν παρεσκευασμένον οὕτως ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως.

A. ἀλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς μὲν μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν, οἴμαι μέντοι τοὺς τε Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγοὺς καὶ τὸν Περσῶν  
 5 βασιλέα οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων.

Σ. ἀλλ’, ὦ ἄριστε, τὴν οἴσιν ταύτην σκόπει οἷαν ἔχεις.

A. τοῦ πέρι;

- Σ. πρῶτον μὲν ποτέρως ἂν οἶε σαυτοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπι-  
**d** μεληθῆναι, φοβούμενός τε καὶ οἰόμενος δεινούς αὐτοὺς εἶναι, ἢ μή;

A. δῆλον ὅτι εἰ δεινούς οἰοίμην.

Σ. μὴ οὖν οἶε τι βλαβήσεσθαι ἐπιμεληθεὶς σαυτοῦ;

- 5 A. οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὀνήσεσθαι.

Σ. οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῦτο τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔχει ἢ οἷσιν αὕτη;

A. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

- Σ. τὸ δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν εἰ-  
**io** κόντων σκέψαι.

120a9–b1 ὀρτυγοκόπον i: ὀρτυγοτρόφον D  
 d: σαυτοῦ d

120b6 σαυτοῦ δὴ c: σαυτοῦ δὲ

Α. πῶς δῆ;

Σ. πότερον εἰκὸς ἀμείνους γίγνεσθαι φύσεις ἐν γενναίοις  
γένεσιν ἢ μή; e

Α. δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς γενναίοις.

Σ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς εὖ φύντας, ἐὰν καὶ εὖ τραφῶσιν, οὕτω  
τελέους γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετήν;

Α. ἀνάγκη. 5

Σ. σκεψώμεθα δῆ, τοῖς ἐκείνων τὰ ἡμέτερα ἀντιτιθέντες,  
πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι φαυλοτέρων γενῶν εἶναι οἱ Λακε-  
δαιμονίων καὶ Περσῶν βασιλῆς. ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὥς οἱ μὲν Ἡρα-  
κλέους, οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιμένους ἔκγονοι, τὸ δ' Ἡρακλέους τε γένος  
καὶ τὸ Ἀχαιμένους εἰς Περσέα τὸν Διὸς ἀναφέρεται; 10

Α. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς Εὐρυσάκη, τὸ 121  
δ' Εὐρυσάκους εἰς Δία.

Σ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ γενναῖε Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἰς Δαί-  
δαλον, ὁ δὲ Δαίδαλος εἰς Ἥφαιστον τὸν Διός. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν  
τούτων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀρξάμενα βασιλῆς εἰσιν ἐκ βασιλέων 5  
μέχρι Διός, οἱ μὲν Ἄργους τε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνος, οἱ δὲ τῆς  
Περσίδος τὸ αἶι, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν·  
ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖ τε ἰδιῶται καὶ οἱ πατέρες. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς προ- b  
γόνους σε δέοι καὶ τὴν πατρίδα Εὐρυσάκους ἐπιδειῖσαι Σαλ-  
αμῖνα ἢ τὴν Αἰακοῦ τοῦ ἔτι προτέρου Αἰγιναν Ἄρτοξέρξη  
τῷ Ξέρξου, πόσον ἂν οἶι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν; ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ τοῦ  
τε γένους ὄγκῳ ἐλαττώμεθα τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ 5  
τροφῇ. ἢ οὐκ ἦισθησαι τοῖς τε Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῦσιν  
ὥς μεγάλα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ὧν αἱ γυναῖκες δημοσῖαι φυ-  
λάττονται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν μὴ λάθῃ ἐξ  
ἄλλου γενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἐξ Ἡρακλειδῶν; ὁ δὲ Περσῶν c  
τοσοῦτον ὑπερβάλλει, ὥστ' οὐδεὶς ὑποψίαν ἔχει ὥς ἐξ ἄλ-  
λου ἂν βασιλεὺς γένοιτο ἢ ἐξ αὐτοῦ· διὸ οὐ φρουρεῖται ἢ  
βασιλέως γυνὴ ἄλλ' ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου. ἐπειδὴν δὲ γένηται ὁ  
παῖς ὁ πρεσβύτατος, οὐπὲρ ἡ ἀρχή, πρῶτον μὲν ἐορτά- 5  
ζοῦσι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ βασιλεύῳ, ὧν ἂν ἄρχῃ, εἶτα εἰς

121b2 σε δέοι d, i: δέοι d

- τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ βασιλέως γενέθλια  
**d** πᾶσα θύει καὶ ἑορτάζει ἡ Ἀσία· ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τοῦ  
 κωμωιδοποιοῦ, οὐδ' οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα τι αἰσθάνονται, ὥ  
 Ἀλκιβιάδῃ. μετὰ τοῦτο τρέφεται ὁ παῖς, οὐχ ὑπὸ γυναικὸς  
 τροφοῦ ὀλίγου ἀξίας, ἀλλ' ὑπ' εὐνούχων οἱ ἂν δοκῶσιν  
 5 τῶν περὶ βασιλέα ἄριστοι εἶναι· οἷς τὰ τε ἄλλα προστέ-  
 ται ἐπιμέλῃσθαι τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστος  
 ἔσται μηχανᾶσθαι, ἀναπλάττοντας τὰ μέλη τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ  
**e** κατορθοῦντας· καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες ἐν μεγάλῃ τιμῇ εἰσιν.  
 ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐπτέτεις γένωνται οἱ παῖδες, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ  
 ἐπὶ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους φοιτῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θήρας  
 ἄρχονται ἰέναι. δις ἐπτά δὲ γενόμενον ἑτῶν τὸν παῖδα πα-  
 5 ραλαμβάνουσιν οὓς ἐκεῖνοι βασιλείους παιδαγωγοὺς ὀνο-  
 μάζουσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ἐξειλεγμένοι Περσῶν οἱ ἄριστοι δόξαντες  
 ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τέτταρες, ὃ τε σοφώτατος καὶ ὁ δικαιοτάτος καὶ  
**122** ὁ σωφρονέστατος καὶ ὁ ἀνδρειότατος. ὧν ὁ μὲν μαγείαν τε  
 διδάσκει τὴν Ζωροάστρου τοῦ Ὡρομάζου – ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο  
 θεῶν θεραπεία – διδάσκει δὲ καὶ τὰ βασιλικά, ὁ δὲ δικαιο-  
 τος ἀληθεύειν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ὁ δὲ σωφρονέστατος  
 5 μὴδ' ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἄρχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἵνα ἐλεύθερος εἶναι  
 ἐθίζηται καὶ ὄντως βασιλεύς, ἄρχων πρῶτον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ  
 ἀλλὰ μὴ δουλεύων, ὁ δὲ ἀνδρειότατος ἄφοβον καὶ ἀδεᾶ  
 παρασκευάζων, ὥς ὅταν δείσῃ δοῦλον ὄντα· σοὶ δ', ὦ Ἀλ-  
**b** κιβιάδῃ, Περικλῆς ἐπέστησε παιδαγωγὸν τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸν  
 ἀχρειότατον ὑπὸ γήρως, Ζώπυρον τὸν Θραῖκα. διήλθον δὲ  
 καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἂν σοι τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν τροφήν τε καὶ  
 παιδείαν, εἰ μὴ πολὺ ἔργον ἦν καὶ ἅμα ταῦθ' ἱκανὰ  
 5 δηλῶσαι καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα· τῆς δὲ σῆς γεν-  
 έσεως, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας, ἡ ἄλλου  
 ὁτουοῦν Ἀθηναίων, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδενὶ μέλει, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις  
 ἐραστὴς σου τυγχάνει ὧν. εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθέλεις εἰς πλούτους  
**c** ἀποβλέψαι καὶ τρυφὰς καὶ ἐσθῆτας ἱματίων θ' ἔλξεις καὶ  
 μύρων ἀλοιφὰς καὶ θεραπόντων πλήθους ἀκολουθίας τήν τε

121e4 γεόμενον i: γεομένων D

122b8 ἐθέλεις d, i: ἐθέλοις d: ἐθέλης i



ἄλλην ἀβρότητα τὴν Περσῶν, αἰσχυρθείης ἂν ἐπὶ σεαυτῷ,  
 αἰσθόμενος ὅσον αὐτῶν ἐλλείπεις. εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθελήσεις εἰς  
 σωφροσύνην τε καὶ κοσμιότητα ἀποβλέψαι καὶ εὐχέρειαν **5**  
 καὶ εὐκολίαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν καὶ ἀν-  
 δρείαν καὶ καρτερίαν καὶ φιλοποनीαν καὶ φιλονικίαν καὶ φι-  
 λοτιμίαν τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων, παῖδ' ἂν ἡγήσαιο σαντὸν  
 πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. εἰ δ' αὖ τι καὶ πλούτῳ προσέχεις καὶ **d**  
 κατὰ τοῦτο οἶε τι εἶναι, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἄρρητον ἔστω, ἕαν  
 πως αἴσθηι οὐ εἶ. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλεις εἰς τοὺς Λακε-  
 δαιμονίων πλούτους ἰδεῖν, γνώσῃ ὅτι πολὺ τάνθάδε τῶν  
 ἐκεῖ ἐλλείπει· γῆν μὲν γὰρ ὅσῃν ἔχουσιν τῆς θ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ **5**  
 Μεσσηνίας, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἀμφισβητήσῃε τῶν τῆιδε πλήθει οὐδ'  
 ἄρετῇ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀνδραπόδων κτήσει τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν  
 εἰλωτικῶν, οὐδὲ μὴν ἵππων γε, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα βοσκήματα  
 κατὰ Μεσσηνίην νέμεται. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἐὼ χαίρειν, **e**  
 χρυσίον δὲ καὶ ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσιν Ἑλλήσιν ὅσον  
 ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἰδίαι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἤδη γενεὰς εἰσέρχεται μὲν  
 αὐτόσε ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν  
 βαρβάρων, ἐξέρχεται δὲ οὐδαμόσε, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥς κατὰ **123**  
 τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον ἢ ἀλώπηξ πρὸς τὸν λέοντα εἶπεν, καὶ  
 τοῦ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα νομίσματος εἰσιόντος μὲν τὰ ἵχνη τὰ  
 ἐκεῖσε τετραμμένα δῆλα, ἐξιόντος δὲ οὐδαμῇ ἂν τις ἴδοι.  
 ὥστε εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ χρυσῷ καὶ ἀργύρῳ οἱ ἐκεῖ **5**  
 πλουσιώτατοί εἰσιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ὁ  
 βασιλεύς· ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων μέγιστα λήψεις καὶ  
 πλεῖσταί εἰσι τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ βασιλικὸς φόρος  
 οὐκ ὀλίγος γίγνεται, ὃν τελοῦσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς βασ- **b**  
 ιλεῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ὥς πρὸς Ἑλληνικοὺς  
 μὲν πλούτους μεγάλα, ὥς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Περσικοὺς καὶ τοῦ  
 ἐκείνων βασιλέως οὐδέν. ἐπεὶ ποτ' ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀξιο-  
 πίστου τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων παρὰ βασιλέα, ὃς ἔφη παρ- **5**  
 ελθεῖν χώραν πάνυ πολλὴν καὶ ἀγαθὴν, ἐγγὺς ἡμερησίαν

122c4 ἐθελήσεις i: ἐθελήσεις D      122d3-4 ἐθέλεις εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων  
 πλούτους ἰδεῖν c: ἐθέλεις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων πλούτους ἰδεῖν D: ἐθέλεις ἰδεῖν c  
 123a1 ἀτεχνῶς ὥς c: ἀτεχνῶς D      123a2 μῦθον c: μῦθον ὃν D

- ὁδόν, ἣν καλεῖν τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ζώνην τῆς βασιλέως γυ-  
 ναικός· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἣν αὖ καλεῖσθαι καλύπτραν, καὶ  
 ἄλλους πολλοὺς τόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον  
 ἐξηρημένους τὸν τῆς γυναικός, καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχειν ἐκάστους  
 τῶν τόπων ἀπὸ ἐκάστου τῶν κόσμων. ὥστ' οἶμαι ἐγώ, εἴ  
 τις εἴποι τῇ βασιλέως μητρί, Ξέρξου δὲ γυναικί, Ἀμή-  
 στριδι, ὅτι “ἐν νῶι ἔχει σοῦ τῶι ὑεῖ ἀντιτάττεσθαι ὁ Δεινο-  
 μάχης υἱός, ἣ ἔστι κόσμος ἴσως ἄξιος μνῶν πεντήκοντα εἰ  
 πάνυ πολλοῦ, τῶι δ' ὑεῖ αὐτῆς γῆς πλέθρα Ἐρχίασιν οὐδὲ  
 τριακόσια”, θαυμάσαι ἂν ὅτῳ ποτε πιστεύων ἐν νῶι ἔχει  
 οὗτος ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τῶι Ἄρτοξέρξῃ διαγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ  
 οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ πιστεύων  
 οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπιχειρεῖ πλὴν ἐπιμελείαι τε καὶ σοφίαι·  
 ταῦτα γὰρ μόνα ἄξια λόγου ἐν Ἑλλήσιν. ἐπεὶ εἴ γε πύθοιτο  
 ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης οὗτος νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ πρῶτον μὲν ἔτη οὐδέπω  
 γεγωνὶ σφόδρα εἴκοσιν, ἔπειτα παντάπασιν ἀπαίδευτος,  
 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, τοῦ ἔραστοῦ αὐτῶι λέγοντος ὅτι χρή  
 πρῶτον μαθόντα καὶ ἐπιμεληθέντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀσκήσαντα  
 οὕτως ἰέναι διαγωνιούμενον βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ φησιν  
 ἐξαρκεῖν καὶ ὥς ἔχει, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν θαυμάσαι τε καὶ ἐρέσ-  
 θαι· “τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν ὅτῳ πιστεύοι τὸ μειράκιον;” εἰ οὖν  
 λέγοιμεν ὅτι κάλλει τε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ  
 φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡγήσαιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὧ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, μαίνε-  
 σθαι πρὸς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀποβλέψασα πάντα τὰ  
 τοιαῦτα. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λαμπιδῶ, τὴν Λεωτυχίδου μὲν θυγα-  
 τέρα, Ἀρχιδάμου δὲ γυναῖκα, Ἀγιδος δὲ μητέρα, οἱ πάντες  
 βασιλῆς γεγονάσιν, θαυμάσαι ἂν καὶ ταύτην εἰς τὰ παρὰ  
 σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντα ἀποβλέψασαν, εἰ σὺ ἐν νῶι ἔχεις τῶι ὑεῖ  
 αὐτῆς διαγωνίζεσθαι οὕτω κακῶς ἡγμένος. καίτοι οὐκ αἰσ-  
 χρὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ αἱ τῶν πολεμίων γυναῖκες βέλτιον περὶ  
 ἡμῶν διανοοῦνται, οἷους χρή ὄντας σφίσιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ  
 ἡμεῖς περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; ἀλλ', ὧ μακάριε, πειθόμενος ἐμοί τε  
 καὶ τῶι ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματι, γνῶθι σαυτόν, ὅτι οὗτοι ἡμῖν

123e4 πιστεύοι D: πιστεύει c

εἰσιν ἀντίπαλοι, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὓς σὺ οἶει· ὦν ἄλλωι μὲν οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ περιγενοίμεθα, εἰ μὴ περ ἐπιμελείαι τε ἂν καὶ τέχνηι. ὦν σὺ εἰ ἀπολειφθήσῃ, καὶ τοῦ ὀνομαστός γενέσθαι ἀπολειφθήσῃ ἐν Ἑλληνσί τε καὶ βαρβάροις, οὗ μοι δοκεῖς ἔρᾶν 5 ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἄλλου.

A. τίνα οὖν χρή τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποιεῖσθαι; ἔχεις ἐξηγήσασθαι; παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικας ἀληθῆ εἰρηκότι.

Σ. ναί· ἀλλὰ γὰρ κοινὴ βουλή ὧιτινι τρόπῳ ἂν ὅτι βέλτιστοι γενοίμεθα. ἐγὼ γάρ τοι οὐ περὶ μὲν σοῦ λέγω ὡς χρή παιδευθῆναι, περὶ ἐμοῦ δὲ οὐ· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ σου διαφέρω πλὴν γ' ἐνί.

A. τίνι; 5

Σ. ὁ ἐπίτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ σοφώτερος ἢ Περικλῆς ὁ σός.

A. τίς οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σ. θεός, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, ὅσπερ σοί με οὐκ εἶα πρὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας διαλεχθῆναι· ὧι καὶ πιστεύων λέγω ὅτι ἡ ἐπιφάνεια δι' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου σοι ἔσται ἢ δι' ἐμοῦ. 10

A. παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. d

Σ. ἴσως· λέγω μέντοι ἀληθῆ, ὅτι ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, πολλῆς μὲν πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀτὰρ νῶ γε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα.

A. ὅτι μὲν ἐγώ, οὐ ψεύδῃ. 5

Σ. οὐδὲ μὴν ὅτι γε ἐγώ.

A. τί οὖν ἂν ποιοῖμεν;

Σ. οὐκ ἀποκνητέον οὐδὲ μαλθακιστέον, ὦ ἑταῖρε.

A. οὗτοι δὴ πρέπει γ', ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σ. οὐ γάρ, ἀλλὰ σκεπτέον κοινῇ. καὶ μοι λέγε· φαμέν 5 γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἄριστοι βούλεσθαι γενέσθαι. ἢ γάρ;

A. ναί.

Σ. τίνα ἀρετήν;

A. δῆλον ὅτι ἦν περ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοί. 5

124c1 κοινὴ βουλή d: κοινῇ βουλῇ d 124d3 πολλῆς μὲν i: μᾶλλον μὲν d: μᾶλλον δὲ d 124d8 ἀποκνητέον d: ἀπορητέον d, i: ἀπορρητέον d

- Σ. οί τί ἀγαθοί;  
 Α. δῆλον ὅτι οἱ πράττειν τὰ πράγματα.  
 Σ. ποῖα; ἄρα τὰ ἵππικά;  
 Α. οὐ δῆτα.  
**10** Σ. παρὰ τοὺς ἵππικούς γὰρ ἂν ἤμεν;  
 Α. ναί.  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ τὰ ναυτικά λέγεις;  
 Α. οὔ.  
 Σ. παρὰ τοὺς ναυτικούς γὰρ ἂν ἤμεν;  
**15** Α. ναί.  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ ποῖα; ἃ τίνες πράττουσιν;  
 Α. ἅπερ Ἀθηναίων οἱ καλοὶ κάγαθοί.  
**125** Σ. καλοὺς δὲ κάγαθούς λέγεις τοὺς φρονίμους ἢ τοὺς  
 ἄφρονας;  
 Α. τοὺς φρονίμους.  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν ὁ ἕκαστος φρόνιμος, τοῦτ' ἀγαθός;  
**5** Α. ναί.  
 Σ. ὁ δὲ ἄφρων, πονηρός;  
 Α. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;  
 Σ. ἄρ' οὖν ὁ σκυτοτόμος φρόνιμος εἰς ὑποδημάτων ἐρ-  
 γασίαν;  
**10** Α. πάνυ γε.  
 Σ. ἀγαθὸς ἄρ' εἰς αὐτά;  
 Α. ἀγαθός.  
 Σ. τί δ'; εἰς ἱματίων ἐργασίαν οὐκ ἄφρων ὁ σκυτοτόμος;  
 Α. ναί.  
**b** Σ. κακὸς ἄρα εἰς τοῦτο;  
 Α. ναί.  
 Σ. ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ κακός τε καὶ  
 ἀγαθός.  
**5** Α. φαίνεται.  
 Σ. ἦ οὖν λέγεις τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εἶναι καὶ κακοὺς;  
 Α. οὐ δῆτα.  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ τίνας ποτὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς λέγεις;  
 Α. τοὺς δυναμένους ἔγωγε ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει.  
**10** Σ. οὐ δήπου ἵππων γε;

- A. οὐ δῆτα.  
 Σ. ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. ἄρα καμνόντων;  
 A. οὔ. 15  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ πλεόντων;  
 A. οὔ φημι.  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ θεριζόντων;  
 A. οὔ.  
 Σ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ποιοῦντων ἢ τι ποιοῦντων; c  
 A. ποιοῦντων λέγω.  
 Σ. τί; πειρῶ καὶ ἐμοὶ δηλῶσαι.  
 A. συνόντων καὶ συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χρωμένων  
 ἀλλήλοις, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. 5  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν ἀνθρώποις  
 χρωμένων;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. ἄρα κελευστῶν χρωμένων ἐρέταις;  
 A. οὐ δῆτα. 10  
 Σ. κυβερνητική γὰρ αὕτη γε ἀρετή;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν αὐλητῶν, ἀνθρώποις  
 ἡγουμένων ὠιδῆς καὶ χρωμένων χορευταῖς; d  
 A. οὐ δῆτα.  
 Σ. χοροδιδασκαλική γὰρ αὕτη γ' αὖ;  
 A. πάνυ γε.  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ τί ποτε λέγεις χρωμένων ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώποις 5  
 οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἄρχειν;  
 A. κοινωνούντων ἔγωγε λέγω πολιτείας καὶ συμβαλ-  
 λόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τούτων ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.  
 Σ. τίς οὖν αὕτη ἡ τέχνη; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ σε ἐροίμην πάλιν  
 τὰ νυνδὴ, κοινωνούντων ναυτιλίας ἐπίστασθαι ἄρχειν τίς 10  
 ποιεῖ τέχνη;  
 A. κυβερνητική.

125c4 συνόντων c: οὐκοῦν τῶν D

- e Σ. κοινωνούντων δ' ὠιδῆς, ὥς νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο, τίς ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ ἄρχειν;  
 Α. ἤνπερ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες, ἡ χοροδιδασκαλία.  
 Σ. τί δέ; πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα καλεῖς  
 5 ἐπιστήμην;  
 Α. εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.  
 Σ. τί δέ; μὴν ἀβουλία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν κυβερνητῶν;  
 Α. οὐ δῆτα.  
 Σ. ἀλλ' εὐβουλία;  
 126 Α. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, εἴς γε τὸ σώζεσθαι πλείοντας.  
 Σ. καλῶς λέγεις. τί δέ; ἤν σὺ λέγεις εὐβουλίαν, εἰς τί ἐστιν;  
 Α. εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν καὶ σώζεσθαι.  
 5 Σ. ἄμεινον δὲ διοικεῖται καὶ σώζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου ἢ ἀπογιγνομένου; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σὺ με ἔροιο· “ἄμεινον διοικεῖται σῶμα καὶ σώζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου ἢ ἀπογιγνομένου;” εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι ὑγείας μὲν παραγιγνομένης, νόσου δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. οὐ καὶ σὺ οἶε  
 10 οὕτως;  
 b Α. ναί.  
 Σ. καὶ εἴ μ' αὖ ἔροιο· “τίνος δὲ παραγιγνομένου ἄμεινον ὄμματα;” ὡσαύτως εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι ὄψεως μὲν παραγιγνομένης, τυφλότητος δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης. καὶ ὥτα δὲ  
 5 κωφότητος μὲν ἀπογιγνομένης, ἀκοῆς δὲ ἐγγιγνομένης βελτίω τε γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται.  
 Α. ὀρθῶς.  
 Σ. τί δὲ δὴ πόλις; τίνος παραγιγνομένου καὶ ἀπογιγνομένου βελτίων τε γίγνεται καὶ ἄμεινον θεραπεύεται καὶ διοικεῖται;  
 10 Α. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν φιλία μὲν αὐτοῖς γίγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τὸ μισεῖν δὲ καὶ στασιάζειν ἀπογίγνηται.  
 Σ. ἄρ' οὖν φιλίαν λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν ἢ διχόνοιαν;  
 5 Α. ὁμόνοιαν.  
 Σ. διὰ τίν' οὖν τέχνην ὁμονοοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις περὶ ἀριθμούς;

- A. διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν.  
 Σ. τί δὲ οἱ ἰδιῶται; οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν;  
 A. ναί. 10  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἕκαστος;  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. διὰ τίνα δὲ τέχνην ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁμονοεῖ περὶ **d**  
 σπιθαμῆς καὶ πήχεος ὁπότερον μεῖζον; οὐ διὰ τὴν μετρη-  
 τικὴν;  
 A. τί μήν;  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀλλήλοις καὶ αἱ πόλεις; 5  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. τί δέ; περὶ σταθμοῦ οὐχ ὡσαύτως;  
 A. φημί.  
 Σ. ἦν δὲ δὴ σὺ λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν, τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τοῦ,  
 καὶ τίς αὐτὴν τέχνη παρασκευάζει; καὶ ἄρα ἥπερ πόλει, **10**  
 αὐτὴ καὶ ἰδιώτῃ, αὐτῷ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον;  
 A. εἰκὸς γέ τοι.  
 Σ. τίς οὖν ἔστι; μὴ κάμητις ἀποκρινόμενος, ἀλλὰ προθυ- **e**  
 μοῦ εἰπεῖν.  
 A. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι φιλίαν τε λέγειν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν, ἦνπερ  
 πατὴρ τε υἱὸν φιλῶν ὁμονοεῖ καὶ μήτηρ, καὶ ἀδελφῶν  
 ἀδελφῷ καὶ γυνὴ ἀνδρί. 5  
 Σ. οἶε ἂν οὖν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἄνδρα γυναικὶ περὶ ταλα-  
 σιουργίας δύνασθαι ὁμονοεῖν, τὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενον τῇ ἐπισ-  
 ταμένῃ;  
 A. οὐ δῆτα.  
 Σ. οὐδέ γε δεῖ οὐδέν· γυναικεῖον γὰρ τοῦτό γε μάθημα. **10**  
 A. ναί.  
 Σ. τί δέ; γυνὴ ἀνδρὶ περὶ ὀπλιτικῆς δύναιτ' ἂν ὁμονοεῖν **127**  
 μὴ μαθοῦσα;  
 A. οὐ δῆτα.  
 Σ. ἀνδρεῖον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἴσως αὖ φαίης ἂν εἶναι.  
 A. ἔγωγε. 5  
 Σ. ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ μὲν γυναικεῖα, τὰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖα μαθήματα  
 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.  
 A. πῶς δ' οὐ;

- Σ. οὐκ ἄρα ἓν γε τούτοις ἐστὶν ὁμόνοια γυναιξὶ πρὸς  
**10** ἄνδρας.  
 Α. οὐ.  
 Σ. οὐδ' ἄρα φιλία, εἴπερ ἡ φιλία ὁμόνοια ἦν.  
 Α. οὐ φαίνεται.  
 Σ. ἦ ἄρα αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ αὐτῶν πράττουσιν, οὐ φιλοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν.  
**15** Α. οὐκ ἔοικεν.  
 Σ. οὐδ' ἄρα οἱ ἄνδρες ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἢ τὰ αὐτῶν.  
 Α. οὐ.  
 Σ. οὐδ' εὖ ἄρα ταύτῃ οἰκοῦνται αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν τὰ  
**5** αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;  
 Α. οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.  
 Σ. πῶς λέγεις; φιλίας μὴ παρούσης, ἧς ἔφαμεν ἐγγιγνομένης εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ἄλλως δ' οὐ;  
 Α. ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς φιλία ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτεροι πράττουσιν.  
**10** Σ. οὐκ ἄρτι γε· νῦν δὲ πῶς αὖ λέγεις; ὁμονοίας μὴ ἐγγιγνομένης φιλία ἐγγίγνεται; ἢ οἷόν θ' ὁμόνοιαν ἐγγίγνεσθαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οἱ μὲν ἴσασι, οἱ δ' οὐ;  
 Α. ἀδύνατον.  
**5** Σ. δίκαια δὲ πράττουσιν ἢ ἄδικα, ὅταν τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;  
 Α. δίκαια· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
 Σ. τὰ δίκαια οὖν πραττόντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν πολιτῶν φιλία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται πρὸς ἀλλήλους;  
**10** Α. ἀνάγκη αὖ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες.  
**d** Σ. τίνα οὖν ποτε λέγεις τὴν φιλίαν ἢ ὁμόνοιαν περὶ ἧς δεῖ ἡμᾶς σοφούς τε εἶναι καὶ εὐβούλους, ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ὦμεν; οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι μαθεῖν οὐθ' ἥτις οὐτ' ἐν οἷσισιν· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς φαίνεται ἐνοῦσα, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, ὥς  
**5** ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου.  
 Α. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἶδ' ὅτι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λεληθέναι ἐμαυτὸν αἰσχιστὰ ἔχων.



Σ. ἀλλὰ χρή θαρρεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἦισθου πεπονθὼς πεντηκονταετῆς, χαλεπὸν ἂν ἦν σοι ἐπιμεληθῆναι σαυτοῦ· **e**  
 νῦν δ' ἦν ἔχεις ἡλικίαν, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἐν ἣι δεῖ αὐτὸ αἰσθῆσθαι.

Α. τί οὖν τὸν αἰσθόμενον χρή ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σ. ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ· καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο ποιῇς, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, εἴ τι δεῖ καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντεῖαι **5**  
 πιστεύειν, σὺ τε κἀγὼ βέλτιον σχήσομεν.

Α. ἔσται ταῦτα ἕνεκά γε τοῦ ἐμὲ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Σ. φέρε δῆ, τί ἐστὶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι – μὴ πολ-  
 λάκεις λάθωμεν οὐχ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι, οἰόμενοι δέ **128**  
 – καὶ πότ' ἄρα αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπος; ἄρ' ὅταν τῶν αὐτοῦ  
 ἐπιμελῇται, τότε καὶ αὐτοῦ;

Α. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

Σ. τί δέ; ποδῶν ἄνθρωπος πότε ἐπιμελεῖται; ἄρ' ὅταν **5**  
 ἐκείνων ἐπιμελῇται ἃ ἐστί τῶν ποδῶν;

Α. οὐ μανθάνω.

Σ. καλεῖς δέ τι χειρὸς; οἷον δακτύλιον ἔστιν ὅτου ἂν ἄλ-  
 λου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίης ἢ δακτύλου;

Α. οὐ δῆτα. **10**

Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ποδὸς ὑπόδημα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;

Α. ναί.

Σ. καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος  
 ὁμοίως;

Α. ναί. **b**

Σ. ἄρ' οὖν ὅταν ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελώμεθα, τότε ποδῶν  
 ἐπιμελούμεθα;

Α. οὐ πάνυ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σ. τί δέ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ; ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλεῖς τι **5**  
 ὁπουοῦν πράγματος;

Α. ἔγωγε.

Σ. ἄρ' οὖν ὅταν τίς τι βέλτιον ποιῇ, τότε ὀρθὴν λέγεις  
 ἐπιμέλειαν;

Α. ναί. **10**

128a13–b1 καὶ ἱμάτια . . . ναί i: not in D

- Σ. τίς οὖν τέχνη ὑποδήματα βελτίω ποιεῖ;  
 Α. σκυτική.  
 Σ. σκυτικῇ ἄρα ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελούμεθα;  
**c** Α. ναί.  
 Σ. ἦ καὶ ποδὸς σκυτικῇ; ἢ ἐκείνη ἣ πόδας βελτίους  
 ποιοῦμεν;  
 Α. ἐκείνη.  
**5** Σ. βελτίους δὲ πόδας οὐχ ἥπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα;  
 Α. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.  
 Σ. αὕτη δ' οὐ γυμναστική;  
 Α. μάλιστα.  
 Σ. γυμναστικῇ μὲν ἄρα ποδὸς ἐπιμελούμεθα, σκυτικῇ  
**10** δὲ τῶν τοῦ ποδός;  
 Α. πάνυ γε.  
 Σ. καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν χειρῶν, δακτυλιογλυφαίαι δὲ  
 τῶν τῆς χειρός;  
 Α. ναί.  
**15** Σ. καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν σώματος, ὑφαντικῇ δὲ καὶ ταῖς  
**d** ἄλλαις τῶν τοῦ σώματος;  
 Α. παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.  
 Σ. ἄλλῃ μὲν ἄρα τέχνῃ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου ἐπιμελούμεθα,  
 ἄλλῃ δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ.  
**5** Α. φαίνεται.  
 Σ. οὐκ ἄρα ὅταν τῶν σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ, σαυτοῦ ἐπι-  
 μελῇ.  
 Α. οὐδαμῶς.  
 Σ. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τέχνη, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἣ τις ἂν αὐτοῦ τε  
**10** ἐπιμελοῖτο καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ.  
 Α. οὐ φαίνεται.  
 Σ. φέρε δὴ, ποῖαι ποτ' ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθείημεν;  
 Α. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.  
**e** Σ. ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε ὠμολόγηται, ὅτι οὐχ ἣ ἂν τῶν  
 ἡμετέρων καὶ ὅτιοῦν βέλτιον ποιῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἣ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

128d6 τῶν σαυτοῦ c: τῶν ἑαυτοῦ d, i: τῶν αὐτοῦ d      128d9 ἣ τις i: ἥ τις D

Α. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σ. ἢ οὖν ἔγνωμεν ἂν ποτε τίς τέχνη ὑπόδημα βέλτιον ποιεῖ, μὴ εἰδότες ὑπόδημα;

5

Α. ἀδύνατον.

Σ. οὐδέ γε τίς τέχνη δακτυλίου βελτίους ποιεῖ, ἀγνοοῦντες δακτύλιον.

Α. ἀληθῆ.

Σ. τί δέ; τίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπον, ἄρ' ἂν ποτε γνοῖμεν ἀγνοοῦντες τί ποτ' ἐσμὲν αὐτοί;

10

Α. ἀδύνατον.

129

Σ. πότερον οὖν δὴ ῥάδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γινῶναι ἑαυτόν, καί τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοῖ νέων, ἢ χαλεπὸν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός;

Α. ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰκίς μὲν ἔδοξε παντὸς εἶναι, πολλὰκίς δὲ παγχάλεπον.

5

Σ. ἀλλ', ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἴτε ῥάδιον εἴτε μὴ ἐστίν, ὅμως γε ἡμῖν ὥδ' ἔχει· γνόντες μὲν αὐτὸ τάχ' ἂν γνοῖμεν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ οὐκ ἂν ποτε.

Α. ἔστι ταῦτα.

10

Σ. φέρε δὴ, τίν' ἂν τρόπον εὐρεθείη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό; οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν τάχ' εὕροιμεν τί ποτ' ἐσμὲν αὐτοί, τούτου δ' ἔτι ὄντες ἐν ἀγνοίαι ἀδύνατοί που.

b

Α. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

Σ. ἔχε οὖν πρὸς Διός. τῷ διαλέγῃ σὺ νῦν; ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοί;

5

Α. ναί.

Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐγὼ σοί;

Α. ναί.

Σ. Σωκράτης ἄρ' ἐστὶν ὁ διαλεγόμενος;

10

Α. πάνυ γε.

Σ. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' ὁ ἀκούων;

Α. ναί.

Σ. οὐκοῦν λόγῳ διαλέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης;

128e10 ἄνθρωπον c: αὐτὸν D: αὐτῶν i 129b1 αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό i: αὐτοποαυτὸ  
d: αὐτὸ ταῦτο d: αὐτὸ τοῦτο i

- c**     Α. τί μήν;  
        Σ. τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταυτόν που καλεῖς;  
        Α. πάνυ γε.
- 5**     Σ. ὁ δὲ χρώμενος καὶ ὧι χρῆται οὐκ ἄλλο;  
        Α. πῶς λέγεις;  
        Σ. ὥσπερ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομεῖ καὶ σμίληι καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις.  
        Α. ναί.
- 10**    Σ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τέμνων καὶ χρώμενος, ἄλλο δὲ οἷς τέμνων χρῆται;  
        Α. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;  
        Σ. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως καὶ οἷς ὁ κιθαριστὴς κιθαρίζει καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κιθαριστὴς ἄλλο ἢ εἶη;  
        Α. ναί.
- 15**    Α. ναί.
- d**     Σ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀρτίως ἡρώτων, εἰ ὁ χρώμενος καὶ ὧι χρῆται ἀεὶ δοκεῖ ἕτερον εἶναι.  
        Α. δοκεῖ.  
        Σ. τί οὖν φῶμεν τὸν σκυτοτόμον; τέμνειν ὀργάνοις
- 5**    μόνον ἢ καὶ χερσίν;  
        Α. καὶ χερσίν.  
        Σ. χρῆται ἄρα καὶ ταύταις;  
        Α. ναί.  
        Σ. ἢ καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμενος σκυτοτομεῖ;
- 10**    Α. ναί.  
        Σ. τὸν δὲ χρώμενον καὶ οἷς χρῆται ἕτερα ὁμολογοῦμεν;  
        Α. ναί.
- e**     Σ. ἕτερον ἄρα σκυτοτόμος καὶ κιθαριστὴς χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν οἷς ἐργάζονται;  
        Α. φαίνεται.  
        Σ. οὐκοῦν καὶ παντὶ τῷ σώματι χρῆται ἄνθρωπος;
- 5**     Α. πάνυ γε.  
        Σ. ἕτερον δ' ἢν τό τε χρώμενον καὶ ὧι χρῆται;  
        Α. ναί.  
        Σ. ἕτερον ἄρα ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ;

- Α. ἔοικεν.  
 Σ. τί ποτ' οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; **10**  
 Α. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.  
 Σ. ἔχεις μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τὸ τῷ σώματι χρώμενον.  
 Α. ναί.  
 Σ. ἢ οὖν ἄλλο τι χρήται αὐτῷ ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ; **130**  
 Α. οὐκ ἄλλο.  
 Σ. οὐκοῦν ἄρχουσα;  
 Α. ναί.  
 Σ. καὶ μὴν τόδε γ' οἶμαι οὐδένα ἂν ἄλλως οἰηθῆναι. **5**  
 Α. τὸ ποῖον;  
 Σ. μὴ οὐ τριῶν ἐν γέ τι εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.  
 Α. τίνων;  
 Σ. ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ συναμφότερον.  
 Α. τί μὴν; **10**  
 Σ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχον ὡμο-  
 λογήσαμεν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι;  
 Α. ὡμολογήσαμεν. **b**  
 Σ. ἄρ' οὖν σῶμα αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄρχει;  
 Α. οὐδαμῶς.  
 Σ. ἄρχεσθαι γὰρ αὐτὸ εἵπομεν.  
 Α. ναί. **5**  
 Σ. οὐκ ἂν δὴ τοῦτό γε εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν.  
 Α. οὐκ ἔοικεν.  
 Σ. ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸ συναμφότερον τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει, καὶ  
 ἔστι δὴ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος;  
 Α. ἴσως δῆτα. **10**  
 Σ. πάντων γε ἡκιστα· μὴ γὰρ συνάρχοντος τοῦ ἐτέρου  
 οὐδεμίᾳ πον μηχανὴ τὸ συναμφότερον ἄρχειν.  
 Α. ὀρθῶς.  
 Σ. ἐπεὶ δὲ δ' οὔτε τὸ σῶμα οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστιν **c**  
 ἄνθρωπος, λείπεται οἶμαι ἢ μηδὲν αὐτ' εἶναι, ἢ εἴπερ τί  
 ἐστι, μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχὴν.

130ag συναμφότερον c: συναμφότερον τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο D

A. κοιμηθῆι μὲν οὖν.

5 Σ. ἔτι οὖν τι σαφέστερον δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναί σοι ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος;

A. μὰ Διὰ, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

d Σ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ μετρίως, ἐξαρκεῖ ἡμῖν ἀκριβῶς μὲν γὰρ τότε εἰσόμεθα, ὅταν εὖρωμεν ὃ νυνδὴ παρήλθομεν διὰ τὸ πολλῆς εἶναι σκέψεως.

A. τί τοῦτο;

5 Σ. ὃ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἐρρήθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτέον εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό· νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸν ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα ὅτι ἐστί. καὶ ἴσως ἐξαρκέσει· οὐ γὰρ που κυριώτερόν γε οὐδὲν ἄν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν.

A. οὐ δῆτα.

10 Σ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἔχει οὕτω νομίζειν, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ προσομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν;

e A. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

5 Σ. τοῦτ' ἄρα ἦν ὃ καὶ ὀλίγωι ἔμπροσθεν εἴπομεν, ὅτι Σωκράτης Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαλέγεται λόγωι χρώμενος, οὐ πρὸς τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ποιοῦμενος τοὺς λόγους· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ.

A. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σ. ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὃ ἐπιτάττων γινῶναι ἑαυτόν;

131 A. ἔοικεν.

Σ. ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τεχνιτῶν τοῦ σώματος γιγνώσκει, τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν ἔγνωκεν;

A. οὕτως.

5 Σ. οὐδεὶς ἄρα τῶν ἰατρῶν ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκει, καθ' ὅσον ἰατρός, οὐδὲ τῶν παιδοτριβῶν, καθ' ὅσον παιδοτρίβης;

A. οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Σ. πολλοῦ ἄρα δέουσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι

130d5 αὐτοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ c: τοῦ αὐτοῦ D 130d6 ὅτι d, i: τί d 130d10 τῇ ψυχῇ D: τὴν ψυχὴν c 131a2 τῶν τεχνιτῶν τοῦ σώματος c: τῶν τοῦ σώματος D: τῶν τοῦ σώματος τι i: τὰ τοῦ σώματος i

δημιουργοὶ γινώσκουν ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ ἑαυτῶν οὕτοί γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτῶν κατὰ γε τὰς **10**  
τέχνας ἃς ἔχουσιν· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ σώματος γινώσκουσιν, οἷς **b**  
τοῦτο θεραπεύεται.

A. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σ. εἰ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν γινώσκουν, οὐδεὶς  
τούτων σώφρων κατὰ τὴν τέχνην; **5**

A. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

Σ. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ βάνουσοι αὐται αἱ τέχναι δοκοῦ-  
σιν εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ μαθήματα.

A. πάννυ μὲν οὖν.

Σ. οὐκοῦν πάλιν ὅστις αὖ σῶμα θεραπεύει, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ **10**  
ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτὸν θεραπεύει;

A. κινδυνεύει.

Σ. ὅστις δέ γε τὰ χρήματα, οὐθ' ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, **c**  
ἀλλ' ἔτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ;

A. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σ. οὐ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἄρα ἔτι πράττει ὁ χρηματιστής;

A. ὀρθῶς. **5**

Σ. εἰ ἄρα τις γέγονεν ἐραστής τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου  
σώματος, οὐκ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἄρα ἠράσθη ἀλλὰ τινος τῶν Ἀλ-  
κιβιάδου;

A. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Σ. ὅστις δέ σου τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρᾷ;

A. ἀνάγκη φαίνεται ἐκ τοῦ λόγου. **10**

Σ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν τοῦ σώματός σου ἐρῶν, ἐπειδὴ λήγει  
ἀνθοῦν, ἀπιὼν οἴχεται;

A. φαίνεται.

Σ. ὁ δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν οὐκ ἄπεισιν, ἕως ἄν ἐπὶ τὸ **d**  
βέλτιον ᾗ;

A. εἰκός γε.

Σ. οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ εἶμι ὁ οὐκ ἀπιὼν ἀλλὰ παραμένων  
λήγοντος τοῦ σώματος, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεληλυθόντων. **5**

A. εὖ γε ποιῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ μηδὲ ἀπέλθοις.

Σ. προθυμοῦ τοίνυν ὅτι κάλλιστος εἶναι.

A. ἀλλὰ προθυμήσομαι.

e Σ. ὡς οὐτω γέ σοι ἔχει· οὐτ' ἐγένεθ', ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀλκibiάδῃ τῷ Κλεινίου ἐραστῆς οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ εἰς μόνος, καὶ οὗτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ Φαιναρέτης.

5 A. ἀληθῆ.

Σ. οὐκοῦν ἔφησθα σμικρὸν φθῆναί με προσελθόντα σοι, ἐπεὶ πρότερος ἂν μοι προσελθεῖν, βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι δι' ὅτι μόνος οὐκ ἀπέρχομαι;

A. ἦν γὰρ οὐτω.

10 Σ. τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον, ὅτι μόνος ἐραστῆς ἦν σός, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι τῶν σῶν· τὰ δὲ σὰ λήγει ὥρας, σὺ δ' ἄρχῃ ἀνθεῖν.

132 καὶ νῦν γε ἂν μὴ διαφθαρῇς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ αἰσχίων γένει, οὐ μή σε ἀπολίπω. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ μάλιστα ἐγὼ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ δημεραστῆς ἡμῖν γενόμενος διαφθαρῇς· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ ἀγαθοὶ αὐτὸ πεπόνθασιν Ἀθηναίων. 5 εὐπρόσωπος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ μεγαλήτορος δήμος Ἐρεχθέως· ἀλλ' ἀποδύντα χρή αὐτὸν θεάσασθαι. εὐλαβοῦ οὖν τὴν εὐλάβειαν ἣν ἐγὼ λέγω.

A. τίνα;

b Σ. γύμνασαι πρῶτον, ὦ μακάριε, καὶ μάθε ἃ δεῖ μαθόντα ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, πρότερον δὲ μή, ἵν' ἀλεξιφάρμακα ἔχων ἴῃς καὶ μηδὲν πάθῃς δεινόν.

A. εὔ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι ὄντινα τρόπον ἐπιμεληθεῖμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

5 Σ. οὐκοῦν τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν πεπέρανται – ὁ γὰρ ἐσμέν, ἐπεικῶς ὠμολόγηται – ἐφοβούμεθα δὲ μὴ τούτου σφαλέντες λάθωμεν ἑτέρου τινὸς ἐπιμελούμενοι ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡμῶν.

10 A. ἔστι ταῦτα.

c Σ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον καὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλεπτέον.

A. δῆλον.

132b5 ὄντινα D, i: ὄντιν' ἂν c



Σ. σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐτέροις παραδοτέον.

5

Α. τί μήν;

Σ. τίν' οὖν ἂν τρόπον γνοῖμεν αὐτὰ ἐναργέστατα; ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γνόντες, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς γνωσόμεθα. ἄρα πρὸς θεῶν εὖ λέγοντος οὗ νυνδὴ ἐμνήσθημεν τοῦ Δελφικοῦ γράμματος οὐ συνίμεν;

10

Α. τὸ ποῖόν τι διανοούμενος λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σ. ἐγὼ σοι φράσω, ὃ γε ὑποπτεύω λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα. κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλοῦ εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον.

d

Α. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

Σ. σκόπει καὶ σύ· εἰ ἡμῶν τῷ ὄμματι ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβουλευῶν εἶπεν “ἰδὲ σαυτόν,” πῶς ἂν ὑπελάβομεν τί παραινεῖν; ἄρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπειν, εἰς ὃ βλέπων ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἔμελλεν αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν;

5

Α. δηλον.

Σ. ἐννοῶμεν δὴ εἰς τί βλέποντες τῶν ὄντων ἐκεῖνό τε ὀρῶμεν ἅμα ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

e

Α. δηλον δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Σ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ὧι ὀρῶμεν ἔνεστί τι τῶν τοιούτων;

5

Α. πάνυ γε.

Σ. ἐννεόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ὄψει ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην καλοῦμεν, εἶδωλον ὃν τι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος;

133

Α. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

5

Σ. ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ὧι ὀράϊ, οὕτως ἂν αὐτὸν ἴδοι.

Α. φαίνεται.

132c7 αὐτὰ D, i: αὐτὸ c 132d6 συμβουλευῶν c: συμβουλεύων D, i  
132e6 ἔνεστί τι c: ἔνεστι D

- 10** Σ. εἰ δέ γ' εἰς ἄλλο τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου βλέποι ἢ τι τῶν ὄντων, πλὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὁμοιον, οὐκ ὄψεται ἑαυτόν.
- b** Α. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.  
Σ. ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρ' εἰ μέλλει ἰδεῖν αὐτόν, εἰς ὀφθαλμὸν αὐτῷ βλέπτεον, καὶ τοῦ ὁμματος εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει ἢ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ ἐγγιγνομένη· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο  
**5** που ὄψις;  
Α. οὕτως.  
Σ. ἄρ' οὖν, ᾧ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ μέλλει γνῶσεσθαι αὐτήν, εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλέπτεον, καὶ μάλιστ' εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται ἢ ψυχῆς  
**10** ἀρετῇ, σοφίᾳ, καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ᾧ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὁμοιον ὄν;  
Α. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ᾧ Σώκρατες.  
**c** Σ. ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θεióτερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν;  
Α. οὐκ ἔχομεν.  
Σ. τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔοικεν αὐτῆς, καὶ τις εἰς τοῦτο  
**5** βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίῃ μάλιστα.  
**c7** Α. φαίνεται.  
**c18** Σ. τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν αὐτὸν ὠμολογοῦμεν σωφροσύνην εἶναι;  
**20** Α. πάνυ γε.  
Σ. ἄρ' οὖν μὴ γινώσκοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς μηδὲ σῶφρονες ὄντες δυνάμεθ' ἂν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν κακὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ;  
Α. καὶ πῶς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο, ᾧ Σώκρατες;

133c1 θεióτερον d, i: νοερώτερον d 133c4 θεῷ d, i: θείω d, i 133c8–17 Σ. ἄρ' οὖν, ὅθ' ὥσπερ κάτοπτρά ἐστι σαφέστερα τοῦ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ἐνόπτρου καὶ καθαρώτερα καὶ λαμπρότερα, [10] οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμέτεραι ψυχῇ βελτίστου καθαρώτερόν τε καὶ λαμπρότερον τυγχάνει ὄν; Α. ἔοικέ γε, ᾧ Σώκρατες. Σ. εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄρα βλέποντες ἐκείνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ χρώμεθ' ἂν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς [15] ἀρετὴν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα ὁρώμεν καὶ γινώσκομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς. Α. ναί. i: not in D 133c18 ὠμολογοῦμεν d, i: ὁμολογοῦμεν d, i

Σ. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἴσως σοι φαίνεται μὴ γιγνώσκοντα **d**  
 Ἀλκιβιάδην τὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου γιγνώσκειν ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδου  
 ἐστίν.

Α. ἀδύνατον μέντοι νῆ Δία.

Σ. οὐδ' ἄρα τὰ ἡμέτερα ὅτι ἡμέτερα, εἰ μὴδ' ἡμᾶς **5**  
 αὐτούς;

Α. πῶς γάρ;

Σ. εἰ δ' ἄρα μὴδὲ τὰ ἡμέτερα, οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων;

Α. οὐ φαίνεται.

Σ. οὐκ ἄρα πάννυ τι ὀρθῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν ὁμολογοῦντες **10**  
 ἄρτι εἶναί τινας οἱ ἑαυτοὺς μὲν οὐ γιγνώσκουσιν, τὰ δ'  
 αὐτῶν, ἄλλους δὲ τὰ τῶν ἑαυτῶν. ἔοικε γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα  
 εἶναι κατιδεῖν ἐνός τε καὶ μιᾶς τέχνης· αὐτόν, τὰ αὐτοῦ, τὰ **e**  
 τῶν ἑαυτοῦ.

Α. κινδυνεύει.

Σ. ὅστις δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων που ἂν  
 ἀγνοοῖ κατὰ ταῦτά; **5**

Α. τί μὴν;

Σ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἀγνοή-  
 σαι;

Α. ἀνάγκη.

Σ. οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν γένοιτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ πολιτικός; **10**

Α. οὐ δῆτα.

Σ. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' οἰκονομικός γε;

Α. οὐ δῆτα. **134**

Σ. οὐδέ γε εἴσεται ὅτι πράττει;

Α. οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

Σ. ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς οὐχ ἀμαρτήσεται;

Α. πάννυ γε. **5**

Σ. ἐξαμαρτάνων δὲ οὐ κακῶς πράξει ἰδίαί τε καὶ δημο-  
 σίαι;

Α. πῶς δ' οὔ;

Σ. κακῶς δὲ πράττων οὐκ ἄθλιος;

133d8 μὴδὲ i: not in D

133d12 ἄλλους δὲ i: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ D

- 10**     Α. σφόδρα γε.  
          Σ. τί δ' οἷς οὔτος πράττει;  
          Α. καὶ οὔτοι.  
          Σ. οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τε, ἐὰν μή τις σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθὸς ᾦ,  
 εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.
- b**       Α. οὐχ οἶόν τε.  
          Σ. οἱ ἄρα κακοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄθλιοι.  
          Α. σφόδρα γε.  
          Σ. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ὁ πλουτήσας ἀθλιότητος ἀπαλλάττε-
- 5**       ται, ἀλλ' ὁ σωφρονήσας.  
          Α. φαίνεται.  
          Σ. οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τριήρων οὐδὲ νεωρίων δέονται  
 αἱ πόλεις, ὧς Ἀλκιβιάδης, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδαιμονήσῃν, οὐδὲ  
 πλήθους οὐδὲ μεγέθους ἄνευ ἀρετῆς.
- 10**     Α. οὐ μέντοι.  
**c**       Σ. εἰ δὴ μέλλεις τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράξῃν ὀρθῶς καὶ  
 καλῶς, ἀρετῆς σοι μεταδοτέον τοῖς πολίταις.  
          Α. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;  
          Σ. δύναιτο δ' ἂν τις μεταδιδόναι ὃ μὴ ἔχοι;
- 5**       Α. καὶ πῶς;  
          Σ. αὐτῷ ἄρα σοὶ πρῶτον κτητέον ἀρετὴν, καὶ ἄλλωι  
 ὅς μέλλει μὴ ἰδίαι μόνον αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἄρξῃν καὶ  
 ἐπιμελήσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πόλεως καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως.  
          Α. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
- 10**     Σ. οὐκ ἄρα ἐξουσίαν σοι οὐδ' ἀρχὴν παρασκευαστέον  
 σαντῷ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληι, οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ δικαιο-  
 σύνην καὶ σωφροσύνην.  
          Α. φαίνεται.
- d**       Σ. δικαίως μὲν γὰρ πράττοντες καὶ σωφρόνως σύ τε καὶ  
 ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράξετε.  
          Α. εἰκός γε.  
          Σ. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ
- 5**       λαμπρὸν ὀρῶντες πράξετε.  
          Α. φαίνεται.  
          Σ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐνταῦθά γε βλέποντες ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ  
 τὰ ὑμέτερα ἀγαθὰ κατόψεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε.

A. ναί.

Σ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ πράξετε; 10

A. ναί.

Σ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε πράττοντας ὑμᾶς ἐθέλω ἐγγυή- e  
σασθαι ἢ μὴν εὐδαιμονήσειν.

A. ἀσφαλὴς γὰρ εἶ ἐγγυητής.

Σ. ἀδίκως δὲ πράττοντες, εἰς τὸ ἄθεον καὶ σκοτεινὸν  
βλέποντες, ὥς τὰ εἰκότα, ὅμοια τούτοις πράξετε ἄγ- 5  
νοοῦντες ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

A. ἔοικεν.

Σ. ὦι γάρ, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἐξουσία μὲν ἦι ποιεῖν ὁ  
βούλεται, νοῦν δὲ μὴ ἔχει, τί τὸ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν, ἰδιώτηι ἢ  
καὶ πόλει; οἷον νοσοῦντι ἐξουσίας οὕσης δρᾶν ὁ βούλεται, 135  
νοῦν ἰατρικὸν μὴ ἔχοντι, τυραννοῦντι δὲ ὥς μηδὲν ἐπι-  
πλήττοι τις αὐτῷ, τί τὸ συμβησόμενον; ἄρ' οὐχ, ὥς τὸ  
εἰκὸς, διαφθαρῆναι τὸ σῶμα;

A. ἀληθὴ λέγεις. 5

Σ. τί δ' ἐν νηί, εἴ τωι ἐξουσία εἴη ποιεῖν ὁ δοκεῖ, νοῦ τε  
καὶ ἀρετῆς κυβερνητικῆς ἐστερημένωι, καθορᾷς ἃ ἂν συμ-  
βαίῃ αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς συνναύταις;

A. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἀπόλοιτο πάντες ἄν.

Σ. οὐκοῦν ὥσαύτως ἐν πόλει τε καὶ πάσαις ἀρχαῖς καὶ 10  
ἐξουσίαις ἀπολειπομέναις ἀρετῆς ἔπεται τὸ κακῶς πράττειν; b

A. ἀνάγκη.

Σ. οὐκ ἄρα τυραννίδα χρή, ὦ ἄριστε Ἀλκιβιάδη, παρα-  
σκευάζεσθαι οὐθ' αὐτῷ οὔτε τῇ πόλει, εἰ μέλλετε εὐδαι-  
μονεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴν. 5

A. ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

Σ. πρὶν δέ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἄρχεσθαι ἄμεινον ὑπὸ  
τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνδρί, οὐ μόνον παιδί.

A. φαίνεται.

Σ. οὐκοῦν τὸ γ' ἄμεινον καὶ κάλλιον; 10

A. ναί.

134e8 γάρ D, i: γὰρ ἄν c 135a2–3 ὥς μηδὲν ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ i: ὥς  
ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ d: ὥς ἐπιπλήττοι τις ἑαυτῷ d: ὥς μηδ' ἐπιπλήττοντι  
ἑαυτῷ d

- Σ. τὸ δὲ κάλλιον πρεπωδέστερον;
- c A. πῶς δ' οὐ;
- Σ. πρέπει ἄρα τῷ κακῷ δουλεύειν· ἄμεινον γάρ.
- A. ναί.
- Σ. δουλοπρεπὲς ἄρ' ἡ κακία.
- 5 A. φαίνεται.
- Σ. ἐλευθεροπρεπὲς δὲ ἡ ἀρετή.
- A. ναί.
- Σ. οὐκοῦν φεύγειν χρή, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὴν δουλοπρέπειαν;
- A. μάλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
- 10 Σ. αἰσθάνη δὲ νῦν πῶς ἔχεις; ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς ἢ οὐ;
- A. δοκῶ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα αἰσθάνεσθαι.
- Σ. οἷσθ' οὖν πῶς ἀποφύξει τοῦτο τὸ περὶ σὲ νῦν; ἵνα μὴ ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ καλῷ ἀνδρί.
- d A. ἔγωγε.
- Σ. πῶς;
- A. ἐὰν βούλῃ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
- Σ. οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη.
- 5 A. ἀλλὰ πῶς χρή λέγειν;
- Σ. ὅτι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.
- A. λέγω δὴ. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις μέντοι τόδε λέγω, ὅτι κινδυνεύομεν μεταλαβεῖν τὸ σχῆμα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὲν σὸν ἐγώ, σὺ δὲ τοῦμόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ παιδ-
- 10 αγωγήσω σε ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, σὺ δ' ὑπ' ἐμοῦ παιδ-αγωγήσῃ.
- e Σ. ὦ γενναῖε, πελαργοῦ ἄρα ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρωσ οὐδὲν διοίσει, εἰ παρὰ σοὶ ἐννεοττεύσας ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον ὑπὸ τούτου πάλιν θεραπεύσεται.
- A. ἀλλὰ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄρξομαί γε ἐντεῦθεν τῆς δικ-
- 5 αιοσύνης ἐπιμέλεσθαι.
- Σ. βουλοίμην ἂν σε καὶ διατελέσαι· ὀρρωδῶ δέ, οὐ τὴ τῇ σῇ φύσει ἀπιστῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ῥώμην, μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ.

135d8 μεταλαβεῖν c: μεταβαλεῖν D

## COMMENTARY

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### 103a1–104c7: Socrates breaks his silence

*Socrates has long been in love with Alcibiades, and now addresses him for the very first time. Alcibiades has had many admirers, whom he has treated with scorn. But Alcibiades has, at least in his own opinion, great advantages, first among which is a beauty that is evident to all. All this has led Socrates to form certain hopes . . .*

**103a1 ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου** ‘child of Cleinias’. Socrates often speaks in such a way when addressing his younger interlocutors; it reminds the addressee of what can be expected of him as child of his father. On the one occasion on which Socrates himself is addressed in this way (*La.* 180d: ὦ παῖ Σωφρονίσκου), it is by a man who proceeds to point out that he was a friend of Sophroniscus’, and hence has a claim on Socrates’ time. Generals use patronymics when a special effort is needed: in *Hom. Il.* 10.68 Menelaus is told to rouse his troops ‘addressing each man πατρώθεν, by his lineage’; and in *Th.* 7.69.2, Nicias exhorts the captains of his triremes, ‘addressing them πατρώθεν, and by their own names and tribe’, and entreating ‘those with celebrated forebears not to deface the glorious deeds of their fathers (τὰς πατρικὰς ἀρετὰς)’. Cf. 124d8n., on ὦ ἑταῖρε ‘comrade’.

**θαυμάζειν**: according to *Th.* 155d, ‘the experience of wonder (θαυμάζειν) is especially characteristic of the philosopher, and philosophy has no other origin than this’; and the same thought is developed at greater length in *Arist. Met.* 982b11–21. Cf. the wonder that Euthydemus felt, and was attempting to suppress, at the outset of Socrates’ attempts to turn him to philosophy (*Xen. Mem.* 4.2.3; cf. 4.2.6). All of Socrates’ dealings with Euthydemus, as represented at *Xen. Mem.* 4.2, 3, 5 and 6, make instructive reading: for comparisons on points of detail, see the notes on 104a5, 104b7, 104c2, 104d7–9, 104e5, 105a7 ἐὰν θᾶπτον, 105d6 ἐλπίδας, 112b1, 116e3–4, 117e4, 118b6–7, 118c3–4, 120c1, 124b1, 130d6 and 135c8.

**ὅτι**: when the fact that prompts Alcibiades’ wonder is given in a ὅτι clause rather than with a milder εἰ, the suggestion is (as at e.g. *Rep.* 489a, *Th.* 142a) that it is a fact

too gross to be doubted or ignored. **a2 ἐραστής** ‘lover’. This translation must however be treated with caution. In current English, we often speak of two people as ‘lovers’ when they are both equal partners in a sexual relationship. The word ἐραστής, by contrast, is characteristically used of a man who feels sexual desire for a youth, his ἐρώμενος or παιδικά. There is no implication that the older man gets what he desires, or that his desire is reciprocated. **a3–4 δι’ ὅχλου ἐγένοντό σοι διαλεγόμενοι** ‘used to pester you with their conversations’. The phrase δι’ ὅχλου suggests that the conversations were both frequent and tiresome; cf. Th. 1.73.2, Ar. Ec. 888, where it is used of things grown boring by repetition. **a4 οὐδὲ προσεῖπον** ‘I have not so much as said hello to you’, by contrast with the lovers who have had entire conversations. **a5–6 δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα**: Socrates was charged with, among other things, ‘not accepting the gods (θεούς) whom the city accepts’, but ‘introducing strange supernatural beings (καινὰ δαιμόνια)’ instead (*Ap.* 26b; Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.1). Behind the charge lay such talk as this. According to Plato, the supernatural voice that spoke to Socrates spoke to him only to veto (as it does here; hence ἐναντίωμα) some action that he had in mind (*Ap.* 31c–d, 40a–c, 41d; *Tht.* 151a; *Euthd.* 272e; *Phdr.* 242b–c). According to others, the voice did much more besides (Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.4; Xen. *Ap.* 13; [Plato] *Thg.* 128d–131a). **a6 καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ**: i.e. ‘you will have another opportunity to ask about it later, and therefore we will not discuss it now’; indeed, they do not discuss it ever again in the course of this dialogue. Socrates’ words are in fact an idiomatic way of dropping a subject; cf. the way that subjects are dropped at *Smp.* 175e ‘We’ll sort this out καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον’, *Rep.* 347e ‘We’ll examine this καὶ εἰς αὖθις’, *Phlb.* 33b–c ‘We’ll look at this καὶ εἰς αὖθις, if it’s relevant’, and *GP* 319.

**b2 οὖν** is ‘resumptive’ (*GP* 428), and marks a return to the earlier topic of Alcibiades’ lovers, after the digression on Socrates’ supernatural voice. **b5–104a1 ὑπερβληθεὶς τῷ φρονήματι ὑπὸ σοῦ πέφευγεν**: it was a commonplace of literary courtship, and no doubt of courtship in real life, to begin by speaking of the haughtiness with which the beloved treats his lovers; cf. Demos. 61.3 on those who ‘disdain the company of their lovers (τὴν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἐραστὰς ὁμίλιαν δυσχεραίνοντας)’. In 131c12–13, after he has won Alcibiades’



confidence, Socrates offers a different and less flattering explanation for why all Alcibiades' other lovers have left him: they have left him not because of his haughtiness, but because they were not really lovers of Alcibiades himself; instead they loved only his body, which is now losing its adolescent charm.

**104a2** οὐδενὸς φήις ἀνθρώπων ἐνδεὴς εἶναι εἰς οὐδέν 'You say that you do not need anybody for anything.' Since Socrates' statement of intent in the previous sentence makes the connexion obvious, there is no connecting particle (cf. 105a7; see *GP* xliii). In *Smp.* 216a Alcibiades summarises the effect of many discussions with Socrates: 'He forces me to agree that, while I myself continue to be in great need (πολλοῦ ἐνδεὴς ὢν) ...' One must of course become aware of one's needs before one can set out to satisfy them. The point is of general validity (as *Smp.* 200e indicates). In this dialogue, the application that matters is to knowledge: Alcibiades is ignorant (106c–119a), but he has ambitions that cannot be achieved without knowledge (119b–124b); and only once he is persuaded of these things does he seek to improve himself intellectually (124b–135e). **a2–3** τὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχοντά σοι 'for the things that you have to your credit', or 'your advantages'. The great advantages of the beloved were, after his haughtiness (103b5–104a1n.), the next topic in a speech of courtship; cf. *Demos.* 61.6 'for, by going through your advantages (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχοντά σοι διελθών)', and 61.7 'as your advantages merit (ἀξίως τῶν ὑπάρχόντων)'. Socrates however breaks with the routine pattern of courtship by not himself vouching for the greatness of Alcibiades' advantages: their greatness is something that Alcibiades asserts (μεγάλα εἶναι; the infinitive is governed by φήις 'you say' in 104a2; cf. οἶε 'you think' in 104a4, 104b4). The contrast between Alcibiades' magnificent advantages and his dreadful behaviour is the theme of *Demos.* 21.143–6. Pride in their advantages was taken to be hereditary in Alcibiades' family: thus in *Isoc.* 16.24, a speech written in the persona of the Alcibiades who was the son of our Alcibiades, the speaker is made to say 'since long ago, we have had the biggest and finest advantages of the citizens (πόρρωθεν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα τῶν πολιτῶν)'. **a4** ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀρξάμενα τελευτῶντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν: this rhetorical figure, where two mirror-image phrases are juxtaposed with no connecting parti-

cle ('asyndetic chiasm'), marks a quite exalted style (cf. *Rep.* 617e αἰτία ἐλομένων· θεὸς ἀναίτιος, the climax of a most grandiloquent passage). It is in such a style, suggests Socrates, that Alcibiades likes to speak of himself. For ornamental chiasms on Alcibiades' own lips, see 113d6–8 and 135d8–9. **α5** **πρῶτον μὲν κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος**: the good looks of the beloved are the first of his advantages to be described in a speech of courtship; cf. *Demos.* 61.10: 'I will start by praising first your beauty (ἄρξομαι δὲ πρῶτον ἐπαινεῖν . . . τὸ κάλλος).' The phrase κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος is the superlative of the phrase whose positive forms καλός τε μέγας τε and καλή τε μεγάλη τε Homer often uses. Size no less than shapeliness was regarded as an important aspect of an attractive physique (cf. *Chrm.* 154c 'he looked wonderful, both in size and in beauty'; *Phlb.* 48e 'those who think they are taller and more beautiful and in all other physical respects better than the way they really are'); and to be tall and handsome could be regarded as an essential ingredient of happiness (cf. *Arist. EE* 1215b10–11 'thinking that he could not be called happy, since he was not either tall and handsome or rich'). Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν), by contrast with Alcibiades, was merely καλός (*Xen. Mem.* 4.2.1). **α6** **τοῦτο μὲν**: see 108egn. **παντὶ δῆλον ἰδεῖν ὅτι οὐ ψεύδῃ** 'it is plain for everyone to see that you are not wrong' in your belief that you are very tall and very handsome. It is one of the clichés of courtship that the beloved not only is beautiful, but also has a beauty obvious to everyone; cf. *Demos.* 61.10: 'your beauty, which everyone can recognise in you the moment that they see you (ὅπερ πρῶτον ἰδοῦσιν ἅπασιν ἔστι γινῶναί σου, τὸ κάλλος)'. Note that Socrates expresses agreement only with the thought that Alcibiades is physically very attractive. He does not express agreement with the thought that this, or any other of the features that he will proceed to list, are in fact advantages. It will later become clear that his reason for not expressing agreement is that he disagrees; cf. 107b6–c2, 123d5–124a1. **α6–b1** **νεανικωτάτου γένους ἐν τῇ σεαυτοῦ πόλει, οὔσῃ μεγίστῃ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων**: with the structure of this thought, compare the praise of Agesilaus' line in *Xen. Ages.* 1.3: 'just as their family was the most distinguished in their country, so too their city was the most reputable in Greece' (see 121a5–b1n. for another allusion to this book). Something of Alcibiades' character is indicated by the way that he

prides himself on belonging, not to the most distinguished family, but to the family that is νεανικώτατον (here perhaps ‘most vigorous’, but the word can connote the vices as well as the virtues of youth, and in some contexts can be translated ‘brashness’), and not to the ‘most reputable’ city, nor yet to the city that is ‘oldest, biggest and most notable among the entire human race’ or ‘biggest, and with the finest reputation for wisdom and strength’ (Athenian boasts in Isoc. 4.23, *Ap.* 29d), but simply to the city that is ‘biggest’ (the Athenian boast in Th. 5.111.4, addressed to the Melians; cf. 109c2–3n.).

**b1** πρὸς πατρός: on the side of his father Cleinias, Alcibiades belonged to ‘the Eupatrids, whose very name makes manifest their noble birth’ (Isoc. 16.25). **τε** is correlated with the δέ of τούτων δὲ τοὺς πρὸς μητρός in 104b3. **b1–2** φίλους καὶ συγγενεῖς πλείστους: belonging to such a circle was thought, in spite or because of its advantages, to provide temptations to lawlessness. Cf. the description in Arist. *Rh.* 1372a13–17 of the sort of people whom the orator’s audience will take to be particularly capable of committing injustice: they include above all ‘those with lots of friends’ and ‘the rich’ (cf. 104c1); they include also ‘those who can count among their resources friends or supporters or associates of this sort (κἂν ὑπάρχωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι φίλοι ἢ ὑπηρέται ἢ κοινωνοί). For these things make people capable both of doing the deed, and of escaping detection, and of not paying the penalty.’ **b3** πρὸς μητρός: on the side of his mother Deinomache, Alcibiades belonged to the Alcmeonids, whose wealth and public services (not least the establishment of Athenian democracy by Deinomache’s grandfather Cleisthenes) are described in Isoc. 16.25–7. **b5** Περικλέα: himself an Alcmeonid (his mother was niece of Cleisthenes), and the leading figure in Athenian politics for the three decades until his death in 429. Athens under Pericles’ influence is described by a famous phrase in Th. 2.65.9: ‘in principle, a democracy; in practice, rule by the first man (λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή)’. **b6** ἐπίτροπον κατέλιπε is the standard legal phrase for nominating someone in one’s will to be guardian of one’s children, and trustee of their inheritance, until they reach adulthood (cf. Demos. 36.22, Isaeus 1.10, Lys. 32.18). Pericles was not in fact the only guardian of Alcibiades; he shared the responsibility

with his brother Ariphton (Plu. *Alc.* 1.2; Antiphon, in the passage quoted in 127a6n., speaks of ‘guardians’). Pericles was however by far the more eminent in Athenian politics. Perhaps this is why Alcibiades is not said to pride himself on his connexion with his other guardian Ariphton. **τῷ ἀδελφῷ:** Cleinias, Alcibiades’ younger brother (*Prt.* 320a), on whom see 118e4n. **b7 δύναται πράττειν**

**ὅτι ἂν βούληται:** the power to do whatever one likes was agreed by Euthydemus (103a1n. on θανμάζειν) to be the goal of training in any of the arts (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.6: ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται δυνατοί). At 134c10–12, 134e8–135b5 it will be agreed that such power may not in fact be as good a thing as it here seems to be. In 433 (the approximate dramatic date of this dialogue; cf. 123d6–7n.), Pericles could well be described as having such power: every year since 443 he had been elected στρατηγός (Plu. *Per.* 16.3), and this was the most powerful elected office in Athens (cf. Lys. 21.7, a description of Alcibiades himself: στρατηγὸς ὢν, ᾧ ἐξῆν ποιεῖν ὅτι ἐβούλετο). However, Pericles’ power was not to last: in 430 he was convicted of embezzlement, fined, and temporarily removed from office (Th. 2.65.3–4; *Grg.* 516a, which has motives for exaggeration, adds that he was nearly executed). **b7–8 ἐν πάσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι:** the thought that Pericles could do whatever he wanted, not only in Athens, but throughout Greece, would have been plausible enough in 433, when memories of Pericles’ various victories over other Greeks would still be fresh (e.g. Th. 1.111.2, 1.114.3, 1.116.1), and when the Peloponnesian War, which eventually led to the collapse of Athenian power, was not yet under way.

**b8 τῶν βαρβάρων:** Pericles had campaigned against barbarians in the Chersonese and on the shores of the Black Sea (Plu. *Per.* 19.1, 20.1).

**ci γένεσιν** ‘tribes’. Barbarians do not have any such institution as the πόλις. See 111a1n. and 111c8–9n. for the connexion between not speaking Greek (i.e. being βάρβαρος) and not having Greek institutions. **ὅτι τῶν πλουσίων** ‘that you are one of the rich’. The curtness of the phrase corresponds to the small importance that Alcibiades attaches to his wealth: although it is one of the things on which he prides himself (104c2–3 κατὰ πάντα ... ταῦτα ... μεγαλαυχούμενος), it does not loom large among them. The genitive plural τῶν πλουσίων suggests, not only that Alcibiades is πλούσιος,

but also that, in being πλούσιος, he belongs to a group with something of an identity of its own (cf. 123b5 τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων ‘one of those who have gone up’; Demos. 21 Hypothesis 1.2 τῷ Μειδίαι, τῶν πλουσίων ἐνί ‘Meidías, one of the rich’). The rich were indeed such a group in many Greek cities. For example, the essential distinction between oligarchy and democracy was, in spite of etymology, not rule by the few as opposed to the people, but rule by the rich as opposed to the poor (Arist. *Pol.* 1279b11–1280a5).

**c2 ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἥκιστα μέγα φρονεῖν:** Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) too did not pride himself on his wealth (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.9). However, quite unlike Alcibiades, he was, says Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.1, one of those who ‘think they have had the best education, and pride themselves on their wisdom (μέγα φρονοῦσιν ἐπὶ σοφίαι)’. **c3 τε . . . τε:** such a repetition of τε was, conjectures *GP* 503, ‘felt to be slightly colloquial’. At any rate, while common elsewhere, it was avoided in formal contexts like inscriptions, and speeches before the Assembly of the sort that Alcibiades proposes soon to make (105b1, 106c3–5). **c4 καὶ σε ταῦτ’ οὐ λέληθεν:** it is more usual to stress the attention that the lover pays to the beloved’s affairs, than to stress the attention paid to them by the beloved: cf. Demos. 61.7: ‘It has however not escaped my attention that (καίτοι μ’ οὐ λέληθεν) . . .’, and 105a2–3n. With the way that something like a lover’s attention to Alcibiades’ affairs is being paid by Alcibiades himself, cf. the way that Alcibiades himself is represented as giving what might otherwise be a lover’s list of the beloved’s advantages (104a2–3n.). Here perhaps are some seeds for that care of himself which Socrates will later be urging on Alcibiades (see the passages listed in 104d3n. on ἐπιμελέσταις). **c6 ἐλπίδα:** as part of the ritual of courtship, a lover might declare what he hoped for from the relationship that he was trying to initiate; cf. Demos. 61.8: ‘These then are the hopes with which I start my speech (τὰς μὲν οὖν ἐλπίδας ἔχων τοιαύτας ἐγχειρῶ τῷ λόγῳ).’

### 104d1–106c2: Alcibiades’ ambitions

*Alcibiades too has been waiting for a suitable moment at which to start courting. He hopes to persuade the Athenian Assembly of his merits; and then, once Athens*

*yields to his persuasions, to use it as a power-base from which to dominate the world. But to achieve these ambitions, he needs help that, says Socrates, only Socrates can provide. Alcibiades will learn why, if he answers some questions that Socrates will put to him.*

**104d1–2** **σμικρόν με ἔφθης** ‘you’ve got in just one step ahead of me’. **d2** **ἐν ὧν εἶχον . . . 3 αὐτὰ ταῦτ’ ἐρέσθαι**: the fact that Alcibiades has never got around to asking the question is symptomatic of a general reluctance to learn. Recall that his education was not on the list of things on which he prided himself at 104a1–c4; and see also 106b5–6, e6–7, e10n., 114e1, 118e8, 119b5–9, 130c7 for other signs of intellectual laziness. **d2** **πρότερός σοι προσελθών**: the fact that Alcibiades has not approached Socrates first is a mark of arrogance: the ὑπερήφανος, who suffers from ‘a contempt for everyone apart from himself’, is the sort of person who ‘is never willing to approach anyone else first (προσελθεῖν πρότερος οὐδενὶ θελήσει)’ (Thphr. *Char.* 24.1, 6). **d4** **ἐνοχλεῖς με** ‘you harass me’. **d4** **ἀεὶ ὅπου περ ἂν ὦ . . . 5 πάρων**: we will learn that Socrates has loitered outside Alcibiades’ school during playtime (110b1–6). Cf. *Smp.* 213c, where a much older Alcibiades says to Socrates ‘it’s your habit to appear all of a sudden, where I least expect you to be’. The two complaints (‘You are always about’, ‘You keep turning up unexpectedly’) are not easily seen to be consistent with one another; but the same pattern of behaviour could be described in both these ways by someone prone to exaggeration. **d4** **ἐπιμελέστατα**: the very first hint of the theme that will later be so prominent in the dialogue: how Alcibiades is to take care of (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) himself (119a9, 120c8–d4, 123d4–e1, 124b7, d2, 127e8–129a9, 132b5–c5). **d5** **θαυμάζω**: see 103a1n. on θαυμάζειν. **d5–6** **οἷ τι πρᾶγμα** ‘what on earth your game is’; cf. LSJ s.v. πρᾶγμα π.4.b. In *Smp.* 217c Alcibiades says that, when his attempts to seduce Socrates were not succeeding, ‘I decided that I had to find out what his game was (τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα).’ In *Ap.* 20c, Socrates imagines a heckler asking ‘But Socrates, what is your game (τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα)? Why have there been all these complaints about you?’ **d7** **ἀκούσῃ . . . μου . . . προθύμως . . . 8–9 καὶ ὥς ἀκουσομένῳ καὶ περιμενοῦντι λέγω** ‘will you listen to me eagerly . . .; and can I speak on the assumption that you will stay around and listen?’ Cf.

the way that after intriguing Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν), Socrates moved in, ‘once he sensed that he was more ready to wait (ἐτοιμότερον ὑπομένοντα) while Socrates talked with him, and more eager to listen (προθυμότερον ἀκούοντα)’ (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.8). **διο** πάνυ μὲν οὖν ‘Certainly’. This formula is a great favourite in Plato and Xenophon’s Socratic works, but otherwise rare. The formula was mocked in comedy, perhaps in Ar. *Pl.* 97, 1195, and certainly in this dialectic from Epicharmus DK 23 B 3: “Is pipe-playing a thing?” “πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “Is pipe-playing a man then?” “Not at all.” “Let’s see then: what of a pipe-player? What do you think he is? A man, isn’t he?” “πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “Now don’t you think that the same applies to the good?” Cf. 109e5n. on καὶ μάλα, 130c4n. on κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

**ει–2** ὥσπερ μόγις ἡρξάμην, οὕτω μόγις καὶ παυσαίμην ‘I am as slow to stop speaking as I was to start.’ Socrates wants to make really sure that Alcibiades will listen to the end. **ε3** ὡγαθέ λέγε· ἀκούσομαι γάρ: Alcibiades is getting impatient: hence the repeated request that Socrates tell him, and the repeated assurance that he will listen. But Alcibiades retains his politeness: hence ὡγαθέ, used as ‘a term of gentle remonstrance’ (LSJ) in dramatic dialogues (e.g. 120a9), comedy, satyr plays, and no doubt in everyday conversation too, but not, it seems, elevated enough for tragedy. See 113c5–6n. on ὦ βέλτιστε, for politer forms of address, to express stronger remonstrance. **ε4** λεκτέον ἂν εἴη ‘It looks as if I’ve got to tell you.’ The use of ἂν plus optative, instead of a plain indicative, suggests that Socrates is less than fully convinced that he should tell Alcibiades, which in turn suggests that he is less than fully convinced of the sincerity of Alcibiades’ assurances that he will hear him out. For a similar construction, to indicate similar doubts, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.1: someone had been describing a courtesan, ‘and had been saying that her beauty was greater than words could describe. When he said that artists would visit her house in order to paint her, and that she displayed to them all the beauties of her person, Socrates replied “It looks as if we’ve got to go and see (ἰτέον ἂν εἴη θεασομένους); for we won’t come to know something greater than words can describe just by hearing about it.”’ **ε4–5** ‘It is difficult for a lover to approach someone who is now a man, and who does not

give way to lovers.’ **e4 ἄνδρα** is somewhat double-edged. The term *μειράκιον* would be more exact for someone ‘not quite twenty yet’ (123d6–7), and so to call Alcibiades an *ἄνῆρ* would make the flattering suggestion that he lacks the immaturity connoted by *μειράκιον* (cf. 123e4). On the other hand, to call him an *ἄνῆρ* would also suggest that he is not quite as lovely as he was. See *Prt.* 309a, where someone describes Alcibiades thus: ‘He seemed to be a handsome man still, but a man nevertheless (*καλὸς . . . ἄνῆρ ἔτι, ἄνῆρ μέντοι*), Socrates, to speak between ourselves, and already getting quite a beard.’ **e5 προσφέρεσθαι**: in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.1 the same verb is used in connexion with Socrates’ approach to Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν).

**105a1 ὥς γε δὴ ἑμαυτὸν πείθω**: the tone of this is close to ‘or so I flatter myself’. One says ‘I persuade myself’ of what might be believed out of vanity (e.g. *Phd.* 92e ‘This I have accepted, ὥς ἑμαυτὸν πείθω, quite correctly and with good reason’; *Phd.* 97b ‘I no longer πείθω ἑμαυτόν that I understand the reason why . . .’; And. 1.70 ‘You have heard all about what took place then, and I have given an adequate account of myself – ὥς γε ἑμαυτὸν πείθω, but if anyone would like [to ask a question], then . . .’; Isoc. *Ep.* 3.1 ‘quite sufficiently, ὥς ἑμαυτὸν ἔπειθον’; Th. 6.33.1 ‘I won’t be deterred from speaking, or remain silent while our city is in danger, πείθων γε ἑμαυτόν that I know what to say rather better than others do.’). A speaker who says ὥς ἑμαυτὸν πείθω to acknowledge the possibility of self-deception thereby mitigates the air of vanity. In our passage, the vanity is further mitigated by the ‘emphatic limitative’ γε δὴ (*GP* 245; cf. 106b5n.), with its strong suggestion that ‘persuading himself’ is all there is to Socrates’ belief that he would long since have ceased to love an Alcibiades who was too easy to satisfy. Socrates therefore makes a flirtatious insinuation: Alcibiades’ charms are so great that Socrates might after all have continued loving him, even against his better judgement. **a2 ᾧ καὶ γνώσῃ**: lit. ‘by which you will actually know’, i.e. ‘and this will make you appreciate’. The ᾧ is a neuter relative pronoun, whose antecedent is the entire clause ἔτερά . . . σέ; cf. 133a3n. on ὃ δὴ καὶ . . . καλοῦμεν. **a2–3 προσέχων γέ σοι τὸν νοῦν διατετέλεκα** ‘I have at least been giving you my sustained attention’; i.e. even if Socrates’ diagnosis of Alcibiades’ inner



thoughts is not altogether accurate, it will at least indicate that Socrates has been giving Alcibiades the sort of attention that a lover, more than anyone else, will give to a boy (cf. *Lys.* 205b ἐραστήν ὄντα καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα τῷ παιδί). For some details of the attention that Socrates has paid to Alcibiades' affairs, see 106e4–9, 109d2–4, 110b1–6. **a3–4 εἰ τίς σοι εἴποι θεῶν:** actual values are revealed by imaginary choices; and in many such thought experiments it would, as here, take something like the power of a god to present one with the choice. It is therefore no accident that such choices are envisaged by the founder of modern decision theory, F. P. Ramsey, *Foundations* (London 1978) 78: 'If then we had the power of the Almighty, and could persuade the subject of our power, we could, by offering him options, discover how he placed in order of merit all possible courses of the world.' The device of an imaginary choice offered by a god was common in the Alcibiades literature (see *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.16, quoted in 105a5–6n., and *Alc. mi.* 141a–b, 148a); but it occurs elsewhere too, both in philosophy (e.g. *Laws* 683b–c) and outside it (*Men. Theophroroumene* fr. 1 Sandbach). The device may stem ultimately from such choices as the one presented to Achilles in *Hom. Il.* 9.410–16 by his mother, the goddess Thetis: a glorious death at Troy, or a safe but inglorious return home. **a5 αὐτίκα τεθνάναι** 'to die straightaway'. Perhaps an allusion to *Hom. Il.* 18.98 αὐτίκα τεθναίην, the words in which Achilles responds to his mother's warning that, if he kills Hector, he too will die soon after (*Ap.* 28c–d quotes these words, and reworks the tale from Homer so as to make it more explicitly the tale of a choice presented by a goddess). The perfect tense of the verb τεθνάναι directs attention to the state of being dead, by contrast with the process of dying (cf. the shift of tenses in *Phd.* 64a: true philosophers 'prepare themselves for dying and being dead (ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι)'). Alcibiades is therefore invited to ignore such considerations as whether dying would be painful; he is to focus simply on whether being dead is preferable to being alive but without prospect of further achievement. **a5–6 δοκεῖς ἂν μοι ἐλέσθαι τεθνάναι** 'I think you would choose death.' In direct speech, this would be ἔλοιο ἂν τεθνάναι; the ἂν is retained, even after the optative ἔλοιο is replaced by the infinitive ἐλέσθαι, governed by δοκεῖς. For the construction, and the entire thought, cf. *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.16: 'My opinion

is (ἡγοῦμαι) that if God had granted them [Critias and Alcibiades] either an entire life lived in the way they saw Socrates living his, or death, they would have chosen death (ἐλέσθαι ἂν μᾶλλον αὐτῷ τεθνάναι).’ **a6–7 ἐπὶ τίνι . . . ; ἐγὼ φράσω:** a question, followed immediately by a promise to answer it, is a figure at home in the highest rhetoric (e.g. Demos. 4.20, 22). A fan of the sophist Gorgias uses the figure (*Phlb.* 19c; cf. 58a); so does Socrates, when parodying Gorgias’ manner (*Grg.* 487b–c), and when addressing the jury that has just condemned him to death (*Ap.* 40b). **a7 ἡγῆ:** for the absence of any connecting particle, cf. 104a2n. **ἐὰν θᾶττον** ‘as soon as’. For the idiom, and the entire thought, cf. the description of the young Plato in *Ep.* 7.324b–c ‘I was young once, and the same thing happened to me as happens to many others. I thought that as soon as (εἰ θᾶττον) I became of age I would immediately set out on a career in politics.’ Until he reached the age of twenty, a citizen could not exercise his right to address the Assembly (Arist. *Ath.* 42.5). With Alcibiades’ waiting upon his coming of age, cf. Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαναμάζειν), who ‘because of his youth, was not yet entering the agora’ (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.1; for the taboo on youth in the agora, cf. Isoc. 7.48). Alcibiades is more patient than Plato’s elder brother Glaucon, who, according to Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.1, ‘used to try and speak before the people: he yearned to be prominent in public life, even though he was not yet twenty years old. Of his other friends and relations, not one could stop him being dragged from the speakers’ platform and made a laughing stock. Socrates alone stopped this happening.’ For other comparisons between Alcibiades and Glaucon, see 105b7–8n., 106d1n., 114b6–7n.

**b1 παρέλθης:** the standard term for a speaker stepping forward to address the Assembly (LSJ s.v. παρέρχομαι vi). **μάλα ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν** ‘within a very few days’. Alcibiades is ‘not quite twenty yet’ (123d6–7), and so not quite yet of age to speak in the Assembly (105a7n. on ἐὰν θᾶττον). **b2 οὖν** here is at least in part ‘resumptive’, after the aside τοῦτο . . . ἡμερῶν. But it also marks the apodosis of a conditional; in such a use it ‘is almost confined to Ionic prose and Plato’ (*GP* 428). **b2–3 ἐνδείξεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ἄξιός ἐστι τιμᾶσθαι ὡς οὔτε Περικλῆς οὐτ’ ἄλλος οὐδείς:** for a story about how Alcibiades managed to endear himself to the Assembly on his first

appearance before them, see 120a9–b1n. Alcibiades eventually did persuade the Athenians to give him unprecedented honours: on his return to Athens in 407, he was acclaimed ‘Universal Leader Plenipotentiary’ (ἀπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ, Xen. *HG* 1.4.20). This acclamation was all the more striking, in that some seven years previously the Athenians had sentenced him to death (Th. 6.61.7).

**b5–6 ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι:** Alcibiades’ high status among the other Greeks is evident from how they celebrated an appearance of his at the Olympic Games: ‘The Ephesians pitched him a marquee in Persian style, twice the size of the city’s official one; the Chians provided sacrificial animals and fodder for his horses; and he got the Lesbians to supply wine and the rest of his expenses’ (And. 4.30; cf. Plu. *Alc.* 11.1–12.1, Sat. in Ath. 12 534d). Well might these allied cities have celebrated him, for he gained enormous prestige by his unparalleled showing in the chariot race (seven chariots entered, which won first, second and fourth places according to Th. 6.16.2, and first, second and third according to Isoc. 16.34 and Eur. fr. 755 *PMG*; cf. 122d8n. on the prestige of this event). Nor was Alcibiades’ influence among the other Greeks confined to Athenian allies. When in Sparta, while under sentence of death from the Athenians, he gave the Spartans strategic advice, on which they acted with devastating effect: they should send assistance to the Syracusans (Th. 6.91.4); and they should establish a permanent garrison at Decelea, a spot on high ground close to Athens itself (Th. 6.91.6, 7.27.2–28.2). For another mark of Alcibiades’ influence on Sparta, see 121b8–c1n. Alcibiades’ relationship with other Greeks had however the same ups and downs as his relationship with his fellow Athenians: it was not long before the Spartans too decided to kill him (Th. 8.45.1).

**b6–7 τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὅσοι ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμῖν οἰκοῦσιν ἡπείρωι:** e.g. the Thracians, among whom Alcibiades settled after falling out with the Athenians for the second time (see 125d10–11n.). He there set himself up as captain of a band of brigands (Plu. *Alc.* 36.5; Nep. *Alc.* 9.1–2).

**b7–8 καὶ εἰ αὖ σοι εἴποι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος θεὸς ὅτι** ‘And if this same god were to speak to you a second time, to say that ...’ Attaining the ambitions that Socrates has just described would make Alcibiades the equal of Pericles (cf. 104b6–c1). The second intervention from the god marks how radically the ambitions about to be described go beyond those described already. Cf. Xen.

*Mem.* 3.6.2: ‘To make him willing to listen [cf. 104d7–e3] ... , Socrates said “... you will be famous, first of all in the city [cf. 105b4–5], then in Greece [cf. 105b5–6], and perhaps, like Themistocles, even among the barbarians [cf. 105b6–7, 105c1: as victor over the Persians, and eventual defector to them, Themistocles was famous not only in Europe but also in Asia]; and you will be admired in all quarters, wherever you might be.” Glaucon [105a7n. on ἐν ᾧ ττον] rejoiced to hear this, and gladly stayed around.’

**c1 Ἀσίαν:** Asia Minor, i.e. not the whole of what is now meant by ‘Asia’, but just that part of it which is in western Turkey. Alcibiades had some elaborate intrigues with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, Persian ‘satraps’ or governors in the area (Th. 8.45.1–56.4, Plu. *Alc.* 37.8, Nep. *Alc.* 9.3–10.1), and was in fact living in Asia when, on the orders of Pharnabazus, he was assassinated (Plu. *Alc.* 39, Nep. *Alc.* 10.3–6).

**c3–4 ἐμπλήσεις τοῦ σοῦ ὀνόματος** ‘fill with your name’, in the sense of reputation. Alcibiades however managed to fill at least some parts of the world with his name in a more literal sense. A bizarre style of footwear that he affected was named the Alcibiades (Sat. in Ath. 12 534c); and Tissaphernes ‘decreed that the finest park in his possession ... should be called “Alcibiades”, and everybody always did speak of it by that name’ (Plu. *Alc.* 24.7).

**c4–5 πάντας ὡς ἔπος εἶπεῖν ἀνθρώπους** ‘more or less the whole of humanity’; the ὡς ἔπος εἶπεῖν acknowledges that πάντας is an exaggeration, while suggesting that it is not far wrong. And in fact, 105b4–c2 has already mentioned almost all the places that Alcibiades would have heard of and thought worth conquering. The main omission is North Africa, which at one time he hoped to conquer (Th. 6.15.2, cf. Th. 6.90.2), but which he never even visited. This omission serves to make Socrates’ account of Alcibiades’ ambitions correspond better to his later career.

**c5 Κύρου καὶ Ξέρξου:** kings of Persia, and therefore the worst of models for a citizen of the Athenian democracy. Cyrus reigned from 559 to 529; Xerxes reigned from 486 to 465. The conquests of Cyrus established the Persian empire; Xerxes was remembered above all for a grandiose invasion of Greece, which, although ultimately defeated, led to the devastation of Attica. The aspect of imperial power that particularly attracts Alcibiades is therefore, it seems, the opportunity to command large armies at war, regardless

of success or failure, and regardless also of the good or harm he might do. **c7 εὖ οἶδα καὶ οὐκ εἰκάζω:** contrast Socrates' profession here that, so far from guessing, he knows for sure about Alcibiades' ambition, with the ignorance that he professes elsewhere (117b12–13n.) about important matters. The two professions are consistent: they imply merely that the facts about Alcibiades' ambition are unimportant. Cf. 106c2n., on Socrates' readiness to accept an evasive answer about Alcibiades' ambitions, and its contrast with his reluctance to accept similarly evasive answers to questions about philosophy. **c8–d1 τί δὴ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ σοι πρὸς λόγον;** 'So just what do you think that's got to do with it, Socrates?' **c8 δὴ οὖν:** combinations of δὴ and οὖν, 'very common in Herodotus and Plato, are rarely found elsewhere ... in Attic they are especially used in questions' (*GP* 468).

**d1 πρὸς λόγον:** lit. 'related to discussion', and hence 'relevant to the point we are supposed to be talking about'. This is not a rare idiom (see *Prt.* 351e, *Phlb.* 33c, 42e), but it is not so common as to safeguard it from all corruption (see *Grg.* 459c). Someone made an inept attempt to explain the idiom, and the explanation got incorporated into the text as the words ὃν ἔφησθα ἑρεῖν, διὸ ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἀπαλλάττηι ('which you said [you?] would say, why you are not abandoning me'). **d1–2 ὦ φίλε παῖ Κλεινίου καὶ Δεινομάχης:** to address someone as child of both his father and his mother is most unusual (contrast 103a1n. on ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου). This turn of phrase was striking enough to be alluded to by other authors (*Ath.* 5 219c, *Ael. VH* 2.1); perhaps it is imitated in what would otherwise be its only independent parallel: *Eph.* 2.313a ὦ παῖ Διονυσίου καὶ Δωρίδος. Olympiodorus gives the following explanation of why Socrates uses this strange form of address: 'In these words, he seems to be saying "Neither your kinsfolk on your mother's side, nor those on your father's, can provide the power that I can provide you."' See also 123c6–7n., 131e1–4n. and D. M. Schaps, 'The woman least mentioned: etiquette and women's names', *CQ* 27 (1977) 323–30. **d4 εἰς τὰ σὰ πράγματα καὶ εἰς σέ:** the distinction between his belongings and himself is in effect denied by Alcibiades at 127e8–128a4, and subsequently explained to him. **d6 περιέμενον:** Socrates has himself already shown, in waiting upon God, the sort of patience that he has sought

from Alcibiades; cf. περιμενοῦντι 104d9. **ἐλπιδας:** Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) ‘thought himself already superior in wisdom to his contemporaries, and had high hopes (μεγάλας ἐλπίδας) that he would become superior to everybody in his ability to speak and to act’ (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.1).

**ε6 μέτα τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι:** on Socrates’ regular use of such caveats, see 135d6n.

**106a2 ἐφήκεν** ‘he has let me loose on you’, by withdrawing his former veto. As in *Rep.* 388e, 555d, *Tim.* 59d, the verb ἐφήμι here means no more than ‘give free rein to’; see 103a5–6n., on whether the supernatural voice that spoke to Socrates ever did anything more than veto actions that he was contemplating. **a3–5** ‘You seem far more outlandish, now that you have started to speak, than you did when you were trailing after me in silence; yet even then you were very outlandish to look at.’

**a3 ἀτοπώτερος:** Socrates’ outlandishness (ἀτοπία) is the leading theme of Alcibiades’ speech in his praise in the *Symposium* (*Smp.* 215a, 221d); it is the subject of exasperated remarks by his interlocutors, sometimes affectionate (*Phdr.* 230c), sometimes not (*Grg.* 494d). **a4 εἶπου:** it was the mark of a lover to follow his beloved about the place. Thus Aristodemus, who was, ‘as much as anyone in those days, a lover of Socrates’ (*Smp.* 173b), ‘trailed off after’ Socrates, ‘as was his wont (ὥσπερ εἰώθει ἔπαισθαι)’ (*Smp.* 223d). **a5 ἰδεῖν:** by mentioning what Socrates is like to look at, Alcibiades responds to Socrates’ compliment at 104a5–6. One thing that made Socrates look outlandish was his habit of going unshod (*Ar. Clouds* 103, 363). Others were his snub nose and his bulging eyes: in *Tht.* 143e, someone apologises to Socrates for drawing attention to how ugly these features make him; and in Xen. *Smp.* 5.3–6 (cf. 116a3n.) Socrates displays his dialectical prowess by getting someone to admit that these features are in fact beautiful.

**a5–7 εἰ μὲν οὖν ... κτλ.:** with Alcibiades’ unembarrassed refusal to answer, contrast Charmides’ response at *Chrm.* 158c–d. Socrates has asked him if he is indeed as modest (σώφρων) as Critias says. His blushing modest response is that he can’t say ‘No’, both because such self-accusation would be ἀτοπον, and because it would mean calling Critias a liar; but also that he can’t say

‘Yes’ either, because such self-praise would be in bad taste. Alcibiades by contrast gives only one reason why he can’t say ‘No’, which is simply that he won’t be believed; and he gives no reason at all why he can’t say ‘Yes.’ Alcibiades’ answers will often be marked by evasiveness, not always unembarrassed; see 106c2, 109c1–3, 116d6, 130b10, and perhaps 127c10 and 131c11. **a7–8** ὅτι μάλιστα

is idiomatically used in the protasis of what one might call a ‘so what?’ conditional, where the apodosis suggests that however true the protasis, it still would not have the implications which the audience have ascribed to it. The same idiom occurs in 113e1. **a8–9**

πῶς διὰ σοῦ μοι ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ σοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο; ‘how is it that I will have these things because of you, but would not attain them without you?’ The indicative ἔσται shows that Alcibiades is confident of success; the optative οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο shows that he regards failure as a remote possibility. The contrast between the two constructions accentuates a contrast already present between the meanings of the two verbs: the verb εἶμι connotes being something stably and reliably, whereas the verb γίγνομαι connotes instability and unreliability; cf. e.g. Empedocles DK 31 B 17.11–13: ‘in one respect, they γίγνονται and have no stable life; in another respect, in that they never cease their perpetual interchanging, they ἔασιν always, changeless in a cycle’; *Grg.* 506c–d: ‘Pleasant is that by whose presence (παράγενομένου) we are pleased, while good is that by whose presence (παρόντος) we are good’; and *Lys.* 14.38: Alcibiades ‘wanted γενέσθαι a citizen of Thrace and of every city, rather than εἶναι one of his own fatherland’.

**b1** λόγον μακρόν, οἷους δὴ: when δὴ is used with οἷος ‘the note of disparagement, irony, or contempt is rarely quite absent’ (*GP* 220). The ‘long speeches’ to which Alcibiades is accustomed are rhetorical performances. Socrates frequently contrasts such speeches with the snappy question-and-answer dialectic that he prefers (e.g. *Prt.* 334c–335c, 336b–d; *Grg.* 449b–c; *Hp. mi.* 373a). The phrase λόγος μακρός was used in particular for the shifty ramblings of a slave (*Eur. IA* 313 μακροὺς δὲ δοῦλος ὦν λέγεις λόγους, *Arist. Met.* 1091a7–9 μακροὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν δούλων ὅταν μηθὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν; cf. *Simonides fr.* 653 *PMG*). In consequence, it has disdainful overtones here (and at e.g. *Ar. Ach.* 302, *Antisth. fr.* 150 *SSR*). **b2** ἀλλ’ . . . **3** μέν: the

μέν here marks a contrast, not with the succeeding clause, but with the preceding one; it is customary, but not obligatory, to add an ἀλλά to such a μέν (*GP* 377–8). **b4** ἐὰν ἔν μόνον μοι ἐθέλης βραχὺ ὑπηρετῆσαι ‘if you are prepared to do me just one little service’. The word βραχὺ has a particular use for the short answers that Socrates likes to receive (*Prt.* 334d, 334e–335a, 336a; *Grg.* 449a, 449b–c; *Minos* 321c). The word ὑπηρετῆσαι adds to the flirtatious tone, in that it can be used euphemistically of the sexual favours that a youth might grant his lover (*Smp.* 185a, *Xen. Hieron* 1.37). The word ὑπηρετῆσαι also hints at something of a reversal of rôles, in that Alcibiades, who has so many powerful relatives at his service (ὑπηρετοῖεν 104b3), is now expected to render services to Socrates. The reversal of rôles will be explicit at 135d8–e3; cf. 131e2–3n. for another anticipatory hint of it. **b5** εἰ γὰρ δὴ ‘if’. The combination of particles is an ‘emphatic limitative’ (*GP* 245; cf. 105a1n.); the strong emphasis this combination places on the εἰ gives it almost the force of ‘only so long as’. For the laziness that Alcibiades evinces here, cf. 104d2–3n.

**c2** ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, οὕτως ‘let’s suppose that that’s so, if you like’. Socrates lets Alcibiades get away with this characteristically (106a5–7n.) evasive answer. Contrast *Prt.* 331c–d, where Protagoras uses a similar wording (εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω . . .) to give a hesitant and evasive answer to Socrates’ question ‘Is justice holy and holiness just?’, and Socrates rejects the evasion: ‘for I don’t want to examine this “if you like” (εἰ βούλει) and “if you think so” (εἴ σοι δοκεῖ), but you and me. And I say “you and me”, because I think that the proposition would best be examined if the “if” were removed.’ But the question put to Protagoras was of immediate philosophical import, whereas that put to Alcibiades is merely biographical; Protagoras was speaking contrary to his own expressed view, whereas Alcibiades does, in his heart, agree; and Protagoras was already in the thick of a philosophical discussion, whereas Alcibiades still needs to be enticed into one. Hence Socrates signals no dissatisfaction with Alcibiades’ evasive answer. Cf. *Euthphr.* 9c–d, where Socrates himself uses such a formula (εἰ βούλει, . . . ἡγείσθων . . . μισούντων) in order to avoid getting bogged down in something that is not the key issue.



**106c3–107c12: On what can Alcibiades speak?**

*The subjects in which Alcibiades has been educated are not among those on which the Assembly deliberates. The subjects on which the Assembly defers to expert authority are not among those on which Alcibiades is competent to pronounce. On what subject therefore is Alcibiades to speak?*

**106c4** ἐντὸς οὐ πολλοῦ χρόνου: cf. 105b1n. on μάλα ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν. εἰ ... **5** ἐροίμην ... **8** τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; the remote and hypothetical manner in which the question is put, and in which it is to be answered, is a tactful device whereby Socrates avoids putting his interlocutor directly on the spot; the same device is used also in e.g. *Prt.* 311d–e, *Hp. ma.* 287b–d, *Rep.* 337b–c. **c6** ἐπειδὴ περὶ τίνος κτλ. ‘What will the Athenians be intending to discuss when you get up to give them your advice?’ English idiom prefers to have the interrogative particle in the main clause of the sentence. Greek is quite happy to leave it in a subordinate clause, as here and e.g. 107c4, 126a5, 126b2, 126b8.

**d1** περὶ ὧν οἶδα βέλτιον ἢ οὗτοι: Glaucon (105a7n. on ἐὰν θᾶπτον) also had some such notion: at any rate, Socrates was able to persuade him to postpone his attempts to address the people until he had cured his ignorance of economic and military matters (*Xen. Mem.* 3.6.4–18). **d4–5** παρ’ ἄλλων ἔμαθες ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρες ‘you have learnt from other people, or found out for yourself’. The verbs μανθάνω and εὐρίσκω, taken by themselves, express this contrast adequately in a conversation among the philosophically sophisticated (*Phd.* 85c, *Cra.* 439b, *Rep.* 618c). The addition of παρ’ ἄλλων, αὐτός and the like, is needed to bring the contrast home when speaking to the less sophisticated (*La.* 186c–187a, *Tht.* 150d, *Euthd.* 285a–b) or adopting a slow-witted air (*Phd.* 99c). **d6** ποῖα γὰρ ἄλλα; spelled out in full, the thought is ‘Yes; for what else could I know, apart from those things?’ The ποῖα adds here (as often: 111d6–7n.) a touch of scorn. Should Alcibiades instead invoke the doctrine of recollection (*Meno* 81a–86c), and reply to Socrates’ dilemma by saying ‘There are things that the soul, being eternal, has known from all eternity, and that it has therefore neither learnt from

others nor found out for itself’? Schleiermacher (1836) 332 thought that Alcibiades should make such a reply, and that his failure to do so is an argument that Plato did not write this dialogue. However, there is no reason to suppose that, in a genuinely Platonic dialogue, every character, no matter how naïve, will be familiar with relevant ideas developed in other dialogues. Moreover, the doctrine of recollection is, in any case, hardly relevant here, for it would not enable Alcibiades to escape Socrates’ dilemma. According to that doctrine, before Alcibiades can ever use, in e.g. advising the Assembly, the knowledge which his soul has had from all eternity, he needs to recollect this knowledge; and he will not recollect it if he does not attempt to do any such thing as those commonly labelled ‘learning from others’ and ‘finding out for oneself’. It is in fact one aspect of the doctrine of recollection, and the only aspect on which Socrates wants to insist, that we should be resolute in our attempts to come to know things (*Meno* 86b–c).

**ει ἤν χρόνος ὅτε** ‘once upon a time’. The phrase is known otherwise mainly from poetry, where it and its variants are used to introduce tales of a past now definitively over (Linus in D.L. 1.4, Critias DK 88 B 25.1; cf. e.g. Theoc. *Idylls* 7.1 ἥς χρόνος ἀνίκ, *Prt.* 320c ἤν γάρ ποτε χρόνος ὅτε). **ε4 ἀλλὰ μὴν** marks, as often in Plato, the introduction of the next premiss in a piece of reasoning (*GP* 346).

**σχεδόν τι** ‘more or less’, qualifying οἶδα, not μεμάθηκας. It is enough for Socrates’ argument here that he knows what were the main elements in Alcibiades’ education. The qualification indicates that this is the only knowledge he is here claiming to have. He is not making the unqualified claim to know absolutely every topic, no matter how trivial, on which Alcibiades has learnt something from other people.

**ε6 γράμματα καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν**: literacy, playing the harp (which included learning lyric poetry), and wrestling were the three staples of primary education for an Athenian boy (*Prt.* 312b, *Clit.* 407b–c, Xen. *Lac.* 2.1). Literacy was a comparatively recent addition to this curriculum; see 112b1–2n. for Alcibiades’ attitude to it.

**ε7 αὐλεῖν** ‘to play the pipe’. αὐλός is conventionally translated as ‘flute’, but it is in fact the name for reed instruments more akin to the oboe or clarinet. When Alcibiades is said here to have refused to learn how to play the pipe, it no doubt indicates, among other

things, his intellectual idleness (cf. 104d2–3n.), his concern for his looks (cf. 104a5, 113b9; according to Arist. *Pol.* 1341b2–6, blowing the pipe was thought to make the face ugly), and his snobbery (playing the harp traditionally had more prestige than playing the pipe: see *Rep.* 399d–e, and Eur. *Alc.* 345–7, where a king says that in mourning he will no longer touch the harp, or sing to the pipe). Plu. *Alc.* 2.5–7 suggests that Alcibiades had, in addition to these motives, another and more creditable motive for refusing to learn to play the pipe: ‘He paid adequate attention to his other teachers, but he avoided playing the pipe, on the grounds that it was ignoble and servile. For using a plectrum and harp in no way damaged the shape and form that befit a free man; but when someone blew on a pipe with his mouth, even those who knew him could hardly recognise his face. Besides, the harp would sound with and sing with its user; but the pipe would block his mouth and gag him, removing from him all power of rational speech. “Therefore,” he said, “let the children of the Thebans [traditionally thought to be rather thick: see e.g. Pind. *O.* 6.89–90] play the pipe [which they did: it was, says Cic. *Tusc.* 1.2.4, one of the accomplishments of the Theban statesman Epaminondas]; for they don’t know how to conduct a conversation (διδάσκεισθαι). We Athenians however, as our fathers tell us, have Athena for foundress and Apollo for patron. She threw the pipe away [as represented in a prominent carving placed in the Acropolis when Alcibiades was a boy: Paus. 1.24.1, Plin. *Nat.* 34.57]; he went on to flay the pipe-player.” By such jokes, which were also meant in earnest, Alcibiades ensured that he never learnt to play the pipe, and that others did not either. For word went out among the boys about the good effect to which Alcibiades abominated pipe-playing and mocked its teachers. The result was that the pipe altogether ceased to be among those things on which free men spent their time, and came to be quite despised.’ Contrast however Douris (*FGH* 76 fr. 29), who claims that Alcibiades did learn to play the pipe, and who purports to know the name of his teacher, Pronomus. For a full account, see Peter Wilson, ‘The *aulos* in Athens’, in Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne, edd., *Performance culture and Athenian democracy* (Cambridge 1999) 58–99. **e7–9** ‘These are what you know – if, that is, you have not been learning something without my knowledge. But I shouldn’t think you have, neither when you leave the

house by day, nor when you leave it by night.’ **e8 οἶμαι δέ γε:** this, unlike its literal English translation ‘But I do think so’, can easily be used to endorse a negative proposition. Here it endorses ‘You have not been learning something without my knowledge.’ For the use of this phrase in endorsing negative propositions, cf. *Rep.* 507c–d, on whether the sense of hearing needs anything else to operate, in the way that the sense of vision needs light: “Do hearing and sound require something of another kind for the one to hear and the other to be heard, some third thing, in the absence of which the one will not hear, and the other will not be heard?” “No (οὐδενός)”, he said. “I should think not (οἶμαι δέ γε)”, said I, “nor do many other senses need any such thing (οὐδ’ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς . . . τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός).”’ As *Rep.* 507c–d also illustrates, the combination of particles δέ γε has a special use in ‘lively rejoinders’ (*GP* 153), a use which means that even in continuous speech, ‘there is often some tinge of repartee about δέ γε’ (*GP* 155); and there no doubt is some such tinge here. **νύκτωρ:** a law ascribed to Solon himself forbade schools to be open outside daylight hours (Aeschin. 1.12). Alcibiades’ nocturnal excursions would therefore not have included any schooling. There were however stories describing nocturnal excursions of quite another nature: while still a boy, he was out drunk one night and stole half the gold and silver plate of one of his lovers (Sat. in Ath. 12 534e–f, Plu. *Alc.* 4.5–6; the lover professed gratitude that Alcibiades had left him with the other half); as an adult, he was among those who, one night shortly before the Sicilian expedition set sail, went about mutilating the Herms (Th. 6.27.1, 6.61.1). Indeed, there was a general presumption that those found wandering abroad after dark were up to no good: see Arist. *SE* 167b8–12, on how orators might reason ‘He is seen wandering around at night. Therefore he debauches the womenfolk of other citizens’; and *Rh.* 1401b23–4, on how they might reason to the same conclusion from the premiss ‘He dresses elegantly [cf. 1139n.] and wanders around at night.’ **e9 ἐξίων:** the key to understanding the syntax of this participle is to appreciate that οἶμαι δέ γε is in effect an abbreviation of the assertion ‘You have not been learning something without my knowledge’, and therefore that οὔτε νύκτωρ οὔτε μεθ’ ἡμέραν ἐξίων ἐνδοθεν has the same syntax when appended to οἶμαι δέ γε as it would were it appended to the Greek form of that assertion spelt out in full (cf. the

syntax of *Rep.* 507c–d, quoted in 106e8n.). In such a context, the participle ἐξιὼν would be ‘circumstantial’ (*MT* §§832–3); hence the translation ‘neither when you leave the house by day, nor when you leave it by night’. It is wrong to take the participle ἐξιὼν as governed by λέληθας, in the same construction as the participle μανθάνων. This was the interpretation of the ancient commentator Proclus, and is seen in Jowett’s translation: ‘This is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.’ On this interpretation, the Greek has two supposedly coordinate clauses, the one containing μανθάνων, and the other containing ἐξιὼν, without any particle at all to connect them. Moreover, this interpretation makes Socrates assert that he has spent the years watching outside Alcibiades’ house both day and night; and even in the light of 104d4–5, that assertion is not readily credible. (Proclus himself was alert to this aspect of his interpretation, and welcomed it: ‘That Alcibiades should not leave home, whether by day or by night, without Socrates knowing it, is truly supernatural (δαιμόνιον ἔστιν ὄντως).’) **εἰο οὐ πεφοίτηκα εἰς ἄλλων ἢ τούτων: φοιτῶ** is used of going to somebody for elementary schooling (LSJ s.v. φοιτῶ 1.5), and not, apparently, of studying rhetoric (106b1–2), or of receiving the military training that Alcibiades, who is ‘not quite twenty yet’ (123d6–7), would have begun at the age of eighteen (Arist. *Ath.* 42.3). Thus this remark is not, strictly speaking, false. But something about the attention that Alcibiades pays to his studies is shown by the fact that he does not think to mention either his rhetorical or his military training when Socrates asks him what he has learnt; cf. 104d2–3n.

**107a2 πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν** ‘what is the right way to spell something’. The Athenians of course never do deliberate about such matters, any more than they deliberate about the musical (107a5) and gymnastic (107a7) matters that formed the other two ingredients of Alcibiades’ education. The reason is explained by Arist. *EN* 1112a34–b11: ‘There is no deliberation about those branches of knowledge that are exact and self-contained, e.g. about spelling (for we don’t hesitate over how to spell). Instead, the things that we deliberate about are those things that come about through us, but not

always in the same way, e.g. about matters to do with medicine, or making money. And we deliberate more about navigation than we do about gymnastic training, since navigation is not such an exact branch of knowledge. . . . And we bring in other people to advise us (συμβούλους) for important matters, where we do not trust ourselves to settle them correctly.’ **a7 οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδέ:** the reduplicated οὐδέ gives emphasis to the denial: ‘And they definitely don’t talk about wrestling either’ (*GP* 197, 340). **a10 γάρ που:** each of the particles collocated here has the meaning it would have in isolation. The που gives a tentative air to the remark (‘Presumably, it won’t be when . . .’); the γάρ shows that the remark is intended to reveal Socrates’ reason for asking the question ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος βουλευώνται; The only significance to the collocation of the particles is that ‘we may recognize in Plato a certain fondness for the juxtaposition of γάρ and γε with που: and there is something characteristic about καὶ που: while on the other hand, οὖν που is avoided’ (*GP* 493). Our dialogue has γάρ που four times (the other three are 108b5, 117e7, 130d6; cf. 108c6), and γέ που once (117e1); nowhere does it have a καὶ που or an οὖν που. **a11 οἰκοδομίας** ‘building’, of fixed structures of all kinds, and not just, in spite of the element οἶκο-, of houses alone. Thus Th. 1.93.1–5 uses this word for the fortifications of Athens. **a13 οἰκοδόμος . . . βέλτιον συμβουλευσει:** the same point is made in *Prt.* 319b–c ‘When we gather in the Assembly, then when the city has to do something about building, builders are summoned to give advice about the buildings, when it has to do something about constructing ships, shipwrights are summoned, and likewise with everything that they think can be learnt and taught.’ Cf. *Grg.* 455b–c, making the same point, and drawing the corollary that, on such matters, the Assembly would never listen to the advice of οἱ ῥητορικοί.

**b2 μαντικῆς:** the skill of divining the future, in particular from the interpretation of such things as dreams, the flight of birds, and the entrails of sacrificial animals, as opposed to the production and interpretation of oracles in verse, or χρησμοί (for the distinction, see Paus. 1.34.4, *Meno* 99c–d, *Ap.* 22c, Th. 8.1.1). Isoc. 19.5–9 recounts the career of someone who inherited some books about divination, and made it into a fairly lucrative living. Diviners were regularly

consulted by Athenian assemblies (Arist. *Ath.* 54.6, Cic. *Div.* 1.95). Their predictions were therefore subject to political manipulation. Alcibiades was not above manipulating them himself: ‘There are said to have been many objections to the expedition [of the Athenian fleet to Sicily], in particular from the priests. Alcibiades however had other diviners, and proclaimed, on the basis of certain ancient prophecies, that the Athenians would win great fame in Sicily. Moreover, he sent people to enquire at the oracle of Ammon, and they came back bringing a prophecy that the Athenians would capture all the Syracusans; however, they kept concealed the indications to the contrary, for fear that they would be ill-omened’ (Plu. *Nic.* 13.1–3; Th. 8.1.1 records that the diviners eventually shared the blame when the expedition failed). For a general account of divination, see Jon D. Mikalson, *Athenian popular religion* (Chapel Hill 1983) 39–49. **b6 τε έ γε:** ‘The combination of τε and γε, especially in juxtaposition, seems to have been rather disliked by Greek writers, except perhaps Plato’ (*GP* 161). **μέγας ... καλός ... 7 γενναῖος:** the three qualifications here declared irrelevant are precisely the size, looks and birth on which Alcibiades particularly prides himself (104a1–c1). Compare the qualifications declared to be irrelevant in *Prt.* 319c, where Socrates is making, on this occasion to Protagoras, a similar point about the Assembly’s deference to the expertise of craftsmen: ‘If somebody else, whom they do not take to be a craftsman, attempts to give them advice, then even if he is very handsome and rich and among the well-born, they are not any the more receptive, but they jeer and heckle, until either the would-be speaker has been heckled down and departs of his own accord, or the stewards drag him off or carry him away on the orders of those chairing.’ **b8–10** have been transposed with **b11–c2** in order to ease the flow of the argument. With this transposition, Socrates first points out that wealth is irrelevant to giving advice about health (b12–c2), and then, reasonably enough, explains (γάρ) why wealth is irrelevant by remarking that the proper qualification for giving advice is not wealth, but expertise (b9–10). If, however, these speeches are taken in the order in which they occur in the manuscripts, then when Socrates remarks that the proper qualification is not wealth, but expertise, he is attempting to explain the irrelevance, not of wealth, but of size, looks and birth instead (b6–7). The fact that Alcibiades gives

the same reply (πῶς γὰρ οὐ;) to both speeches of Socrates' no doubt helped the manuscripts to confuse their order.

**c4** ὅταν οὖν περὶ τίνος σκοπῶνται, τότε . . . ; is to be translated as 'What will be the subject of their deliberations when . . . ?'; and the ὅταν clauses in c6, d2, d3, d5 should be treated on the same lines. On the placing of the interrogative here within the subordinate clause, see 106c6n.

**c7** τῶν περὶ ναυπηγίας 'concerning those of their affairs that concern shipbuilding'. The τῶν is governed by a περί understood from περὶ τῶν ἐαυτῶν πραγμάτων in the previous line. For the construction cf. e.g. *Grg.* 450a "It looks then as if medicine too deals with talk (περὶ λόγους ἐστίν)." "It does." "With talk that deals with illness, at least (τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα)."

**c8** ναυπηγεῖσθαι is middle. The Assembly does not plan to build any ships itself; it discusses rather what sorts of ships it should get built.

**c10** ναυπηγεῖν is active. When planning to get ships built, the Assembly seeks the advice of someone who knows how to build ships himself.

### 107d1–109c12: War, peace and justice

*Alcibiades proposes to advise the Assembly about when and with whom to be at war, and about when and with whom to be at peace. But can he say what is the standard of correctness in such matters? Not at first. He even has difficulties in appreciating that to play the harp correctly is to play it musically. But eventually he comes to realise what a standard of correctness is. He comes to realise too that he needs to be able to specify the standard of correctness for the advice he will be giving about war and peace. Since people always allege that they are going to war in response to some injustice that has been done them, Alcibiades' advice on when to go to war must be judged correct or incorrect by the standards of justice.*

**107d1** περὶ ποίων perhaps expresses a certain impatience (111d6–7n.), after Alcibiades has thrice failed to answer the same question phrased with the neutral περὶ τίνος (106c6, 107a10, 107c4).

**d3** πολέμου . . . εἰρήνης . . . **4** ἄλλου του: war and peace, as might be expected, regularly appear on lists of topics about which a public body would deliberate. Public finances (πόροι) too make no less



regular an appearance (see Arist. *Rh.* 1359b19–23, [Arist.] *Rh. Al.* 1423a21–6, Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.6–13, [Xen.] *Ath. pol.* 3.2). When he mentions war and peace by name, but relegates to a catch-all ‘anything else’ so standard a topic for public deliberation as the public finances, Alcibiades acts in keeping with the disdain for money mentioned in 104c1–2. And when he names war and peace almost as if they were two separate items for the agenda (separated by ὃ Σώκράτες, and each coordinated by ἢ . . . ἢ . . . with any item that might come under ἄλλου του), Alcibiades speaks as if not altogether aware that the question of when and when not to be at war is the same as the question of when and when not to be at peace. Contrast *Phd.* 97d, where Socrates, in conversation with his intimates, mentions as an aside, and more or less as a truism, the principle that to understand something is to understand its opposite; and compare *Ion* 531e, where Ion needs to have the principle spelt out to him. **δ5 πρὸς τῖνας . . . 6 τίσιν . . . τίνα τρόπον:** with this range of questions, contrast Gilbert Ryle, *The concept of mind* (Harmondsworth 1973) 26–60, which confines practical knowledge to ‘knowing how’ (τίνα τρόπον), and compare *Phdr.* 268a–c, which says that a doctor must know, not only how to raise or lower a patient’s temperature, or make him vomit or excrete, but also ‘to whom he is to do each of these things, and when, and to what extent (οὐστίνας . . . ὅποτε . . . μέχρι ὅπου)’. Compare also *Laws* 638c, which, to illustrate how silly it is to condemn or commend the practice of drinking wine ‘the moment it is mentioned (εὐθύς ῥηθέν)’, speaks of how silly it would be, ‘if someone was commending wheat for being a good food, to condemn it instantly, without asking him about its preparation or serving: in what way, to whom, with what accompaniments, in what condition, and to people in which condition, it is served (ὄντινα τρόπον καὶ οἷστισι καὶ μεθ’ ὧν καὶ ὅπως ἔχοντα καὶ ὅπως προσφέρειν ἔχουσιν)’. Arist. *EN* 1104b22–4 and *EE*: 1222a1–2 make similar points, with similar ranges of questions, about the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. The idea is that making war, like drinking wine, eating wheat, pursuing pleasure or avoiding pain, is not unconditionally right, nor unconditionally wrong; that its rightness or wrongness in a particular case will depend on the circumstances of the case; and hence that there is need for skill in deliberation, to make oneself

sensitive to the varied demands of circumstances. Contrast Arist. *EN* 1107a9–17, on kinds of action that are unconditionally wrong: ‘Some things connote viciousness the moment they are named (εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται), e.g. ... debauching a citizen’s womenfolk, theft and murder (μοιχεία κλοπή ἀνδροφονία) ... In their case, it is never possible to do it right, but only to go wrong. Doing well or ill in such matters does not depend on one’s debauching the woman that one ought to, and when one ought to, and in the way that one ought to (ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὥς). On the contrary, to do any one of these things is, quite generally, to go wrong.’

**e5 Ἀθηναῖοι** is the reading of all the medieval manuscripts. One of the fragmentary ancient manuscripts contains instead the letters αν, preceded by traces that might be either δι or μ or ν. **προσπαλαίειν** ‘wrestling’, lit. ‘wrestling at close quarters’. **e6 ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι**: this, by contrast, means ‘sparring’, lit. ‘handing’: the χεῖρες, strictly speaking, go all the way up to the shoulders; the ἄκραι χεῖρες (‘tips of the χεῖρες’) do not go beyond the wrists.

**108a5 ἀλλὰ μήν**: see 106e4n. **a5–6 τὸν αἰδοντα δεῖ κιθαρίζειν ποτὲ πρὸς τὴν ᾠδὴν καὶ βαίνειν** ‘someone who is singing, must, at certain moments, accompany the song by playing a note on the harp or taking a step in the dance’.

**b4 οὐκ ἐννοῶ**: Alcibiades’ failure to appreciate the standards of correctness in playing the harp, even though he understands proper standards in athletics, may indicate that he is better at ease with the body than with the soul. For wrestling was thought to train the body only (*Rep.* 376e; the thought was mistaken, says *Rep.* 410b–d); learning how to perform on the harp was therefore traditionally taken to be the intellectual element in élite education. Thus in Ar. *Wasps* 959, 989 κιθαρίζειν ἐπίσταςθαι is used to mean being an educated man; and Themistocles was held to be rather ill-educated because, at banquets, he refused to take his turn on the harp (*Cic. Tusc.* 1.2.4). **b5 γάρ που**: see 107a10n. **ἀπεκρινάμην**: although the obvious sense ‘answered’ is the only one that Alcibiades will understand this word to have, the word in the active voice also bears, in Platonic dialectic, the semi-technical sense of isolating, as Socrates has done

here, the common ingredient from an array of cases; cf. *Plt.* 302c τὴν ὀρθὴν χωρὶς ἀποκρίναντες.

**c6** **πρέποι** ‘it would be seemly’. The word is used to commend things specifically on grounds that might be called aesthetic (by contrast with e.g. **δεῖ** for the obligatory, and **λυσίτελεῖ** for the expedient). In saying ‘When the seemly (τὸ πρέπον) is present, it makes things both be (εἶναι) and look (φαίνεσθαι) fine (καλά)’ (*Hp. ma.* 294c), Hippias is faithful to the word’s connotations of conspicuousness and beauty. The word is therefore especially suitable when commending things to someone with Alcibiades’ concern (124a5–6n.) to cut a fine figure. It recurs also at 124d9, 135c2 (cf. 135b12). **γάρ ... πού:** see 107a10n. **καὶ σοί** ‘particularly for you’; talking **καλῶς** would be seemly for anyone, but particularly for someone as **καλός** as Alcibiades.

**e2** **ἐκεῖ ἐφ’ ἐκάστωι** ‘there’, i.e. when talking about music, ‘for each’, i.e. for each of the three activities (playing the harp, singing, dancing) which belong to the art of music (108a5–6, c7–8). **e3** **ἐπὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ** ‘for the other case’, i.e. for wrestling. **e6–109a4** Socrates switches from one thought to another partway through this sentence, and so makes its precise structure harder to grasp than its general import. In effect, he embarks upon saying ‘There is a shameful contrast, in that, although (μέν) you can say that health is the standard for judging advice on diet, nevertheless (δέ) you can’t say what the standard is for judging advice on politics’; he then loses his way in some syntactical complexities attached to the μέν clause; and so, instead of the initially intended δέ clause, he ends with ‘Won’t you be shamed by your inability to say what the standard is for judging advice on politics?’ The result is rather disjointed; it is as if Socrates himself has been sympathetically afflicted by the embarrassed incoherence that he sees in store for Alcibiades. With this representation of emotional disturbance by ungainly syntax, cf. the indignant pleas of Crito in *Crt.* 45d–46a. **e6** **ἀλλὰ μέντοι** ‘but surely’. This combination ‘is practically confined to Plato and Xenophon, who seldom separate the particles’ (*GP* 410). **e6** **αἰσχρόν γε εἰ μὲν τίς ... ὅ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ...** ‘it is quite shameful that although, if someone ..., you can say that ...’ αἰσχρόν can take two

different constructions: one with εἰ (as in Soph. *Ajax* 1159–60: ‘I’ll leave. It would be a disgrace if anyone learnt (αἰσχροῖν, εἰ πύθοιτό τις) that I have been using words to chide someone on whom I can use force’), and another with the infinitive (as in the reply at Soph. *Ajax* 1161–2: ‘Off you go then. For me the worst disgrace is listening to (αἰσχιστον κλύειν) the idle chatter of a fool’). Socrates’ αἰσχροῖν γε εἰ may create the impression that he is using the former of these two constructions, but the ἔχειν eventually makes it clear that he is using the latter, and that the εἰ clause is used only because the shameful state of affairs itself contains a conditional element: that although Alcibiades can say, if asked, . . . , nevertheless . . . **e7 βέλτιον τόδε τοῦδε** ‘this one is better than that’. Cf. 109b4 ὥδε ἢ ὥδε ‘in this way rather than that’, *Phdr.* 271d τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα ‘of this and that size, and of this and that character’. **e7–8 καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσοῦτον**: a fussy and here needless recollection of the point (107d5–6n.) that good advice is likely to be more nuanced than just a stark declaration that one food is better than another. **e8 ἔπειτα . . . τί τὸ ἄμεινον λέγεις**; ‘So what do you mean by “better” then?’ It is idiomatic to use ἔπειτα for introducing belligerent questions; cf. Ar. *Pl.* 827 ἔπειτα τοῦ δέει; (‘So what do you want then?’), *Birds* 911 (quoted in 120b2–3n.). Editors usually leave the ἔπειτα outside the inverted commas. However, it would then be in a construction that ‘conveys “although . . . , nevertheless . . .”, usually in a tone of surprise or indignation’ (Dover on *Smp.* 213e); we would thus have to translate ‘if, although you were talking and giving advice . . . , someone were nevertheless to ask . . .’; and such a meaning is out of place here. **e8 ἐρωτήσκειν** ‘were to ask’. The optative indicates that being asked this easy question about diet is a fairly remote contingency. Contrast the subjunctive ἔχῃς in 109a3, suggesting that Alcibiades is more likely to be asked this question’s more difficult counterpart about politics. **e9 περὶ μὲν τούτων**: the clause already has one μὲν at 108e6. A second μὲν can be ‘added for clearness, as an extra signpost, or, perhaps more often, for emphasis’; a double μὲν is often followed by a double δέ (cf. 109a1–3); and the second μὲν, like the second δέ, typically goes with some part of οὗτος (*GP* 184–5, 385–6). Here Socrates’ double μὲν/δέ seems to mark a valiant but unsuccessful effort at calling his convoluted sentence to order. See 104a6, 120d6 for other examples of the construction.

**109a1** καίτοι οὐ προσποιῇ γε ἱατρὸς εἶναι ‘even so, you certainly don’t pretend to be a doctor’. The flow of the sentence would have been smoother if, instead of this parenthetical remark with καίτοι (which usually indicates a strong break and contrast between two coordinate remarks, as at 106a4, 110e5, 119b1, 124a5), Socrates had used some subordinating device. As it is, the multiple contrasts and oppositions that Socrates is trying to work into the sentence (between advising on diet and advising on politics, between professing expertise and acknowledging ignorance, between the remote possibility of being asked one question and the comparative likelihood of being asked the other, between being able and being unable to answer) are getting out of control. **a3** τοῦτου δ: see 108e8n.

**a3–4** ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ αἰσχυνῇς; ‘if you can’t answer, won’t you be ashamed of yourself?’ The construction is that of Eur. *Herac.* 516: κοῦκ αἰσχυνοῦμαι δῆτ’, ἐὰν δὴ τις λέγῃ . . . ; (‘Shan’t I feel ashamed if someone says . . .?’): a protasis using ἐάν with the subjunctive (ἔχῃς, λέγῃ), to posit something as a distinct and vivid possibility for the future, and an apodosis using the future indicative (αἰσχυνῇ, αἰσχυνοῦμαι), to indicate what will be the result if that possibility is realised (*MT* §444). Our text would originally have been written without accents, and the scribes who supplied them opted for the present αἰσχύνῃ rather than the future αἰσχυνῇ.

**a4** ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανεῖται; ‘It won’t look good, will it?’ Socrates directs Alcibiades’ attention to the fact that, in the circumstances envisaged, his ignorance will be on display, as opposed to hidden; cf. *Cri.* 53c: οὐκ οἶε ἄσχημον φανεῖσθαι . . . ; (‘Don’t you realise how unseemly it will look?’). Some manuscripts have instead the present tense φαίνεται. This was presumably introduced to fit with the present tense αἰσχύνῃ. For this reading, we would have to think of another sense of φαίνομαι, that of seeming, as opposed to being; and we would have to translate as ‘Don’t you think that’s disgraceful?’

**b3** ἔχε ‘stop right there’. Cf. e.g. 129b5, *Laws* 627c, *Prt.* 349e, *Ion* 535b, and Dodds on *Gr.* 460a ἔχε δῆ: ‘The exclamation indicates that Socrates has now got what he wanted, the lever which will overturn Gorgias’ position.’ **b4** ὥδε ἢ ὥδε: see 108e7n. **b8**

ἀλλὰ μὴν: see 106e4n. **διαφέρει ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν** ‘makes a world

of difference'. The Greek phrase is as clichéd as its English translation. For although ὅλον καὶ πᾶν sometimes is used with straightforward reference to the entire cosmos (as in *Rep.* 486a τοῦ τε ὅλου καὶ παντός . . . θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου), it is far more commonly used to indicate an enormous difference: cf. *Rep.* 469c and *Cra.* 434a ὅλωι καὶ παντὶ διαφέρει, *Rep.* 527c τῶι ὅλωι καὶ παντὶ διοίσει, *Laws* 734e εὐδαιμονέστερον . . . τοῦ ἐναντίου τῶι παντὶ καὶ ὅλωι, *Laws* 944c διαφέρει . . . ὅλον που καὶ τὸ πᾶν.

**ci δεινὸν τοῦτό γε ἔρωτᾷς** 'What an odd question to ask!' – so odd a question, that it receives a characteristically (106a5–7n.) evasive answer.

**c2–3 οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειέν γε** 'he would never acknowledge it'. This remains true even when Athenian politics are at their closest to Realpolitik. Thus in Thucydides' representation of the debate between the Athenians and the Melians (a small and inoffensive people whom the Athenians propose, quite unjustly, to add to their empire) the Athenians do indeed announce that they will not waste words accusing the Melians of acting unjustly (Th. 5.89). But even so, the Athenians do not acknowledge that they propose, as 109c2 puts it, 'to make war on those who are acting justly'. Rather, they promptly insist that notions of justice and injustice have no place in relations between parties so grossly unequal in power as Melos and Athens (Th. 5.89). Furthermore, they are not wholehearted in this insistence. On the contrary, they subsequently defend the intended annexation in terms that owe much to conventional notions of justice: they are obeying a law applicable to all, following precedent, and only reciprocating the treatment that the Melians would give to them if they had the opportunity (Th. 5.105.2). The words that Thucydides here puts into the mouths of the Athenians may owe something to those that were used at the time (cf. Th. 1.22.1). In particular, they may owe something to words used by Alcibiades himself. For Alcibiades seems to have played a large part in the formation of Athenian policy towards the Melians: according to And. 4.22, he 'declared his judgement in favour of enslaving them'; and according to Plu. *Alc.* 16.6, 'by his speech in favour of the motion, he bore the greatest responsibility for the slaughter of those who were of military age and above'. (In the event, says Th. 5.116.4, all male captives of military age were slaughtered, the women and

children enslaved, and the territory taken over for an Athenian settlement.) Such reluctance to acknowledge openly that one proposes to violate the norms of justice is found not only in public utterance, but even in the privacy of philosophical discussions. Thus in *Grg.* 482d–484c, Callicles criticises others for being ashamed to acknowledge their readiness to do things that would normally count as unjust, such as despoiling the weak; but when he proclaims his own readiness to do such things, he is careful to insist that they really are just after all, not indeed by convention (νόμῳ), but by the superior standard of nature (φύσει), and that they are an appropriate retaliation for the efforts of the weak to debilitate the strong by imposing on them conventional so-called ‘justice’. **c4 οὐ γὰρ νόμιμον:** the law against waging war on those who are acting justly is not Athenian alone, but more generally Greek. Cf. *Th.* 3.59.1, where the Plataeans appeal to τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμιμα, which they say should protect them from destruction by the Spartans, unless the Spartans have been wronged (ἁδικηθέντας) by them. No doubt such talk about a law regulating the relations between cities was often disbelieved; but people would not have bothered to engage in it if it were uniformly ineffective; and it would never have been effective unless at least sometimes some people genuinely did believe in such a law. **c6 οὐδὲ γε καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι** ‘And it doesn’t look to be fine either.’ As ‘the negative counterpart of δέ γε’ (*GP* 156), οὐδὲ γε ‘picks up the thread after a remark interpellated by another speaker’ (*GP* 154). It recurs, again picking up the thread after an interpellated οὐ δῆτα, at 126e10, 134a2. **πρὸς ταῦτα:** i.e. taking into account considerations of what is lawful, just and noble. **c9 νυνδῆ:** at 108d9–e1.

### 109d1–110d4: Learning about justice

*Does Alcibiades know enough about justice to be able to give good advice on matters of war and peace? He cannot name any teacher who has ever instructed him about justice. Nor has he ever found out about justice for himself. In fact, he has always thought himself too well informed about these matters ever to investigate them: even in his childish tantrums, when he shouted ‘That’s not fair’, he evinced utter confidence in his knowledge of justice. So how then has he come to have this knowledge?*

**109d1 ὦ φίλε:** this mode of address usually expresses a genuine affection (contrast the sarcastic overtones that typically attach to ὦγαθέ 104e3n., ὦ βέλτιστε 113c5–6n., ὦ ἄριστε 119c2n., ὦ μακάριε 124a8n.). Frequent use of this mode of address is characteristic of the Platonic Socrates; in Platonic dialogues, it rarely occurs on the lips of others; and Xenophon's Socrates never uses it (see *FA* 90; *GFA* 274–5). **σαυτὸν λέληθας:** an early hint of what will later be a prominent theme in the dialogue: how is Alcibiades to obey the inscription in Delphi that bids him γνῶθι σαυτὸν, 'Know yourself'? See 124a8–b2, 128e4–129a10, 130e7–131b5, 132c7–134a5, 134d7–8. **d4 τίς ἐστίν οὗτος;** this request that Alcibiades name his teacher is more than an idle request for information. For those seeking a professional position would be challenged to show their professional competence by naming their teachers (*Rep.* 488b, on navigators; *Xen. Mem.* 4.2.5, on doctors). To remind Alcibiades that he cannot do this would therefore be like reminding someone that he cannot produce his diploma. **d7 μὰ τὸν Φίλιον** 'No, by the god of friendship.' There is something of a tendency to invoke Zeus Philios when, as here, there are suspicions that a friend is teasing (cf. *Euthphr.* 6b, *Grg.* 500b, *Phdr.* 234e). When an oath is sworn in support of a denial, Greek idiom allows, but does not require, the inclusion of some negative particle, to give e.g. (what is actually the correct reading here, according to someone who corrected the manuscript of Proclus' commentary) οὐ μὰ τὸν Φίλιον. For a similar oath, which has been subject to a similar corruption, cf. *Grg.* 489e, where Socrates denies the charge 'You're being disingenuous (εἰρωνεύη)' with an oath that begins μὰ τόν, and that figures in some sources as οὐ μὰ τόν. **d7–8 ὃν ἐγὼ ἤκιστ' ἂν ἐπιορκήσαιμι:** from *Hom. Il.* 15.40 onwards, a standard way of adding solemnity to an oath.

**e5 καὶ μάλα:** to use this intensifier (lit. 'greatly indeed') as a way of saying 'yes' may have been a catchphrase of the intelligentsia. In such a use, the phrase is very frequent in Socratic dialogue. In one of its two such uses in Aristophanes, the clever-dick Euripides announces that there are gods other than Demeter to whom he prays, is asked 'So you've got special gods of your own, freshly minted?', and replies καὶ μάλα (*Frogs* 890); in the other such use, a



young man, corrupted by Socrates, beats his father, admits to it, and when the father appeals to onlookers with the words ‘You see: he admits that he’s beating me’, says καὶ μάλα (*Clouds* 1326). See 104d10n., for other ways of saying ‘yes’. **e8 εἶχον οὕτω** ‘I was in this state’. Alcibiades, who has been happy to echo Socrates’ words when they talk of him as seeking and finding (109e3–6), is too squeamish to describe himself as thinking that he is ignorant. Socrates will allude to this squeamishness in 118b6, and imitate it in 118e7, 119a8–9, 135c12–13.

**110a3–4** τάληθῃ ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα μὴ μάτην οἱ διάλογοι γίνωνται ‘you must tell the truth when you answer, if our conversations are to have any point’. See 105e6–106a2 for another condition that needed to be met if the conversations were to have any point. When Socrates is attempting, as here, to reveal to someone how muddled his thoughts are by getting him to make inconsistent responses, the respondent must answer his questions sincerely. If the question is as easy as the one that Socrates has just asked, then the sincere answer, without which the conversation would be pointless, will also be the true one. If the question is more difficult, so that the respondent’s beliefs might not in fact be true, then Socrates demands sincerity, even when (as at e.g. *Grg.* 495a, *Rep.* 350e) the sincere answer differs from (what he takes to be) the truth. Later on, Socrates relaxes his demand for sincerity: once someone’s muddled thoughts have been thoroughly exposed, and removed, it then becomes possible to have a fruitful discussion in which the answers to his questions are not believed, but only hypothesised (*Meno* 86e–87c). **a6 τρίτον δ’ ἔτος καὶ τέταρτον καὶ πέμπτον** ‘two years, and three years, and four years ago’. Greek usage counts inclusively, so that the present year would be number one, last year (πέρυσι 110a2) would be number two, the year before last would be the third, and so on; thus to say that the Olympic games take place ‘every four years’, Greek uses αἰεὶ δι’ ἔτους πέμπτου (*Ar. Pl.* 584). English usage tends to count exclusively, except when literally translating Greek, as in ‘on the third day, He rose again from the dead’, of someone who died on a Friday, and rose again on the Sunday. **a8 ἀλλὰ μὴν**: see 106c4n. **τό γε πρὸ τοῦ** ‘previously’. The γε is scarcely translatable: after the transitional particles ἀλλὰ μὴν, it simply ‘serves to

define more sharply the new idea introduced’ (*GP* 119). The words  $\pi\rho\acute{o}$  τοῦ alone are quite sufficient to bear the sense ‘previously’ (e.g. *Phd.* 96c). The article τό may freely be added to indications of time, at most providing a slot for a particle (as here and at *Th.* 2.15.3 τὸ δὲ  $\pi\rho\acute{o}$  τοῦ; cf. e.g. 121d3 μετὰ τοῦτο and *Smp.* 219d τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο), and sometimes (e.g. 121a7 τὸ αἰεὶ) not having even that minimal effect. **παῖς**: an Athenian boy was a παῖς so long as he was still under fifteen and therefore still young enough to go to school. Once old enough to leave school he became a μεράκιον (*La.* 179a, *Xen. Lac.* 3.1).

**b1** σοῦ ἐν διδασκάλων ἤκουον: we are to imagine Socrates outside the school, overhearing Alcibiades as he shouted inside. On pain of death, no man, apart from members of the schoolteacher’s own family, was allowed to enter a school while the boys were present (*Aeschin.* 1.12; no doubt the purpose of the law was to spare the boys from the sexual attentions of their elders). **b2** ἀστραγαλίζοις: in giving special mention to dice as an occasion for one of Alcibiades’ childhood tantrums, Socrates may be hinting at some comparison with Patroclus, who in childhood killed one of his playfellows ἀμφ’ ἀστραγάλοισι χολωθείς (*Hom. Il.* 23.88), and so came to take refuge in the household of Achilles (cf. 115b1–3n. for another allusion to the story of Patroclus). Less heroic are other stories of Alcibiades’ childhood tantrums. They have it that he once, when wrestling, fastened his teeth in, and nearly bit through, the arm of another boy who was about to throw him (*Plu. Alc.* 2.2–3); and that in the wrestling school of one Siburtius, he clubbed one of the attendants to death (*Antiphon’s Invective against Alcibiades*, in *Plu. Alc.* 3.1). **b5** ἀδικοῖ is the verb standardly used for cheating in a competition; cf. *Ar. Clouds* 25 ‘You cheat (ἀδικεῖς), Philo. Stick to your own lane’, said of a chariot race by a young man whose many similarities with Alcibiades are itemised by Michael Vickers, *Pericles on stage: political comedy in Aristophanes’ early plays* (Austin 1997) 22–58. **b7** τί ἔμελλον ποιεῖν: lit. ‘what was I likely to do ...?’ i.e. ‘what else do you think I would have done ...?’ **b9** σὺ δ’ ... **io** τί σ’ ἐχρῆν ποιεῖν ‘You mean [λέγεις, indicating that this is a correction of Alcibiades’ words in 110b7–8]: what *ought* you to have done on that occasion, if you did not know whether you were being wronged or not?’

**ο6 ἐν ποίῳ χρόνῳ ἐξευρών;** ‘And when, pray, did you discover it?’ Cf. 111d6–7n., and Burnet on *Phd.* 76d ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; ‘The interrogative ποίῳ is not a mere equivalent of τίνι. It always expresses feeling of some sort, surprise, scorn, or incredulity. Here we may reproduce the effect by saying, “And at what other time do we lose it, pray?”’ **οὐ γὰρ δήπου . . . γε:** this turn of phrase is sometimes used when someone supports one possibility by eliminating another (*GP* 268). Such reasoning is of course likely to go astray where there is some third possibility to be considered, as here, where Alcibiades needs to consider the possibility that he has never found out about justice, and indeed has no knowledge of justice from any source. The particles hint that the speaker is aware that there might be some third possibility, for the *που* gives a tentative air to the reasoning, and the *γε*, in emphasising the alternative possibility being eliminated, comes close to conceding that there might be a third. Thus *Grg.* 459a: ‘“You said that an orator could speak more persuasively about health than a doctor.” “So I did, at least when he’s speaking before a crowd.” “But doesn’t that mean ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι does the orator speak more persuasively than the doctor.”’ The third possibility neglected here is that the crowd consists neither of the knowledgeable alone, nor of the ignorant alone, but of a mixture. Cf. *Smp.* 187b, *Chrm.* 171b, where again the speaker presents an over-simplified pair of alternatives.

**δ3 ἀλλὰ μὴν:** see 106e4n.

### 110d5–112d11: Learning from the general public

*Alcibiades suggests that he has after all been taught about justice. He has been taught about justice in the way that he has been taught about Greek, not by any single nameable instructor, but by the public at large. The public at large however are not competent to teach anyone about justice. This is because they do not know about justice – as is shown by their violent disagreements about it.*

**110d7 τὸ δὲ πῶς εἶχεν;** ‘And how, in fact, were things?’ For this idiomatic use of τὸ δέ, see LSJ s.v. *ὅ, ἡ, τό* A.VIII.3; for the entire

phrase, cf. *Lys.* 205d τὸ δὲ πῶς ἔχει; and *Ep.* 7.330a τὸ δ' εἶχεν δὴ πῶς; **d8 οἶμαι:** this hesitant 'I think' shows Alcibiades' discomfort with what he now finds himself saying. If he has been taught about justice, but only in the way that other people have, then he still is in no better position than they are to instruct the Assembly. **καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι:** the redundant use of καί (lit. 'I too, like other people too') is 'almost confined to prose, and is commonest in Plato and Xenophon' (*GP* 324; cf. 114c10–11). **d9 τὸν αὐτὸν . . . λόγον** 'the same argument' as the one in 109d4.

**εἰ τῶν πολλῶν** 'people at large', 'the masses', 'the general public', and hence those who have no special expertise. In *Cri.* 47b–48a, *Ap.* 25a–b, οἱ πολλοί are contrasted with ὁ εἷς, 'the one', who has an expert knowledge (cf. *Euthd.* 307a 'in every pursuit, those who are bad at it are πολλοί and worth nothing, while those who are good are ὀλίγοι and worth everything', and *La.* 184e 'What is going to be judged properly must, I think, be judged by knowledge, not by counting heads'). Traditional thought connected plurality with error, unity with truth (Pind. *O.* 1.28–9 contrasts 'the true λόγος' in the singular, with plural 'μῦθοι, embellished with many-coloured falsehoods'; the Pythagoreans (Arist. *Met.* 986a24) put unity on their list of goods, plurality on their list of bads). Arist. *EN* 1106b28–33 rationalises the traditional thought by pointing out that 'there are many ways of getting things wrong, but only one of getting them right . . . ; which is why the former is easier but the latter is difficult, it being easier to miss the target, but difficult to hit it'. **e2–3 εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναφέρων** 'in deferring to the authority of the public at large'. This use of ἀναφέρω εἰς is standard enough (e.g. *Ap.* 20e, *Cra.* 424d, *Phdr.* 237d); contrast 120e10n. **e5 οὐκ οὖν τὰ πεττεῦ- τικά γε καὶ τὰ μή:** the combination οὐκ οὖν . . . γε occurs 'particularly in dialogue, introducing an emphatic negative answer' (*GP* 423); the masses are certainly not adequate teachers about what is and is not good in πεττεία, a boardgame, or family of boardgames, similar to draughts. Cf. *Plt.* 292e: not fifty in a thousand would be experts in πεττεία, and a fortiori even fewer would be experts in kingship. **e6–7 τί δέ; σὺ οὐχ οὕτως οἶε;** Alcibiades does not immediately express his agreement with Socrates' claim that boardgames are less important than justice. No doubt this is because

Alcibiades is pausing to reflect on a point that has just struck him, the point that he will make at 110e11–111a4. Socrates however believes, or affects to believe, that this is because Alcibiades is unclear about the relative importance of boardgames and justice; hence these questions to elicit his opinion.

**111a1 οἷον** ‘for example’. **τὸ ἐλληνίζειν** ‘to speak Greek’; but with the implication of therefore being morally superior to those who speak other languages. The way in which people anywhere learn their native language was an obvious proof that people can be taught things by the public at large, and therefore that their claim to have been taught to be virtuous is not impugned by their inability to name the experts who taught them (*Dissoi logoi* DK 90.6.12). That, however, is not quite the point that needs proving here. For Alcibiades is maintaining that the public at large, incompetent though they are to teach even so trivial a thing as skill in draughts, ‘can teach a lot of other things that are more worthwhile’ (110e11–12), among which might be justice. Alcibiades is not assuming that so widespread an accomplishment as mere knowledge of one’s native language, whatever it happens to be, is superior to something as rare as being good at draughts. He is relying rather on three commonplace Greek thoughts: first, one’s native language indicates a lot about the sort of person one is (compounds of the name of an ethnic group with -ίζω/-άζω are used to mean not only sharing the speech of that group, but also or instead sharing its manners, customs, values, and political allegiance; see LSJ s.vv. αἰγυπτιάζω, αἰολίζω, ἄπτικίζω, βαρβαρίζω, βοιωτιάζω, δωρίζω, λακωνίζω, λεσβιάζω, μηδίζω, περσιζω, σκυθίζω, σολοικίζω); second, if one’s native language is not Greek, then what it indicates is unfavourable (βάρβαρος, the onomatopoeic term for someone who spoke another language, had already acquired some of the contemptuous overtones that still attach to the English ‘barbarous’; hence Ar. *Clouds* 492 ‘ignorant and βάρβαρος’, Men. *Epitrepontes* 898–9: ‘βάρβαρος and pitiless’, Isoc. 5.139 ‘βάρβαρος and badly brought up’, Demos. 23.135 ‘βάρβαρος and untrustworthy’, Demos. 26.17 ‘cackhanded and βάρβαρος’, Demos. 45.30 ‘βάρβαρος and easy to despise’); and third, the moral superiority of Greeks over barbarians consists above all in their sense of justice and readiness to obey the law (thus in Eur. *Medea*

536–8, Jason reminds Medea of what she owes him: ‘First of all, you live in Greece instead of in some barbarous land: you know both justice and the use of law (δίκην ἐπίστασαι νόμοις τε χρῆσθαι)’; in Eur. *Or.* 485–7, there is this exchange: ‘*A*: You’ve spent too long among the barbarians, and gone native (βεβαρβάρωσαι). *B*: But it is Greek to hold one’s brother always in honour. *A*: Yes, and it is Greek also not to want to be above the law’; and in Men. *Pk.* 1007–8 someone comments ‘to accept the lawful satisfaction that has been offered (δέχεσθαι τὴν δίκην) – that’s the mark of a Greek character’. Cf. *Prt.* 327c–328b, where Protagoras uses the way that one learns Greek to show, not only that one can learn to be virtuous from the public at large, but also that there is nevertheless a rôle for experts (like Protagoras himself) paid to give instruction in the finer points of virtue, just as there is a rôle for experts paid to give instruction in the finer points of good Greek usage. **a2 εἰς . . . 3 ἀναφέρω**: cf.

110e2–3n. **a5 ὃ γενναῖε**: it is something of a tease to remind Alcibiades of the lineage in which he takes so much pride (104a6–b4), when he is claiming that he defers to the masses. Socrates never addresses Alcibiades in this way without some such tease in mind: the other examples are 121a3, 135e1. **a6 δικαίως ἐπανίους ἂν αὐτῶν εἰς διδασκαλίαν** ‘you would be right to resort to their in-

struction’. ἐπανερχομαι is used of resorting to something as a standard of judgement, sometimes, as here, with εἰς (*Plt.* 297e), at other times with πρὸς or ἐπὶ or no preposition at all (*Laws* 926c, *Rep.* 434e, *Tht.* 186b). Our ἐπανίους was corrupted, perhaps in the first instance to ἐπαινοῖς. The corruption would have been encouraged by closeness of spelling, and also of sense: one might well praise the standards to which one defers. Similar in some respects is the corruption in *Laws* 770e–771a: εἰς ταῦτα ἑκάτερα βλέποντες ἐπάνιτε [Apelt’s correction of the manuscripts’ ἐπαινεῖτε], καὶ ψέγετε τοὺς νόμους ὅσοι μὴ ταῦτα δυνατοί, τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς ἀσπάζεσθε.

**b9 τούτων οὐκ διδάσκαλοι πῶς ἂν εἶεν**; from the fact that a group of people do not all agree with one another on something, it follows that at least some of them have got it wrong and therefore that they do not all understand it. This is enough to show that the group, as a group, can have no collective authority on the subject. However, it takes a further argument to show that not one single member of the

group has the knowledge that would enable him to teach the disputed subject. This further argument is hinted at in *ἐαυτοῖς* 111c8, 111e3; see 111c7–8n. **111–c1** *ποῖόν ἐστι λίθος ἢ ξύλον* ‘which things are sticks or stones’. Sticks and stones are frequently mentioned elsewhere too as paradigms of the contemptibly commonplace (see *Phd.* 74a–b, *Prm.* 129d, *Grg.* 468a, *Hp. ma.* 292d, *Laws* 956a–b, *Minos* 319a, *Xen. Mem.* 1.1.14; cf. *Hom. Il.* 22.126, *Od.* 19.163, *Hes. Th.* 35). *ποῖόν* is used in preference to *τί*, partly perhaps to express scorn (111d6–7n.) at the triviality of the question, but also perhaps to avoid any confusion with the Socratic use of *τί ἐστι* as more or less a technical term, asking for the definition of a thing (127e8n.).

**c1–2** *τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμολογοῦσιν* ‘they fully agree’. The wording here (lit. ‘they agree on the same things’) is redundant (what else would they agree on?); contrast the freedom from redundancy of what seems to be the only other passage in Plato to talk of agreeing on the same things: *Rep.* 472e *πάλιν μοι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν τὰ αὐτὰ διομολόγησαι* (‘to make the same agreement with me for the purposes of this proof [sc. as was made previously in another connexion]’). The redundancy may be an attempt to emphasise the depth of the agreement. The point is not simply that (to give an English example) the public at large all agree on the general principle that the word ‘stick’ applies to all sticks, and to sticks only; for they have such agreements about English words generally, however contested their application. The point is rather, at very least, that in each individual case the public at large would all say the same thing in response to the question ‘Is this a stick?’ Even this, however, is not quite all that Socrates is getting at; for it is compatible with some of them not believing what they say. The full depth of their agreement is made explicit only by the following clause. **c2–3** *ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὁρῶσιν ὅταν βούλωνται λαβεῖν λίθον ἢ ξύλον* ‘they go for the same things whenever they want to get a stick or a stone’. There is no better proof of our sincerity in calling something a stone than that we go to get it when we want a stone. The trouble is that, when we give this proof of how sincere our agreement is on that question, we are also likely to prove that we disagree on a further question: to which of us in justice does the stone belong? **c3** *πάνθ’ ὅσα*

**τοιαῦτα:** besides sticks, stones, human beings and horses (111d6–7), these would no doubt also include iron and silver (*Phdr.* 263a: ‘Don’t we all think of the same thing when someone says “iron” or “silver”?’), and all readily recognisable kinds of thing. **c3–4** **σχεδὸν γάρ τι μανθάνω τὸ ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι τοῦτο λέγεις** ‘I gather, more or less, that this is what you mean by “knowing how to speak Greek”.’ Socrates is giving a minimal interpretation of ἐλληνίζειν, one shorn of the moral implications that Alcibiades would like the word to bear (cf. 111a1n.). With the thought that knowing how to speak Greek is enough for being able to recognise sticks and stones, cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford 1953) §381: ‘How do I know that this colour is red? – It would be an answer to say: “I have learnt English.”’ (Piquantly enough, ‘I have learnt English’ here translates ‘Ich habe Deutsch gelernt.’) There are certain kinds of thing (e.g. sticks, stones, or for that matter red things) such that anyone who knows the meaning of a word for things of such a kind can recognise things as belonging to that kind. Understanding a word for things of such a kind is therefore tantamount to having mastered the skill of applying the word correctly. Conversely, those who apply such a word differently (as the English and the Americans do the word ‘pavement’) show merely that they mean different things by it, not that they are in any real disagreement. **c7–8** **ἀλλήλοις τε ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἰδία** ‘agree both with one another and with themselves, as individuals’; cf. *Phdr.* 237c οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν, of those who have started to deliberate about something which they do not understand. The sign of your not agreeing with yourself will be that you say first one thing, then its opposite; cf. *Meno* 96a αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰναντία λέγει, of Theognis, who disqualifies himself as a teacher of virtue, by contradictory statements about whether it is teachable. It does not matter for present purposes whether we are to think of such contradictory statements as indicating frequent changes of mind, or as indicating the simultaneous presence of contradictory thoughts, each belonging to a different part of the soul (the position taken in e.g. *Rep.* 439c–440a, *Phdr.* 237d–238a, where a muddled individual is compared to a strife-torn city); either way, you do not make assertions contradicting one another on a subject which you understand, and which you are



competent to teach. **c8–g δημοσῖαι αἱ πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν** ‘as communities, the cities [i.e. the various communities that speak Greek; cf. 104c1n.] do not dispute with one another’. It would be redundant to add ‘and no city disagrees with itself’; for that is already implied by there being no two individuals in dispute with one another.

**d6 εἰ βουλευθεῖμεν**: only a grotesquely heavy-handed translation can bring out the difference between this aorist optative and the present optative βουλοίμεθα in 111d2: ‘If it should be our settled desire (εἰ μὲν βουλοίμεθα) ... if against the background of that settled desire we should then form also the desire (εἰ βουλευθεῖμεν) ...’ The general rule for optatives in direct speech is that the distinction between present and aorist tenses marks, not the distinction of time between now and previously, but the distinction of aspect between the persistent and the momentary (see *MT* §87). The distinction is illustrated by *Laws* 662a: *A*: τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἂν συγχωρήσαιτε, τό γε αἰσχρῶς; (‘Perhaps you’d give your consent on this one point at least, that it’s disgraceful?’) *B*: Of course. *A*: But what about ...? *B*: καὶ πῶς ἂν ταῦτά γε ἔτι συγχωροίμεν; (‘How would we go on consenting when it comes to *these* points?’); and *Phd.* 88a εἰ γάρ τις ... συγχωρήσειεν, δοῦς ... δοῦς δὲ ταῦτα, ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ ... (‘Suppose someone were to give his consent, by granting ...; and suppose that after granting all this, he were no longer to go on giving his consent when it came to ...’). Contrast *Meno* 90b–c, where two equal and alternative desires are both described in the same tense: ‘If we wanted (βουλοίμεθα) Meno here to become a good doctor, where would we send him for instruction? Surely to the doctors ... What if we wanted (βουλοίμεθα) him to become a good cobbler? Wouldn’t we send him to the cobblers?’ **d6–7 ποῖοι ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν ... τίνες αὐτῶν δρομικοί** ‘which are human beings ... which of them would make good runners’. The ποῖοι connotes scorn (any fool can tell a man from a horse); the τίνες is free of such connotations (it takes some skill to pick winners, whether human or equine).

**εἰ ἱκανὸν ... τεκμήριον** ‘evidence enough’. ἱκανόν is one of the two adjectives standardly used to commend evidence; the other is μέγα (‘weighty’). ἱκανόν seems to give a stronger commendation: evidence

can be weighty without being weighty enough. Thus at *Hp. mi.* 372b–c some evidence is described as ἱκανόν, and it is then asked what evidence could be μείζον. **e2 κρήγυοι** is a rare and distinctly poetic word (Theon, *Progymnasmata* 81.10–2 Spengel). Presumably Socrates is alluding to some poetic tag about bad teachers disagreeing. Other possible traces of this tag are ‘I was educated κρηγύως’ (Call. *Iambs* 193.30 Pfeiffer), ‘the snares in which most sophists entangle the young, giving their lectures to no κράγυον [the Doric form of the word] purpose’ (Lysis, *Epistle* 3 Herscher), ‘the boys were taught their letters by one Thestorides, who was not a κρήγυος man’ ([Hdt.] *Life of Homer* 195–6 Allen), and “‘not one derides his own stupidity, but each derides another ... since they do not agree ...’” I replied “Those are κρήγυα points ...” (Hipp. *Epistles* 17.31–2 Herscher). If Gow was correct to conjecture (in his notes on Theoc. *Epigram* 19) that Hipponax made prominent use of the word κρήγυος, then the source of the tag might be Hipponax. **e3 ἐαυτοῖς**: see 111c7–8n. **e5 εἰ βουληθεῖμεν**: see 111d6n. **ποῖοι ... 6 ὅποιοι**: the contrast with 111d6–7 ποῖοι ... ποῖοι is one only of sound, not of sense. A pair of indirect questions can be grammatically introduced by any combination of interrogative with relative forms of a pronoun (the other two possibilities are exemplified by *Tim.* 49b ὅποῖον ... ὅποῖον, *Rep.* 414d ὅποῖαι ... ποίοις); and the choice of combination depends on euphony. **e9 ἦν δ’ ἄν σοι ... 10 διαφερομένους**: with this contrary-to-fact conditional (‘You would have evidence ..., if you saw them wrangling’) contrast the unconditional construction of 111e1–3 (‘You do have evidence ..., since they do not agree ...’). Presumably the masses quarrel about who is healthy much less often than they quarrel about who would make a good runner. **e12 περὶ τῶν δικαίων ... 112a2 ἀλλήλοις**: cf. *Phdr.* 263a: ‘What if someone says “just” or “good”? Aren’t different people carried away in different directions, and don’t we disagree, both with one another and with ourselves?’ The disagreement is not about every question to do with justice, any more than the agreement mentioned in 111b11–c10 is about every geological question, no matter how abstruse. Instead, the claim is that whereas the masses agree about which things are stones, they disagree about which particular individuals and actions (ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων)

are just. And this is quite compatible with there being a general consensus about the principles of morality: ‘They don’t dispute that the wrongdoer should pay the penalty; but they may dispute about who is the wrongdoer, what he did, and when’ (*Euthphr.* 8d).

**112a6** οὐκ οὖν ... γέ: cf. 110e5n. **a6–7** ἰδεῖν οὐδ’ ἀκοῦσαι σφόδρα οὕτω διαφερομένους ἀνθρώπους ‘seen or heard of people so thoroughly at odds’. The contrast is between ἰδεῖν, to indicate what he has seen for himself, and ἀκοῦσαι with the accusative and participle, to indicate what he has heard tell of from others. The genitive with ἀκοῦσαι (as in 112b1–2) would indicate, not the thing heard about, but the source of the sounds that were heard. The difference between the two constructions is on display in *Grg.* 503c: Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας; (‘Don’t they tell you that Themistocles was a good man, and that so were Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles? Pericles has only recently died, and you actually heard him speak’, said to Socrates, who is too young to know of Themistocles except by reputation, but who has listened to Pericles addressing the Assembly: *Grg.* 455e).

**b1** καὶ εἰ μὴ ἑώρακας, ἀκήκοας γοῦν has almost the force of ‘although you have not seen, nevertheless you have heard’; cf. *Plt.* 264c εἰ καὶ μὴ πεπλάνησαι περὶ ... , πέπυσαι γοῦν ... (‘although you haven’t travelled around ... , nevertheless you have been made aware that ...’).

**b1, b2 ἀκήκοας:** Alcibiades will of course have heard Homer recited; in the fifth century, few knew of Homer through any other medium. Some anecdotes in *Plu. Alc.* 7.1–2 present the young Alcibiades as decidedly disrespectful towards written texts of Homer: ‘Towards the end of his childhood, he accosted an elementary teacher [γραμματοδιδασκάλωι, i.e. someone who taught little boys how to read and write], and asked for a book of Homer. When the teacher said he had nothing of Homer’s, Alcibiades punched him, and went off. And when another one said that he had a Homer whose text he himself had checked for correctness, Alcibiades replied: “You’re an elementary teacher, then, even though you are competent to correct Homer? You’re not educating young men

[οὐχὶ τοὺς νέους παιδεύεις, i.e. promoting the moral welfare of young adults; cf. *Ap.* 24e].” If such anecdotes were already in circulation when our dialogue was written, they would give a special point to the repeated ἀκήκοας. Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) was by contrast an ardent bibliophile, who actually possessed, in written form, the complete works of Homer; and in deference to his love of letters, Socrates actually resorts to compiling two written lists, one of just things, the other of unjust ones (*Xen. Mem.* 4.2.1,8,10,13). **b4** ταῦτα ποιήματά ἐστι περὶ ... ‘these are poems about ...’ Not ‘these poems are about ...’, which would be ταῦτα τὰ ποιήματά ἐστι περὶ ... Without the article τὰ to bind the noun ποιήματα to the demonstrative ταῦτα as part of the subject, ποιήματα is left as part of the predicate. The text without τὰ thus gives a somewhat patronising tone to Socrates’ remarks: he is announcing, not simply the subject of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but also the fact that they are poems.

**b4–5** διαφορᾶς δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων: Anaxagoras (118c5n.) ‘seems to have been the first to maintain that the poetry of Homer is about virtue and justice’ (DK 59 A 1.11). The adequacy of this account of Homer has been much debated, and is judiciously discussed in Hugh Lloyd-Jones, *The justice of Zeus* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1971) 1–54.

**b7–8** αἱ μάχαι γε καὶ οἱ θάνατοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν: cf. *Euthphr.* 7d ‘the just and the unjust and fine and foul and good and bad: isn’t it because we disagree over these things, and are unable to reach any adequate judgement of them, that we become enemies of one another?’

**b8** τοῖς τε Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Τρωσὶν ‘both the Greeks and the Trojans besides’; see LSJ s.v. ἄλλος II.8.

**c2** Τανάγραι: Tanagra, in Boeotia, was in 458 the site of a battle in which the Athenians were defeated, with ‘great slaughter on both sides’ (Th. 1.108.1).

**c4** Κορωνεῖαι: Coroneia, also in Boeotia, was in 447 the site of another Athenian defeat (Th. 1.113.2). In both these battles, the Athenians were fighting against their fellow Greeks: the fact that they all spoke Greek did not stop them disagreeing about justice.

**c5** οὐδὲ περὶ ἐνός ‘over absolutely nothing’. Separating the two elements of οὐδενός gives something more emphatically negative than περὶ οὐδενός. Cf. 122d6 οὐδ’ ἂν εἴς, 124b2–3 οὐδ’ ἂν ἐνί.

**d2–3** τὰ ἔσχατα σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐργάζονται ‘do the ultimate harm to one another’? Or ‘do the ultimate harm to themselves’? Although σφᾶς αὐτοὺς basically means ‘themselves’, it can sometimes be used in place of ἀλλήλους ‘one another’ (see LSJ s.v. σφεῖς B.1.3; cf. 125c4–5n. on ἑαυτοῖς for ἀλλήλοις). No doubt Alcibiades does take it to mean ‘one another’ here; in which case, he is taking death as ‘the ultimate harm’, in contradiction to 105a3–c5 (for another such contradiction, see 115d8–10n.). Socrates however does not share the general belief that being killed is the ultimate harm (see *Ap.* 40a–b on why his imminent execution is not ἔσχατα κακῶν, and *Phd.* 83c for some description of what he there calls πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατον: being obsessed with bodily matters). By using σφᾶς αὐτοὺς here, Socrates therefore leaves open the possibility that he really does mean ‘themselves’. The ultimate harm will then be what you do to yourself if you act on an erroneous conception of justice, and the chief victim of any injustice will be its perpetrator (as Socrates regularly maintains elsewhere: e.g. *Cri.* 49b ‘doing injustice is in every respect bad and shameful for the doer’, *Grg.* 474b ‘doing injustice is worse than suffering it’, 479e ‘the one who commits an injustice is always more wretched than the one who suffers it’).

**d5** εἰς ... ἀναφέρεις: cf. 110e2–3n. **d9** πλανᾷ ‘you’re rambling’; a preliminary use of a metaphor for intellectual confusion that will be invoked frequently in 117a–118b; see 117a10n. **οὔτε μαθὼν φαίνῃ παρ’ οὐδενός** ‘you plainly have not learnt from anyone’. For this use of φαίνομαι plus participle, in contrast with φαίνομαι plus infinitive to mean ‘seem to’, see LSJ s.v. φαίνομαι B.11.

**d11** μέν: to use a μέν without an accompanying δέ is common ‘with words denoting opinion, appearance, or probability, implicitly contrasted with certainty or reality’ (*GP* 382).

### 112e1–113c6: Questions and assertions

*It is Alcibiades himself who has been asserting that Alcibiades does not know about justice. Socrates has merely been asking questions; it is Alcibiades who has been giving the answers, and therefore making the assertions. In *Prt.* 330e–331a, Socrates takes only a sentence to make this point; but that is to someone rather more advanced in philosophy than Alcibiades is here.*

**112e1** ὁρᾷς ...; ‘Don’t you realise ...?’ This is the idiomatic way in Greek conversation to draw someone’s attention to a glaringly obvious fact that he has nevertheless overlooked. The fact need not be in any literal sense visible. Cf. e.g. *Cri.* 44d ‘But ὁρᾷς, Socrates, that you’ve *got* to pay attention to public opinion too?’, *Ar. Frogs* 1136 ‘ὁρᾷς that you’re talking drivell?’ **e10–11** τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ δύο πότερα πλείω ἐστὶ ‘which is bigger, one, or two’. In *Xen. Mem.* 4.4.7, Socrates imagines the sophist Hippias being asked a marginally more taxing question on the same subject: ‘Is twice five ten?’ The point there is that since Hippias knows about arithmetic, he will give the same old answer time after time (cf. 113e8n.).

**113a4** ποῖα γράμματα Σωκράτους ‘what the letters are in “Socrates”’. In *Xen. Mem.* 4.4.7, Socrates imagines himself putting to Hippias a similar question of slightly more elaborate form: ‘How many letters are there in “Socrates”, and what are they (πόσα καὶ ποῖα)?’ The questions that Socrates is imagining for Alcibiades are systematically kept utterly trivial.

**b1** διὰ παντός ‘throughout’, i.e. ‘throughout the argument’. There is no need to add τοῦ λόγου (see LSJ s.v. πᾶς D.IV). **ἐγὼ μὲν ἢ ὁ ἐρωτῶν**: if you confine yourself to asking questions, you do not purport to know the answers as you would if you were to make assertions instead. Questioning is therefore especially appropriate for someone whose wisdom, such as it is, consists in Socrates’ form of intellectual modesty (117b12–13n.). Questioning is moreover an especially effective way of getting other people to share in that wisdom. To bring home to people how ignorant they are, nothing is quite so effective as a series of questions to which they find themselves giving inconsistent answers. For people gripped by some conceit about how much they know will hardly be impressed if you simply assert that they are ignorant. Besides ridding people of conceit, apt questions can sometimes be of more positive benefit: they can help us develop our thoughts (*Thi.* 149a–151d expounds this point with an elaborate analogy of Socrates as an intellectual midwife); and they can also remind us of things that we have known, but have since forgotten

(from this uncontroversial point *Meno* 81a–86c develops its speculations about recollection; see 106d6n.). Thus Socrates often quite ostentatiously confines himself to asking questions, and thereby incurs the wrath of interlocutors less polite than Alcibiades (e.g. Charicles in *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.36, and Thrasymachus in *Rep.* 336c–337b). **b6 φαίνομαι μέν:** see 112d11n. **b8–9 Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ καλὸς ὁ Κλείνιου:** when remarks addressed to somebody speak of him in the third person to set out his views, there is some suggestion that they are, as it were, an official and binding declaration, a minute of what he has said, so that he cannot later deny having said it. The suggestion can be made by using just his name to refer to him (as at *Thi.* 160d–e). The suggestion can be reinforced by using also the names of his father and his deme, as if in some public document (*Phdr.* 244a; cf. *Grg.* 495d). Here however the suggestion is reinforced by using, instead of the name of Alcibiades' deme, the expression ὁ καλός, as if this were some formal title. Moreover, by speaking of Alcibiades as 'the handsome, the son of Cleinias', Socrates reminds him that neither the looks nor the family in which he places so much pride (104a4–b4) have saved him from crass error. See also 131e1–4n.

**c2 τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου:** *Hipp.* 352 σοῦ τάδ', οὐκ ἐμοῦ, κλύεις ('You hear this from yourself, and not from me'), said to someone who, after heavy hints, has guessed a secret. There is an anachronism here, in that this play was first produced in 428, a few years after the dramatic date of the dialogue (123d6–7n.). But the anachronism hardly glares. Cf. *Prt.* 327d for another anachronistic reference to a play. **c4–5 καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις** 'And yet, you've actually got a point.' The string of particles is characteristic of Plato (*GP* 413–14). **c5 μανικόν . . . 6 διδάσκειν ἃ οὐκ οἶσθα:** Socrates identified madness, according to *Xen. Mem.* 3.9.6, with the belief that one knows something of which one is in fact ignorant (cf. 117b12–13n., 124b1n.). There are further charges of madness in 118e4 and 123e6–7. **c5–6 ὦ βέλτιστε:** a highly polite form of address, used here as at 118b7, *Men. Dyscolus* 338, *Samia* 81, in order to make severe criticism more palatable. Cf. 104e3n. on ὦ γαθέ, 119c2n. on ὦ ἄριστε, 124a8n. on ὦ μακάριε.

### 113d1–115a1: Justice, advantage and dialectic

*Alcibiades suggests that he need not know about justice in order to advise the Assembly. This is because the Assembly rarely deliberates about what is just; it deliberates instead about the quite different question of what is beneficial. But does Alcibiades know any more about what is beneficial than he does about what is just? Apparently not. Can he even persuade Socrates that there is a difference between justice and benefit? Apparently not. Yet he should be able to persuade Socrates by the method that he proposes to use in persuading the entire Assembly, if indeed that method is the method of an expert, giving instruction in the subject of his expertise. Socrates however can persuade Alcibiades that justice is beneficial after all. To do so, he will use, not Alcibiades' rhetorical method, but the more effective method of question-and-answer dialectic.*

**113d1 οἶμαι μὲν:** see 112d11n. This occurrence of οἶμαι is the first of three in seven lines. Perhaps Alcibiades is slightly embarrassed. There are similar threefold repetitions of οἶμαι in *Phd.* 87c–d, where Cebes is contradicting his two great friends, Socrates and Simmias, simultaneously, and in *Rep.* 400b–c, where Socrates is using musico-logical jargon with which he is ill at ease. **d2 πότερα δικαιοτέρα . . . 4 ὁπότερα συννοίσει:** Alcibiades is not alone in drawing the distinction between considering what will benefit (which is done in the Assembly), and considering what is just (which is not). Rhetorical theory recognised three different kinds of oratory, each with a place and goal of its own. One kind had its place in the Assembly: deliberative oratory (συμβουλευτικόν; cf. 106c3–4 συμβουλευέσων), which dealt with actions proposed for the future, debating whether they would be beneficial or harmful (συνφέρον, βλαβερόν). Another kind had its place in the law courts: forensic oratory (δικανικόν), which dealt with putative actions from the past, debating whether they were just or unjust (δίκαιον, ἄδικον). For the third kind, display oratory (ἐπιδεικτικόν), see 115a4n. The classic statement of this threefold distinction is *Arist. Rh.* 1358a36–b29. Aristotle may have formulated this distinction around the date (early 350s; see 116d8n., 121a5–b1n.) that the *Alcibiades* was composed; at any rate, it seems that he was, during his time in Plato's Academy, already attracting criticism for his theories of rhetoric (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Isocrates* 18; Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica* 14.6.9–10). **d6–8 πολλοῖς δὴ**



ἐλυσιτέλησεν ἀδικήσασι μεγάλα ἀδικήματα, καὶ ἑτέροις γε οἶμαι δίκαια ἐργασσάμενοις οὐ συνήνεγκεν: rhetorical overkill. To show that the just is distinct from the beneficial, it suffices to give a single counter-example: an act that was beneficial but not just, or just but not beneficial. However, instead of actually giving a counter-example, Alcibiades expatiates elaborately. His model is the sort of sophistic proem parodied at *Grg.* 448c. The speaker is Polus, a rhetorician who also – and Plato thinks this no coincidence – distinguishes the just from the beneficial: πολλοὶ τέχνηαι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἡρῆσθαι ... ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἀριστοὶ ὦν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὁδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν ('Many are the arts which human beings have discovered from their experience by experience ... Different people practise these different arts in different ways. The best arts are practised by the best people. Gorgias here is one of them, and he practises the finest of the arts.'). Five points of resemblance deserve remark. First, with Alcibiades' πολλοῖς, cf. Polus' initial πολλοί, and also the speech of Protagoras in *Prt.* 334a–c (quoted in part in 126e4–5n.) beginning οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδα, and the opening words of Isoc. 1 (ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν, ὧς Δημόνικε, πολὺ), 4 (πολλάκις), 7 (πολλοὺς), *Ep.* 9 (εἰδώς, ὧς Ἀρχίδαμε, πολλοὺς). Second, with Alcibiades' repetitious ἀδικήσασι ... ἀδικήματα, cf. Polus' ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ... ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως ... ἀρίστων ... ἀριστοί. Note that Alcibiades' ἀδικήματα cannot be justified as providing a syntactical peg on which to hang the adjective μεγάλα (cf. 124e7n.); for even a modest injustice that benefited its perpetrator would be quite adequate to show that the just and the beneficial are not the same. Third, by combining πολλοί with ἄλλοι κτλ., Polus produces an effect that sophists felt piquant enough to be worth producing almost regardless of sense (cf. Isoc. 12.176 'The next thing I have to say will go against the opinions of the many, but it is just as true as the rest (ἔσται δ' ὁ λόγος παράδοξος μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὁμοίως δ' ἀληθὴς τοῖς ἄλλοις)'). Alcibiades presumably combines πολλοῖς with ἑτέροις in order to produce such a piquant effect. For certainly the ἑτέροις clause is logically redundant: many big but beneficial injustices are more than enough to show the distinction between justice and benefit; and even if it were necessary to mention also just acts that have not been beneficial,

there would still be no need for those just acts to be performed by people other than the many who benefited from their injustices. Fourth, with Alcibiades' use of λυσιτελεῖν and συμφέρειν, two synonyms for benefiting, cf. Polus' use of μεταλαμβάνειν and μετέχειν, two synonyms for practising. Fifth, with Alcibiades' mannered chiasm (104a4n.), of the two finite verbs ἔλυσιτέλησεν and συνήνεγκεν, sandwiching the two participles ἀδικήσασι and ἐργασαμένοις, which in turn sandwich the objects of those participles μεγάλα ἀδικήματα and δίκαια, cf. Polus' even more elaborate chiasm, which around ἄλλως sandwiches the genitive plurals ἄλλων and (slightly ampler) τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων, then the nominatives ἄλλοι and (again slightly ampler) οἱ ἀρίστοι· ὦν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὁδε, then the verbs μεταλαμβάνουσιν and μετέχει, and at the very outside two more genitives ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων and τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

**e1 ὅτι μάλιστα** marks this out as a 'so what?' conditional (106a7–8n.). **e2 οὐ τί που** is common in 'incredulous or reluctant questions' (*GP* 492): 'Surely you can't imagine ...?' **e6 οἷον τοῦτο ποιεῖς** 'What a way to go on!' When the demonstrative pronoun τοῦτο is added to the exclamatory οἷον, it seems to make the exclamation more vigorous. Compare such uses of the demonstrative at heightened moments in tragedy (e.g. Eur. *El.* 290 οἷμοι, τόδ' οἷον εἶπας, Eur. *Hipp.* 874 οἷμοι, τόδ' οἷον ἄλλο πρὸς κακῶι κακόν), para-tragedy (e.g. Ar. *Th.* 703 οἷον αὖ δέδρακεν ἔργον, οἷον αὖ, φίλαι, τόδε), and prose dialogue (e.g. *Phd.* 61c οἷον παρακελεύηι τοῦτο, where the exclamation is prompted by the extraordinary advice 'If you have any sense, die as soon as possible'); contrast οἷος without the demonstrative in *Rep.* 450a, *Euthphr.* 15e, where the things exclaimed at are not nearly so surprising. See also 119c2n. on οἷον ... τοῦτ' εἴρηκας. **e8 καινά:** Alcibiades' desire for novelty would be met only by Socrates' intellectual rivals. Dionysodorus calls Socrates an old fogey for expecting him to be consistent with what he had said previously (*Euthd.* 287b; cf. Isoc. 12.172, boasting of his inconsistency). Callicles complains that Socrates always says the same old things (*Grg.* 490e). Hippias of Elis makes the same complaint, and boasts 'I of course always try to say something novel (καίνον)' (*Xen. Mem.* 4.4.6). Socrates makes, appropriately enough, the same reply to both Callicles and Hippias: 'I don't just make the same

assertions; I make them about the same subjects as well (ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν).’ On the day of his death, Socrates proclaims that his philosophical principles are ‘nothing novel (οὐδὲν καινόν)’, and when he is asked what instructions he has for his friends after he has died, his reply is ‘What I always say; nothing all that novel (οὐδὲν καινότερον)’ (*Phd.* 100b, 115b). **ε9 σκευαρίων:** a contemptuous diminutive of σκευή ‘clothing’. Alcibiades was notorious for his extravagant dress. In the indictment against him for profaning the Eleusinian mysteries, he was accused of ‘wearing a vestment like the one that the initiating priest wears, when he displays the sacred objects’ (*Plu. Alc.* 22.4). Moreover, he used to wear a bizarre kind of shoe; and he once processed into a theatre dressed in purple, ‘which excited the wonder not only of the men, but also of the women’ (*Sat. in Ath.* 12 534c). He sometimes dressed as a Persian (*Ath.* 12 535e), and sometimes as a woman (*Plu. Alc.* 16.1). Even his arms were outré: he had a shield of gold and ivory, emblazoned with Love wielding a thunderbolt (*Sat. in Ath.* 12 534e, *Plu. Alc.* 16.1). The true philosopher, by contrast, according to *Phd.* 64d, will have little respect for ‘possessing distinctive garments and footwear and for other bits of bodily finery’. For more on Alcibiades’ clothing, see 122c1n. on ἱματίων θ’ ἔλξεις. **ε10–114a1 τεκμήριον καθαρὸν καὶ ἄχραντον:** the terms used here to commend evidence are, in deference to Alcibiades’ tastes, decidedly non-standard. For another non-standard term, again in deference to Alcibiades’ tastes, see 118d6n. on καλόν; and for the standard terms, see 111e1n. **καθαρόν:** wearing fresh clothes could be taken as a sign that one was up to no good; see *Arist. Rh.* 1416a22–4, on how to rebut an opponent who argues ‘He is καθάριος; so he debauches the womenfolk of other citizens.’

**114a1 ἄχραντον** is itself an appropriately rare and precious word; its only other extant occurrences in Attic literature are both in poetry. Perhaps it should be translated as the tetrasyllabic ‘undefiled’. **a2 προδρομάς:** probably just ‘sallies’ (as in *Xen. An.* 4.7.10); but according to Olympiodorus, this word ‘is used to mean when in warfare someone occupies a strong point, from which he can safely wage war’. **a4 πάντ’ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερον ἐρωτῶ μιᾷ ἐρωτήσῃ:** lit. ‘I ask in a single question all those things that I was asking you previously’; i.e. ‘Tell me in just one word: everything that you said

about your knowledge of justice and injustice applies also to your knowledge of benefit and harm, doesn't it?' Socrates now adds bullying to his sarcasm. Compressing several points into a single question, as Socrates does here, was frowned on as a sophistical trick. A wily questioner might ask 'Are all these things true, or aren't they? Yes or No?', and hope to twist the answer 'No' into an agreement that all those things were false; for example, if you replied 'No' to the question 'Are Callias and Coriscus at home or not?' on the grounds that Callias was not at home, your questioner might attempt to infer from your 'No' that Coriscus was not at home either. The best response to such quibbles is simply to insist that 'No, Callias and Coriscus are not both at home' differs from 'Callias and Coriscus are both not at home', and more generally that 'not all are' differs from 'all are not'. However, among the dialecticians of classical Athens, so-called 'multiple' questions were classified as themselves improper: they were not to be asked; and if asked, they were not to be answered as put. Thus when Socrates is asked a question of the form 'Is it not the case that both A and B?', his reply is 'You are asking me two questions', and he proceeds to give a separate answer to each (*Grg.* 466b–e; cf. *Arist. SE* 167b38–168a16, 169a6–18, 175b39–176a18 on the trick of 'making multiple questions into one (τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν)'). **ἐρωτῶ** here is, in effect, 'I hereby ask'; cf. *Rep.* 350e τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ ὅπερ ἄρτι ('Let me put to you the question I was recently asking') and *Grg.* 463c, where someone is told 'If you want to find out, ask me what ... (εἴπερ βούλει πυνθῆσθαι, ἐρώτα ὅποιον ...)', and he replies ἐρωτῶ δὴ (cf. 135d7n. on λέγω δὴ). **a4–5 ἀλλὰ γάρ ...** 'But there is no point in my asking, since ...'; cf. *GP* 101–2. Socrates does not give Alcibiades a chance to protest at the question he has just asked. **a6 ἐξευρών ... μαθών:** see 106d4–5n. for the contrast. **a7 τρυφᾷς:** the translation 'you're being decadent' perhaps comes closest to combining this word's connotations of luxury, indolence and depravity: τρυφή is associated with μαλθακία or μαλακία (softness), ἀκολασία (wantonness) and ἀκρασία (lack of self-control) in *Grg.* 492c, *Rep.* 590b, *Arist. EN* 1145a35, 1150b2–3; and Lysias' story about Alcibiades' incestuous activities (127a6n.) was quoted in illustration of his τρυφή. Similar charges of decadence are made against Euthyphro in *Euthphr.* 11e, for needing Socrates' encouragement to stop him flagging intellectu-

ally, and against Socrates himself in *Prt.* 327e, for being reluctant to face what Protagoras sees as facts. γεύσαιο λόγου: the same metaphor of ‘tasting’ an argument is deployed in *Rep.* 539b, *Phlb.* 15d, which speak of youths, presumably less decadent than Alcibiades, going wild with excitement when they first taste argument.

**βι ταὐτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντ’** ‘the same things are both just and beneficial’. This slippery phrase recalls the thesis which Alcibiades rejected in 113d5–8. That thesis includes a couple of definite articles missing here (ταὐτά ... ἐστὶν τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα). That thesis therefore unambiguously means that the just and the beneficial are one and the same (i.e. that all beneficial things are just, and all just ones beneficial). Remove the articles, and it would mean instead that some things are just and they, those self-same things, are also beneficial (i.e. that some things are both just and beneficial). Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.8.6 (quoted in 116a3n.), where Socrates maintains that ‘the same things are both fine and shameful (καλά τε καὶ αἰσχρὰ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι)’, not because he believes in any identity between the fine and the shameful, but because, as he points out, things are often fine for one purpose but shameful for another. Because the articles are such unobtrusive little words, but make such a big logical difference, they offer various opportunities for confusion. In the argument to come, Socrates will exploit these opportunities (116c1–2n., 116e1–2n.). Cf. *Euthphr.* 7e–8c, where from Euthyphro’s belief that on some issues the gods differ violently from one another, Socrates infers: ‘So it seems that the same things are both hated and loved by the gods (ταῦτ’ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, μισεῖται τε ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται), and the same things would be both hateful to the gods and dear to the gods (θεομισῇ τε καὶ θεοφιλεῖ ταῦτ’ ἂν εἴη).’ In the light of the premiss from which this is inferred, all that it can legitimately mean is that *some* things are both dear to and hated by the gods. Socrates however suggests it implies that *everything* dear to the gods is also hated by them (ὁ δ’ ἂν θεοφιλες ᾗ καὶ θεομισές ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν), and offers a potential application of this general principle. Euthyphro promptly and rightly rejects the application, saying ‘*That’s* not a point on which I take one god to differ from another.’ Alcibiades will prove less alert than Euthyphro. **β2 τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας;** ‘why don’t you show ...?’ Whether its verb is aorist

or present, a question with τί οὐ is often more or less tantamount to an imperative. Using the aorist does not suggest that the speaker has in mind any particular past failure to act as specified: thus in *Gr.* 503b someone is asked with the aorist τί οὐχὶ . . . ἔφρασας ('why don't you tell . . .?'), but he answers with the present οὐκ ἔχω ('I can't'), not with a past 'I couldn't'. Rather, using the aorist seems to add especial urgency: hence *Ar. Lys.* 181–2 τί δήτα ταυτ' οὐχ ὥς τάχιστα, Λαμπιτοί, | ξυνωμόσαμεν ('Lampito, why don't we swear this oath as soon as possible?'), *Aesch. Pr.* 747–8 τί δήτ' ἐμοὶ ζῆν κέρδος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τάχει | ἔρριψ' ἐμαυτὴν τῆσδ' ἀπὸ στύφλου πέτρας ('What's the point in living? Why don't I throw myself this instant off this cliff?').

**b2–3** εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σε· εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξεσθαι 'If you like, you can question me as I did you; or, if you prefer, go through it in a speech all by yourself.' For the omission of the βούλει from the εἰ δέ clause, and a proof that it is βούλει that is omitted, cf. *Rep.* 432a εἰ μὲν βούλει, . . . εἰ δέ βούλει, . . . εἰ δέ, . . . The lack of grammatical correspondence between the participle ἐρωτῶν and the imperative διέξεσθαι is ungainly, but still within the bounds of idiom: cf. e.g. *Ep.* 7.330c πρῶτον μὲν συμβουλευσας . . . ὕστερον . . . διέξειμι. **b6** ὡγαθέ: see 104e3n. **b6–7** καὶ ἐκεῖ τοί σε δεήσει ἕνα ἕκαστον πείθειν 'There too [when speaking to the people in the Assembly] you will have to persuade them individually.' There is some imprecision here. It is one thing to say that Alcibiades cannot persuade the citizenry of Athens without persuading individual citizens. It is another thing to say that Alcibiades cannot persuade the citizenry without persuading each and every individual citizen. The former is true, but the latter is false; for the citizenry takes its decisions by majority vote, and unanimity is not required. However, the former implies at most that if Alcibiades is capable of persuading the citizenry, then he is capable of persuading a majority of individual citizens. Only the latter implies that if Alcibiades is capable of persuading the citizenry, then the individual citizens that he is capable of persuading include Socrates in particular. Alcibiades however cannot evade Socrates' suggestion by drawing attention to this imprecision. For that would be to confess that, when he addresses the Assembly, his position is, after all, different from that of an expert teacher, who is able to instruct an entire class, and not simply to win a majority vote among them at the end

of the lesson. For similar play with the thought that someone who intends to persuade the people should certainly be able to persuade a single individual, cf. Socrates' words to Glaucon (105a7n. on ἐὰν θᾷπτον) in Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.15: 'So you are not able to persuade your uncle, but you think you will be able to get all of the Athenians, your uncle among them, to be persuaded.'

**CI τοῦ αὐτοῦ . . . οἷόν τε εἶναι** 'it is one and the same person who has the capacity . . .'; lit. 'having the capacity . . . belongs to one and the same person'. Greek idiom allows this construction, where the subject of a verb is in the genitive and the verb itself is in the infinitive, as an alternative to the standard construction, where the subject is in the nominative and the verb takes some finite form. This alternative is not noticeably different in meaning. There is the same construction at 129a4 παντός, 133e1 ἐνός τε καὶ μᾶς τέχνης. **ἔνα . . . κατὰ μόνας** 'a single individual taken separately', as opposed to συμπόλλους in 114c2. For the idiom κατὰ μόνας, see LSJ s.v. μόνος B.III. Here is another imprecision to which Alcibiades cannot draw attention, unless he confesses that there is a difference between him addressing the Assembly and an expert teacher instructing a class. The pupils who receive the expert's instruction together in a class could also receive that instruction separately in private supervisions or tutorials; by contrast, the presence of a crowd may persuade individuals within it of things that they would repudiate were they addressed by the orator in private. There is a vivid description of this in *Rep.* 492b–c: 'When a large mass are all in session as an Assembly . . ., and with a great hubbub of cheers and boos they complain about some parts of the proceedings and applaud others, doing both to excess; and, besides the people, the cliffs and the site in which they are gathered echo back and redouble the hubbub of their jeering and applause: in such a situation, how do you think the young man's heart . . . will be affected? What sort of education adequate for private life (παιδείαν ἰδιωτικὴν) do you think will resist all this, so that it is not swamped by such jeering and applause, and swept away wherever the current may take it? Don't you think the young man [he has in mind a young man like Alcibiades; see 120e3–4n.] will agree with the crowd about what's fair and what's foul, and do the same things as they do, and become just like them?' Alci-

biades of course does not want to admit that his ability to persuade individuals depends upon exploiting such effects. **c2** συμπόλλους ‘lots of people taken together’. **c3** ἔπειθεν is in the imperfect because Alcibiades is being reminded of what he must have witnessed in his schooldays; cf. the imperfects in *Euthd.* 276a ‘Now aren’t teachers teachers of pupils, just as the harp master and the writing master (ὁ γραμματιστής) were (ἦσαν), I imagine, teachers of you and the other boys, and you were pupils?’, and *Prt.* 312a–b ‘Do you expect to get from Protagoras the sort of instruction that was provided (ἐγένετο) by the writing master, the harp master and the trainer?’ The ‘philosophic imperfect’ (129e6n.) is a somewhat similar construction. **c6** πείσει . . . **c8** ἔσται: the future tense is idiomatically used, in Greek as in English, to formulate the conclusion of an inference; cf. e.g. the string of futures in 133e7–134a6 ἀγνοήσῃ, εἴσεται, ἀμαρτήσεται, πράξει. The reason why Alcibiades needs to *infer* that a skilled arithmetician can convince both individuals and groups is of course that arithmetic was not on the standard curriculum which has been his only educational experience (106e5–10; *Laws* 819a–b implies that teaching children arithmetic along with their letters was a distinctively Egyptian custom). **c10** ἅπερ καὶ πολλοὺς . . . **11** ταῦτα καὶ ἓνα: for the repeated καὶ here, see 110d8n. on καὶ ἐγὼ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. **c12** εἰκός γε ‘probably’, a considerably less confident answer than the ναί, ναί and πάννυ γε and πάννυ γε of 114c4, c7, c9. The description that Alcibiades has confidently applied to experts is not one that he can confidently apply to himself.

**d2** ὁ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ συνουσίᾳ ‘the orator in the sort of gathering we have here’, a gathering in which there are just two people present (118b6), one of whom is the orator. To speak of oratory with an audience of one sounds very incongruous: Gorgias is in strict conformity with standard usage when he defines the distinctively oratorical sort of persuasion as ‘that in law courts and other such crowds (τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις)’ (*Grg.* 454b); and when Socrates proposes to define oratory in general as a skill that operates ‘not only in law courts and all other public gatherings (ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι), but also in private ones (ἐν ιδίοις)’, Phaedrus responds by saying that he has never heard of oratory operating so widely (*Phdr.* 261a–b). Alcibiades is evidently reluctant



to accept the possibility of oratory with an audience of one (hence his unenthusiastic agreement at 114d4 κινδυνεύει), but he can hardly deny the possibility outright, without acknowledging that he means to practise the standard sort of oratory: one which, because it neither has nor imparts knowledge, can address only mass audiences.

**d5–6** ἐπειδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται πολλούς τε καὶ ἓνα πείθειν, ἐν ἔμοι ἐμμελέτησον: we learnt right at the start of this dialogue (103a–b) that Socrates does not follow the crowd: they talked, he kept silent; they have left, he remains. His own case is therefore likely to provide an exception to the principle that ‘he who can persuade many, can persuade one’; and the invitation ‘practise on me’ is a teasing reminder of this fact.

**d6** ἐπιδείξαι contrasts both with 114b2 ἀπείδειξας and with 114d6 πείθειν. An ἀπόδειξις is a rigorous argument whereby something is shown to be true. An ἐπίδειξις (115a4n.) is a rhetorical performance whereby the performer shows off his virtuosity. He can do this quite successfully without persuading his audience of the conclusion for which he is ostensibly arguing: thus Demos. 61.2 contrasts ἐπιδεικτικοί with πιθανοί speeches, and Isoc. 4.17 says ‘If one is not just putting on a display (μὴ μόνον ἐπιδείξιν ποιούμενον), but actually means to have some effect, then one must search out those arguments that will persuade (πείσουσιν) ...’ When in *Phd.* 99d Socrates describes himself as ‘putting on a display’, it is with the explicit acknowledgement that his discourse is, by ideal standards, second best.

**d8** ὕβριστής εἶ has something of the affectionately exasperated tone of ‘You bugger!’, here as at *Smp.* 175e, 215b, *Meno* 76a. Only an intimate could make such a charge in jest; and only an irritated intimate would wish to do so. The central element in the offence of ὕβρις was a gratuitous slighting of the honour of other people. In Athens, a conviction for such an offence could be punished by death (Demos. 54.1). The subject is exhaustively treated in N.R.E. Fisher, *Hybris: a study in the values of honour and shame in ancient Greece* (Warminster 1992).

**d9** γοῦν marks a so-called ‘part proof’ (*GP* 451). The thought is: ‘your claim that I am a ὕβριστής, i.e. that I habitually commit acts of ὕβρις, has this much truth in it: at the present moment I am committing one, in that ...’

**d9–10** μέλλω σε πείθειν τάναντία οἷς σὺ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις ‘I intend to persuade you of the opposite of the point that you refuse to persuade me of.’

**ει μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς λέγε:** the colloquialism μή, ἀλλὰ . . . is elliptical for ‘Don’t say that; instead . . .’ (*GP* 4–5). Cf. the words with which Meno refuses Socrates’ request that he answer a question: μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ (*Meno* 75b). Meno uses the aorist εἰπέ, since it is just a single question that he wants Socrates to answer. Alcibiades uses the present λέγε, since (with characteristic laziness 104d2–3n.) he wants Socrates to do all the answering. **e8–9 ἄλλωι γε λέγοντι μὴ πιστεύσης** ‘you shouldn’t take it on trust from anyone else’. This aorist subjunctive with μή is in effect a prohibition. Cf. Socrates’ remarks to Polus in *Grg.* 472b–c: he concedes that a great many people would agree with Polus, and continues ‘But I, even though there is only one of me, do not agree with you. You are not presenting any compelling argument; instead, you are bringing lots of false witnesses against me, and trying to expel me from my property, the truth. Unless I can produce you yourself, even though there is only one of you, as a witness agreeing to what I say, then I don’t think I’ll have achieved anything much with regard to what we are talking about. And I don’t think you’ll have achieved much either, unless you can produce me, the single solitary me, as a witness on your side.’ Socrates is relying on the simple but important logical point that, however many other people contradict you, you might still be right, whereas if you contradict yourself, you are bound to be wrong. **e10–11 ἀποκριτέον· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶμαι βλαβήσεσθαι:** cf. Socrates’ words in *Grg.* 475d ‘Don’t hesitate to answer, Polus; it won’t do you any harm (οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ)’; Socrates’ words to Meno in *Meno* 84b ‘In perplexing [your slave by our questions], and numbing him as a stingray does, we didn’t do him any harm, did we (μῶν τι ἐβλάψαμεν)?’; and Socrates’ words to Hippias in *Hp. mi.* 373a ‘If you are willing to answer me as you did before [i.e. in short answers, not long speeches; cf. 106b1n.], then you will do me a lot of good, and I don’t expect that you’ll do yourself any harm either (οἶμαι δὲ οὐδ’ αὐτὸν σὲ βλαβήσεσθαι).’ The fact that Alcibiades himself makes this point, instead of having to have it put to him as Polus, Meno and Hippias did, is some sign that he is making intellectual progress.

**115a1 μαντικὸς γὰρ εἶ** ‘You’d make a good diviner.’ To call Alcibiades a μάντις, rather than μαντικός, would imply the falsehood

that he is one of those who divine for a living (cf. 107b2n.), and so not the politician that he aspires to be (see Th. 8.1.1 for the distinction between μάντις and ῥήτωρ); cf. the moderating ‘perhaps’ in Socrates’ words to the politician Anytus in *Meno* 92c: ‘You’re a diviner, perhaps (μάντις εἴ ἴσως).’ But what exactly provokes Socrates’ ascription of prophetic powers to Alcibiades? No doubt Alcibiades is content to take the ascription as provoked by his statement that answering questions will do him no harm. There is however a further possibility, suggested by the recorded peculiarities of the young Alcibiades’ pronunciation: his rho was indistinguishable from his lambda (Ar. *Wasps* 44–6), and he stammered (Thphr. fr. 134 Wimmer, in Plu. *Alc.* 10.4, describes how he coped with his stammer when giving speeches in adult life); both peculiarities were thought characteristic of the youthful, handsome, reckless and irascible (Hipp. *Epidemics* 1.19). If we allow for these peculiarities, then Alcibiades’ words at 114e10–11 would sound as if he were saying ἀποκλί- τέον· καὶ γὰρ οὐδένα οἶμοι βραβῆ ἔσσεσθαι (‘I must fall away, since I don’t expect there will be any umpire’). These words would then be an omen of his future decline: he is bound to go astray, since he does not acknowledge any higher authority (with this metaphor from athletic competition, cf. the epitaph quoted in Demos. 18.289, on those who ‘made Hades their common βραβῆ’; for other athletic metaphors in this dialogue, see 119b5–9, 119e7, 124b2, 132b1). The omen would be of the genre called κληδών or φήμη, where words can be taken to bear a sense quite different from any intended by their utterer. The practice is to acknowledge such omens: e.g. when a Samian called Hegesistratus tells a Spartan his name, the Spartan says ‘I accept the omen of “You will lead an army (Ἡγησιστράτου, i.e. ἡγήσει στράτου)”’, foretelling that Sparta is to lead an allied force which includes a Samian contingent (Hdt. 9.91). Therefore Socrates’ remark ‘You’d make a good diviner’ might have, besides its straightforward meaning, the rôle of acknowledging an unintended omen in what Alcibiades says here. Such a rôle is far from obvious to one looking at a written text, but it could be plain enough to one hearing the dialogue performed (as it seems to have been originally: Arist. *Pol.* 1263b16 speaks of the reactions to a Platonic dialogue of ‘the listener (ὁ ἀκροώμενος)’, where we would say ‘the reader’). Cf. 120b3n. on φαῖεν ἄν αἱ γυναῖκες, for a less obscure hint about distinctive pronunciation.

### 115a1–116e2: Why justice is beneficial

*Whatever is just is also fine. It might seem that some fine things are bad, and some shameful ones good. This however is a mistake. For if something is fine in one respect, then it will be good in that respect, even if it is bad in another respect. So whatever is fine is also good. This can be shown also by reflecting on the fact that someone doing fine is happy, and thus in possession of good things. Or so Socrates gets Alcibiades to agree, by some rather shoddy reasoning. However, the fact that Alcibiades lets him get away with such reasoning is itself proof of the main point that Socrates is here trying to establish: Alcibiades is very ignorant of these matters. Now whatever is good is also beneficial. So whatever is just is also beneficial. And since Alcibiades agrees to all this, he will mock any orator who denies it.*

**115a4 καλά:** praising things as καλά, or censuring them as αἰσχροί, was the task of display oratory (ἐπιδεικτικόν), which was the third kind of oratory (113d2–4n.), besides the deliberative (concerning benefit) and the forensic (concerning justice). The distinctions between these three kinds of oratory will therefore be quite thoroughly subverted by Socrates' argument that everything just is fine (115a8), everything fine is good (116c4–5), everything good is beneficial (116c7) and hence that everything just is beneficial (116d3). **a6 εἰ** 'whether'; i.e. 'I am asking [understood from ἐρωτᾷς 115a5] whether ...'; the same construction recurs in *Sph.* 233a, *Phlb.* 39c. **a8 πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλά:** cf. *Grg.* 476b, where Socrates gets Polus to admit that 'Things that are just are all fine, to the extent that they are just (τὰ γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστί, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια).' Socrates' arguments against Polus thereafter take a different route from his argument against Alcibiades, but they come to rather similar conclusions. For example, since Polus accepts that fine things are all either pleasant or beneficial (474d–475a), and can hardly deny that just punishment is painful, he is forced to infer that just punishment is beneficial (477a). Socrates' argument against Alcibiades here is therefore vulnerable to the same objection as his argument against Polus: justice, at least as conventionally understood, is not fine, and the only fine justice is the natural justice whereby the strong lord it over the weak (*Grg.* 482c–484b). Plato does have an argument that justice is good which does not rely on this premiss that justice is fine. But to present that argument takes the whole of the *Republic*.

**b1–3** Alcibiades would have learnt to contrast the beneficial with the fine from the orators, among whom this contrast was, notes Arist. *Rh.* 1358b38–1359a5, a cliché: ‘Those who are praising someone, and also those who are censuring, do not consider whether what he did was beneficial (συμφέροντα) or harmful. Instead, they have often counted it as praise that he neglected his own advantage to do something fine (καλόν); e.g. they praise Achilles for going to rescue his comrade (ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἐταίρῳ) Patroclus, in spite of its being possible for him to live, because he knew that he ought (δεῖ) to die: to him, such a death was more fine (κάλλιον), but life was beneficial (συμφέρον).’ Isoc. 4.53 applies the cliché in praise of the Athenians: ‘We have chosen to rescue (βοηθεῖν) the weak, even contrary to our own benefit (παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον), rather than join with the strong in committing injustices to our advantage.’ The extant treatments in oratory of the Achilles/Patroclus example are not quite as frank as Isocrates in distinguishing the just from the beneficial (see *Ap.* 28b–d, *Smp.* 179d–180a, Aeschin. 1.145–51). Cf. 110b2n. for another allusion to the story of Patroclus. **b3 δέον** ‘when they should have done’; an accusative absolute, as often with impersonal verbs like δεῖ. **b4 πάνυ μὲν οὖν**: see 104d10n. **b6 τοῦτο**: when it indicates that one expression glosses another (as ἀνδρεία here glosses τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν κτλ.) the demonstrative pronoun regularly occurs in the neuter, regardless of the genders of the gloss and the expression glossed; cf. 122a2, 130e5, 133b4.

**c1 ἄρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἢ ἀνδρεία, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ θάνατος**; ‘Now isn’t courage one thing, and death another?’ This is certainly true in the limited sense that an action can display courage without being fatal, and be fatal without displaying courage. But these two features, that of displaying courage and that of being fatal, are not distinct in any more profound sense. For the very thing that makes it courageous to rescue a friend in battle will be the fact that such an action risks death. **c3–4 οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτόν γ’ ἐστὶ καλὸν καὶ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς φίλοις βοηθεῖν**; ‘So it is not in the same respect that rescuing friends is both fine and bad?’ This too is true in only a limited sense. For the fineness of rescuing embattled friends is in large part due to the fact that one does it knowing the evils that one may thereby bring upon oneself. Contrast the position of someone who says that

everything nutritious is healthy, and who is presented with the objection that a dish of beef and strychnine is nutritious but unhealthy. He can reply to the objection by pointing out that the dish is nutritious in respect of the beef, but unhealthy in respect of the strychnine, that beef is utterly distinct from strychnine, and therefore that the dish is not both nutritious and unhealthy in anything remotely like the same respect.

**c6** ἥι γε καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν ‘at least in so far as it is fine [i.e. even if in no other respect], it is also good’. The feminine dative singular ἥι (lit. ‘in the respect in which’) follows a standard Greek pattern for turning pronouns into adverbs: thus ἐκείνῃ (LSJ s.v. ἐκεῖνος III), ταύτῃ (LSJ s.v. οὗτος C.VIII.4.c), τῇδε (LSJ s.v. ὅδε IV.1.b), ποίῃ (LSJ s.v. ποῖος IV). The ‘*qua*’ of Latin, and hence of English philosophical jargon, is the same construction.

**c6–7** ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ‘as in this case in particular’; cf. 108d6, 108e4 for this use of ἐνταῦθα.

**c9** ὥδε δὲ σκόπει ‘try looking at it like this’. We should imagine something of a pause before Socrates says these words. When, as here, Socrates has stumped an interlocutor with a question, and is going to give him a clue about how to answer, he often introduces the clue with this turn of phrase. He does this some dozen times in Plato (e.g. *Cra.* 392c, *Grg.* 478a, *Meno* 82c); and with the possible exception of *Rep.* 577c, he does not otherwise combine ὥδε with the imperative σκόπει.

**d2** μάλιστα: having Alcibiades give this sign of assent here is the easiest way to break up the very awkward double question that the manuscript tradition ascribes to Socrates: οὐκοῦν τὰ μέγιστα μάλιστα καὶ ἥκιστα τῶν τοιούτων δέξαιο ἂν στέρεσθαι;

**d5–6** ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ δέξαιο στέρεσθαι; ‘On what terms would you be prepared to be deprived of it?’ This is an idiomatic way of enquiring about a price. Here the enquiry is about the price that Alcibiades would *accept* in return for being a coward. Contrast *Ap.* 41a Ὀρφεῖ συγγενέσθαι . . . ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ’ ἂν ὕμῶν;, where the idiom is used to enquire about the price that someone would *pay* in return for associating with Orpheus.

**d5** αὐτοῦ: i.e. ἀνδρείας; for the shift in gender, cf. *Rep.* 526c, where the reply to the question γεωμετρίαν λέγεις; is the neuter αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

**d7** οὐδὲ ζῆν ἂν ἐγὼ δεξαίμην δειλὸς ὢν is not mere bravado: Alcibiades was in fact decorated for his valour in battle (*Smp.* 220d–e, *Isoc.* 16.29, *Antisth.* fr. 200 *SSR*).

**d8** ἔσχατον ἄρα κακῶν . . . ἡ δειλία . . . **10** ἐξ ἴσου τῷ τεθνάναι: Alcibiades is not being entirely logical. How can what is ‘ultimate of evils’ be ‘on a par with death’, if Alcibiades would choose death over anything short of universal fame and power (105a3–c5)? How indeed can there be two distinct things, one of which is both ultimate of evils, and on a par with the other? For another illogicality over the ultimate of evils, see 112d2–3n. **d12–13** οὐκοῦν θανάτῳ τε καὶ δειλίᾳ ἐναντιώτατον ζωῇ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ; ‘So life and courage is completely opposite to both death and cowardice?’ This is a somewhat clumsily compressed statement of the facts that life is the complete opposite of death and that courage is the complete opposite of cowardice. When life and courage are described by the singular adjective ἐναντιώτατον, this implies that life and courage are either to be identified or at very least to be taken as inseparable aspects of a single thing (for this use of a singular adjective with two subjects, cf. *Rep.* 548c διαφανέστατον δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν τι μόνον . . . φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι). Moreover, since a single thing can have at most a single opposite (*Prt.* 332c), the implication is that the complex phrase ‘both death and cowardice’ also stands for a single thing. These implications can hardly be objected to by one who has just described cowardice as ‘ultimate of evils’, ‘on a par with death’.

**e10** κατ’ ἀγαθοῦ πράξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας ‘in so far as it is an act of a good thing, namely, the act of courage’. Here lurks a difficulty. The earlier argument has established simply that, in so far as rescuing embattled friends is courageous, it is a fine thing (115b5–8), and that courage is a good thing (115e4–8). From these premisses, we cannot rightly infer that rescuing embattled friends owes its fine character to the goodness of courage. (Think of an ornament that consists of some cheap metal, plated with gold. In so far as the ornament is golden, it is metallic; moreover, gold is costly. But the ornament does not owe its metallic character to the costliness of gold.) Nor can we rightly infer that in so far as rescuing embattled friends is a fine thing, it is also a good one. (The ornament may be costly in various ways and respects, but not in so far as it is metallic.) At most, we can infer that rescuing embattled friends is, in so far as it is courageous, both good and fine. (In so far as the ornament is golden, it is both metallic and costly.) But this, the only legitimate inference, gets

us no closer to the general conclusions that in so far as a thing is good, it is fine, and that in so far as a thing is fine, it is good. (It is simply false that things are metallic in so far as they are costly, and vice versa.) **ε13** κατὰ δὲ κακοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τοῦ θανάτου ‘but in so far as it is an act of a bad thing, namely, the act of death’. **ε16–ι16αι** εἴπερ ἡ κακὸν ἀπεργάζεται κακὴν καλεῖς, καὶ ἡ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὴν κλητέον ‘if in so far as it has a bad effect, you call it a bad act, then in so far as it has a good effect, you ought also to call it a good act’. This logic is open to question. At any rate, if one bad effect is enough to make an act bad, but one good effect is not enough to make an act good, this logic is comparable to ‘if in so far as someone votes against a decision, you call the decision contested, then in so far as someone votes for a decision, you ought to call the decision unanimous’.

**ι16a3** ἄρ’ οὖν καὶ ἡ ἀγαθόν, καλόν, ἡ δὲ κακόν, αἰσχρόν; ‘Now isn’t it also the case that in so far as it [presumably anything; and hence, in particular, rescuing embattled friends] is good, it’s fine, and that in so far as it’s bad, it’s shameful?’ In giving a prompt ‘yes’ to this question, Alcibiades sides both with the handsome but unreflective playwright Agathon (*Smp.* 201c τὰγαθὰ οὐ καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι; ἔμοιγε), and with the distinguished statesman and philosopher Timaeus (*Tim.* 87c πᾶν δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν). Not everyone shared this opinion. Thus in *Xen. Mem.* 3.8.6–7, Aristippus asks Socrates whether a dung-basket is a fine thing; Socrates replies ‘By Zeus it is, and a golden shield is a shameful one, if for their respective tasks the former has been finely constructed, and the latter badly.’ Aristippus, evidently thinking that by anyone’s account a dung-basket must be shameful, however good it is, asks Socrates whether he is saying that the same things are both fine and shameful (cf. **ι14b1n.**); Socrates replies ‘By Zeus I am; and I’m also saying that the same things are both good and bad. For often what’s good for malnutrition is bad for fever, and what’s good for fever is bad for malnutrition; moreover, often what makes a fine runner makes a shameful wrestler, and what makes a fine wrestler makes a shameful runner. For everything that’s good is also fine for the ends for which it is good, and everything that’s bad is also shameful for the ends for which it is bad.’ Socrates maintains the same thesis that what functions well is fine in *Hp. ma.*



290d–291a (for stirring a pot of bean stew, a spoon made of figwood is finer than one made of gold) and Xen. *Smp.* 5.3–6 (since his protruding eyes and snub nose mean that he can see more than other people, his features are therefore finer).

**b2** ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὧδε σκέψαι marks the introduction of a new argument for an old point, as in e.g. *Phlb.* 55a καὶ τῇιδε ἔτι λέγωμεν. The end of the new argument is marked by 116c1 πάλιν αὖ. **b2–3**

ὅστις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει; ‘If someone is doing fine, then isn’t he also doing well?’ καλῶς πράττειν and εὖ πράττειν are standardly used of leading a life in which things generally are going well. So understood, this premiss can scarcely be contested. **b5**

οἱ δὲ εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες; ‘And aren’t people who do well happy?’ Given the standard use of εὖ πράττειν, for having a life in which all goes well, this premiss too is scarcely contestable. Thus when Arist. *EN* 1095a17–20 is talking about ‘the highest of the goods achievable in action (τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν)’, he remarks: ‘As for its name, more or less everyone agrees. For both the masses and the sophisticated call it happiness (εὐδαιμονίαν), and they suppose that living well (εὖ ζῆν), and doing well (εὖ πράττειν) are the same as being happy (εὐδαιμονεῖν).’ See 134e1–2n. for a more contentious claim that Socrates makes on other occasions with the words οἱ εὖ πράττοντες εὐδαίμονες: the claim that those whose actions are right are happy. **b7** οὐκοῦν εὐδαίμονες δι’ ἀγαθῶν

κτήσιν; ‘Now aren’t they happy through getting good things?’ Cf. *Smp.* 205a, where Diotima suggests to Socrates that κτήσῃ ... ἀγαθῶν οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες. Cf. also *Euthd.* 280d–281b, where Socrates argues that matters are a little more complicated: for us to be happy, it is not enough that we just get good things, if by ‘good things’ are meant wealth, health, power, courage and the like; we would need also to use those things, and use them rightly; and that means having wisdom (cf. 134e8–135b6). However, Socrates continues by arguing that, since these supposedly good things are positively dangerous unless used wisely, only wisdom is unconditionally good (*Euthd.* 281b–e). Thus it is after all possible that ‘getting good things’ (to be exact, getting the one unconditionally good thing, wisdom) is enough to make us happy. **b11** τὸ εὖ ἄρα πράττειν

ἀγαθόν; ‘So isn’t doing well a good thing?’ **b13** οὐκοῦν καλὸν ἡ

**εὐπραγία;** ‘Now aren’t good deeds a fine thing?’ The shift in the translation from ‘doing well’ to ‘good deeds’ – two expressions that the unwary might think are equivalent, but are not in fact so – is an attempt to reproduce in English the effect of Socrates’ shift from τὸ εὖ πράττειν to ἡ εὐπραγία. If Socrates’ argument is to work, Alcibiades must take these two expressions to be equivalent, as their common derivation suggests. But common derivation is no guarantee of common meaning. And εὐπραγία can in fact be used of altruistic deeds, whose doer would be described as εὖ ποιῶν or εὐεργετῶν, rather than as εὖ πράττων (as doing good, rather than as doing well). In such a use, but only in such a use, εὐπραγία stands for something that would be uncontentiously fine. Thus Arist. *Rhet.* 1367a4–6, in a list of fine things which might be described in a speech of praise, mentions things that are good from a point of view other than that of self-interest; these include in particular: ‘Those εὐπραγίαι that relate to other people, rather than to the agent himself, especially those that relate to benefactors (αἱ περὶ τοὺς εὖ ποιήσαντας); for [repaying benefactors with εὐπραγίαι] is just. Also τὰ εὐεργετήματα; for these are not directed towards oneself.’ Since the term εὐπραγία can apply to activity that is fine because it benefits someone other than the agent, Socrates can more easily gain assent to καλὸν ἢ εὐπραγία than he could to καλὸν τὸ εὖ πράττειν. But once he has gained assent to the former, he can rely on the misleading clues of derivation, and proceed as if he had gained assent to the latter.

**ει–2 ταῦτόν ᾧρα ἐφάνη ἡμῖν πάλιν αὖ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν;** ‘So once again we have had the same thing turn out to be both fine and good?’ The argument at 116b2–14 has proved at most that the putatively single thing, τὸ εὖ πράττειν or ἡ εὐπραγία, is both a good thing and a fine one, just as the argument at 115a10–116b1 did not in fact prove much more than that the single thing, courage, was both good and fine. This is very far from proving that the good and the fine are identical. The absence of articles from καλὸν and ἀγαθόν here is some acknowledgement of that fact: contrast the construction in 129c2–3 τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταῦτόν που καλεῖς (identifying conversation with the use of λόγος); and compare the construction in *Euthphr.* 8a ὁ τυγχάνει ταῦτόν ὃν ὁσιόν τε καὶ

ἀνόσιον (said of a single thing that is both holy and unholy, given Euthyphro's belief that some things are liked by some gods and disliked by others, and his definition of the (un)holy as what gods (dis-)like). However, in his next speech, Socrates will pretend that this argument identifies the good with the fine; for he will be inferring that *every* fine thing is also good. On this fallacy, see 114b1n. **c4–5** ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου 'to judge by this argument at any rate'. Socrates hints that the argument is less than conclusive. **c6** ἀνάγκη 'Certainly.' Alcibiades is too impetuous to take Socrates' hint. **c11** οἶμαι κτλ. 'I think that [understand: 'we agreed that' from 116c9–10] those who are doing just things must be doing fine ones.' **c13** καὶ τοὺς τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθὰ; i.e. 'Didn't we agree also that those who are doing fine things must be doing good ones?'

**d1** τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρειν; 'And also that good things must be beneficial?' **d5** σὺ ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁ ἐρωτῶν: to remind Alcibiades of the point made at 112e1–113c4. The reminder is the more timely, in that, now that they have reached the conclusion that just things are beneficial, Alcibiades is trying to back away from it: note the way that his response has changed from ναί at 116c14 and d2, to ἔοικεν at d4. **d6** φαίνομαι, ὥς ἔοικα 'It looks as if I am, it seems [the asserter of these things].' This odd response (whose closest parallel is the words of Alcibiades' cousin Cleinias in *Euthd.* 281e: φαίνεται, ὥς ἔοικεν, οὕτως, ὥς σὺ λέγεις) is simultaneously evasive (106a5–7n.) and pleonastic: evasive, because Alcibiades is reluctant to confess frankly that he has been making these assertions, or even that he seems to have been making them; and pleonastic, because 'seeming to seem to be so' cannot be understood as anything other than simply 'seeming to be so'. Alcibiades' tendency to pleonasm will be manifested later too: see 125c4–5, 135d9–11, and cf. 124e7n. Repeating the same thought in different words was the mark of certain rhetorical styles; hence Socrates' complaint in *Phdr.* 235a about a speech by the orator Lysias: 'I thought . . . he'd said the same things two and three times over, whether because he wasn't all that competent at making several observations about a single topic, or maybe because he just doesn't care about that sort of thing. Well, my impression was that he was swanking (νεανιεύεσθαι; cf. 104a6–7 νεανικωτάτου), showing off (ἐπιδεικνύμενος; cf. 114d6 ἐπιδείξει) his talent for saying some-

thing first one way, then another, and saying it splendidly either way.’ Such repetitiveness was a mark also of the more over-heated forms of lyric poetry: cf. e.g. the cluster of four terms for a woman in frenzy at Timotheus fr. 778(b) *PMG* θυιάδα φοιβάδα μαινάδα λυσσάδα (at which a heckler said ‘I hope that’s how your daughter turns out.’). **δ8 Πεπαρηθίοις:** Peparethos was a tiny and obscure island in the northern Aegean. It is here paired with Athens (‘the biggest city in Greece’ 104a7–b1) to indicate that Socrates’ point applies with utter generality to any city, however big or small (cf. 119a1–2n. on ‘polar expressions’). Of all the many tiny and obscure places that might be contrasted with Athens, why should Peparethos come to mind? Peparethos was too insignificant even to be the byword for insignificance (that was Seriphos; see Ar. *Ach.* 542, Isoc. 19.9, and *Rep.* 329e–330a, which retells about Seriphus an anecdote that had earlier, in Hdt. 8.125, hinged on the insignificance of Belbina). Peparethos does not seem to have impinged much on the awareness of the Athenians, except for some dramatic events in 361, when the Athenians sent a force to defend it against Alexander of Pherai, and Alexander was provoked to mount a damaging raid on the Piraeus (D.S. 15.95, Polyaeus 6.2.2). This suggests that the *Alcibiades* was written not before, and not too long after, the events of 361. After all, we would expect a British author, who picks on Port Stanley as paradigmatically small and insignificant, to be writing after the Falklands War, but before Port Stanley has relapsed into its previous obscurity.

**ε1–2 σὺ λέγων ὅτι ταῦτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντα:** Socrates invokes again the loose formulation that confuses ‘Some things are both just and beneficial’ with ‘All beneficial things are just, and all just ones beneficial’ (cf. 114b1n.). Alcibiades has never denied the former. And the recent argument has led him to affirm only part of the latter; for it concluded simply that ‘All just things are beneficial’ (116d3). This conclusion is therefore fully consistent with Alcibiades’ earlier assertion that ‘great injustices have often benefited their perpetrators’ (113d6–7). Moreover, this conclusion is itself subject to the qualification that just things are beneficial *in respect of being just* (cf. 115b6, e10). This conclusion is therefore consistent also with the assertion that some just things, while of course beneficial in respect

of being just, are nevertheless, all things considered, harmful. The fact that Alcibiades does not protest at Socrates' description of what he is saying indicates how thoroughly muddled he is.

### 116e3–119a7: The different kinds of ignorance

*Alcibiades' contradictions and confusions indicate that he is suffering from a most serious kind of ignorance. Those who suffer from the milder kind of ignorance are aware of their ignorance. This awareness means that they do not form erroneous opinions, for it means that they do not form any opinions at all about the matters on which they know they are ignorant. This awareness saves them not only from erroneous opinions, but also from erroneous actions; for it leads them to entrust themselves to the guardianship of experts. Much more serious is the ignorance of those who take themselves to have knowledge: they are liable to form, and act upon, all manner of erroneous opinions. That is Alcibiades' condition; and Pericles, the guardian to whom he has been entrusted, does not have the wisdom to remedy it.*

**116e3–4** οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε οὐδ' ὅτι λέγω is the standard confession of Socrates' interlocutors, after they have been chastened by his questions, and are moving towards the Socratic wisdom (117b12–13n.) of acknowledging the limits of their understanding. Cf. 127d6–7, Polemarchus in *Rep.* 334b 'I don't know any more what I was saying (οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι ἔλεγον)', Agathon in *Smp.* 201b 'Chances are, I don't know any of what I said back then (κινδυνεύω ... οὐδὲν εἰδέναι ὧν τότε εἶπον)', and Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) in *Xen. Mem.* 4.2.19 'I no longer trust my answers (οὐκέτι μὲν ἔγωγε πιστεύω οἷς ἀποκρίνομαι)' and 39 'The chances are that I know absolutely nothing (κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν εἰδέναι).' **e4** ἀτεχνῶς is the colloquial Attic way of emphasising the aptness of a comparison. It is frequent in Plato and Aristophanes, but not grand enough for tragedy, oratory, or history. Momentarily, Alcibiades has come to resemble Socrates even in vocabulary. **εἰκα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι**: the dialectic has now brought Alcibiades to a state resembling that of Socrates, whose looks and behaviour were notably ἀτοπα (106a3n.). **e5** ἕτερα ... ἄλλα: these two words can scarcely be distinguished in sense (cf. 129d2 ἕτερον used as a synonym for 129c5 ἄλλο). Greek generally (from *Hom. Il.* 9.313 onwards) is

happy to have ἕτερος correspond to ἄλλος, and no particular significance can be attached to having such a correspondence, rather than just repeating one of these words (e.g. *Phlb.* 57a–b asks whether one branch of theoretical knowledge is purer than another (ἑτέρας ἄλλη), as one practical skill is clearer than another (ἄλλην ἄλλης); *Prm.* 143b has a repeated ἕτερον, followed immediately by ἕτερον corresponding to ἄλλο). **e6 ὦ φίλε:** cf. 109d1n. **e8–11** There is something especially absurd about getting the number of one's limbs wrong. Cf. the sarcastic remark in *Rep.* 522d 'as if Agamemnon did not even know how many feet he had'; Bertrand Russell, *Introduction to mathematical philosophy* (London 1919) 9 'We want our numbers not merely to verify mathematical formulae, but to apply in the right way to common objects. We want to have ten fingers and two eyes and one nose'; G. E. Moore, *Philosophical papers* (London 1959) 146 'I certainly did at the moment *know* that which I expressed by the combination of certain gestures with saying the words "Here is one hand and here is another."'

**117a5 περὶ ὧν ... 6 περὶ τούτων:** to have the relative pronoun preceding its 'antecedent' is rather more standard Greek than such a description implies: περὶ ὧν ... περὶ τούτων ... recur in the same order in e.g. *Isoc.* 12.262, *Demos.* 8.23. **a5 ἄκων** 'involuntarily'. An important qualification: deliberately giving inconsistent answers is no sign of ignorance. **a10 πλανᾶσθαι:** 'rambling' is one of Plato's two favourite metaphors for the intellectual confusion displayed by people who cannot help contradicting themselves. The other is also a metaphor from unsuccessful journeying: ἀπορία, lit. 'having one's path blocked by an unfordable river'. Both metaphors occur together in *Hp. ma.* 304c, *Sph.* 245e, *Phd.* 108b–c. Such metaphors were used for intellectual confusion both before Plato (e.g. *Soph.* *OC* 316, Parmenides DK 28 v 8.54) and after (Wittgenstein (op. cit. in 111c3–4n.) §123 'A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about"' and §309 'What is your aim in philosophy? – To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle'). Sometimes Plato applies the metaphor of rambling, not only to confused thoughts themselves, but also to the subject matter of such thoughts: sometimes our thoughts 'ramble' because they are about something that itself 'rambles', and that therefore is not the subject of firm,

consistent and unqualified truths (e.g. *Rep.* 479d, 484b, *Phd.* 79c); if however we focus our minds on things that do not themselves ‘ramble’, our thoughts can become consistent and stable (*Rep.* 485b, *Tim.* 47c, *Phd.* 79d); and if our thoughts cease to ‘ramble’, we will become virtuous (*Rep.* 444b, *Laws* 962d). **α10–11** δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανᾷ: cf. Socrates’ description of a confusion of his own at *Hp. mi.* 372d–e: πλανῶμαι περὶ ταῦτα, δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι. **διὰ τὸ . . . διὰ ταῦτα**: this switch between singular and plural is idiomatic. Since there is no serious sense in which Alcibiades’ ignorance of these matters is a single unit rather than several different things, or several things rather than a unit, Greek allows it to be spoken of both in the singular and in the plural. Cf. 117b8 ταῦτα and b12 αὐτό, referring back to b5 ὄντινα τρόπον; and 125a8–b1, where εἰς ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίαν is summarised by εἰς αὐτά, while εἰς ἱματίων ἐργασίαν is summarised by εἰς τοῦτο. Such casualness about the difference between singular and plural is found even in fairly formal registers, as in *Prt.* 323c, where Protagoras shifts between singular and plural in mentioning the point(s) he has just made and is about to make: ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . , ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ . . . , τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξειαι.

**b3 τὴν ψυχὴν** is the first hint of a thesis that will later be developed at length: a human being is nothing other than a soul (130c3). For unless Alcibiades is his soul, the suggestion that Alcibiades is rambling about justice because he is ignorant about justice (117a10–11) could not fairly be generalised to the suggestion here that ‘whenever anyone is ignorant about anything, then *his soul* is bound to ramble about that thing’. **b5–6 ἀναβήσῃ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν**: in their rebellion against the Gods, the Giants piled one mountain upon another ‘to make it possible to ascend to the sky (ἵν’ οὐρανὸς ἀμβατὸς εἴη)’ (Hom. *Od.* 11.316; cf. *Smp.* 190b). Ascending to the sky figures in Pind. *P.* 10.27 as a feat that would take superhuman powers and bestow a superhuman felicity; it is the climactic feat of the know-all but hungry little Greek in Juvenal 3.77–8: *omnia novit | Graeculus esuriens; in caelum iusseris, ibit*. Perhaps we are to think also of Socrates’ ‘ancestor’ Daedalus (121a3–4n.), who constructed wings with which he himself successfully flew, and of Daedalus’ son Icarus, who was also equipped with such wings, but who perished by attempting

to fly too high: Icarus would then be a sort of counterpart to Alcibiades, in whom Socrates' love will beget another 'love with wings' (135e2), and whose ambitions will be his undoing. **b12 ὦ φίλε:** cf. 109d1n. **b12–13 οὐκ οἶει αὐτὸ ἐπίστασθαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος** 'you don't think that you know it when in fact you don't know it'. Appreciating the extent of one's ignorance was, according to Socrates, what constitutes human wisdom. This was the only sense he could make of the Delphic oracle's declaration that nobody was any wiser than he was (*Ap.* 21a; contrast *Xen. Ap.* 14). Wondering what the oracle might mean, Socrates talked to a politician, attempting to prove to him that he was not as wise as he thought. Socrates reflected on the conversation: 'I am wiser (σοφώτερος) than this fellow. For the chances are that neither of us knows anything important (καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν); but whereas he thinks he knows something but doesn't (οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς), I by contrast don't even think I know anything, as indeed I don't. At any rate, it looks as if in this one little way I am wiser than him at least: what I do not know, I do not even think I know (ἄ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶμαι εἰδέναι)' (*Ap.* 21d). Confucius came to a similar conclusion: 'The Master said "Yu, shall I teach you what knowledge is? When you know a thing, to recognise that you know it, and when you do not know a thing, to recognise that you do not know it. That is knowledge"' (*Analects* 2.17; trans. Arthur Waley).

**c3–4 ὄψου σκευασίας:** cookery is of such low status that Alcibiades is happy to confess his ignorance of it. The man who has lost all sense of his own dignity (ὁ ἀπονενοημένος) is 'adroit at keeping inns, pimping, farming taxes; he thinks no disgraceful occupation beneath him, but works as an auctioneer, a cook, a gambler' (*Thphr. Char.* 6.5). **c7 τῷ ἐπίσταμένῳ ἐπιτρέπει:** the same point is made by the same example in *Lys.* 209d–e: the Great King of Persia (the archetypal despot) would give authority over (ἐπιτρέψειν) his steward to Socrates and Lysis, rather than to his eldest son, 'if we showed him that we knew better than his son does about cookery'.

**d2 τὸν οἶακα εἴσω ἄγειν ἢ ἔξω** 'to put the helm to port or starboard'. Socrates envisages here a ship steered by a single oar, mounted on one side of the stern, with its blade trailing in the water;



to the upper end of this oar is attached the tiller (οἶαξ); and the helmsman steers the ship by either pulling the οἶαξ inboard towards himself (εἴσω), or pushing it outboard away (ἔξω). (For this use of εἴσω and ἔξω in connexion with a single oar, see Hdt. 1.194.3, Arist. *Mechanica* 851a35). The more usual arrangement was to have a pair of steering oars mounted on either side of the stern; the οἶαξ was then a bar of wood running across the ship, and connected to the upper ends of the two oars so that they could be handled by a single helmsman (see Cecil Torr, *Ancient ships* (Cambridge 1894) 74–8).

**d8–g τὰ ἀμαρτήματα ἐν τῇ πράξει διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀγνοίαν ἐστί:** Socrates here omits to allow for cases where we know that we do not know which choice to make, where we are nevertheless forced to make a choice, and where we have no expert to advise us: for example, the road forks, you know you need directions, but you cannot stop the car to ask for them. There are similar omissions in *Sph.* 229c, where this species of ignorance is singled out, given the special name ἀμαθία, and blamed for ‘all our intellectual failings (πάντα ὅσα διανοίαι σφαλλόμεθα)’, and in *Chrm.* 171d–e, where Socrates describes the advantages of being aware of the limits of our knowledge: ‘we would live out our lives without making mistakes (ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν; cf. 117e4–5);... for we would not try to do (ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν; cf. 117d12) what we didn’t know how to do, but instead we would seek out those who did know, and entrust them with the job (παρεδίδομεν; cf. 117e2)’. The addressee in those two passages is, like Alcibiades, an intellectually promising youth. Contrast the confirmed lovers of the sensible world whom Socrates is addressing in *Rep.* 476b–480a: for such an audience, the mental capacity that is ‘not infallible (μὴ ἀναμάρτητοι)’ (477e) and that ‘grasps at what rambles (πλανητόν)’ (479d), is labelled ‘belief (δόξα)’, and contrasted both with knowledge and with ignorance.

**e1 δέ γέ που:** see 106e8n., 107a10n. for this combination of particles. **e4 ἀναμάρτητοι:** in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.26, Socrates points

out to Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) that those who know what they are capable of doing, and what not, ‘keep away from what they do not understand, and so manage to avoid mistakes (ἀναμάρτητοι) and escape doing badly’. **e7 γάρ που:** see 107a10n.

**118a5–6** καὶ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία: cf. *Ap.* 29b: ‘How can this not be the reprehensible ignorance that I have described (τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος), that of thinking that one knows what one does not know?’

**b5 βαβαῖ:** a thoroughly conversational exclamation, too humdrum for tragedy, but frequent in comedy, satyr plays, and Platonic dialogue. Cf. 135d6n. **οἶον πάθος πέπονθας:** see 119c2n. on οἶον . . . τοῦτ’ εἶρηκας. **b6** ὀνομάζειν μὲν ὀκνῶ: for other hesitations about naming Alcibiades’ condition, see 109e8n. **b6–7** ἐπειδὴ μόνω ἐσμέν, ῥητέον ‘since there are just the two of us here, I’d better tell you’. Socrates is reluctant to shame Alcibiades before others. Cf. *Clit.* 406a, where Socrates has heard gossip of some criticisms that Clitophon was making about him, and Clitophon remarks: ‘I’ll gladly go through them for you myself, since there happen to be just the two of us here (ἐπειδὴ καὶ μόνω τυγχάνομεν ὄντε).’ No doubt it was for similarly tactful motives that Socrates turned up alone for his first conversation actually with Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) himself, having previously whetted the boy’s philosophical appetite by letting him overhear conversation with some of Socrates’ circle (*Xen. Mem.* 4.2.1–2, 8). In *Smp.* 217a–b, Alcibiades tells his own story of how he first came to be talking alone together with Socrates: Alcibiades arranged for them to be alone together (μόνος μόνω) in the hope of encouraging Socrates to seduce him – but all he got was Socrates’ usual sort of talk. **b7** ὦ βέλτιστε: cf. 113c5–6n. **b9** παιδευθῆναι: being educated to play his part as a mature citizen was what a respectable ἐρώμενος hoped to gain from the attentions of a respectable ἐραστής. Spartan law was said to regard the right sort of homosexual relationship as καλλίστην παιδείαν (*Xen. Lac.* 2.13). There was a similar attitude in Athens, where people cited the good educational effects of the ἔρως between the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton (*Hipparchus* 229c says that Aristogeiton ‘educated’ Harmodius, *Aeschin.* 1.140 says that the pair were ‘educated’ by their ‘chaste and law-abiding ἔρως, or whatever one should call it’; cf. *Arist. Rh.* 1401b9–12, on how an orator might argue ‘Lovers benefit cities; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton brought down the tyrant Hipparchus.’).

**c1–2 τοῦ σοῦ ἐπιτρόπου Περικλέους:** as the ἐπίτροπος of Alcibiades (the person to whom the young Alcibiades had been entrusted by his father's will: 104b5–6), Pericles should himself (by the principle of entrusting the ignorant to the authority of experts: 117c7 τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ ἐπιτρέπεις, 117d3 τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας) have the expertise that the young Alcibiades lacks.

**c3–4 ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου:** Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) had his interest in philosophy sparked by the realisation that political skill has to be learnt, and does not just come automatically (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.2, 4, 6).

**c5 Πυθοκλείδης:** Pythocleides of Ceos had a reputation as a teacher of music. Apart from this passage, there is little evidence that he had any connexion with Pericles (in fact, there is no other evidence at all, if *Plu. Per.* 4.1 is misremembering this passage when it names Aristotle as sole authority for the view that Pericles studied under Pythocleides). In *Prt.* 316e, Protagoras declares that Pythocleides advertised himself as a musician in order to conceal his real trade: that of a sophist.

**Ἀναξαγόρας:** the chief reputation of Anaxagoras of Clazomenai was as a natural philosopher. He made the programmatic proclamation that 'Intellect orders and is responsible for all things', but failed, so *Phd.* 97c–99c complains, to work this out in any detail. It was from listening to Anaxagoras' frequent discourses on the nature of intellect and understanding that Pericles supposedly derived the elevation of his rhetorical style (*Phdr.* 270a). There are persistent reports that, in order to get at Pericles, Anaxagoras was prosecuted for impiety (DK 59 A 1.12, 3, 17, 18, 19, 20).

**c5–6 τηλικούτος:** at the dramatic date of the dialogue (123d6–7n.), Pericles would have been in his sixties (he must have been already an adult in 472, when, as *Inscriptiones Graecae* II<sup>2</sup> 2318 col. 1, line 9 records, he sponsored the first production of Aeschylus' *Persians*). A man of such an age would have shown considerable dedication in attending lessons: see *Euthd.* 272c, where an elderly Socrates reports that he is going to harp lessons, and is laughed at by the boys who are his fellow pupils.

**c6 Δάμων:** Damon of Athens is described by Nicias in *La.* 180d as 'a most accomplished man, not only in music, but also in other ways an extremely valuable companion for young men'. He was 'reputed to be the wisest citizen of his day' (Isoc. 15.235). 'A supreme intellectual, he seems to have wormed

himself down into his reputation for music as a way of concealing his intelligence from the masses. His relationship to Pericles was, as it were, that of a coach and trainer to someone competing in politics. Still, people realised that Damon was using the harp as a cover. He was ostracised for harbouring grand ambitions and favouring tyranny' (Plu. *Per.* 4.2–3). It was supposedly on Damon's advice that Pericles introduced payments for jury service (Arist. *Ath.* 27.4).

**d6** καλὸν ... τεκμήριον 'beautiful evidence', in deference to the desire of the beautiful (104a5) Alcibiades for 'a pure and undefiled piece of evidence' (113e10–114a1). καλὸν is not one of the terms standardly used for commending evidence (see 111e1n.). Whenever καλὸν is used for this purpose, it is with some such point as the point here. Thus *Smp.* 195d talks of beautiful evidence, presented by the beautiful Agathon (*Smp.* 194d), for the beauty of Eros; and *Hp. ma.* 282e, 283a, talk of beautiful evidence presented to the beautiful Hippias (*Hp. ma.* 281a), in a dialogue about beauty. **d7–8** καὶ ἄλλον οἰοί τ' ὥσιν ἀποδείξαι ἐπιστάμενον 'they have the power to make someone other than themselves also be manifestly knowledgeable'. For this sense of ἀποδείκνυμι, see *Phd.* 72c, *Phdr.* 278c, *Ep.* 7.324d. **d11** τῶν ὑέων: it was a notorious fact that Paralus and Xanthippus, the two legitimate sons of Pericles, had not learnt good ways from their father (for instance, according to Stesimbrotus, *FGH* 107 fr. 11, Xanthippus went so far as to accuse Pericles of incest and adultery: if the accusations were false, Xanthippus had not learnt good ways from anyone; and if they were true, Pericles had not had good ways to teach him). Both *Meno* 94b and *Prt.* 319e–320a advert to this notorious fact. The ostensible purpose of both those passages is however to indicate, not that Pericles can be blamed for his failure to teach his sons virtue, but rather that virtue is not in fact the sort of thing that can be taught.

**e1** ἡλιθίῳ ἐγενέσθην 'turned out to be stupid'; and hence their failure to learn casts no doubt on Pericles' ability to teach. **e3** ἀλλὰ Κλεινίαν τὸν σὸν ἀδελφόν; i.e. 'Did Pericles make your brother Cleinias wise?' Cleinias too was subject to Pericles' care (104b5–6), and so might be expected to have learnt wisdom from him if Pericles were able to teach it. **e4** τί δ' ἂν αὖ Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μαινόμενον

**ἄνθρωπον;** ‘Why mention Cleinias? He’s a madman.’ For this use of the optative, and for the use of ἄνθρωπος in contempt, cf. Callicles’ question in *Grg.* 520a: τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων περὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιων; (‘Why talk about worthless people?’). **μαινόμενον:** the idea is that not even the most competent of teachers can be expected to succeed in teaching madmen. What, if anything, Cleinias’ madness consisted in we do not know. One piece of gossip suggests that it was not due entirely to Alcibiades’ bad influence: according to *Prt.* 320a–b, Pericles, for fear that Cleinias would be corrupted by Alcibiades, sent him away to be brought up in the household of Pericles’ brother Ariphron, and Ariphron, being unable to cope with him, returned him within six months. Arist. *Rh.* 1390b24–9 says that μανία is a typical defect of the well born: a distinguished ancestry bestows a sort of momentum; if someone has such a momentum and does not go off the rails, then he is γενναῖος (see 111a5n., 120d12–e1nn.); but if he goes off the rails without any check to the momentum, the result is ‘a fairly mad character (μανικώτερα ἦθη), like the progeny of Alcibiades and those of Dionysius the First’. For a Socratic conception of madness, see 113c5–6n. on μανικόν κτλ. **ε6 σοὶ . . . σέ:** given strong emphasis by being placed at the front of their respective clauses. **ε7 οὕτως ἔχοντα:** Socrates hesitates to name Alcibiades’ dreadful condition; cf. 10ge8n. **ε8 ἐγὼ οἶμαι αἰτίας:** with the disarmingly graceful way in which Alcibiades here takes the blame for Pericles’ failure, cf. Plu. *Alc.* 8.1–3: the morning after he had, for a joke, punched the leading citizen Hipponicus, Alcibiades went round to his house, ‘knocked on the door, entered into his presence, and taking off his tunic offered him his body, with the instruction to whip and chastise him. Hipponicus forgave him, and ceased to be angry; and subsequently let him marry his daughter Hipparete.’ Socrates however is not disarmed, and will continue to press his questions. **οὐ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν:** for the laziness betokened here, cf. 104d2–3n. Alcibiades’ failure to pay attention is of course not so discreditable as the stupidity of Pericles’ sons and the madness of Cleinias; still, a pupil’s refusal to pay attention can, like stupidity and madness, frustrate the efforts of the most competent teacher. However, the more cases that Socrates can adduce of Pericles’ failure to teach people wisdom, the more likely it is that the cause of so systematic a failure lies in Pericles himself.

**119a1–3** Cf. *Grg.* 515d–516d, where Pericles’ failure to improve his fellow citizens is used to argue that he was no good at politics.

**a1–2** τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων δοῦλον ἢ ἐλεύθερον: the pair of so called ‘polar expressions’ is ‘a stylistic trait which is common throughout early Greek literature from Homer onwards’, and is ‘often used instead of a single inclusive term to express a general notion’ (G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and analogy* (Cambridge 1966) 90–1). In such contexts as this, asking whether anyone whatsoever has in fact gained from associating with a presumed expert in ethics, Plato is rather fond of combining the pairs ‘Athenian’/‘foreign’ and ‘slave’/‘free’: other examples are ἡ ξένος ἡ ἄστος, ἡ δοῦλος ἡ ἐλεύθερος (*Grg.* 515a) and Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων, ἡ δοῦλοι ἡ ἐλεύθεροι (*La.* 186b).

**a2** αἰτίαν ἔχει ‘is reputed’.

**a4** Ζήνωνος: Zeno of Elea, notable for the paradoxes that, in defence of his friend Parmenides, he devised for the commonsense view that there are extended objects, moving through space. If, as *Plu. Per.* 4.5 says, he numbered Pericles among his associates, he could not have been quite so reliable a transmitter of wisdom as Socrates here suggests.

**Πυθόδωρον:** in *Prm.* 127a, Pythodorus is represented as the host of Zeno and Parmenides when they visited Athens, and as recounter of the conversation that they had with Socrates. In spite of his association with Zeno, Pythodorus’ subsequent career had some affinities with that of Alcibiades: he was a general in 425, and exiled, on charges of corruption, in 424 (*Th.* 3.115.2–6, 4.65.3).

**Καλλίαν:** another Athenian general, he died in battle at Potidaea in 432 (*Th.* 1.63.3), soon after the dramatic date of the dialogue (cf. 123d6–7n.).

**a5** ἑκατὸν μῶς: thirty thousand times the daily subsistence allowance for those serving on Athenian juries. The figure is of course utterly fantastic, even for a fee paid to a sophist who, unlike Zeno, purveyed skills in rhetoric. Some late sources (*D.S.* 12.53.2, *D.L.* 9.52, scholion on *Rep.* 600c) do indeed talk about fees of one hundred minas paid to the sophists Gorgias and Protagoras. The two hundred minas that Zeno is said to have made from just two customers, Pythodorus and Callias, are however better compared with earlier figures for sophists’ earnings. In *Hp. ma.* 282d–e, Hippias of Elis boasts about a spectacularly profitable trip to Sicily: he made ‘over one hundred and fifty minas’ from the entire trip, which he

estimates is ‘more than any two other sophists put together’. Five minas was the sum paid to Euenus by a man ‘who has spent more on sophists than everybody else put together’ (*Ap.* 20a–b). And for fifty drachmas (i.e. half a mina) you could buy admission to one of Prodicus’ most electrifying lectures (*Cra.* 384b, *Arist. Rh.* 1415b16; his other lectures were much cheaper: *Cra.* 384c, *Axiochus* 366c). Sums paid in the fourth century, apparently for entire courses of instruction, are of the same order as the sum paid to Euenus (three or four minas, *Isoc.* 13.3; ten minas, *Demos.* 35.42). Alcibiades’ failure to protest at this fantastic figure indicates a mind that is careless about money (cf. 104c1–2), and receptive to confused and exaggerated gossip: Pythodorus no doubt did associate with Zeno; and the Callias son of Calliades who is here said to have paid Zeno one hundred minas was namesake of Callias son of Hipponicus, who was the man who paid Euenus five minas, who ‘gave lots of money to Protagoras for his wisdom, and to Gorgias and to Prodicus and to many others’ (*Xen. Smp.* 1.5), and who is represented as host of the huge gathering of sophists in the *Protagoras*. (Callias’ mother married Pericles (*Prt.* 314e–315a); his sister married Alcibiades (*And.* 4.13).)

### 119a8–120e5: Why remedy ignorance?

*Alcibiades admits his ignorance, but cannot see why he should be bothered to remedy it: after all, the Athenian politicians with whom he will be competing are just as ignorant as he is; and even if his real rivals are the kings of Sparta and Persia, they too are no less ignorant. This view of his opponents may however be a dangerous underestimate.*

**119a8–9** ὥς νῦν ἔχεις: Socrates again hesitates to name Alcibiades’ dreadful condition; cf. 109e8n. **ag** ἐπιμέλειαν: Socrates got many to abandon bad ways, says *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.2, ‘by making them desire virtue, and by holding out to them the hope that if they cared for themselves they would be really fine people (ἄν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελῶνται, καλοὺς καγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι)’.

**119b1** κοινὴ βουλή ‘We will have to consider that together.’ I.e. it is not, as the second person singular διανοῆι in 119a8 apparently suggested, a question for Alcibiades to consider alone. In *Cri.* 49c–d,

Socrates says that there can be no κοινή βουλή between people who disagree over the principle that ‘you should not respond to injustice with injustice, nor do any harm to people, no matter what harm they have done you’. **b1–2** καίτοι ἐννοῶ σου εἰπόντος καὶ συγχωρῶ ‘And yet [i.e. in spite of my contradicting your apparent suggestion that it was not for you to join me in considering my future], I take note of what you were saying [about the ignorance of Athenian politicians at 118b7–c2], and I agree with you.’ The verb ἐννοῶ here has for its object the genitive σου εἰπόντος. Such a construction is idiomatic, though not particularly widespread, with Greek verbs for knowledge (e.g. 131a2, 132c9–10, *Hp. mi.* 369e ἐνόηκα σοῦ λέγοντος, *Ap.* 27a γινώσεται . . . ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου, *Phlb.* 51c εἴ μου μανθάνεις, *Mx.* 249c ὧν . . . ἐνθυμουμένους and *Rep.* 375e οἴσθα . . . τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι κτλ.; cf. *Grg.* 517c ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων, ὅτι λέγομεν). The point of the construction is perhaps to indicate the source from which the knowledge derives, and hence the subject which it concerns. **b4** εἶτα τί δὴ τοῦτο; ‘And that implies?’; lit. ‘So why exactly are you saying this?’ For the ellipsis of λέγεις in such a context, cf. *Prt.* 309a εἶτα τί τοῦτο; *Rep.* 357d ἀλλὰ τί δὴ; *Xen. Cyr.* 7.1.7 τί δὴ τοῦτο; *Antiphanes* fr. 209.3 *PCG* τί δὴτα τοῦτο; **b5–c1** For other signs of Alcibiades’ reluctance to learn, see 104d2–31. For the entire line of thought, and its expression in sporting metaphors, cf. *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.24: ‘Alcibiades . . . easily obtained the first place in politics; and, just as athletes (ἀθληταί) in gymnastic competitions (ἀγώνων) neglect their training (ἀμελοῦσι τῆς ἀσκήσεως) if they easily obtain the first place, so too Alcibiades neglected himself (ἡμέλησεν αὐτοῦ)’; and *Xen. Mem.* 3.5.13, which gives a similar explanation of why the Athenians did not live up to their earlier promise. The chief difference between Xenophon’s version of the thought and the version that is here put into the mouth of Alcibiades is this: Alcibiades here does not describe his attitude as self-neglect. That will be left for Socrates to do, at 120b6.

**c1** τῇ γε φύσει πάνυ πολὺ περιέσομαι: Alcibiades is adopting the values of the most aristocratic of all poetry when he declares that, in political competition, his good breeding alone is enough for success, and does not need enhancement by anything that can be learnt. See Pindar’s pronouncements on athletic competition in *O.* 9.100–2



‘What comes by breeding is always best (τὸ δὲ φυαὶ κράτιστον ἄπαν); but many people have set out to win glory by getting instruction in great deeds (διδασκαίς . . . ἀρεταῖς)’, and *N.* 3.40–2, proclaiming the superiority of ‘the man whose glory is innate (συγγενεῖ . . . εὐδοξίαι)’ over ‘the man who has only what is taught (διδάκτ’ ἔχει)’; see also Pindar’s application of this principle to poetic competition in *O.* 2.86 ‘Wise is he who knows much by his breeding (σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυαὶ)’, unlike those who have merely ‘learnt (μαθόντες)’. Less aristocratic authors unanimously insist that a good natural endowment needs education to bring it to perfection (e.g. *Phdr.* 269d, *Isoc.* 13.17, *Hipp. Law* 2, *Xen. Oec.* 21.11). **c2 βαβαῖ:** see 118b5n. **οἶον . . . τοῦτ’ εἴρηκας** expresses, as the *τοῦτο* helps indicate (see 113c6n.), greater shock than that expressed at 118b5. Then, the object of Socrates’ shock was only a πάθος of which Alcibiades was the victim; now it is a statement that Alcibiades himself has made. The πάθος – that of mistakenly thinking himself knowledgeable – was bad enough. It is far worse for him, now fully aware of his ignorance, still to insist that he need do nothing to remedy it. **ὦ ἄριστε:** this very polite form of address is used here, as at 120c6, 135b3, to make it easier for Alcibiades to take the stern criticism here addressed to him. Such politeness is in accordance with the recommendation of *Phdr.* 268d–e: ‘Suppose a musician met a man who thought that, just because he knew how to make the very top and the very bottom notes on a harp, he had mastered harmony. The musician wouldn’t say brusquely “ὦ μοχθηρέ, you’re a nutter.” Instead, he’d speak more gently (after all, he is a musician), and say “ὦ ἄριστε, someone who is going to master harmony must indeed know what you know, but it’s quite possible for someone in your condition not to understand harmony in the slightest. For what you know are the unavoidable preliminaries to harmony, not harmony itself.”’ Cf. also 113c5–6n. on ὦ βέλτιστε. **c3 ὑπαρχόντων:** see 104a2–3n. **c5 ὑπέρ τε σοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑμαυτοῦ ἔρωτος** ‘on your account, and on account of the love that I have [sc. for you]’; i.e. because Alcibiades has only petty ambitions, and because Socrates loves one whose ambitions are only petty. This reading, and its explanation, come from Olympiodorus. The reading of all the manuscripts, τοῦ σοῦ, would have Socrates feeling indignant ‘on account of the love that you and I have [sc. for one another]’; but it would be far too pre-

sumptuous of Socrates to assume that, at this stage, Alcibiades has already come to love him. **c7** εἰ ἡξίωσας goes with ἀγανακτῶ 119c5. Translate: ‘I’m feeling indignant . . .’ ‘Why’s that?’ ‘Because you thought . . .’ By giving the object of his emotion in an εἰ clause rather than with a blunter ὅτι (cf. 103a1n. on ὅτι), Socrates avoids making an overt declaration that Alcibiades really did think the unworthy things that he said at 119b5–c1; and by using the aorist ἡξίωσας rather than the present tense, Socrates distances himself still further from any suggestion that Alcibiades continues to think such unworthy thoughts.

**d6–7** ταῦτα μὲν ὧιου ἂν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ἀπέβλεπες δ: with this thought and its expression, cf. *Smp.* 198d ‘In my stupidity, I thought that we should (ῶμεν δεῖν) tell the truth about whatever thing we are praising, and that we should, while taking this as our basis (τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν, . . . δέ), select the most beautiful truths, and present them in the most becoming way.’ **d8** ὧν has τοὺς συναγωνιστάς as its antecedent: Alcibiades must triumph over those on his own side before he can use them to triumph over others.

**e1–2** καταφρονήθοντας: Alcibiades’ technique for getting the better of his crew will therefore be the technique by which he has already got the better of so many lovers (ὑπερπεφρόνηκας 104a1, μεγαλαυχούμενος 104c3). **e2–3** εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι γε . . . διανοῇ ‘if you really and truly do plan’. The simpler εἰ δὴ διανοῇ would already mean ‘if you do plan’, conveying a note of caution missing from the simple εἰ διανοῇ ‘if you plan’ (*GP* 223; cf. 134c1). Inserting τῷ ὄντι intensifies the note of caution (cf. *Euthd.* 296d εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθῆ λέγεις, said to someone who has told the speaker that he is, always has been, and always will be, omniscient). Emphasising the τῷ ὄντι with γε turns the note of caution into something approaching incredulity. **e5** ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διανοοῦμαι γε ‘That’s certainly what I am planning.’ The ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, followed by διανοοῦμαι picking up διανοῇ from 119e3, indicates that Alcibiades is vouching for the truth of the protasis of the conditional that Socrates has just put forward (*GP* 394). The γε indicates that this is all that Alcibiades is doing: he does not claim to have got beyond the planning stage, and in any case he is in no position to vouch for the truth of the condi-

tional as a whole. Cf. *Euthd.* 275b–c: “We don’t mind [talking with him], Socrates,” he said, “if only the lad is willing to answer our questions.” “He’s certainly quite used to *that* (ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . τοῦτό γε καὶ εἶθισται),” I said. “These people here often come up to him and ask him lots of questions and talk with him; so he is rather bold about answering.”’ **e6–g** ‘So is it really worthy of you to be sat-

isfied if you are superior to the troops, rather than, once you have come to be their superior by training with them in view, setting your sights upon the leaders of your rivals?’ **e6 τῶν στρατιωτῶν:** with this reading, we have to translate as ‘the troops’, i.e. soldiers in contrast to their commanding officers (for the contrast between στρατιώτης and στρατηγός, see *Ion* 540d, *Laws* 944e–945a). But the intended reference is to Alcibiades’ fellow Athenians, who were earlier described as his συναγωνισταί (119d8), and compared with συναῦται (119d5). The intended reference would be picked out more clearly if the text read, not στρατιωτῶν, but συστρατιωτῶν ‘fellow soldiers’ (συστρατιῶται are coupled with σύμπλοι in *Rep.* 556c, Arist. *EN* 1159b28–9; and *Rep.* 556c also makes it clear that both commanders and commanded can be called συστρατιῶται). **e8**

**ἐκείνων . . . e9 ἐκείνους:** these refer back to τῶν στρατιωτῶν of 119e6, as the first of the two contrasting groups to be mentioned. This repeated reference back to the former of the two groups makes one want to ask, as Alcibiades soon will, ‘Who are the latter?’

**120a1 τούτους** refers back to τοὺς τῶν ἀντιπάλων ἡγεμόνας of 119e7, as the more recently mentioned of the two contrasting groups.

**a2–3 ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις τε καὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ πολεμοῦσαν ἐκάστοτε:** the most recent war between Athens and Sparta had been waged on and off from 461 until the Thirty Years Peace in 445. Athens had also been at war with the Great King of Persia on and off for the fifty years down to the Peace of Callias in about 449. Alcibiades’ ancestors perhaps did not fully share in the traditional hostility of Athens to Sparta and Persia: on his father’s side, his ancestors were the hereditary consuls (πρόξενοι) at Athens of the Spartans (Th. 5.43.2); and on his mother’s side, his ancestors were rumoured to have attempted to betray Athens to the Persians (Hdt. 6.115, 6.121.1).

**a5–6 ἡγεμῶν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως:** the Athenians at one stage made Alcibiades their

‘Universal ἡγεμών Plenipotentiary’ (105b2–3n.). **a5 ἡγεμών . . . 7 ἡγούμενος . . . ἡγοῖτο**: the pun is unfortunate, and can be reproduced in English only with grave difficulty: e.g. ‘if you mean to take command . . . , then you would be right to take it that your struggle is with . . .’ **a9 ὠγαθέ**: see 104e3n. **Μειδίαν**: an Athenian politician, of whom nothing more is known than that the comic playwrights (see Ar. *Birds* 1297–8 and scholion) mocked him for, among other things, being lower-class, an embezzler, and keen on quail fighting, or ὀρτυγοκοπία. **a9–b1 ὀρτυγοκόπον**: in the game of ὀρτυγοκοπία, a quail was set against a man, the ‘quail-hitter’ or ὀρτυγοκόπος, who had to drive it out of the ring by striking it with his forefinger or plucking feathers from its head; if the quail stood its ground, the man lost (Pollux 9.107–9). A quail figured prominently in one story (Plu. *Alc.* 10.1–2) of Alcibiades’ first appearance before the Assembly. He overheard the hubbub of a fundraising drive, ‘went in, and made a contribution. The people so applauded and shouted with delight, that he forgot the quail which he happened to have in his tunic. It panicked, and made its escape. The Athenians shouted out all the more. Many got up and tried to catch the bird, but it was Antiochus the helmsman [see 125d10–11n.] who got hold of it and handed it back. This endeared him greatly to Alcibiades.’

**b2 ἀνδραποδώδη . . . 3 τρίχα**: Athenian slaves customarily had their hair cropped short, ‘because it is not easy to do menial work with long hair’ (Arist. *Rh.* 1367a31–2), and because longer hair would have concealed the tattoo often made on the forehead of those sold into slavery (cf. Plu. *Nic.* 29.2, *Per.* 26.4). Hence the astonished question in Ar. *Birds* 911 ἔπειτα δῆτα δοῦλος ὦν κόμην ἔχεις; Hence also Diphilus fr. 67.6–8 *PCG*, which represents a dishonest shopkeeper as growing his hair long to conceal the tattoo that marks his servile origin. Alcibiades’ own hair was, of course, ostentatiously long (Sat. in Ath. 12 534c). **b3 φαῖεν ἄν αἱ γυναῖκες**: presumably Socrates gives a feminine pronunciation of ἀνδραποδώδη . . . τρίχα. Women’s speech had its characteristic pronunciation, which was felt to be more conservative than men’s, in particular in the way that it distinguished delta from zeta and iota from eta (*Cra.* 418b–c). (On this and other features of women’s speech, see Alan H. Sommerstein,

‘The language of Athenian women’, in Francesco De Martino and Alan H. Sommerstein, edd., *Lo spettacolo delle voci* (Bari 1995) II 61–85.) Cf. 115a1n. for a more obscure hint about distinctive pronunciation.

**b3** ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ: with the bizarre notion of a soul’s haircut, cf. the no less bizarre notion of a soul’s plumage in *Phdr.* 246c.

**b4** βαρβαρίζοντες: Socrates here uses against Alcibiades the prejudices to which Alcibiades had earlier appealed: these politicians of slavish extraction are still not proper Greeks, and therefore are, by Alcibiades’ standards, of dubious character; see 111a1n. on τὸ ἐλληνίζειν, 111c3–4n.

**b5** κολακεύοντες τὴν πόλιν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄρξοντες: the κόλαξ sucks up to other people, gratifying their sense of self-esteem, with a view to benefiting himself. His manners are described in detail by Thphr. *Char.* 2 and Eup. fr. 172 *PCG*. Ordinary usage speaks of κολακεία primarily in connexion with private life. The comic playwrights however extended the term, as here, to cover the activities of demagogic politicians (e.g. Ar. *Kn.* 48). The philosophers followed this example. Thus *Grg.* 463a–466a gives an elaborate taxonomy of different kinds of κόλαξ: among them are the orator and the sophist, whose aim is merely to gratify the people, unlike genuine statesmen, who operate for the people’s benefit. Arist. *Pol.* 1292a15–38 says that in a democracy which has abandoned the rule of law, the demagogue plays exactly the same rôle as a κόλαξ does in a tyranny.

**b6** οὗσπερ λέγω ‘whom I’ve just been describing’. For the present tense in such a context, cf. e.g. *Ap.* 18d ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, referring back to 18a; *Smp.* 221d οἷς ἐγὼ λέγω, referring back to 215a–216c.

**b7** σαυτοῦ δὴ ἀμελεῖν: this, unlike the other elements in Socrates’ present description of Alcibiades’ policy, is not borrowed from Alcibiades’ own description at 119b5–c1: nobody likes to say, or perhaps even to think, that he is neglecting himself.

**b7** μανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήσεως ἔχεται ‘to learn whatever can be learnt’. Plato noticeably relished such turns of phrase: cf. *Prt.* 324d διδάσκουσιν ἃ διδασκάλων ἔχεται (‘they teach whatever can be taught’), *Meno* 94b ἐπαίδευσεν ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται (‘educated in every skill’), *Laws* 661b πάντα ὅσα ἔχεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων εὐαίσθητως ἔχειν (‘well able to perceive all that is perceptible’), *Thi.* 145a ἀστρονομικός καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικός καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται (‘good at astronomy, arithmetic, music – every branch of culture’), *Epinomis* 992d ὅσα μαθήματος ἔχεται μακαρίου πάντα εἰληφότες (‘having

grasped all aspects of the happy science [i.e. astronomy]’), *Amat.* 135b μαθὼν ... ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας (‘having learnt all the theory, though not all the practical side’). **b7** **μανθάνειν ... μαθήσεως ... 8** **ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι ... ἀσκεῖν ... ἀσκήσεως ... c1** **παρασκευὴν παρασκευασμένον**: this cluster of jingles is a Socratic version of a very elevated rhetorical figure (cf. 124e7n.). As he has already shown by his recent resorts to sarcasm (119e6, and – more grossly – 120a9), Socrates is beginning to despair of persuading Alcibiades by straightforward dialectical argument.

**c1 παρασκευὴν**: Socrates let Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) overhear him remarking that while people make great efforts to train themselves for other activities, ‘some think they will be able, spontaneously, just like that, without any preparation and care (ἀνευ παρασκευῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας)’ to take part in politics (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.6).

**c3** **δοκεῖς μὲν μοι**: see 112d11n. **c4–5** **τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίων στρατηγούς καὶ τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα**: contrast the way that Socrates spoke, not of the Spartans’ ‘generals’, but of their ‘kings’ (120a6), and not just of ‘the King of Persia’, but of ‘the Great King’ (120a3). Alcibiades’ less grand description of these figures indicates his low estimate of them. **c5** **οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων**: i.e. are as little educated as the Athenian politicians mentioned in 119b2–3. **c6** **ὦ ἄριστε**: see 119c2n. on ὦ ἄριστε.

**d4** **μὴν οὖν οἶει τι βλαβήσεσθαι**: reminding Alcibiades of his own words at 114e10–11. **d6** **ἐν μὲν τοῦτο**: the μὲν is repeated from 120c8 πρῶτον μὲν, so that when we reach 121d9 τὸ δεῦτερον, we still recall what it is contrasted with. See 108e9n. on such repetitions.

**d9–10** **ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων** ‘going by what’s likely’. In *Phd.* 92d, Simmias says ‘I am conscious that, whether in geometry or elsewhere, arguments which show things by appeal to likelihoods (διὰ τῶν εἰκότων) promise more than they can deliver, and will trick anyone who does not take great care.’ Mere likelihoods are distinguished, both by the theorists of rhetoric (e.g. *Phdr.* 266e), and by its practitioners (e.g. *Demos.* 22.22–3), from τεκμήρια, the more forceful kind of argument to which Socrates has earlier been appealing (111e1, 118d6). Another way to point out the deficiency of mere likelihoods is by contrast with what is necessary. Thus when someone concedes that, ὥς τὸ

εἰκός γε, one longs only for what one does not have, Socrates asks him to consider, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος, εἰ ἀνάγκη οὕτως (*Smp.* 200a); and *Phdr.* 269d and *Rep.* 485c describe things as εἰκός, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, and as οὐ μόνον . . . εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. Similarly, Arist. *APr.* 70a2–16 defines a likelihood as something that is known to be true by and large, ('for instance, that people hate those who bear them ill will, and like those to whom they are sexually attracted'), and contrasts reasoning that relies on likelihoods with reasoning that relies on premisses known to be universally and necessarily true (e.g. 'She is lactating; but those who lactate have conceived; so she has conceived').

**δι2–ει ἀμείνους γίγνεσθαι φύσεις ἐν γενναίοις γένεσιν:** in *Rep.* 485a–b, where he is not presenting a nobly born but unreflective young man with things he will regard as likely, Socrates suggests that the better natures are to be recognised, not by the nobility of the family into which they are born, but by their aptitude and desire for learning. **γενναίοις γένεσιν** is, in form at least, more or less tautologous: if the meaning of γενναῖον is as its derivation suggests, then how could there be a γένος that was not γενναῖον? The phrase is perhaps a dig at Alcibiades, who has a taste for such ornaments (124e7n.) and pleonasm more generally (116d6n.), and who has moreover the mistaken belief that his own γένος is more γενναῖον than many another (cf. 121a1–b5 and nn.). Elsewhere, such tautologies are sometimes straightforwardly sarcastic (*Sph.* 231b ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική) and sometimes downright chilling (*Soph.* *OT* 1469 ὦ γονῆι γενναῖε: Oedipus' family is now known to be so extraordinary that such tautologies may no longer be presumed true, just as the contradictions ἄγαμον γάμον in 1214, and γυναικά τ' οὐ γυναικα in 1256, may no longer be presumed false).

**ε2 δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς γενναίοις:** the vigour of this agreement to Socrates' suggestion is made all the more striking by Socrates' warning that his suggestion was only a matter of 'likelihood' (120d9–10n.).

**ε3–4 τοὺς εὖ φύντας, ἐὰν καὶ εὖ τραφῶσιν, οὕτω τελέους γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀρετήν:** accusative and infinitive, continuing the construction after εἰκός in 120d12. In *Rep.* 487a, Socrates asserts that people need to be well brought up, however good they are by nature, if they are to become capable of being entrusted with the government of a city. *Rep.* 491d–492a adds that the better the nature, the more

dangerous it becomes if it gets the wrong upbringing. Subsequent passages describe some ways in which better natures are more liable to be badly brought up; and in *Rep.* 494c–d, we are invited to consider the dire effects of a bad upbringing, especially on someone who, like the Alcibiades of 104a4–c1, ‘happens to belong to a big city, is rich and nobly born, and is good-looking and tall besides. Won’t he’, like the Alcibiades of 105a6–c7, ‘be filled with irresistible hopes, and think himself capable of running the affairs both of Greeks and of barbarians too?’ **ε5 ἀνάγκη**: an impetuously emphatic form of agreement. It is far stronger than Socrates is seeking (he has claimed only to be reasoning from likelihoods, not from necessities: 120d9–10n.). And it is in any event far stronger than is warranted. For the right τροφή is only one aspect of a good upbringing; the other is the right παιδεία (cf. 122b5–6n.). One must put, not only the right foodstuffs into the child’s body, but also the right ideas into its mind. When Alcibiades here fails to object that παιδεία might also be needed if the naturally well-endowed are to become perfectly virtuous, this is in keeping with his agreement (120e2) that a good natural endowment comes from a noble descent, rather than from any intellectual aptitude.

### 120e6–124b6: The Spartans and the Persians

*The previous dialectic has not persuaded Alcibiades that he needs education. On other occasions where dialectic will not work, Socrates sometimes resorts to imagining how the dialectical argument would go if he had someone more suitable to answer his questions (Grg. 506c–507b; Tht. 179e–180b, 181d–183b; cf. Sph. 246c–248a). But even if some imaginary dialectic might establish, abstractly, that Alcibiades needs education, it would hardly persuade Alcibiades himself to be educated. Socrates therefore resorts to a long speech, in spite of the preference for dialectic over long speeches he had expressed in 106b. Alcibiades hopes that his high birth and his great wealth will suffice for him to outdo his rivals; but his rivals are to be the kings of Sparta and Persia, and in birth and wealth they are by far his superiors. Even if all this were true (which, as a long speech, and not dialectically tested, it need not be), it does not show that education actually would benefit Alcibiades; it shows only that his condition is otherwise so desperate that he must fall back on education as his only hope.*



The Spartans were the traditional paradigm of austerity, just as the Persians were the traditional paradigm of luxury (e.g. Critias fr. 6 *IEG*). When Socrates tries to get Alcibiades to emulate both these quite opposite extremes, he is appealing to a trait that is very prominent in descriptions of Alcibiades' character. According to his third-century biographer Satyrus (in *Ath.* 12 534b) 'It is said that in Ionia, he showed himself more luxurious than the Ionians; in Thebes, he wrestled and trained naked, and was more Boeotian than the Thebans themselves; in Thessaly, he bred horses and drove chariots, and was more of a horseman than the Aleuads; in Sparta he practised hardy and austere living, and outdid the Laconians; and he went beyond even the Thracian way of drinking wine unmixed with water.' (There is similar material in *Plu. How to tell a flatterer from a friend* 52e, *Nep. Alc.* 11.2–6; cf. *Lys.* 14.38, quoted in 106a8–9n.)

**120e9 Ἡρακλέους:** Hdt. 7.204, 8.131 give detailed lineages for the Spartan kings, all the way back to Heracles. **Ἀχαιμένους:** Achaemenes was the founder of the dynasty (the 'Achaemenids', or 'sons of Achaemenes') which ruled Persia until the conquest by Alexander the Great. Hdt. 7.11.2 gives a list of Achaemenes' descendants down to Xerxes (105c5n.). **εἰς Περσέα τὸν Διὸς ἀναφέρεται** 'is traced back to Perseus, the son of Zeus'. For this sense of ἀναφέρω εἰς, cf. *Tht.* 175a ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα; for another sense, see 110e2–3n. Socrates is putting an ingenious spin on the unpromising materials provided by legend, in order to make the Spartan and the Persian kings seem as similar as possible. Heracles was, so legend had it, the son of Zeus. Socrates ignores this, and draws attention instead to a less direct relationship on his mother's side: Heracles was, so legend also had it, the son of Alcmene, the daughter of Electryon, the son of Perseus, the son of Zeus (*Apollod.* 2.4.5.1, 2.4.5.4, 2.4.8.3). Only this indirect relationship makes Heracles at all like Achaemenes. Even then, the resemblance is less than perfect; for the closest connexion of Zeus to Achaemenes was that Achaemenes was a Persian, and the Persians were supposedly descended from Perses, the son of Perseus, the son of Zeus (Hdt. 7.61.3, 7.150.2).

**121a1** **Εὐρύσάκη:** according to legend, Eurysaces was great-grandson of Aeacus (121b3n. on Αἰακοῦ), the son of Zeus. He was king of Salamis (121b2–3n.), which he ceded to the Athenians; he thereafter settled in Melite, where he came to be worshipped as a hero (Plu. *Sol.* 10.3; for fuller details, see *HoA* 164). **α3 ὦ γενναῖε:** when Socrates is undermining Alcibiades' pride in his family, this form of address is particularly teasing; cf. 111a5n. **εἰς Δαίδαλον** ... **4 εἰς Ἥφαιστον τὸν Διός:** Socrates' parody (note the repeated καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ὦ ...) shows how easy it is to construct such ancestries as the one that Alcibiades has just presented, and how fanciful the results can be. As himself a craftsman, Socrates claims descent from the god of crafts Hephaestus, through the legendary craftsman Daedalus (for a similar claim, cf. *Euthphr.* 11b–c); Daedalus was worshipped as a hero at or near Alopeke (*HoA* 154), Socrates' own deme (*Grg.* 495d). Yet any descent traced through Daedalus would be dubious, even by the standards of mythic genealogy: Greek myth gave three different names for Daedalus' father, and four for his mother (Apollod. 3.15.8.6, D.S. 4.76.1, Paus. 9.3.2, Pherecydes, *FGH* 3 fr. 146, Plu. *Thes.* 19.9, scholion on *Rep.* 529d). **α5 βασιλῆς εἰσιν ἐκ βασιλέων** ... **β1 ἰδιώται:** on the purity of the Spartan and Persian royal bloodlines, see 121b8–c1n and 121c4–5n. In an obituary piece for Theaetetus, presumably written soon after his death in 369, Plato had mocked those who took pride in their ancestry, for not appreciating that everyone has uncountably many ancestors of all sorts, including both kings and slaves (*Tht.* 174e–175b). In an obituary piece for Agesilaus, king of Sparta, presumably written soon after his death in 360, Xenophon described the ancestors of Agesilaus as οὐκ ἰδιώταις ἀλλ' ἐκ βασιλέων βασιλεῦσιν, and he sidestepped the mockery of *Tht.* 174e–175b by claiming that Agesilaus' ancestry could be documented: his ancestors could be named in order all the way back to Heracles (*Ages.* 1.2). Perhaps *Ages.* 1.2 was written with *Tht.* 174e–175b in view; and perhaps *Ages.* 1.2 is itself in view here, as *Ages.* 1.3 was in view in 104a6–b1. That would then date the *Alcibiades* to some time in or after 360. Another contribution to the wrangle may be Isoc. *Ep.* 9.3, which asks the Spartan king Archidamus 'How could anyone outdo the pedigree (τὴν εὐγενεῖαν) of those who stem from Heracles and Zeus, the pedigree that every-

body knows only your family is agreed to have to its credit (ἦν πάντες ἴσασι μόνοις ὑμῖν ὁμολογουμένως ὑπάρχουσιν);’ Isocrates so turns this compliment that the *Alcibiades* is forced to endorse it: with its egalitarian attitude to ancestries, the *Alcibiades* can hardly assert that there is a *better* ancestry than one that comes from Heracles and Zeus; and although the *Alcibiades* might like to say that many others come from Heracles and Zeus, it too shares in the common knowledge that only Spartan kings are *agreed* to have such an ancestry. It is therefore tempting to think that Isocrates has the *Alcibiades* in view. That would then date the *Alcibiades* to before the time in 356 when Isocrates wrote this letter (*Ep.* 9.16 says he was eighty when he wrote it). **α7 τὸ αἰεὶ** is equivalent to the simple αἰεὶ; cf. 110a8n. on τό γε πρὸ τοῦ. **Ἀσίας**: cf. 105c1n. The Persian kings had taken control of Asia Minor in the 540s BC. Their control was occasionally interrupted by rebellions among the Greek cities on the coast.

**β1–2 εἰ . . . τοὺς προγόνους σε δέοι . . . ἐπιδείξαι** ‘if it were your duty to display your ancestors’. Alcibiades, conceding that his father is no match for the fathers of his rivals, might hope to find something more than a match by going back to yet earlier generations. Socrates here alludes to a particular sort of ‘display’ or ἐπίδειξις (115a4n.), the speech that every year in Athens was delivered over the grave of those who had fallen in battle (ὁ ἐπιτάφιος λόγος). The orators invariably start from the ancestors (τῶν προγόνων) of the fallen (Th. 2.36.1 ‘I will start first from their ancestors’; Lys. 2.3 ‘First of all I will go through the dangers faced of old by their ancestors’; Demos. 60.3–6 ‘I will start from the origin of their line . . . So much then . . . for the ancestors of these men’; *Mx.* 237a–b ‘Let us celebrate first their noble birth, then . . . And first their noble birth: the manner in which their ancestors came into existence . . .’; cf. Hyp. *Epit.* 3, 6–7); and they often describe this invariable practice as their duty (Th. 2.35.3 χρῆ; Demos. 60.2 δεῖν; *Mx.* 237a χρῆναι; cf. Lys. 2.3 ἄξιον). One important object of an ἐπιτάφιος λόγος (professed at Th. 2.43.1, Lys. 2.3, Demos. 60.35, *Mx.* 236e) was to incite its audience to virtue, as Socrates here hopes to incite Alcibiades. Moreover, an ἐπιτάφιος λόγος would hope, as Socrates does, to achieve this object by extravagant praise. The crucial difference is that its extravagant praise would be of Athens, and Sparta and Persia would

figure only as foils, to set Athens in an even better light. **b2** **Εὐρυσάκου:** see 121a1n. **b2–3** **Σαλαμίνα . . . Αἴγινα:** Salamis and Aegina are islands off the coast of Attica. In comparison with the Persian empire, they are of course minute. Salamis did not fall under Athenian control until about 600. Aegina was at war with Athens in 459 (Th. 1.105.2); and the Athenians expelled all its inhabitants in 431 (soon after the dramatic date of the dialogue: 123d6–7n.), on the grounds that they had fomented the war between Athens and Sparta (Th. 2.27.1). Thus Alcibiades is less securely connected with Athens than his rivals are with the countries where their ancestors have always been kings. Moreover, he is less securely connected with Athens than his compatriots are. The Athenians liked to believe that they, unlike other peoples, had never migrated, but had originated in the territory that they still continued to inhabit; and it was *de rigueur* in an ἐπιτάφιος λόγος (121b1–2n.) to praise their ancestors by vehemently expressing this belief (see *Mx.* 237b, Th. 2.36.1, Demos. 60.4, Lys. 2.17, Hyp. *Epit.* 7). **b3** **Αἰακοῦ:** Aeacus was, according to legend, the son of Zeus and the nymph Aegina, who gave her name to the island of which he was king. However, he came to be worshipped as a hero in Athens, where the centre of his cult was by the Agora (Hdt. 5.89.3; for fuller details, see *HoA* 141). It was said that the descendants of Aeacus were uniformly distinguished, and that they therefore stood out even among other families that could trace their descent from Zeus (Isoc. 9.13). **Ἄρτοξέρξης:** Artoxerxes ruled Persia from 464 to 424. **b4** **Ξέρξου:** see 105c5n. **γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν:** the desire not to look ridiculous is one of Alcibiades' few motivations; cf. 116d9–e1, 124a5–6n. **b7** **μεγάλα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα** alludes to τὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχοντά σοι μεγάλα in 104a2–3; cf. 124a4. The verb ὑπάρχειν is standardly used in an ἐπιτάφιος λόγος (121b1–2n.), to speak of things to the credit of present or past Athenians (cf. *Mx.* 237b, Th. 2.42.1, 2.45.2, Demos. 60.6, Lys. 2.17, Hyp. *Epit.* 28). **b7–8** **αἱ γυναῖκες δημοσῖαι φυλάττονται:** the licence (ἄνεσις) granted to Spartan women was in fact a byword among other Greeks (*Laws* 637c, Arist. *Pol.* 1269b13). Athenians were struck by, above all, the way that girls in Sparta stripped naked for physical exercise (*Laws* 806a, Ar. *Lys.* 82, Xen. *Lac.* 1.1.4); and this (according to a character in Eur. *Andr.* 595–601) meant that 'a Spartan girl couldn't be chaste, not even if she wanted to'.

**b8–c1** ὅπως ... μὴ λάθῃ ἐξ ἄλλου γενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἐξ Ἑρακλειδῶν: these precautions were not always thought to be successful. Demaretus was one Spartan royal to be suspected of illegitimacy (Hdt. 6.63.2); Leotychidas was another (Xen. *HG* 3.3.2). Alcibiades himself was said to have been the father of Leotychidas; his motive, he declared, was that it would be a feather in his cap to have Sparta ruled by his descendants (Plu. *Ages.* 3.2, *Alc.* 23.7; cf. also Adespota fr. 123 *PCG*, for what is presumably an allusion to Alcibiades' affair with the queen of Sparta).

**c3–4** οὐ φρουρεῖται ἡ βασιλείῳ γυνή: for example, Persians, unlike Greeks, would take their wives out to banquets (Hdt. 5.18.2; contrast D.L. 6.97, which puts the Cynic Hipparchia's going out to banquets on a par with her wearing male clothes and copulating in public). Artoxerxes' mother was supposed to have taken great advantage of her liberty: for her vigorous and repeated adulteries, see Ctes. *Pers.* 42.

**c4** φόβου: presumably Alcibiades is more readily impressed by a king with such a power to intimidate, than he would be by one who used rational persuasion to keep his subjects in line (see *Laws* 783a, *Rep.* 554d, for the contrast between φόβος and λόγος).

**c4–5** ὁ παῖς ὁ πρεσβύτατος, οὐπὲρ ἡ ἀρχή: the Persian succession was less regular than this suggests. Xerxes was not the eldest son of his father Darius; he argued that he should be made Darius' heir on the grounds that he, unlike his elder half-brothers, was son of a daughter of Cyrus, and had been born after Darius had come to the throne (Hdt. 7.2.2–3.4). Artoxerxes became king only after killing his elder brother Darius (Ctes. *Pers.* 20, 29). The Xerxes who was the heir of Artoxerxes reigned for only forty-five days before being killed and succeeded by his brother Secudianus (Ctes. *Pers.* 44–6). Secudianus lasted another six months and fifteen days, before he was killed and succeeded by another brother, Ochus, who renamed himself Darius (Ctes. *Pers.* 48). And the Artoxerxes who was the heir of this Darius faced a rebellion by his younger brother Cyrus (Xen. *An.* 1.1.1–4).

**c7** βασιλείῳ γενέθλια: the feasting in which the whole of Asia took part is Socrates' exaggeration of a custom which Greeks found remarkable: Persians celebrated birthdays (Hdt. 1.133.1; cf. Hdt. 9.110–12 for an account of savage deeds at a birthday feast given by Xerxes).

**d1–2 τὸ τοῦ κωμωιδοποιοῦ:** Plato the comic playwright, fr. 227 *PCG*. The original form and application of the tag are not known.

**d3–4 τρέφεται ὁ παῖς, οὐχ ὑπὸ γυναικὸς τροφῶ:** Alcibiades had been nursed by a woman, the Spartan Amycla (Antisth. fr. 201 *SSR*, probably from his dialogue *Alcibiades*). But, contrary to what Socrates says, that is no reason for him to feel inferior to the Persians: according to Hdt. 1.136.2, a Persian boy was reared in the harem until he reached five, and never saw his father before then; and according to *Laws* 694c–696a (a passage that D.L. 3.34 took to criticise Xenophon), all recent kings of Persia had been reared in the harem, and this was why they had never amounted to much. **d4 εὐνούχων:** Persians were renowned for the trust they placed in eunuchs: Hdt. 1.117.5, 8.105.2; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.59–65. For lurid tales of eunuchs betraying that trust, see e.g. Ctes. *Pers.* 29, 40, 45. **d6 ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστος ... e1 κατορθοῦντας:** Soranus, *Gynaeciorum* 2.32–5 gives elaborate recommendations for massaging, stretching, flexing and swaddling babies to ensure that they grow up with shapely bodies. *Laws* 789d–790a toys with the idea of legislation that would require babies to be treated in this way, and says that such legislation would be disobeyed by nurses who have the minds of women, and indeed of slaves.

**e2 ἐπτέτεις ... 4 δις ἐπτά:** it is entirely fictional to give the ages of seven and fourteen any special significance in Persian education. Cf. Hdt. 1.136.2, which has the turning points in a Persian's education at five years and at twenty; and Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.8–9, which has them at 'sixteen or seventeen', and 'ten years after'. Socrates' fiction borrows from a pattern in traditional Greek thought: Solon fr. 27 *IEG* and Hipp. *Sevens* fr. 5 (both preserved in Philo, *De opificio mundi* 104–5) elaborately divide a human lifespan into periods of seven years (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1335b33–4, implying that many poets did this).

**e2 ἵππους:** for the glamour of horsemanship, see 122d8n. At 106e4–10, Alcibiades was not able to recall that his own education had included anything on horsemanship. Other accounts of Persian education emphasise that it was also an education in archery: Hdt. 1.136.2, Xen. *An.* 1.9.5, *Cyr.* 1.2.8. That would not suit Socrates here.

The bow was the weapon of the Scythian slaves who formed the Athenian police (e.g. *And.* 3.5); and besides seeming savage and slavish, it could also seem effeminate, cowardly and mercenary (*Hom. Il.* 11.385–7; *Eur. HF* 157–64, 188–203; *Xen. Cyr.* 2.1.18).

**e4–5** δις ἑπτὰ δὲ γενόμενον ἑτῶν τὸν παῖδα παραλαμβάνουσιν . . . : there is something ostentatiously absurd about postponing a boy's moral education until he reaches the age of fourteen, as if ethics were some technical discipline best left until his character has already been formed. Cf. *Rep.* 376e–377c, on the importance of exposing children to suitable nursery rhymes and fairy tales, even before they begin their physical training: 'The start of any undertaking is its most important stage, especially for something young and tender; for it is then that a thing is most readily moulded, and most readily takes on whatever pattern one might want to impress' – which is why it is far more important that nurses and mothers should use the right sort of stories to mould (πλάττειν; cf. 121d7 ἀναπλάττοντας) their babies' souls than use their hands to mould their babies' bodies. **e5**

**βασιλείους παιδαγωγούς:** an ordinary, unroyal, παιδαγωγός was a slave; his duty was not to give the boy in his care any instruction, but rather to conduct him to school, to keep a deferential eye on him while he was out of the house, and to conduct him safely home at the appointed time (e.g. *Lys.* 208c, 223a).

**e7–122a1 ὁ τε σοφώτατος καὶ ὁ δικαιοτάτος καὶ ὁ σωφρονέστατος καὶ ὁ ἀνδρειότατος:** behind this story about Persian education lies the theory of the four 'cardinal' virtues, wisdom, justice, moderation and courage, that together amount to a perfect character (*Rep.* 427e, 441c–442d; cf. *Phd.* 69b, *Smp.* 196d, *Laws* 631c–d, 965d). On this theory, nobody can have even one of these four virtues perfectly without having them all. The assignment of each virtue to a different teacher perhaps adapts this theory to the limited understanding of Alcibiades, and perhaps (like the word δόξαντες) hints also that the Persians' virtues are not so great after all. *Isoc.* 16.28 claims that Alcibiades himself had something like the education that Socrates here ascribes to the Persian prince: he had for his guardian Pericles, unanimously accepted as σωφρονέστατον καὶ δικαιοτάτον καὶ σοφώτατον of the citizens (cf. 122b5–6n., *Isoc.* 15.111). But the argument at 118d10–119a7 has undermined any suggestion that Alcibiades benefited from his dealings with Pericles.

**122a1 μαγείαν** ‘magic’, as in Thphr. *Historia plantarum* 9.15.7, Gorgias DK 82 B 11.10 (cf. *Rep.* 572e, *Plt.* 280e). The Μαγικός, a fourth-century philosophical text, maintained that the Persian Magi were not even acquainted with ἡ γοητική μαγεία (D.L. 1.8, who says that the author was Aristotle; Suda s.v. Ἀντισθένης says that the author was Antisthenes). This locution hints that, at a pinch, μαγεία might be made to indicate something more elevated than mere γοητεία or magic. But there is no other reason to think that Socrates means by μαγεία here anything so elevated as ‘the theology of the Magians’ (LSJ); and no reason at all to think that Alcibiades takes μαγεία here to mean anything more elevated than ‘magic’. **a2 Ζωροάστρου:** Zoroaster (the transliteration ‘Zarathustra’ might better catch the exotically glamorous ring that this name would have had) was revered as founder of the Persian religion, and was the subject of some discussion among philosophical circles in fourth-century Greece. He was the subject of the Μαγικός (Suda s.v. Ἀντισθένης). Aristoxenus made him a contemporary of Pythagoras (late sixth century BC), from whom he supposedly received a visit (DK 14.11); Aristotle and Eudoxus dated him to six thousand years before Plato (Plin. *Nat.* 30.3); recent scholarship dates him to around the fourteenth or thirteenth centuries BC (*TSZ* 22). **Ὠρομάζου:** Horomazus (‘Ahura Mazda’) was not Zoroaster’s father, but rather (as was known to Aristotle, Theopompus and Eudoxus: D.L. 1.8), the good one of the two equal and conflicting gods in whom Zoroastrians believed. **τοῦτο:** see 115b6n. on the gender of this pronoun. **a4 ἀληθείην:** Hdt. 1.136.2 makes truthfulness a prominent part of the Persian curriculum; and 1.138.1 adds that the Persians deemed lies to be the most disgraceful thing of all. A word that translates literally as ‘the Lie’ was used to name the evil rival of Ahura Mazda: thus the Persian king Darius the Great erected inscriptions boasting that ‘I was not a follower of the Lie, I did not do wrong’, and praying Ahura Mazda to ‘protect this land from an enemy army, from famine, from the Lie’ (*TSZ* 104–5). Truthfulness is however missing from the ideal Persian education described in Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.2–14 (cf. Xen. *An.* 1.9.7–8, suggesting that truthfulness was a distinctive feature of Cyrus). **a5 ἐλεύθερος ... 6 ὄντως βασιλεύς ... 7 δουλεύων:** these metaphors have a double signifi-



cance. First, the promptings of bodily desire are regularly seen as the commands of a master: e.g. Gorgias DK 82 B 11(a).15 and Xen. *Mem.* 1.5.5 speak of ‘slaves to pleasure’; the ageing Sophocles is relieved to describe his senile impotence as ‘like escaping from an insanely savage master’ (*Rep.* 329c); and Isoc. 2.29 enjoins a young tyrant ‘Be as much in charge of yourself as you are of others. Deem the most regal thing to be slave to no pleasure, but to control all your desires more than you control the citizens.’ Second, literal slaves were thought to be particularly keen on bodily pleasure, and to prefer it to the more dignified lives of the philosopher and the statesman. Here is how a slave addresses some fellow-slaves in Alexis’ comedy *The dissipation instructor* (Ἀσωποδιδασκαλός) fr. 25 PCG: ‘Why talk all this nonsense, burbling to and fro about the Lyceum, the Academy, the gates of the Odeon? They’re just sophistic nonsense; not one of them is any good. Let’s drink, and drink again, Sikon, dear Sikon; let’s have fun while we can still keep the breath within us. Let rip, Manes. Nothing’s sweeter than the belly: it, and it alone, is your father, and your mother too. Virtues, embassies, and generalships are just showing off, empty noise, worth as much as dreams.’ Philosophers agreed with the common conception that bodily pleasures are slavish, and offered various explanations for why this should be so. Phaedrus says that almost all bodily pleasures must be preceded by pain before they can be enjoyed (he has in mind e.g. the way that we enjoy our food more if we do not eat until we feel pangs of hunger), and adds ‘because of this, they have justly been called slavish’ (*Phdr.* 258e). Aristotle points out that animals other than ourselves can enjoy bodily pleasures, and adds ‘which is why these pleasures look slavish and bestial’ (*EN* 1118a24–5). **a7–8 ἄφοβον καὶ ἀδεῖα παρασκευάζων:** i.e. ‘gives him instruction [understand διδάσκει from the clause about the wisest man, as it has already been understood in the clauses about the justest and the most moderate] by rendering him bold and fearless’. The syntax is a bit loose, but still tolerable. **a8 ὡς ὅταν δείσῃ διούλον ὄντα:** it is curiously illogical that slaveowners should despise their slaves for cowardice, yet not wish them to be brave enough to rebel.

**b1 ἐπέστησε** ‘put in charge of’. Socrates points out to Lysis that his father puts a παιδαγωγός (121e5n.) in charge of him (ἐφίστησιν), and

that he, a free boy, is governed by a slave (*Lys.* 208c–d). Here the joke is accentuated by the contrast with the royal παιδαγωγοί of the Persian prince, who are presumably not slaves, who have not been described as being in charge of the prince, and who have just been described as doing their best to give him an unslavish character. Cf. Xen. *Lac.* 2.1–2: all Greeks, the Spartans only excepted, put παιδαγωγούς θεράποντας or παιδαγωγούς δούλους in charge of their boys. **b2 Ζώπυρον τὸν Θρᾷκα:** the name ‘Zopyrus’ is of Persian origin; no doubt it came to be given to a Thracian slave by the sort of whimsy described in *Cra.* 384d, and displayed by Diodorus Cronus, when he called his slaves by the particles Μέν, Δέ and Ἀλλὰ μήν (fr. 7 *SSR*). One Persian Zopyrus rendered, like Alcibiades, signal service to his country, and, ‘in the judgement of Darius, did as much good to the Persians as anyone else, before or since, excepting only Cyrus’ (Hdt. 3.160.1). His grandson was another Zopyrus, who resembled Alcibiades in another respect: ‘he defected to Athens from the Persians’ (Hdt. 3.160.2). A third Zopyrus figured in an anecdote concerning Socrates, Alcibiades, and what can be made of natural endowments by a philosophical education. This Zopyrus professed to diagnose people’s characters from their physiognomy. He diagnosed Socrates as stupid and addicted to women. At this, Alcibiades guffawed. But Socrates said that the diagnosis was correct: his natural defects were as Zopyrus had said, but they had been overcome (Alexander, *De fato* 6, Cic. *De fato* 10–11, *Tusc.* 4.80; the anecdote may have been presented in the lost dialogue *Zopyrus*, by Plato’s friend Phaedo; cf. 123a2n.). **b5 γένεσσεως ... 6 τροφῆς ... παιδείας:** the same trio, γένεσις, τροφή, παιδεία, in the same order, are found at *Cri.* 50d–e (where the Laws of Athens recall the birth, rearing and education of Socrates in an argument to remind him of his civic duty), at *Mx.* 237a–b (an ἐπιτάφιος λόγος (121b1–2n.); speeches of this genre often praised education as well as ancestry: cf. Th. 2.39.1, 2.41.1, Demos. 60.3, Hyp. *Epit.* 8), and also at Isoc. 12.198 (congratulating the Athenians on ancestors who were καλῶς γεγονόσι καὶ τεθραμμένοις καὶ πεπαιδευμένοις). By omitting all reference to Alcibiades’ guardian, and by saying that only a lover – such as of course himself – would care about Alcibiades’ birth, rearing and education, Socrates contradicts what Isoc. 16.28 said of Alcibiades: ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ καὶ τοῦτ’ εἶναι τῶν καλῶν, ἐκ τοιοούτων [as Cleinias]

γενομένον ὑπὸ τοιούτοις ἦθεσιν [as those of Pericles, the most moderate, just and wise of the Athenians] ἐπιτροπευθῆναι καὶ τραφῆναι καὶ παιδευθῆναι (cf. 121e7–122a1n.). **b7–8 οὐδενὶ μέλει, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ἐραστὴς σου τυγχάνει ὧν** ‘nobody cares, unless he happens to be a lover of yours’; lit. ‘nobody cares, except if you happen to have a lover [sc. then he will care]’. A standard way to give exceptions to a negative generalisation is by εἰ μὴ εἰ, followed by some form of τις. Cf. e.g. *Rep.* 581c–d ‘the businessman will say that the pleasure of being honoured, or of learning, counts for nothing by comparison with turning a profit, unless he makes money out of them (εἰ μὴ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιῇ)’; *Smp.* 221d ‘one could never find [anyone remotely like Socrates], unless of course one were to draw the comparisons I have just been describing (εἰ μὴ ἄρα εἰ οἷς ἐγὼ λέγω ἀπεικάζοι τις αὐτόν)’.

**c1 τρυφάς:** ‘luxuries’ is perhaps an undertranslation (see 114a7n.). In *Laws* 637d–e, the Persians are said to go in for various τρυφαί rejected by the Spartans: in particular they like to get drunk on undiluted wine, even letting it run down over their clothes. **ἱματίων θ’ ἔλξεις:** the comic poets mocked this as one of Alcibiades’ affectations. Archippus fr. 48 *PCG* described the son of Alcibiades as ‘mincing, trailing his garment (θοϊμάτιον ἔλκων), in order to look as much like his father as possible’. Alcibiades is presumably also the target of Eup. fr. 104 *PCG*, a complaint about high office being given to youths who ‘trail the office of general at their ankles (ἐν τοῖν σφυροῖν ἔλκοντα τὴν στρατηγίαν)’. In the fourth century, Aeschines was another politician to affect the same fashion (*Demos.* 19.314), and Aristotle described the affectation with contempt (*EN* 1150b3–5). Hitching one’s clothes high was a mark of rusticity (*Thphr. Char.* 4.4, Sappho fr. 57 Voigt); letting them trail was a mark of grandeur (Ephippus fr. 19 *PCG* describes someone as ‘grand, and grandly trailing his cloak (σεμνὸς σεμνῶς χλανίδ’ ἔλκων)’). Such grandeur had, since Homer, been thought characteristic of eastern Greeks (Ἰάονες ἐλκεχίτωνες, *Hom. Il.* 13.685) and above all of eastern and female foreigners (Τρωιάδας ἐλκεσιπέπλους, frequently). **c2 μύρων ἀλοιφάς:** Greeks would ordinarily anoint themselves with plain olive oil. To use scented unguents for this purpose would be a sign of the effeminate (*Xen. Smp.* 2.3–4), the extravagantly dainty (*Semonides*

fr. 7.64 *IEG*, on the sort of woman who comes from a mare with a ἄβρός mane) and the sexy (Archilochus fr. 48.5–6 *IEG*). Thus Soph. fr. 334 *TGF* represented Aphrodite as Pleasure anointing herself with scented unguents, and Athena as Virtue using olive oil (cf. Call. *H.* 5.13–26). **c3 ἄβρότητα**: this combination of refinement with extravagance was thought characteristically eastern (Aesch. *Pers.* 41, 135, 541, 543, 1073; Hdt. 1.71.4; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.15). The epithet ἄβρός was used of Alcibiades himself by Adespota fr. 123 *PCG*. **αἰσχυνθείης ἂν . . . 4 αἰσθόμενος** ‘you’d be ashamed . . . , if you were to realise . . .’ **c4 ἐθέλῃσαις**: with this optative, contrast the indicative ἐθέλεις 122b8: that Alcibiades should be ready to look at the austere characteristics of the Spartans is a rather more remote eventuality than his being ready to look at the wealth of the Persians. **c5–8 σωφροσύνην κατ.**: each of these characteristics may belong to the austere and military way of life that has given us our term ‘spartan’; but a string of eleven abstract nouns is not quite in keeping with the style of speech that also belongs to that way of life, and that has given us our term ‘laconic’. **c7–8 φιλονικίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαις**: after starting with some unambiguous virtues, the list culminates with two rather dubious characteristics. These characteristics (or this characteristic: see 115d12–13n. for their identification in *Rep.* 548c) can be seen as praiseworthy (Lys. 2.16 ascribes them both to the way of life chosen by Heracles; Xen. *Oec.* 21.10 expresses admiration for a master who can implant them in his slaves). They can also be seen as quite the opposite (Th. 3.82.8 gives a horrifying description of political violence, and traces it back to these characteristics). Plato sees them as the dangerous upshot of a soul’s being dominated by angry passions: someone whose soul is in such a state acts ‘either in jealousy because of his love of prestige (φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν), or in violence because of his love of victory (βίαι διὰ φιλονικίαν), or in rage because of his irascibility (θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν; contrast εὐκολίαν 123c6), and seeks his fill of prestige, victory and rage, without calculation or comprehension’ (*Rep.* 586c–d).

**d2–3 ἔάν πως** ‘in the hope that’. Cf. *Prt.* 320a: Pericles’ sons were left to their own devices, ‘in the hope that they might spontaneously light upon virtue (ἔάν που αὐτόματα περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ)’. Such a conditional clause gets close to being a final clause. It differs from

a standard final clause, e.g. with ἵνα or a future participle, in that the outcome is presented as too much a matter of luck to be the object of a genuine intention. The contrast is nicely illustrated by Hom. *Od.* 1.93–4, where Athena speaks of sending Telemachus off ‘to enquire about (πενσόμενον) his father’s return, in the hope that (ἥν που) he might hear of him, and in order (ἵνα) for him to have a good reputation among men’. Thus if Socrates’ remarks about wealth do result in Alcibiades’ realising the position he is in, that will be because a gamble has paid off; and if they do not have this effect, nevertheless Socrates will have done the little that he could. **d6 Μεσσήνης:**

subject to Sparta at the dramatic date of this dialogue, it attained independence in 369. οὐδ’ ἄν εἷς ‘no one at all would’. The phrase is more insistently negative than οὐδεὶς ἄν; cf. 112c5n.

**d7 ἀνδραπόδων:** Sparta owned more slaves than any other city (Th. 8.40.2). Unlike the slaves of the Athenians, the slaves of the Spartans consisted of a single population subjugated *en masse* on its native soil. Plato was not impressed by the Spartan form of slavery, or ‘helotry’: it is very difficult to control a large body of slaves who share a common fatherland and communicate in a common language, and this was why there had been so many rebellions in Messene (*Laws* 777b–d). Aristotle too was not impressed by helotry: in contrast to other kinds of slave, helots get above themselves when treated kindly and start plotting when treated with harshness (*Pol.* 1269b7–12).

**d8 ἵππων:** the horse had the most glamour and prestige of any animal. See Th. 6.16.2, Isoc. 16.33 on the significance of Alcibiades’ Olympic victories in the chariot race, and And. 4.25 on how Alcibiades can be expected to appeal to these victories instead of answering the charges against him.

**e2–123a1** Only in the 370s did the Spartan state start to receive contributions from its allies in cash rather than kind (Xen. *HG* 5.2.21–2); hence the talk of money held privately (εἰς ἰδίαι). Socrates here invokes two clichés about the Spartans: they were notoriously corrupt (e.g. Hdt. 6.72, 6.82.1, Th. 1.131; hence their large incomes), and they had nothing to spend their money on (e.g. Xen. *Lac.* 7.3–4; hence their small outgoings). In saying that Spartans held such massive amounts of gold and silver coinage, Socrates accuses them of massive breaches of an ancient law against holding any gold or silver

coinage which Xenophon said they scrupulously obeyed (Xen. *Lac.* 7.5–8.1; an appendix at 14.3 concedes that this was no longer so true as previously).

**123a1 ἀτεχνῶς**: on this colloquialism, see 116e4n. **a2 τὸν Αἰσώπου μῦθον**: 197 Chambry, 142 Perry. A lion, too old to hunt, lay in a cave pretending to be ill. When other animals came in to investigate, he ate them. Along came a vixen to see how he was. When he asked why she did not come in, she replied ‘I would have done, had I not seen many tracks going in, but none coming out.’ There is a special aptness in the idea of Sparta, with all its wealth, as an ageing lion: according to *Rep.* 544c–545b, the Spartans had a constitution of the second-best type, one dominated by a concern for prestige and honour; according to *Rep.* 588c–589b, such a concern is best represented in the language of μῦθος by likening it to a lion; and according to *Rep.* 550c–551b, the second-best constitution declines into oligarchy when concern for wealth comes to take control. Aesop’s fable lends itself also to another application. The ἀλώπηξ, who approaches the lion only after he has eaten all the other animals, would be Socrates, whose deme was Alopeke (‘Foxton’; *Grg.* 495d), and who approaches Alcibiades only after he has got the better of all his other lovers (103a1–4, 104c3–4). The ageing lion would be Alcibiades, whose concern is for prestige rather than money (104c1–2, 105c2–5) and who is losing his adolescent good looks (131c6–e11). Alcibiades is represented as a lion in Ar. *Frogs* 1431, where Aeschylus, asked to comment on how to cope with Alcibiades, gives the oracular advice: ‘Best of all, do not rear a lion in the city; but if you do, humour his ways’ (cf. Hdt. 5.56.1, 6.131.2, for two other sons of Alcmeonid mothers prophetically represented as lions). Alcibiades represents himself as a lion in Plu. *Alc.* 2.3: when someone with whom he is wrestling complains ‘Alcibiades, you bite like a woman’, he replies ‘No, like a lion.’ And in Phaedo’s *Zopyrus* someone (probably Zopyrus himself) told the story of a lion cub who became the pet of a Persian prince (fr. 11 SSR); the moral of the story was presumably that education can do much even, or especially, for those who, like Alcibiades, are leonine by nature (cf. 122b2n.; Isoc. 15.213–14 draws a similar moral from tame lions in travelling circuses). **a8–b1 ὁ βασιλικὸς φόρος οὐκ ὀλίγος**: Hdt.

6.56–7 and Xen. *Lac.* 15.3–7 detail the perquisites of the Spartan kings.

**b5 ἀναβεβηκότων:** ἀναβαίνω was used frequently by Herodotus of going up from the coast into central Asia. Its occurrence in this conversation is therefore no anachronism. But given the suggestion of the genitive plural that the man whom Socrates heard speaking was one of a group who had gone upcountry (cf. 104c1n. on ὅτι τῶν πλουσίων), and given also b7–c1, it is hard not to catch in this word an allusion to Xenophon, the author of the *Anabasis*. Xenophon did not complete this work until some time after 371, when he was forced to move on from his place of exile in Scillus (*An.* 5.3.7; D.L. 2.53). The *Alcibiades* is therefore likely to have been written in the 360s at the earliest.

**b7–c1 ζώνην τῆς βασιλέως γυναικός:** in *An.* 1.4.9, Xenophon claims that he camped in a place allocated to a Persian queen in order to provide her belt. Hdt. 2.98.1 says that the town of Anthylla in Egypt had, since the Persian conquest of that land, been allocated to provide the queen's shoes. Th. 1.138.5 says that the king of Persia gave Themistocles three cities, each to pay for one item on his table. None of these sources suggests that these places were actually named for the items that they provided.

**c5–6 Ἀμήστριδι:** for Amestris' manipulation of her husband see Hdt. 9.108–113; for her manipulation of her son see Ctes. *Pers.* 40–2.

**c6–7 ὁ Δεινομάχης υἱός:** it would be utterly extraordinary to refer to an Athenian as the son of his mother, even in order to distinguish two men of the same name, father and deme (*Demos.* 39.9). Disdain for matronymics is not just an Athenian peculiarity: in early Greek poetry 'matronymics are only used of people fathered by gods, nearly always Zeus . . . , or of those without fathers' (West on Hes. *Th.* 1002); and Hdt. 1.173.4–5 says that the Lycians are unique in using matronymics. This way of referring to Alcibiades is all the more extraordinary, in that it refers to him simply as the son of his mother, and does not use also his own name or that of his father (contrast 105d1–2n., 131e1–4n.; *Demos.* 18.284, 19.281). It is a turn of phrase striking enough to be imitated by those who wish to make an unmistakable allusion to this dialogue (*Persius* 4.20 *Deinomaches ego sum*). Its closest Greek parallel seems to be the second- or third-

century AD text Ael. *NA* 3.40: here a matronymic alone is used for the younger Aristippus, who was so notorious for having learnt his philosophy from his mother that he was nicknamed Μητροδίδακτος. Not quite so closely parallel, but still significant, are: the use of his own name, his mother's name, and his grandmother's name for 'Gryllus, son of Mataline the daughter of Pataecion', a young man who, for all his athletic achievements, is otherwise a bit girlish (Herodas 1.50; the speaker is a woman); and the use of 'Cottalus, son of Metrotime' by the domineering Metrotime (= 'Mother-Honour') herself, for an idle boy with a gaga father (Herodas 3.48). **c7–8 ἄξιός μιν πεντήκοντα εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ** 'worth fifty minas if it is worth very much', i.e. 'worth fifty minas at very most'; cf. *Ap.* 26d–e εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ δραχμῆς. Fifty minas was fifteen thousand times the daily subsistence allowance for those serving on Athenian juries. It was the sum paid for a house by a *nouveau riche* who spent money at an amazing rate (Lys. 19.29). When Alcibiades' property was confiscated in 414, it realised only just over forty-seven minas (Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, *A selection of Greek historical inscriptions to the end of the fifth century BC* (Oxford 1969), no. 79). In Xen. *Oec.* 2.3, Socrates estimates that his own property is worth about five minas in all. **c8 πλέθρα . . . δι τριακόσια:** about 69 acres, or 28 hectares. We know of only one estate in Attica larger than this: the *nouveau riche* who bought a house for fifty minas 'acquired more than three hundred plethra of land' (Lys. 19.29). **c8 Ἐρχίαισιν:** Erchia was a deme some 9 miles, or 15 kilometres, to the east of Athens. Though there is no reason to doubt that Alcibiades' family held land there, it was not in fact his own deme (he was a Scambonid; Plu. *Alc.* 22.4). It was however the deme of Xenophon (D.L. 2.48) and Isocrates (Plu. *Isoc.* 836e).

**d2 οὗτος δ' Ἀλκιβιάδης** 'this Alcibiades chappie'. Amestris is represented as feeling disdain when she is represented as referring to Alcibiades, in his absence, by such a combination of the article with a demonstrative pronoun and his name. Compare *Tht.* 166a 'he'll say in contempt (καταφρονῶν) for us "οὗτος δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης, isn't he a fine fellow? He's scared a little child . . ."', and *Phd.* 59a–b, which says that someone was over-emotional, as usual, and then refers to him as οὗτος . . . ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος. Contrast *Ap.* 33d–34a, where Soc-



rates uses names and demonstrative pronouns, without such articles, to list those of his friends who are present at his trial: Κρίτων οὗτοςί ... Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε ... Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε ... Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισεύς οὗτοςί ... Παράλιος ὁδε ... ὁδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος ... οὗτοςί Πλάτων ... Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁδε. **d6** Ἀλκιβιάδης οὗτος ‘Alcibiades here’.

Socrates is no longer imagining the disdainful attitude of Amestris. **d6–7** ἔτη οὐδέπω γεγονώς σφόδρα εἴκοσιν ‘not quite twenty yet’; and therefore, by Athenian standards, not quite of age yet (105a7n. on ἐὼν θᾶττον). This sets the dramatic date of the dialogue at about 433, just before the start of the Peloponnesian War. Alcibiades was on the Potidaea campaign (*Smp.* 219e), probably in 432 (*Smp.* 220d–e says that he fought in a battle there, presumably the battle described in Th. 1.62–3; Isoc. 16.29 says he went out with Phormio, which, according to Th. 1.64.2, would not have been until after that battle). At the time of his service in Potidaea, Alcibiades would not have been less than twenty (youths between eighteen and twenty did garrison duty in Attica: Arist. *Ath.* 42.3–5); nor would he have been much more than twenty either (he was still only a μεिरάκιον: Plu. *Alc.* 7.3). This dramatic date is in line with that indicated by 104b6–c1; but cf. 124a2–3n. **d8** χρῆ ... **e2** βασιλεῖ: in Aeschines’ dialogue *Alcibiades* (fr. 50 *SSR*), Socrates tells Alcibiades that Themistocles managed to get the better of the Great King only by using his wits (τῶι βουλευέσθαι, τῶι φρονεῖν), reminds him that not even Themistocles’ knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) saved him from exile, and asks him ‘What then do you think will happen to men without virtue, who have no care for themselves (ἐν μηδεμιᾷ ἐπιμελείαι ἑαυτῶν οὔσιν)?’ Themistocles was presented as an exemplar to Glaucon (Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.2, quoted in 105b7–8n.; cf. 105a7n. on ἐὼν θᾶττον) and Euthydemus (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.2; cf. 103a1n. on θαυμάζειν).

**e2–3** φησιν ἔξαρκεῖν καὶ ὥς ἔχει ‘he says he’s all right, just as he is’; a reference to Alcibiades’ statements at 119b5–c1, 120c3–5. The phrase ὥς ἔχει, unlike its literal translation into English, conveys connotations of thoughtless haste as well as, and sometimes even instead of, its literal meaning (cf. Ar. *Ec.* 533 ‘I went off ὥσπερ εἶχον’, said by someone explaining how, when called out on urgent business one night, she grabbed someone else’s cloak by mistake).

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**e4** τί οὖν ποτ' ἔστιν ὅτῳ πιστεύοι τὸ μειράκιον; 'What hath he then on which he can rely, that lad?' Her Majesty begins in high poetic style, but ends with a far more lowly expression. Her indefinite clause with an optative and without an ἄν seems to have no parallel in prose. It does however have parallels in Homer (e.g. *Il.* 22.348 ὥς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅς σῆς γε κύνας κεφαλῆς ἀπαλάλκοι) and in each of the tragedians (e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 620 οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλὰ, Soph. *OC* 1172 καὶ τίς ποτ' ἔστιν, ὃν γ' ἐγὼ ψέξαιμί τι; and Eur. *Alc.* 52 ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως Ἄλκηστις ἐς γῆρας μόλοι;). Furthermore, the use of this construction in paratragedy (Ar. *Th.* 871–2 τίς τῶνδ' ἐρμυνῶν δωμάτων ἔχει κράτος, | ὅστις ξένους δέξατο κτλ.) suggests that it was readily recognisable as a mark of the high poetic style. μειράκιον, by contrast, is not found in either epic or tragedy. The immaturity of Alcibiades was still at issue when, in his thirties, the Assembly appointed him a commander of the Sicilian expedition (Th. 6.12.2, 6.17.1). **e5–6** κάλλει τε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς: these are almost exactly the advantages which, in 104a1–c1, Socrates said Alcibiades thought he had. The sole difference concerns the advantages of soul on which Alcibiades now proposes to rely. He previously thought he had them all (104a3–4); he now proposes to rely on his soul's natural endowments (cf. 119c1n.), not seeking to perfect them by education. **e6–7** μαίνεσθαι: a reiteration of the point in 113c5–6. At 118e4, Alcibiades had accused his brother of being a maniac.

**124a1** Λαμπιδώ: Lampido was daughter of Leotychidas by his second wife, and was married to Archidamus, the son of the son of Leotychidas by his first wife (Hdt. 6.71). **a2–3** οἱ πάντες βασιλεῖς γεγόνασιν: an anachronism. It was not in fact until 427 that Agis succeeded his father Archidamus as king of Sparta (Th. 3.1.1, 3.89.1); yet the other indications set the dramatic date of the dialogue at about 433 (123d6–7n.). The only defence of the anachronism is that it is less glaring than those of *Mx.* 245e and *Smp.* 193a, which refer to events much further removed from the ostensible dramatic date, and much less predictable than a son's succeeding his father as king. **a3–4** τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντα alludes to 104a2–3 τὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχοντά σοι μεγάλα and 104b4–5 μείζω οἷε σοι

δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν; cf. 121b7n. **a5–6** οὐχ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι: such considerations are among the few capable of moving Alcibiades: cf. 108c6n., 109a4, 121b4n. **a6** αἱ τῶν πολεμίων γυναῖκες: it was bad enough to seem ridiculous before one's enemies (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 4.176–82, 8.148–50); it must have been even more galling to seem ridiculous before their womenfolk. **a8** ὦ μακάριε: this form of address standardly insinuates that the bliss of the addressee rests on ignorance or error (e.g. 132b1, *Cra.* 391a, 414c, *Grg.* 512d, *Phdr.* 241e, *Prt.* 309c, *Rep.* 432d, 589c, *Smp.* 214c, *Sph.* 249e, *Men. Pk.* 469). Cf. 113c5–6n. on ὦ βέλτιστε, for other polite forms of address used in presenting criticism.

**b1** γνῶθι σαυτόν: this maxim was among those carved on the front of the temple of Apollo at Delphi; its date was disputed, but all agreed that it was at least as old as the Seven Sages (*Prt.* 343b, *Chrm.* 164c–165b, Paus. 10.24.1, Arist. *Phil.* fr. 3). The maxim enjoins us to know our limits: thus when the maxim is addressed to Prometheus, it is immediately glossed as enjoining him to get used to the fact that there is a new and powerful ruler of the gods, Zeus (*Aesch. Pr.* 309). The maxim was said to have started Socrates on his philosophical career (*Arist. Phil.* fr. 1). He thought that the limits which we most need to know are our intellectual limits (117b12–13n.); he accordingly glossed the maxim as enjoining us not to think that we know things of which we are in fact ignorant (*Xen. Mem.* 3.9.6). In *Xen. Mem.* 4.2.24 Socrates commends the maxim to Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν); and in *Ar. Clouds* 840–2, someone is challenged to explain what can be learnt from joining Socrates' school, and replies 'All human wisdom (δοσσιπέρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις σοφά): you will know yourself for an ignorant thicko (γνώσει δὲ σαυτόν ὡς ἀμαθὴς εἶ καὶ παχύς).' In *Xen. Cyr.* 7.2.20–5 the Delphic oracle commends the maxim to Croesus; rather too late, Croesus appreciates that the maxim warns him not to think himself capable of waging war on a king of Persia, who 'in the first place derives from gods [cf. 120e7–10], in the second traces his descent through kings [cf. 121a5], and in the third has, since childhood, been training to be virtuous [cf. 121e4–122b5]'. **b2** οὐχ οὕς σὺ οἶε: rival Athenian politicians; see 119b2–8. **b2–3** οὐδ' ἄν ἐνί 'absolutely no'; see 112c5n.

**124b7–126a4: A new beginning**

*The prolonged description of his future opponents has made Alcibiades lose some of his complacency. For the very first time, he seeks Socrates' advice: how should he take care of himself? With this new-found curiosity, the dialectic can resume, far more briskly and productively than before. It is not long before Alcibiades is saying that he needs the sort of skill at decision-making that runs a city well.*

**124b7** τίνα . . . χρῆ . . . ποιεῖσθαι: the words τί χρῆ ποιεῖν . . . ; (as in *Euthphr.* 4c, 9a, *Demos.* 47.68, *Thphr. Char.* 16.6) seem to have been the standard formula with which one sought the advice of an ἐξηγητής. **b8** ἐξηγήσασθαι 'explain'. However, the Greek word here has richer connotations than its English rendering. For in the light of the inscription on Apollo's temple in Delphi (124b1), Alcibiades' education has now become a matter of religion; and the ἐξηγηταί were Athenian officials who could be consulted by those in doubt about any duty of theirs with religious implications.

**c1** ναί· ἀλλὰ γάρ . . . 'Yes, I can explain; but the fundamental thing is that . . .'; cf. *GP* 101–2. **κοινή βουλή**: picking up what Alcibiades himself had said in 119b1. With the correction of Alcibiades here, cf. *Smp.* 219a–b, where Alcibiades tells Socrates 'You must decide yourself (σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς . . . βουλευέου) on what you consider (ἡγῆ) to be best for you and for me', and Socrates corrects him by 'We'll decide (βουλευόμενοι) and do whatever we think (φαίνεται νῶϊν) best.' **c3–4** σου διαφέρω 'I am your superior'; not simply 'I differ from you.' **c6** ὁ ἐπίτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς . . . **g** θεός: not a modest claim. The only exact precedent for calling God the guardian of an individual is *Pind. O.* 1.106, a highflown lyric which talks of God as the guardian of Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse and Olympic victor. **c10–11** ἡ ἐπιφάνεια . . . δι' ἐμοῦ is, in the manner characteristic of oracular pronouncements, ambiguous. Socrates could be saying one or other or both of: 'Through my agency, the world will get to know of you' (as promised at 105d2–3), and 'Through my agency, you will get to know of the god and his meaning' (as promised at 124b7–c1).

**d2–4** ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, πολλῆς μὲν πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀτὰρ νώ γε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα ‘we need looking after; everybody needs it a lot, but the two of us have a particularly strong need’. The obvious truth in this is that Socrates and Alcibiades suffer from an unusually gross mismatch between their starting point (Alcibiades as he now is) and their goal (Alcibiades transformed into a world-beater). Socrates may also be hinting at the somewhat less obvious idea that precisely because Alcibiades’ natural endowments are so great, he will be all the more dangerous if he does not get the proper upbringing (cf. the passages cited in 120e3–4n.). **d5** μὲν arouses the expectation of a contrasting δέ clause ‘but you are lying when you say that you need caring for’. **d6** οὐδὲ μὴν . . . γε indicates a strong denial of the expected δέ clause. Cf. *Prm.* 165e ἐν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται . . . οὐδὲ μὴν πολλὰ γε (‘They won’t be just one thing . . . Nor will they be more than one.’). **d7** τί οὖν ἂν ποιοῖμεν; ‘So what are we to do?’; for this use of the optative, cf. 118e4. **d8** ὦ ἐταῖρε ‘comrade’. This form of address conveys more than just affection. It often, both in Plato (e.g. 135c8) and elsewhere (e.g. Praxilla *PMG* 749, 750), suggests that there is need for the virtues (in the present circumstances, steadfast resolution) to be expected of a comrade-in-arms (cf. 103a1n. on ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου). It is particularly characteristic of Plato’s Socrates. Like ὦ φίλε (cf. 109d1n.), it rarely occurs on the lips of other characters in Plato, and it does not occur at all on the lips of Xenophon’s Socrates (see *FA* 94; *GFA* 276). **d9** οὗτοι δὲ πρέπει γε ‘Well, it certainly wouldn’t be seemly.’ On πρέπει, see 108c6n. The combination of particles οὗτοι δὲ is found only in Plato; and only once does it occur without γε (*GP* 552–3).

**e1–2** φαμέν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἄριστοι βούλεσθαι γενέσθαι ‘We say we want to be as good as possible.’ Cf. Alcibiades’ words in *Smp.* 218d: ‘Nothing is more important to me than being as good as possible (ὡς ὅτι βέλτιστον ἐμὲ γενέσθαι).’ Demanding superlatives in terms such as these is a mark of arrogance. Cf. Thphr. *Char.* 24.13, where the ὑπερήφανος writes, without any circumlocutions like χαρίζοιο ἂν μοι (‘I’d be delighted if you were to’), such things as βούλομαι γενέσθαι (‘I want to be’) and τὴν ταχίστην (‘p.d.q.’); Ar. *Birds* 1380, where a

boastful dithyrambist announces flatly ὄρνις γενέσθαι βούλομαι ('I want to be a bird'); and *Thg.* 127b, where after a lot of circumlocutions (including ἐμοὶ χαριῖι), someone confesses αἰσχύνομαι λέγειν ὥς σφόδρα βούλομαι ('I'm ashamed to say how much I want it'). **e7 πράττειν τὰ πράγματα:** what else might one πράττειν, if not τὰ πράγματα? Such a turn of phrase, in which one uses as the object of a verb the noun formed from the same stem, is unilluminatingly pleonastic (cf. 116d6n.), unless one makes the noun a syntactical peg on which to hang some more information, as Socrates does in 110b2–3 ἄλλην τινὰ παιδιὰν παίζοις, 113c5 μανικὸν ... ἐπιχείρημα ἐπιχειρεῖν, 118b5 οἶον πάθος πέπονθας, 120b7–c1 μανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήσεως ἔχεται ... τοσοῦτον ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι ... ἀσκεῖν ὅσα δεῖται ἀσκήσεως ... πᾶσαν παρασκευὴν παρασκευασμένον, 132a6–7 εὐλαβοῦ ... τὴν εὐλάβειαν ἣν ἐγὼ λέγω, and *Grg.* 515a πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα. The various ways of combining different words from the same stem in a single clause were a favourite ornament in epideictic (114d6n.); e.g. the incantatory effect of Gorgias' *Defence of Palamedes* (DK 82 B 11(a)) owes much to the fact that it has one such combination every four lines or so. Alcibiades ventures such ornaments also in 113d6–7, 135d9–11. **e17 οἱ καλοὶ καγαθοὶ** is all but a compound of the two most general Greek words of commendation. Greek values being what they were, the term was commonly applied to the rich (*Arist. Pol.* 1293b38–40, 1294a17–19). However, the term never became a mere label for a social or economic class; it always retained its commendatory overtones, so that those who thought the rich did not merit commendation would speak of them as 'those who are called "fine and good"' (*Rep.* 569a, Th. 8.48.6). See further K. J. Dover, *Greek popular morality* (Oxford 1974) 41–5.

**125a4 ὁ ἕκαστος φρόνιμος, τοῦτ' ἀγαθός:** the principle that people are good at what they are φρόνιμοι at is present also in *Rep.* 349e (ἅπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἃ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν), where the principle is illustrated by someone who is φρόνιμος (and therefore good) at music. Elsewhere too, Socrates talks as if anyone who has any bit of knowledge is therefore φρόνιμος in some respect: see *Grg.* 490b–e (the knowledge of doctors, weavers, cobblers and farmers), and *La.* 192e–193a (an investor's knowledge that his investment will pay off; a doctor's knowledge about diet; a soldier's knowledge that reinforce-

ments will arrive). Such talk seems to be unique to Socrates; he talks like this only when, as here, an interlocutor has lightly ascribed an especially grand status to φρόνησις, and Socrates wants to press him on just what this thing can be which deserves so grand a status. Such talk probably sounded as strange in Greek as it would in English to talk of a carpenter's wisdom, or of being wise at cobbling; for φρόνησις is typically used of a general-purpose good sense, 'the capacity for deciding well about what is good and beneficial for oneself, not in some particular area (e.g. what makes for health, or what for strength), but what makes for a good life generally' (Arist. *EN* 1140a25–8). For similar play with other terminology for intelligence, see 125e6n. (εὐβουλία), 126c4n. (δόμονοια) and *Thg.* 123a–124b (where, in his first meeting with another ambitious young man, Socrates discusses σοφία, putting questions and presenting examples highly reminiscent of those here). **a8 σκυτοτόμος**: at first hearing, says Alcibiades in *Smp.* 221e, 'Socrates' arguments sound utterly ludicrous; ... he talks about pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and tanners.' Socrates' more aristocratic interlocutors seem to have been particularly disconcerted by his habit of mentioning, as here, such low-life craftsmen in what should be elevated conversation about politics. Thus Callicles protests in *Grg.* 491a–b: 'You just never stop your constant talk about cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if they were what we are discussing ... When I talk about superiors, I don't mean superior cobblers or cooks; I mean whichever men are wise in public affairs (εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι).' And in Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.37, Critias, angered by a comparison between his political activities and a cowherd's charge of his beasts, warns Socrates: 'You'll have to stay away from the cobblers and carpenters and smiths. You keep going on about them so much that I reckon they're worn threadbare by now.' **αιι αὐτά ... βι τοῦτο**: for this shift between plural and singular, see 117a10–11n.

**c4–5 συνόντων καὶ συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις** 'living together and combining among themselves and having dealings with one another'. A characteristically (116d6n.) pleonastic form of words. There is no real difference between 'combining among themselves' and 'having dealings with one another': for since nobody can combine with himself, ἑαυτοῖς must here be equivalent

to ἀλλήλοις (for this somewhat unusual sense, see LSJ s.v. ἑαυτοῦ iii); and when Alcibiades explains himself at 125d7–8 with συμβαλλόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, borrowing elements from each of the phrases συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς and χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις, he in effect confesses that those two phrases came to the same thing. **c4 συνόντων** is a conjectural emendation for the οὔκοῦν τῶν of all the manuscripts. The manuscript reading has three difficulties. First, there is no proper parallel for someone answering a question by a statement that begins with οὔκοῦν. *GP* 435 cites our passage to illustrate a use of οὔκοῦν as ‘Introducing a disquisition for which the interlocutor has declared himself ready or eager: “Well”.’ However, both *Meno* 76c and *Rep.* 456c, the two passages cited by *GP* 435 as parallels, use οὔκοῦν to mark the transition to a new question from someone who has just asked his interlocutor whether they should go on, and got the answer ‘Yes’; such a use of οὔκοῦν, as a transitional-cum-inferential particle with an interrogative tinge, is entirely standard; and that is not how the particle is used here. Second, if we read the article τῶν, we have Alcibiades give to Socrates’ question ‘What are they doing?’ the answer ‘... the people who both combine among themselves ...’; the question however invites some amplification of 125c2 ποιούντων, and that requires a participle or participles without any article, like the καμνόντων, πλεόντων and θεριζόντων of 125b14–18. Third, if we read οὔκοῦν τῶν, then the καὶ ... καὶ ... has to be taken as ‘corresponsive’ (*GP* 323–4), and translated as ‘both ... and ...’ However, the standard use of corresponsive καὶ is to ‘couple disparate ideas’ (*GP* 585), whereas συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς and χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις could hardly be less disparate. All three difficulties can be avoided if we replace οὔκοῦν τῶν with some participle similar in sense to συμβαλλόντων ἑαυτοῖς and χρωμένων ἀλλήλοις. One such participle is συνόντων. Its corruption to οὔκοῦν τῶν would have been aided both by the occurrence of οὔκοῦν at the start of Socrates’ next speech, and by the confusion between συν and οὐκ that is exemplified at 112e4. **c6–7 ἀνθρώπων ... ἄρχειν ἀνθρώποις χρωμένων:** appropriately enough for someone who cannot cope with long speeches (106b1n.) Socrates here (as at 126e3–8) focuses on just the last of the items that Alcibiades has listed. Socrates is not giving an entirely fair summary of Alcibiades’ explanation that, by the capacity which good men have for being in charge (125b8–9), he means



the capacity for being in charge of people who are having dealings with one another. The phrase ἀνθρώπων ἀλλήλοις χρωμένων would unambiguously indicate people between whom there are symmetrical and reciprocated dealings. The apparently innocent step of replacing ἀλλήλοις by ἀνθρώποις, to produce ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώποις χρωμένων, gives a phrase that would more naturally indicate people who stand to other people in the asymmetrical and unreciprocated relation of using. In the examples at 125c9–d3, Socrates will think (or pretend to think) that Alcibiades has such an unreciprocated relation in mind. **c9 κελυστῶν χρωμένων ἐρέταις:** the ‘orderer’ (κελυστής) was the petty officer on a trireme who gave the time to the oarsmen (ἐρέται), using them to move the vessel. Socrates therefore is not simply repeating his ‘When they’re sailing (πλέοντων)?’ question of 125b16. πλεῖν can be used for all manner of seafaring, whereas Socrates is now thinking of warships. **c11 κυβερνητική:** the skill of the helmsman (κυβερνήτης), the professional seaman whose responsibilities included telling the ‘orderer’ the speed at which the trireme was to move. The helmsman himself was in turn under the authority of the τριήραρχος, who had helped finance the trireme (e.g. Th. 6.31.3), and who was in at least nominal command of it. Higher still was the position that Alcibiades expects to occupy, as στρατηγός in command of an entire fleet. Th. 7.70.3–8 gives some sense of what these different ranks would do in battle. **c13–d1 ἀνθρώπων λέγεις ἄρχειν αὐλητῶν, ἀνθρώποις ἡγουμένων ὠιδῆς καὶ χρωμένων χορευταῖς** ‘you mean being in charge of people who are pipers, when they are leading people in an ode and making use of the members of a chorus’. Like a trireme, a chorus takes part in a highly competitive struggle, and it has a similar chain of command: the singers take their time from a piper, who in turn is subject to another’s authority, that of the ‘chorus-teacher’. The resemblance between a trireme and a chorus is the closer in that a trireme might carry a τριηραύλης, a piper who gave the time to the oarsmen: Plu. *Nic.* 21.1 comments on how ‘theatrical’ this would make the approach of a fleet.

**d3 χοροδιδασκαλική:** the art of ‘teaching a chorus’ included not only teaching them their parts, but writing the parts as well: ‘So-and-so ἐδίδασκεν’ was the standard formula to record that So-and-so

was the playwright. Like a helmsman, a chorus-teacher is not as high as Alcibiades expects to be himself. Like others with the money, Alcibiades will become a χορηγός, or chorus-sponsor. In this rôle, as in others, he will acquire great notoriety, e.g. by assaulting a rival sponsor (And. 4.20–1, Demos. 21.147) and by parading in purple (113e9n.). **d7 κοινωνούντων ... πολιτείας** ‘partners in civic society’. The expression κοινωνεῖν πολιτείας is standardly used for having a common citizenship (e.g. *Laws* 753a, Arist. *Ath. pol.* 13.5). **d10–11 κοινωνούντων ναυτιλίας ἐπίστασθαι ἄρχειν τίς ποιεῖ τέχνη;** ‘what skill makes one know how to be in charge of those who are partners in seafaring?’ When Alcibiades answers this question with κυβερνητική, he assigns to the helmsman a rather more general authority than Socrates did at 125c9–11, when he said solely that the helmsman is in charge of the ‘orderer’. In the winter of 407–406, Alcibiades assigned a massive authority to his helmsman Antiochus. He left the body of his fleet in the charge of Antiochus, under orders not to provoke the Spartan fleet to give battle. Antiochus disobeyed orders, and lost. As a result, Alcibiades was removed from his command. He sailed off to a castle he owned in the Chersonese, and never saw Athens again (Xen. *HG* 1.5.11–17; see 120a9–b1n. for Alcibiades’ first dealings with the helmsman whom he put in charge of all who were partners in that bit of seafaring).

**e6 εὐβουλίαν:** Alcibiades is learning: this brisk answer to the question ‘What stands to politics as the skill of the helmsman stands to seafaring?’ contrasts strongly with the prolonged agonies at 108a12–d8 over the question ‘What governs playing the harp as gymnastic standards govern wrestling?’ The etymology of the word εὐβουλία (‘being good at working out what to do’) would allow more or less any practical skill to be or contain some sort of εὐβουλία. There is however a tendency to confine εὐβουλία to the skill at planning that is needed by rulers. Thus *Rep.* 428b–d says that one would call a city εὐβουλος, not because its carpenters, smiths and farmers know their jobs, but because its rulers are equipped with the skill ‘which takes decisions (βουλεύεται), not for some one special part of the city, but for the city itself as a whole’; and Arist. *EN* 1142b28–34 distinguishes εὐβουλία proper (ἅπλως), which is directed at *the* goal (human well-being, the goal of the statesman: *EN* 1094a18–29), from more special

sorts of εὐβουλία, which are directed at more special goals. This ambiguity about εὐβουλία motivates the next few speeches. See also 125a4n. for similar ambiguities.

**126a1** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, εἷς γε τὸ σῶζεσθαι πλέοντας ‘I think it *is* good planning, at least for the purpose of keeping people safe when they are voyaging.’ This prompt and positive response, evading the catch in Socrates’ question by including a little catch of its own in the γε clause, is another sign that Alcibiades is learning. Compare the style in which Socrates responded to Alcibiades’ questions at 109e1–7. **a1** σῶζεσθαι: presumably the middle voice, to acknowledge that the helmsman is himself among the voyagers whose safety he ensures. **a4** εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν καὶ σῶζεσθαι ‘It’s for the purpose of administering the city better, and keeping it safe.’ σῶζεσθαι is again presumably middle here, in order to acknowledge that the politician himself benefits from his keeping his city safe.

### 126a5–127e7: When is a city in good condition?

*To run a city well, Alcibiades will need to ensure that its inhabitants, so far from being at odds with one another, share an amicable consensus. But that raises more problems than it solves. On questions of arithmetic, there may be a consensus; but is not such a consensus the result of arithmetical knowledge, rather than of the skill at decision-making to which Alcibiades aspires? On other questions, there may well be no consensus in a just and amicable society; for does Alcibiades expect that there will be a consensus between the two sexes on how to conduct what he thinks the proper business of only one of them? That men and women will be of one mind on how to weave, or how to wage war? His inability to cope with such problems makes Alcibiades realise what a dreadful state he is in. But, says Socrates, he must not despair; he must keep answering Socrates’ questions. And this he agrees to do.*

**126a5–6** ἄμεινον δὲ διοικεῖται καὶ σῶζεται τίνος παραγιγνομένου ἢ ἀπογιγνομένου; ‘And the city is better administered and kept safe by the presence or absence of what?’ Much as English allows us to convert the predicate of ‘Beef is very nourishing’ into an abstract noun, and reword the entire sentence as ‘There’s a lot of nourishment in beef’, so too Greek allows similar constructions with an

abstract noun and a verb like παραγίγνεσθαι. All eight compounds of the two verbs γίγνεσθαι and εἶναι with the four prepositions ἐν, ἐπί, παρά and πρὸς are used in such constructions, both by Plato and by other writers. Plato however has a particular fascination with such constructions, for the abstract noun in such a construction can be viewed as the name of a Form (129b1n.), a special object that, by being present in things of a given kind, causes them to belong to that kind by imparting to them something of its own character. Thus *Phd.* 100d takes it to be as undeniable as it is uninformative to say of a beautiful thing that ‘the presence (παρουσία) or share (or whatever you care to call it)’ of the Form beauty ‘makes it beautiful (ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλόν)’. Here however, while it would no doubt be true, so far as it goes, for Alcibiades to say that a city is well administered because good administration is present, and bad administration absent, that would not go far enough. For, as he shows by the examples in 126a6–b6, Socrates here expects a more instructive specification than ‘the Form of so-and-so’ for the Form whose presence makes things be so-and-so. More instructive explanations by the presence of Forms are found in *Grg.* 506e ‘When some orderly arrangement (κόσμος) – that appropriate to a particular kind of thing – is present in (ἐγγενόμενος ἐν) a thing of that kind, then it renders that thing good (ἄγαθὸν παρέχει)’; in *Rep* 609a, which mentions the facts that rust damages iron and that rot damages wood, and uses them to illustrate the principle that whenever a thing’s ‘cognate evil and affliction (σύμφυτον . . . κακὸν τε καὶ νόσημα)’ is present in it, then ‘it makes bad the thing in which it has come to be present (πονηρόν τε ποιεῖ ὧι προσεγένετο)’; and, most elaborate of all, in the argument for the indestructibility of the soul at *Phd.* 100b–107a. In spite of the apparent triviality of the claim that e.g. the presence of beauty makes things beautiful, Plato is conscious of difficulties for such explanations: in *Euthd.* 301a, Dionysodorus asks Socrates ‘So if you get a cow present (παραγένηταί σοι βοῦς), you’re a cow? And because you now have me present (νῦν ἐγὼ σοι πάρεμι), you’re Dionysodorus?’; *Lys.* 217d–e points out that if we daub red hair with white paint, then whiteness is present, but only in such a way as to make the hair look white, and not in such a way as to make the hair really be white, as it will in old age; and *Prm.* 131a–e and *Phlb.* 15b

ask how one and the same thing can be present in several places at once.

**b2–4** ἄμεινον ὄμματα . . . ὄψεως μὲν παραγιγνομένης, τυφλότητος δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης: the way that eyes are the better for the presence of sight is Plato's favourite illustration of how a thing is the better for the presence of the virtue proper to it. See *Rep.* 353c, and especially *La.* 190a ὅψις παραγενομένη ὀφθαλμοῖς βελτίους ποιεῖ ἐκείνους οἷς παρεγένετο.

**c1** ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ 'I think' (although others might not); contrast 120c3 δοκεῖς μὲν μοι 'I think' (although I might be wrong). **c1–2** φιλία μὲν αὐτοῖς γίγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τὸ μισεῖν δὲ καὶ στασιάζειν ἀπογίγνηται: with this dainty antithesis, cf. Gorgias DK 82 B 6, a fragment of an ἐπιτάφιος λόγος (121b1–2n.), or ἐπίδειξις (115a4n.) in praise of Athenians killed in battle: τί γὰρ ἀπῆν τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις ὧν δεῖ ἀνδράσι προσεῖναι; τί δὲ καὶ προσῆν ὧν οὐ δεῖ προσεῖναι; ('What was absent from these men which in men should be present? And what was present which should not be present?'). It is pleasantly ironic that Alcibiades should speak in such a characteristically rhetorical style when obeying Socrates' invitation to speak in the terms adopted by the philosophical theory of Forms (126a5–6n.). But the fact is that the terms adopted by the theory of Forms do lend themselves to such a style. There were, more or less unavoidably, jingling antitheses in Socrates' own examples of the sort of answer he expected (e.g. 126a8–9 ὑγιείας μὲν παραγιγνομένης, νόσου δὲ ἀπογιγνομένης). And this is fairly typical of attempts to spell out things in the official vocabulary of the theory of Forms. In *Phd.* 102d, Socrates smiles and says 'I seem to be talking like someone who writes prose (συγγραφικῶς).' His amusement is provoked by the formulation he has just given of the fact that Simmias is smaller than Phaedo but bigger than Socrates: τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον ('to the former's bigness, he submits his smallness for it to surpass; while to the latter he presents his bigness that surpasses the latter's smallness'). **c1 αὐτοῖς**: i.e. the citizens, by contrast with the city (126b8 πόλις). For this idiom, cf. e.g. *Laws* 828b πόλεώς τε καὶ

αὐτῶν καὶ κτημάτων ('the city, its citizens, and their possessions'). **c4 ὁμόνοιαν:** a key concept in Greek political thought. It and its relationships to friendship, justice and moderation were much discussed. The etymology of the word ὁμόνοια ('sameness of mind') allows it to stand for any sort of agreement. In political contexts, however, the word was used for a rather special sort of agreement, and much of the philosophical discussion tried to articulate what sort of agreement that was (cf. 125a4n. for such vagaries with other terms). Perhaps the best summary description of ὁμόνοια is *Rep.* 431d–e: 'the same opinion [δόξα; it is, in spite of *Clit.* 409e, unreasonable to demand expert understanding from all parties to a consensus as broad as ὁμόνοια has to be] is present in both rulers and ruled [and hence ὁμόνοια can exist only among people belonging to the same community] about who should rule [rather than about a theoretical question like those of astronomy (*Arist. EN* 1167a25), or a trivial practical question like which chorus should win the prize (*Xen. Mem.* 4.4.16)]'. The opposite of ὁμόνοια is therefore στάσις, the sort of disagreement that is liable to erupt in civil war. For other discussion of ὁμόνοια see Democritus DK 68 B 250, 255, Antiphon περὶ ὁμονοίας (DK 87 B 44a–71), *Rep.* 351d–352a, *Arist. MM* 1212a14–27, *Isoc.* 12.225–7. **c8 ἀριθμητικὴν:** counting, measuring (126d2–3) and weighing (126d7) were found impressive because of the ease and rigour with which they solve perplexities and disputes (*Rep.* 602d, *Phlb.* 55e). Only the possessed would resort to consulting omens on questions that can be answered by this trio (*Xen. Mem.* 1.1.9). The trio were often contrasted with the less reliable means we have for reaching consensus about values in general (*Euthphr.* 7b–c) and justice in particular (*Laws* 757b, *De justo* 373c–d). The trio thus exerted something of the fascination as an intellectual ideal that computation does over modern epistemologies. **c11 αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἑκάστος:** see 111c7–8n., on what it is for an individual to agree or disagree with himself. Socrates has worked systematically towards this, the smallest scale on which there can be (dis)agreement, via the medium scale of private citizens (dis)agreeing with one another in 126c9, from the largest scale of (dis)agreement between entire cities in 126c6. He will go through the same steps in the opposite order at 126d1–5.

**d2–3** μετρητικὴν . . . **d7** σταθμοῦ: see 126c8n. **d10** τίς αὐτὴν τέχνην παρασκευάζει; Socrates' own answer to this question would be 'This consensus is the product of justice, and justice is no skill.' He gives the first part of this answer in *Rep.* 351d: 'Injustice produces strife [στάσεις; cf. 126c2 στασιάζειν] and hatred [μίση; cf. 126c2 μισεῖν] and battles of one with another. Justice produces consensus and friendship [φιλίαν; cf. 126c1 φιλία].' He argues for the second part in *Rep.* 333e–334a and *Hp. mi.* 375d–376c: a skill used in producing something can also be used in producing that thing's opposite (e.g. if you know how to spell a word, then you also know how to misspell it); so if justice were a skill, then those who are just would also make the most consummate criminals. With Alcibiades' failure to challenge the question's presupposition that consensus is produced by a skill, contrast *Grg.* 462b, where Socrates is asked what skill rhetoric is, and replies that it is not a skill at all.

**e3** ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι . . . λέγειν 'I think I mean . . .' As at 117a1–2, Alcibiades is so afraid of hidden catches that he makes cagey statements on what should be the most straightforward topics. **e4–5** πατήρ τε ὕὸν φιλῶν ὁμονοεῖ καὶ μήτηρ, καὶ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ καὶ γυνὴ ἀνδρί: Alcibiades here borrows a rhetorical mode from the sophists. His carefully arranged little catalogue of various family relationships is, in its way, akin to e.g. Prodicus' interleaved catalogues of different sorts and sources of pleasure in DK 84 B 2.24 (= Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.24): 'You will always be considering what delightful (κεχαρισμένον) food or drink to find, or which sights or sounds to enjoy (τερφθείης), or what you might take pleasure in (ἡσθεῖης) smelling or touching, or who is the lover whose company would most gratify (εὐφρανθείης), and how you might sleep most sweetly (μαλακώτατα), and how you might achieve all these things with the least effort (ἀπονώτατα)', and akin also to the catalogues of living things, and of what benefits or harms them, with which Protagoras so pleased the crowd in *Prt.* 334a–c: 'I am aware of many things – both food-stuffs and drinks and drugs and thousands of other things – that are harmful to human beings, and of others that are beneficial. Others again have no effect on human beings, but they do have one on

horses. Yet others have an effect on cattle alone, and some on dogs ...’ Evidently such catalogues had for the audiences of epideictic (115a4n.) something of the charm that e.g. the catalogue of nymphs in Hom. *Il.* 18.39–50 had for audiences of epic. **ε6 ἄνδρα γυναικί:** Socrates forgets all save the last item on the list that Alcibiades has just given him; cf. 125c6–7n. **ε10 οὐδέ γε:** cf. 109c6n. **γυναικεῖον . . . μάθημα:** ‘When it comes to weaving,’ Socrates maintains in Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.11, ‘women are in charge of men, since women know how to weave, whereas men don’t.’ So definitely was weaving women’s work that when Socrates asked Lysis whether his mother discouraged him from touching her weaving equipment, ‘he laughed, and said “By Zeus, Socrates, she doesn’t just discourage me; I’d actually get spanked if ever I touched it”’ (*Lys.* 208d–e).

**127a4 φαίης ἄν:** Alcibiades would, indeed does, say that warfare is men’s work. Perhaps Socrates would not. At any rate, this phrase (like 127a7 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον) reserves for Socrates the right to propose, along the lines of *Rep.* 451c–452a and *Laws* 804d–805b, that suitable women should be trained for, and used in, the traditionally male task of warfare. Socrates entered no such reservation at 126e10, where he endorsed outright the idea that weaving is women’s work. But that too is in keeping with the *Republic*. For in spite of the egalitarian air of some of its proposals, the *Republic* is not concerned to equalise the two sexes’ access to every occupation; its concern rather is that, given the small number of people who are suited to guard the city, the city should not forgo the services of any of them, whatever their sex.

**α6 τὰ μὲν γυναικεῖα, τὰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖα μαθήματα:** although firm here on the difference between masculine and feminine, Alcibiades did not wait long before learning some feminine accomplishments: ‘As soon as you reached your majority [‘which will be in a very few days’: 105b1], and received your inheritance from your guardians, you sailed off to Abydos . . . in order to learn from the women of Abydos (μαθησόμενος παρὰ τῶν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ γυναικῶν) types of activity suited to the lawless depravity of your character, so that you could practise them for the rest of your life’ (Antiphon’s *Invective against Alcibiades*, in Ath. 12 525b). In Abydos, whose inhabitants worshipped Aphrodite the Whore (Ath. 13 572e–f), Alcibiades learnt a particularly lawless type of womanising: ‘Axiochos



and Alcibiades sailed off together for the Hellespont. In Abydos they – the two of them – married Medontias the Abydene, and set up house with her. The pair of them then had a daughter; but they said they could not tell which of the two was her father. When she was of marriageable age, they started sleeping with her too. If Alcibiades had the possession and use of her, he would say that she was Axiochos' daughter; and if Axiochos did, he would say that she was Alcibiades' (Lys. fr. 8, in Ath. 12 534f–535a; Lys. 14.41 and Antisth. fr. 141 *SSR* charge Alcibiades with further incestuous activities). Alcibiades' womanising got him a reputation for being womanish: the comic poets said that 'although no ἀνὴρ [i.e. manly adult], he is ἀνὴρ [i.e. husband] of all the women' (Pherecrates fr. 164 *PCG*), and adjured him to leave the women's ranks (Eup. fr. 171 *PCG* Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐκ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξίτω). (This idea that womanisers are womanish would have been more familiar to a generation that spoke of 'ladies' men' than it is perhaps to our own. It was however familiar enough in ancient Athens: thus Clytemnestra's illicit lover is addressed as a woman in Aesch. *Ag.* 1625, and described as one in Aesch. *Ch.* 304–5.) **a14 ἦ:** see 115c6n.

**b4 ταύτη:** see 115c6n. **b6 οἶμαι ἔγωγε:** i.e. 'I think that's how cities *are* well administered, when everybody sticks to their own job.' For οἶμαι ἔγωγε to accept a point that one has been invited to reject, cf. *Grg.* 497e–498a: "But you've never yet seen (οὔπω εἶδες) a foolish adult enjoy himself?" "οἶμαι ἔγωγε but what of it?" "Nothing; just answer." "I have seen (εἶδον) it happen." **b7–8 πῶς λέγεις; κτλ.:** i.e. 'How do you mean? Do you mean that cities are well administered when friendship is not present? But we said that it's when there's friendship in them, and not otherwise, that cities are well administered.' **b10 ἐκάτεροι** 'each of the two parties', i.e. men and women. Alcibiades returns to the example discussed in 126e6–127b3, even though at 127b4–8 Socrates has tried to generalise from that example to all the different elements in a city.

**c2–3 ἢ οἶόν θ' ὁμόνοιαν ἐγγίγνεσθαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οἱ μὲν ἴσασι, οἱ δ' οὐ;** 'Or can there be a consensus on those matters on which one party has knowledge, and the other does not?' Socrates gives Alcibiades an opportunity to retract his claim at 126e6–127a11 that there

can, for example, be no consensus on weaving between women (who know how to weave) and men (who do not). Alcibiades should take the opportunity. He should distinguish between two sorts of question about weaving. The first would be technical questions about which a weaver has an expert knowledge: which materials and tools are to be used, and how, in making the different kinds of textile? If a woman is an expert weaver, and a man is not, then one should not expect him to have the same opinion as her on questions of this first sort; indeed, if he has any sense, then he will not have any opinion at all about such questions (117b5–13). The second sort of question would be more broadly political than narrowly technical: who is to be in charge of weaving? This second sort of question can well be the subject of a consensus between knowledgeable women and ignorant men; indeed, it will be the subject of such a consensus if things go well, and the ignorant realise to whom they should defer (117c2–118a6). Such a consensus on where authority lies would be a good small-scale model of *ὁμόνοια* in the specialised sense that Greek political theorists were at such pains to explore (126c4n.). **c5–6** **δίκαια δὲ πράττουσιν ἢ ἄδικα, ὅταν τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι πράττωσιν;** the definition of justice given in the *Republic* can be summarised with the tag ‘doing one’s own job’ / ‘minding one’s own business’ (τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν *Rep.* 433b). But Alcibiades can know the answer to Socrates’ question without knowing the *Republic*. For it was a popular cliché that doing one’s own job is a Good Thing (*Xen. Mem.* 2.9.1, *Lys.* 26.3), and that it can be equated with justice (*Rep.* 433a–b) or – such are the vagaries of popular cliché – with moderation (σωφροσύνη, *Chrm.* 161b). Other variants on the cliché are *Tim.* 72a: ‘it is a wise old saying that only the moderate person minds and knows both his own business and himself (πράττειν καὶ γινῶναι τὰ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτόν)’; and *Lys.* 18.17: ‘If the majority of you gained from some retaining their possessions (ἔχειν τὰ αὐτῶν) when the property of others had been taken unlawfully into public ownership, then you would be right to ignore what we are saying. As things stand however, you would all agree that *ὁμόνοια* is the greatest good that a city can have, that *στάσις* is the cause of all evils, and that the worst disputes arise when some hanker after the possessions of other people (τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμῶσι), while others are deprived of what is theirs.’ **c10** **ἀνάγκη αὖ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι:** as at 131c11, Alcibiades’

combination of a vehement ‘it must’ with a tentative ‘it seems’ is perhaps a mark of evasiveness (106a5–7n.); at any rate, it differs from the apparently similar combination in *Smph.* 200b ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ θαυμαστῶς δοκεῖ . . . ὥς ἀνάγκη εἶναι, a response to someone who has grudgingly described as ‘likely’ something that is bound to be so.

**d6–7** ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς οἶδ’ ὅτι λέγω: at 116e3–4, Alcibiades had made the same confession in almost the same words. It had taken a stretch of dialectic lasting since 106c3 to elicit the earlier confession; since the dialectic made its fresh start at 124b7, it has taken only a third of that time to elicit the new confession. **d7–8** κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάλαι λεληθῆναι ἐμαυτὸν αἰσχιστα ἔχων: contrast 104a1–c4, on Alcibiades’ pride in his own desirable attributes, not least the beauty of his body. Contrast also 116e4 ἔοικα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι, the words with which Alcibiades amplified his earlier confession. Then, he commented on no more than his current state, and described it as no worse than ‘outlandish’. Now, he says that his condition all along has been ignorance of how ‘thoroughly ugly’ he is.

**e1 πεντηκονταετής:** in saying that fifty is too late an age at which to start caring for oneself, Socrates is relying on the traditional view that fifty is the age at which a man enters, or should enter, his intellectual prime (Arist. *Pol.* 1335b32–5 reports that this was the traditional view, and endorses it; so does Plato, who in *Rep.* 540a, *Laws* 755a, 765d, 802b, 829c, 946a, 951c, 953c makes fifty the minimum age for various intellectually challenging tasks; cf. Aeschin. 1.23, 3.4, on a procedure whereby those over fifty were invited to address the Assembly before their juniors). Socrates and Pericles, the two rivals for the custody of Alcibiades, are, by equally large margins in either case, on either side of fifty. At the date of this conversation (around 433; see 123d6–7n.), Socrates would have been in his thirties (according to *Ap.* 17d, he was 70 at the time of his trial in 399), and Pericles would have been in his sixties (118c5–6n.). From the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines, there survive some isolated words, mentioning ‘someone who, with as little effort as anyone (ῥᾱϊστα ἀνθρώπων), has reached the age of fifty’ (fr. 44 *SSR*). Perhaps this is no coincidence (see 123d8–e2n. for a plainly uncoincidental resemblance between

Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and our own); but no more than that can be said. **e2** ἦν ἔχεις ἡλικίαν: Alcibiades is not quite twenty (123d6–7).

**e4–5** ἂν τοῦτο ποιῇς, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, εἴ τι δεῖ . . . : with three protases for one conditional, Socrates' prediction that he and Alcibiades will do well is pretty thoroughly hedged. Contrast Socrates' prediction about the brilliant young Theaetetus: 'he's absolutely bound (πᾶσα ἀνάγκη) to attain distinction, if he reaches maturity' (*Tht.* 142d).

**e7** ἐνεκά γε τοῦ ἐμὲ ἀποκρίνεσθαι 'at least to the extent that it depends on my answering the questions'; γε, because Alcibiades is in no position to vouch for the satisfaction of the other two conditions that Socrates has given. Alcibiades' readiness to answer questions now is an improvement over his attitude at 114e1.

### 127e8–129b4: Caring for oneself

*So how is Alcibiades to care for himself? It soon becomes clear that we need different skills to care for different things, and in particular that we will need a special skill to care for ourselves, different from any skill that we might use in caring for our belongings. We cannot identify this special skill, unless we first know what that skill is to care for. In other words, we must obey the Delphic inscription, and come to know ourselves.*

**127e8** τί ἐστίν is the phrase that Socrates standardly uses in asking for a definition (e.g. *Hp. ma.* 286d, *La.* 190d–e, *Euthphr.* 5d). A Socratic definition is not just an explanation of an expression by a synonymous expression, apt for inclusion in a glossary or lexicon (cf. *Tht.* 145e: even though σοφία and ἐπιστήμη are identical, saying 'σοφία' does not answer the Socratic question 'What is ἐπιστήμη?'). Rather, the Socratic definition of caring for oneself would be a formula spelling out the feature that every example of caring for oneself has in common, and that makes each of them be an example of caring for oneself. Equipped with such a definition, he suggests in e.g. *Meno* 71b, *Euthphr.* 6e, we would be in the best possible position to answer other questions about caring for oneself, such as (to use the example in 128a2), when does one do it? We might compare the way that diagnosis and prevention of scurvy were difficult when nobody really knew what it was, and became easy once people appreciated that scurvy is a disease whose symptoms are caused by vitamin C

deficiency. For more on the powers of definition, see 129b1–3nn. **e8 μὴ . . . 128a1 οἰόμενοι δέ:** this parenthetical clause gives Socrates' reason for asking what it is to care for oneself. Spelled out in full, the construction would be 'I ask this question in order that we should not . . .' or 'I ask this question because I fear lest . . .' **πολλάκις** 'as may well happen'. See LSJ s.v. *πολλάκις* III.

**128a2–3 ἄρ' ὅταν τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπιμελῇται, τότε καὶ αὐτοῦ;** in *Ap.* 36c–d (cf. 132c1–5n), Socrates says that he has done the Athenians 'the greatest of all good turns . . . by trying to persuade each one of you not to take care (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) of anything that belongs to him (τῶν αὐτοῦ) before taking care of himself (ἑαυτοῦ), in order to ensure that he becomes as good and as wise as he can; and not to take care of anything that belongs to the city before taking care of the city itself; and likewise to care for other things along the same principles'. **a4 ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ:** with Alcibiades' failure to grasp the distinction between caring for himself and caring for what belongs to him, contrast the grasp expected from the readers of *Isoc.* 15.290, on how a young man who means to start out well in life must 'care for himself before his belongings (αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν)' and must not 'feel pleasure or pride at other goods so much as at those produced in the soul by education'. **a8 καλεῖς δέ τι χειρός; οἶον . . .** 'Does the phrase "*belongs to a hand*" mean anything to you? [lit. Do you call anything "belonging to a hand"?] For example, . . .' Alcibiades did not understand what Socrates meant by the construction with the genitive in 128a6 ἃ ἔστι τῶν ποδῶν ('things that *belong to* the feet'). Socrates therefore attempts to explain the construction, and so first checks that Alcibiades understands the terms in which he will give his explanation. Cf. 128b5 below; *Meno* 75e–76a, where in a series of questions with καλεῖς τι and οἶον (τελευτήν καλεῖς τι; τοιόνδε λέγω οἶον κτλ.) Socrates checks that Meno understands the words that Socrates will use in defining a shape as 'a boundary of a solid (στερεοῦ πέρας)'; and *Phd.* 103c–d (θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; κτλ.), where, before making a point for which the difference is crucial, Socrates checks that Cebes understands by the words for 'hot' and 'cold' something different from fire and snow. With this use of καλεῖν τι, to check that someone understands an expression or construction, contrast the use of φάναι τι

εἶναι, to check that someone agrees on a point of ontology, in such passages as *Prt.* 330d ὁσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι; ... οὐκοῦν φατε καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμα τι εἶναι; ('Do you say that holiness exists? ... So you say that this too is a thing?'), and *Phd.* 65d φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; ('Do we say that there is something that is righteous itself? Or nothing?'). **a13 καὶ ἱμάτια ... b1 ναί:** the mention of weaving at 128c15 ὑφαντικῇ confirms that this passage, with its mention of clothing and blankets, does indeed belong here, in spite of its absence from the direct tradition.

**b5 καλεῖς τι:** see 128a8n.

**d3–4** ἀλλῇ μὲν ἄρα τέχνῃ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου ἐπιμελούμεθα, ἀλλῇ δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ 'So there is one skill with which we care for a thing itself, and another with which we care for what belongs to the thing.' Socrates formulates the general principle implicit in the previous examples, so that he can apply it in his next speech to the case of Alcibiades in particular. Arguments of this pattern were called ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι ('inductive arguments') and were distinct favourites of Socrates' (Arist. *Met.* 1078b27–9). There were rough approximations to this pattern in 107a1–c3 and 114c1–d3, and an exact but trivial instance of it in 112e10–113a10. Here and at 128e4–129a1, Alcibiades meets equally exact but slightly more substantial instances of the pattern. The next time he meets an ἐπακτικὸς λόγος (129c5–d3), it will be more substantial still.

**e10–11** τίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπον, ἂρ' ἂν ποτε γνοῖμεν ἀγνοοῦντες τί ποτ' ἐσμέν αὐτοῖς; 'Could we ever know what art improves a human being, if we are ignorant of what we ourselves are?' Socrates applies to us human beings the principle just illustrated by sandals and rings. **e10 ἄνθρωπον** is a conjectural replacement for the αὐτόν of all the manuscripts. ἄνθρωπος, like other 'nomina sacra' (words that occur frequently in the theological texts that were so large a part of the output of medieval scribes), was often abbreviated; and its abbreviation was easily misread as some shorter word beginning with alpha. Cf. *Hp. ma.* 289a, where the manuscripts all report as ἄλλωι what must originally have been ἀνθρώπων or the like. The corruption to αὐτόν would have been

assisted by the repetitions ὑπόδημα . . . ὑπόδημα and δακτυλίους . . . δακτύλιον in the premisses of the induction (128d3–4n.).

**129a2 τυγχάνει** ‘is’. It would be more usual to include also some form of the participle ὄν, and if Plato had written ράϊδιον ὄν τυγχάνει, the ὄν could easily have been omitted by homoeoteleuton. That is however no good reason to insert an ὄν here. For there are Platonic parallels for the omission of the participle; and in some of them (*Laws* 918c, *Tim.* 61c, *Hp. ma.* 300a) the omission cannot be explained by homoeoteleuton. **a4 παντός**: this genitive, like the παντός in 129a5, goes with the infinitive τὸ γινῶναι ἑαυτόν of 129a2, to form a phrase meaning ‘everyone knows himself’; see 114c1n. on τοῦ αὐτοῦ κτλ. **a5 ἐμοὶ μέν**: see 112d11n. **a5–6 πολλάκις μὲν ἔδοξε παντός εἶναι, πολλάκις δὲ παγγάλεπον** ‘it has often seemed that everybody does it, and often that it is really difficult’. Alcibiades’ own inability to reach a fixed view on this question exemplifies a larger pattern in Greek thought. Here are some of the conflicting views that were expressed: ‘All human beings are able to know themselves and be moderate’ (Heraclitus DK 22 B 116); ‘When Cheilon was asked what is the most difficult thing of all, he said “To know oneself”’ (Stobaeus 3.21.13); ‘“Know yourself” does not sound anything much; but in reality, only Zeus among the gods knows how to do it’ (Ion fr. 55 *TGF*). Croesus at first thought self-knowledge easy (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.2.21), and only later realised his mistake (124b1n.). **a5 πολλάκις . . . 6 πολλάκις**: such anaphora is an ornament ‘commonest in those writers who aim at vividness, force, and pathos: rarest in those who rigidly suppress the emotions’ (J. D. Denniston, *Greek prose style* (Oxford 1952) 84).

**b1 τίν’ ἂν τρόπον εὔρεθείη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό**; ‘How might the itself itself be discovered?’ The itself itself, αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό, is the feature common to all cases in which we can rightly apply some part of the word αὐτός, just as the big itself, αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα, is the feature common to all cases in which we can rightly apply some part of the word μέγας. Such common features are sometimes called Forms (εἶδη, ἰδέαι), and this ‘the so-and-so itself’ construction (αὐτὸ τό plus the neuter singular of the word for so-and-so), is among Plato’s favourite ways of referring to a Form (e.g. *Phd.* 74c αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, *Prm.* 131d αὐτὸ τὸ

σμικρόν, *Smp.* 211d αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν). The so-and-so itself would be ‘discovered’ if we found the right definition of so-and-so (127e8n.). Thus ‘to discover the itself itself’ would be to find a formula which spells out the common feature of those cases in which the expression αὐτός can rightly be applied. This formula would explain the common feature that entitles us to speak of e.g. the *Oresteia* itself (as opposed to e.g. its various productions and performances), of Athens herself (as opposed to e.g. her various territories and inhabitants), and in particular of Alcibiades himself (as opposed to e.g. his various possessions and organs). There is no reason to think that this formula would be limited to those cases in which αὐτός is applied to a person or a mind. The Greek usage of αὐτός has no counterpart to the unfortunate English usage whereby the pronoun ‘self’ can also be used as a noun meaning ‘a permanent subject of successive and varying states of consciousness’ (*Oxford English dictionary*, second edition, s.v. ‘self’ c.1.3). Someone whom you love can indeed be described as your ‘other self’ (ἕτερος or ἄλλος αὐτός; see e.g. Arist. *EN* 1161b28–9, 1166a32). The point of such a description however is not that your loved ones are subjects, permanent or temporary, of states of consciousness; after all, even your enemies are that. The point is rather that you have for your loved ones the same sort of concern that you have for yourself. οὕτω: lit. ‘in this way’; i.e. by discovering the itself itself, i.e. by accurately defining what is meant by αὐτός. **b2** ἂν τάχ’ εὐροιμην τί ποτ’ ἐσμέν αὐτοί ‘we could well find out what we ourselves are’. Once we have defined what is meant by αὐτός, we can hope to be able to single out a thing itself from anything else with which it might be confused. Thus if something is alleged to be Alcibiades himself, we can check the allegation by treating what we have defined as some sort of model or blueprint (χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι: *Euthphr.* 6e), and seeing whether the thing alleged to be Alcibiades himself matches up to this model. The hope is that our definition will enable us to resolve any controversy about what we ourselves are as thoroughly as comparing something with a yardstick will resolve controversy about its length (cf. 126c8n.). **b2–3** τούτου δ’ ἔτι ὄντες ἐν ἀγνοίαι ἀδύνατοί που ‘but while we remain in ignorance of this [i.e. of the itself itself], we will not, I imagine, have that ability [i.e. the ability to find out what we ourselves are]’. Even without the moderating που (‘I imagine’), this



would still not be the fatuous conviction that we can have no idea at all of what we ourselves are unless we first find a definition of αὐτός; for we can have, for the purposes in hand, a good enough idea of what we ourselves are, even if that idea does not exactly amount to knowledge (cf. 130c8–d6).

### 129b5–130e6: People are their souls

*Craftsmen differ from the tools that they use. In general, the user of something differs from the thing that is used. In particular, this principle applies when people use their bodies: the person who is the user of the body is something distinct from it. This user of the body can only be the soul. It is therefore their souls that Socrates and Alcibiades must take care of if they are to take care of themselves.*

**129b5** ἔχε οὖν: as in 109b3, Socrates bids Alcibiades ‘Stop’, to consider the implications of his most recent words. The remark ὀρθῶς λέγεις has suddenly given Socrates an idea: if they decide what exactly it is that is using words to conduct this conversation, that will tell them what they themselves are.

**c7** τομεῖ καὶ σμίλῃ: the difference between these two tools for cutting shoelather has long been forgotten. Olympiodorus guessed that the σμίλη had a straight edge while the τομεύς had a curved one; he based his guess on the way that the word τομεύς is used as a technical term in geometry for a sector of a circle.

**d1–2** ὁ χρώμενος καὶ ὧι χρῆται ἀεὶ δοκεῖ ἕτερον εἶναι: inviting Alcibiades to generalise from the previous examples in the manner of an ἐπακτικὸς λόγος or induction (128d3–4n.). This induction carries more weight than those that Socrates has presented earlier; for the ultimate purpose of the generalisation here is to reach the conclusion that human beings differ from their bodies, and this conclusion, unlike its counterparts in the earlier inductions, is by no means as obvious as the examples from which the generalisation is inferred. Alcibiades therefore continues to make progress. **d4–5**

**τέμνειν ὀργάνοις μόνον ἢ καὶ χερσίν:** the idea that when a cobbler cuts his leather, he uses his hands, and other bodily parts, no less

than his tools, soon leads to the idea that we may talk of bodily parts themselves as tools or ὄργανα (whence the English ‘organs’). Socrates eschews such talk here, presumably to avoid overburdening Alcibiades at this early stage of his education. When talking to Theaetetus, another beginner but rather more promising intellectually than Alcibiades (127e4–5n.), Socrates does engage in such talk, but with apologies (*Th.* 184d: ‘these – as it were – tools (τούτων οἶον ὀργάνων)’). And when talking to intimates, Socrates engages in such talk without any apologies at all (e.g. *Rep.* 508b).

**e6 ἦν** is what is sometimes called a ‘philosophic imperfect’ (*MT* §40). The past tense relates to the past discussion in which they agreed that user differs from used (129c5–d3); there is no suggestion that the difference itself is a thing of the past. Cf. 114c3n. for a similar use of the imperfect, relating to past experience of a permanent fact. **e8 ἕτερον ἄρα ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ**: this inference that, since a human being uses his own body as a tool, he must be distinct from his body, contradicts *Sph.* 267a, where the Eleatic Stranger describes the mimic of another person’s mannerisms both as ‘displaying himself as a tool (αὐτοῦ παρέχοντος ἑαυτὸν ὄργανον)’ and as ‘using his own body (τῷ ἑαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι)’. The contradiction is however only verbal. For the Eleatic Stranger is trying to distinguish the mimic, who uses only his own body, from someone who constructs representations in, for example, paint or clay; and at the cost of some tiresome complexities, the Eleatic Stranger could have drawn just the same distinction without contradicting our passage.

**130a3 ἄρχουσα**: Socrates often talks of the soul as ‘controlling’ the body (e.g. *Phd.* 94b, *Phlb.* 35d, *Rep.* 353d, *Clit.* 407e). He has in mind, above all, the fact that we can use our bodies to execute our rational decisions about what goods to obtain and what evils to avoid. Unfortunately, we sometimes act, not to execute rational decisions, but out of pure rage or greed. *Rep.* 436b–441c says that in such actions the body is still controlled by the soul, only by non-rational parts of it. *Rep.* 611b–612a adds however that the non-rational parts of the soul are temporary accretions, due to embodiment. **a9 ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ συναμφότερον** ‘Soul or body or the pair in combi-

nation.’ συναμφότερον is used in this way for the composite of body and soul also in *Smp.* 209b and *Tim.* 87e. All manuscripts add after συναμφότερον the explanation τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ‘This is the whole.’ The explanation is somewhat inept. It invites the question ‘the whole what?’; and the only answer to that question would be something like ‘the whole human being’. Thus, if this explanation belongs in the text, Socrates is here arguing for the identity of something (a human being) with what he acknowledges to be only a part of that thing (the human being’s soul). Some philosophers did come near to endorsing such arguments (e.g. Arist. *Ptp.* fr. 6 Ross, quoted in 133c1–2n.). Elsewhere however, Socrates is careful, even at the cost of some linguistic oddity, to avoid suggesting that our souls are parts of us (cf. 130d7n.). He is unlikely therefore to be making such a suggestion here. The phrase τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο should therefore be deleted, as an intrusive gloss. **αιι ἀλλὰ μὴν:** see 106ε4n.

**β2 σῶμα αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄρχει:** Socrates senses an absurdity in talk of self-control; elsewhere he suggests that, to avoid the ludicrous suggestion of one and the same thing being both controller and controlled, we should take talk of controlling oneself to mean that one contains two elements, the stronger controlling the weaker (*Rep.* 430e–431b; cf. 131b4n. on σωφροσύνη κτλ.). On the same principle, a body might after all be described as controlling itself if e.g. the brain controls the musculature. **β10 ἴσως δῆτα** ‘Certainly, perhaps.’ This bizarre turn of phrase seems to indicate evasiveness (106a5–7n.), or maybe indecision. Speakers use δῆτα to give emphasis to their answers. To stress an answer in the negative, they say οὐ δῆτα, ‘Certainly not.’ To stress a positive answer, they use δῆτα with some echo of the words to which they are giving their emphatic assent. Where those words themselves include ἴσως, but not otherwise, it is entirely idiomatic and logical to reply with ἴσως δῆτα, as in *Laws* 658d, where a speaker emphatically agrees to ‘Tragedy might (ἴσως) get the votes of ...’, with ἴσως δῆτα (‘Indeed it might’). There is no third occurrence of ἴσως δῆτα in extant literature. **β11–12 μὴ γὰρ συνάρχοντος τοῦ ἐτέρου οὐδεμία που μηχανὴ τὸ συναμφότερον ἄρχειν** ‘For presumably there is no way that the pair in combination can rule, if one of the pair is not ruling in combination.’ There can be pitfalls in reasoning that since things taken individually

lack a certain property, they therefore lack that property when taken together. *Hp. ma.* 301d–302b gives a vivid example: Socrates is just one man, not two; and so is Hippias; but it would be silly to reason that Socrates and Hippias are therefore just one man, not two. The συν- in συνάρχοντος here helps guard against such pitfalls. In one respect at least, it plainly succeeds. For once we agree with Socrates that the body is not ruled by the body in combination with something, we cannot deny him the inference that the body is not ruled by the body in combination with the soul. If there is a fault in Socrates' argument, the fault will therefore lie in his transition from saying that the body does not rule, to saying that the body does not rule in combination. The transition would indeed be faulty, if ἄρχει at 130b2 meant 'is the sole ruler'. But the transition is sound enough if ἄρχει there means 'does some ruling'.

**c3** τὸν ἄνθρωπον ... ψυχὴν ... **5–6** ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος: the nouns with a definite article attached are thereby marked out as subjects; those without a definite article are predicates. By first describing the human being as a soul, and then describing the soul as a human being, Socrates emphasises that what he has argued for is the strict *identity* of human beings with their souls. Socrates would apparently be prepared to accept such identities for other animals too: *Hp. mi.* 375a, perhaps in order to remind us that horses are animate beings, uses the phrase ψυχὴ ἵππου as a circumlocution for 'a horse', and shows a willingness to use corresponding locutions about 'a dog and all other animals'. **c4** κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν: this emphatic form of assent was a great favourite of Plato's; in particular, he has his speakers use it when, like Alcibiades now, they are engaged in a more or less advanced philosophical argument (its 30 other uses are confined to *Rep.*, *Prm.*, *Tht.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*). It is not found at all in Xenophon's Socratic works. It was felt quaint, and was guyed by Aristophanes, who has a character called Just Man use it three times in six lines (*Pl.* 833–8). See 104d10n. for other ways of saying 'yes'. **c7** ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν: Alcibiades reverts to his characteristic (104d2–3n.) desire to save himself intellectual effort.

**d1** ἀκριβῶς μὲν: this μὲν clause is contrasted, after the break for clarification at 132d3–5, with νῦν δὲ ... ἐξαρκέσει at 132d5–6. (It

therefore need not be taken, with *GP* 377–8, as ‘contrasted with what precedes, not with what follows’.) **d1–2** ὁ νυνδὴ παρήλθομεν ‘what we recently [i.e. at 129b5–130c7] sidestepped’. **d2** διὰ τὸ πολλῆς εἶναι σκέψεως ‘because it would have taken a great deal of investigation’. **d4** ἄρτι: at 129b1–3. **d5–6** νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸν ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα ὅτι ἐστὶ ‘However, instead of the itself itself, we have in fact been investigating what each himself is.’ Even though the text here is uncertain, it is clear that αὐτοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ (or whatever is the correct text of the phrase that goes with ἀντὶ) must refer to the same thing as αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό in 129b1 and 130d5. Hence, if the interpretation in 129b1n. is correct, Socrates is here speaking of his failure to investigate the general criterion for picking out a thing itself from any of the various parts, appurtenances, or what have you, with which it might be confused. It is clear also that αὐτὸν ἕκαστον . . . ὅτι ἐστὶ (or whatever is the correct text of the phrase that goes with ἐσκέμμεθα) must refer to the question that has been answered by identifying human beings with their souls (130c3–6). To make these identifications is in effect to say that Socrates himself is Socrates’ soul, that Alcibiades himself is Alcibiades’ soul, and so on. Making these identifications can therefore be described as answering the question of ‘what each himself is’. However, even if these identifications are correct (as Socrates will provisionally take them to be), their correctness will not be known for sure until they have been tested against the general criterion for all such identifications, the criterion that we will have only when we have ‘discovered the itself itself’ (cf. 129b1–3nn.). With the contrast between ‘the itself itself’ and ‘each himself’ cf. the contrasts in *Pm.* 134a between ‘real science itself (αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη)’ and ‘each of the real sciences (ἐκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ ἔστιν)’, and between ‘science that we have (ἡ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη)’ and ‘each science that we have (καὶ αὖ ἐκάστη ἢ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη)’. **d6** καὶ ἴσως ἐξαρκέσει ‘Perhaps that will be good enough’; i.e. perhaps the recent identification of people with their souls is all we need to start caring for ourselves, even though we have not looked for, much less found, a definition against which to test the identification. The Platonic Socrates is not usually so happy to forgo the search for a definition, and in this respect at least he seems to be modelled faithfully on the historic Socrates himself (*Xen. Mem.* 1.1.16, *Arist. Met.*

987b3, 1078b18–31, 1086b3). Perhaps we are to imagine that until Alcibiades is fully hooked on philosophy, Socrates will not risk driving him away by subjecting him to all the rigours of looking for a definition. Similarly, Socrates does not ask Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) to define anything during their first encounter (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2), but only once Euthydemus has become his associate (Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.1–2).

**d6–7** οὐ γάρ που κυριώτερόν γε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ‘For there is, I suppose, nothing of ourselves that we would say is more authoritative than the soul.’ Here Socrates not only indicates (as at *Rep.* 382a–b) that the soul is that of us which is κυριώτατον, but also hints that a thing itself is rightly defined as that of the thing which is κυριώτατον. One consequence of such a hint is that Alcibiades is unwittingly applying the right criterion when he decides that, since his soul is ruler among the things with which he might be identified, his soul is what he himself is. Other consequences are that, by the same criterion, the eye itself can be identified with the pupil (133a7n. on τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ), and that Alcibiades’ soul itself can be identified with his intellect (133c1–2n.).

**d6 γάρ που:** see 107a10n. **d7 ἡμῶν αὐτῶν:** this slightly odd construction with the genitive, ‘of ourselves’, is (like 133a7 αὐτοῦ ‘of it [the eye]’, 133c1 τῆς ψυχῆς ‘of the soul’, 133c4 αὐτῆς ‘of it [the soul]’) studiously general. A thing is ‘of ourselves’ if it is related to us in any way at all that may make it seem something with which we are to be identified. Some of our parts may no doubt be related to us in such a way. But the phrase ‘of ourselves’ does not mean ‘part of ourselves’: e.g. Alcibiades’ body and soul ‘in combination’ (130a9), although no doubt something ‘of’ him, can form no part of him, but if anything form something of which he himself is a part. The odd construction with the genitive is presumably chosen precisely to avoid giving the impression that Socrates and Alcibiades are engaged in the absurd enterprise of singling out, from among Alcibiades’ various parts, one with which to identify him. Cf. the genitive in *Phd.* 79b ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ (‘there is that of ourselves which is soul, and that which is body’), where the point of the construction is presumably again to allow for the possibility that we simply are our souls, and that our bodies are not even parts of us.

**d9–11** ‘So is it all right to think of it like this? That it is you and I who are con-

versing with one another, that we are using words, and that we are using them with the soul and addressing them to the soul?’ This austere description of what is going on fits well with the facts that there is no audience to the conversation (118b6), that the lovers of Alcibiades’ body have all dropped away (103a2, 131c6–d5), and that the conversation (unlike Plato’s usual practice) contains no hints about its physical setting. **δ9–10 ἐμὲ καὶ σέ προσομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις**: i.e.

it is Socrates and Alcibiades themselves (as opposed to e.g. the words that they use 129b14–c5, their bodies 129e4–8, or their bodies and souls in combination 130b8–13) that are conversing; and they are conversing with one another (as opposed again to conversing with e.g. one another’s words, or body, or body and soul in combination).

**δ10 τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους**: i.e. words are merely the instruments used by Socrates and Alcibiades, and so are distinct from their users (129c5–d11).

**τῇ ψυχῇ**: given that Socrates is his soul (130c3), this dative had better indicate that the soul is itself the agent of the action here described, rather than a mere instrument employed by, and thus distinct from, the agent. This dative would thus be akin to the datives in *Tht.* 184d, on how vision, hearing and our other perceptual capacities ‘converge on some single form, on a ψυχὴν or whatever it should be called, *by* which (τῇ), *through* these – as it were – tools (διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων), we perceive what is perceptible’; in *Grig.* 523e, on how a judge in the afterlife operates, stripped of everything bodily, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα (cf. 132a6–b1); and in *Phd.* 66e, again of people reduced to nothing but their souls, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα. The dative τῇ ψυχῇ would therefore be quite distinct from the recent instrumental datives 129c2 λόγῳ, 129c7–8 τομεῖ καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις, and 129d5 χερσίν. It is also quite distinct from the dative ἀλλήλοις governed by προσομιλεῖν and the dative τοῖς λόγοις governed by χρωμένους. If this variety of constructions with the dative is thought intolerably harsh, then it can be reduced, but not removed entirely, by changing the τῇ ψυχῇ of the manuscripts to an accusative τὴν ψυχὴν, as a subject of the infinitive προσομιλεῖν, in the same construction as ἐμὲ καὶ σέ.

**δ10–11 πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν**: i.e. each soul addresses the other soul, as opposed to addressing his words, his body, his body and soul in combination, or (130e3–4) any part of his body.

**εἰ** πάνυ μὲν οὖν: see 104d10n. **εἰ** ἔμπροσθεν: at 129b10–14.  
**εἰ** Σωκράτης . . . διαλέγεται λόγῳ χρώμενος: cf. *Phd.* 115c–d ‘I am failing, gentlemen, to persuade Crito that I am Socrates here, the one who is now conversing (διαλεγόμενος), and controlling each thing that is said. Instead, he thinks that I am the corpse which he will soon see, and he asks how he is to bury me!’ **εἰ** τοῦτο: see 115b6n. on the gender of this pronoun.

### 130e7–132c9: Us, our belongings, and their belongings

*Now that human beings have been identified with souls, Alcibiades can start to estimate his body and his property at something like their proper value. Alcibiades’ body is not him, but just what belongs to him; and his property is at one further remove, being what belongs to what belongs to him. Therefore Alcibiades should attach no great importance to his body and those who care for the body, whether they be doctors and trainers, or for that matter the lovers who, by departing along with his youthful good looks, prove that what they really loved was his body, not him. Still less, should Alcibiades be concerned with property. All this explains what Alcibiades should not do. It leaves unexplained how he is to know and care for himself, that is, his soul.*

The ranking here of soul, body and property is standard Platonic doctrine; e.g. *Laws* 697b and *Phdr.* 241c assign first place to goods that concern the soul, second to those that concern the body, and only third to those that concern wealth and possessions. A distinction between these three objects of concern, without any particular ranking of them, is common currency among the followers of Socrates; thus Xen. *Oec.* 1.13 speaks of damaging body, soul and estate (οἶκον) by the purchase of a whore, and Critias fr. 6.17–18 *IEG* describes how moderate drinking brings benefit to body, wits (γνώμη) and property (κτήσσει). Traditional Greek wisdom already drew some such distinction between soul, body and external possessions, but held that each provides some species of good that is supreme in its own sphere: ‘Justice is the finest thing (κάλλιστον), health the most beneficial (λῶιστον), and most pleasant of all (πάντων ἡδιστον) is to get what one wants (οὗ τις ἔρᾱι τὸ τυχεῖν)’ (epigram inscribed on the



temple of Apollo at Delos, as γνῶθι σαυτὸν was inscribed on the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and quoted in e.g. Arist. *EE* 1214a5–6).

**131a2–3** ὅστις ἄρα τῶν τεχνιτῶν τοῦ σώματος γινώσκει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὐτὸν ἔγνωκεν ‘So any expert whose knowledge is of the body knows, not himself, but what belongs to him.’ See 119b1–2n. for the use of the genitive τοῦ σώματος to indicate the subject or source of the knowledge here described. The present γινώσκει indicates some permanent and fundamental fact about this knowledge, while the perfect ἔγνωκεν indicates the effect which that fact has had on the individual knower: because it is in the nature of such knowledge that it concerns only the body, the result is that he knows only what belongs to himself. For such a change of tense, to mark the contrast between a fundamental fact and a particular manifestation of it, cf. Isaeus 7.30, which describes the ways in which people recognise the importance of leaving an heir, and continues: καὶ οὐ μόνον ἰδίαι ταῦτα γινώσκουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ δημοσίαι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτω ταῦτ’ ἔγνωκε (‘Moreover, it is not only in private life that this is recognised; it has also been given public recognition by the civic authorities in the following way’). **a2** τεχνιτῶν is a conjectural insertion. All the manuscripts read τῶν τοῦ σώματος; the indirect tradition offers the variants τῶν τοῦ σώματος τι and τὰ τοῦ σώματος. All those three readings suffer from a serious difficulty. Whichever of them we were to adopt, it had better be a circumlocution for ‘the body’. For otherwise it will not be possible to derive the conclusion of 131a5–6 that the professional knowledge of doctors and trainers is not knowledge of themselves. But it is hard to treat any of these readings as a circumlocution for ‘the body’. Translators who make the attempt offer ‘the *parts* of the body’. The phrase τὰ τοῦ σώματος is however used elsewhere (128d1, 131b1) for what *belongs to* the body, such as clothing, in contrast to the body itself; and this is the application of a systematic contrast between things themselves and what belongs to them (128a2–14, 128c9–e2, 131b10–c4, 133d1–e8). An obvious answer to this difficulty is to have only the phrase τοῦ σώματος as the object of the verb γινώσκει. Something must then be done about the τῶν; Socrates’ next sentence, beginning οὐδεὶς ἄρα τῶν ἱατρῶν, suggests that it should be considered as the

trace of a noun phrase in the genitive plural; τῶν τεχνιτῶν has a suitable sense; and its τεχνιτῶν might easily have been lost by homoeoteleuton.

**a5** ἱατρῶν ... **6** παιδοτριβῶν: doctors and trainers are stock examples of experts; the expertise of both concerns the body; doctors tell us what restores the body to good health, trainers, what keeps it there; and because of their expertise, we must defer to their authority (*Cri.* 47b–c, *Grg.* 464a–465c, 504a, *Prt.* 313d). Even these experts, it now turns out, are less grand than they might seem. **a5** καθ' ὅσον 'in so far as' or 'to the extent that'; tanta-mount to ἥ (115c6n.).

**b4** εἰ ἄρα: ἄρα in a conditional protasis denotes that the hypothesis is one of which the possibility has only just been realized: "If, after all" (*GP* 37). σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν γινώσκειν: this account of moderation is presented in just this form by Critias in *Chrm.* 164d–e, and in a slightly different form by Timaeus in *Tim.* 72a (quoted in 127c5–6n.). On the assumption that one's intellectual limits are the most important thing to know about oneself, this account of moderation is equivalent to that adopted by Theaetetus in *Sph.* 230d, when he describes 'counting oneself as knowing just the things that one does in fact know, and not any more' as 'the best and most moderate of states'. An alternative and popular account (*Rep.* 430e; cf. *Grg.* 491d–e, *Laws* 626e) describes the moderate man, not as knowing, but as controlling, himself (κρείττω αὐτοῦ, ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα). This, as Socrates points out, is a paradoxical description, for how could a man be master of himself without also being his own slave, or stronger than himself without also being weaker? Nevertheless, Socrates endorses the idea behind this paradoxical description: the moderate man is one whose intellect has control over his appetite for pleasure (*Rep.* 430e–431a; cf. 122a4–7). It is not obvious how to reconcile these two accounts of moderation. **b7** βάνανσοι 'vulgar'; but no one English word does quite the same job of picking out manual labour and simultaneously conveying disdain for it. Such disdain was widespread, both in Greece and beyond (see *Hdt.* 2.167). Even in democratic Athens, before the mass audiences of comedy and oratory, a standard form of abuse (comparable to our abuse of politicians for being grocer's daughters, or ex-actors) is to claim that someone earns his living as a manual labourer: e.g. Hyperbolus is

abused for making lamps (Ar. *Clouds* 1065, *Peace* 690), and Cleophon is abused for making lyres (And. 1.146, Aeschin. 2.76). For philosophical discussion of the view that mechanical arts are vulgar (and in some cases endorsement or rationalisation of it), see *Rep.* 495d–e, 590c, *Grg.* 512b–c, Arist. *Pol.* 1328b39–1329a34, 1337b4–15, *EE* 1215a25–b1, Xen. *Oec.* 4.2–3. **b9** πάνυ μὲν οὖν: see 104d10n.

**c6** εἰ ἄρα: see 131b4n. **c10** ὅστις δέ σου τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρᾷ; ‘But he who loves your soul [sc. is the person who loves you]?’ This sentence might instead be punctuated as ὅστις δὲ σοῦ, τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρᾷ; and translated as ‘But he who [sc. loves] you, loves [sc. your] soul.’ It makes very little difference. **c11** ἀνάγκη φαίνεται ἐκ τοῦ λόγου: the combination of a vehement ‘it must’ with a tentative ‘it seems’ is perhaps evasive; cf. 127c10n. **c12–13** ὁ μὲν τοῦ σώματος σου ἔρῳν, ἐπειδὴ λήγει ἀνθοῦν, ἀπιὼν οἴχεται; Pausanias, in *Smp.* 183e, gives similar expression to the same thought: the lover of a body ‘is not permanent, since what he loves is not permanent. For the moment that there starts to fade the flower of the body, which is what he loved, off he flits (ἄμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι, οὐπὲρ ἦρα, οἴχεται ἀποπτάμενος).’ At 103b5, before he had won Alcibiades’ confidence, Socrates gave a different and more flattering explanation for why Alcibiades’ other lovers have left him: rather than abandoning him because he has lost his looks, they have been driven away by his haughtiness.

**d1** τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῳν: a somewhat odd locution, whose closest parallels, perhaps pointedly, do not assert that someone feels ἔρως for a soul. Thus Pausanias in *Smp.* 183e, speaks of ‘someone who loves the body, rather than the soul (ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῳν)’, and Socrates in Xen. *Smp.* 8.6 says ‘We’d better conceal your love (ἔρωτα), since it is not for my soul (οὐ ψυχῆς), but for my shapely physique.’ It is of course a familiar thought that someone might have for another a feeling more durable than ἔρως for his body, but this more durable feeling is itself rarely described simply and starkly as an ἔρως for his soul. Thus Pausanias in *Smp.* 183e contrasts the lover of the body with ‘the lover of good character (τοῦ ἡθοὺς χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστής)’; Lysias in *Phdr.* 232e–233a contrasts ἔρως for a body with a durable φίλια or friendship; Xen. *Mem.* 4.1.2

explains that ‘Socrates often said he loved (ἐρᾶν) someone; however, the object of his desire (ἐφιέμενος) was plainly not those with youthful bodies, but those whose souls were by nature well adapted to being virtuous’; and when in Xen. *Smp.* 8.6–18, Socrates comes closer to speaking of ἔρως for the soul, this is always with a mixture of other terms: typical is 14 ‘if people are fond of (στέρξωσι) both [soul and body], then the flower of youth soon passes its best, and as it ceases, affection (φιλίαν) too must wither away in tandem; whereas the soul becomes more loveable (ἀξιεραστοτέρα), so long as it is continuing to get wiser (ἵη ἐπὶ τὸ φρονιμώτερον)’. **d1–2** ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἦη ‘while the soul is continuing to improve’. With Socrates’ promise to stay so long as Alcibiades continues to improve, contrast the promise of Protagoras in *Prt.* 318a to a potential customer, Hippocrates: ‘If you associate with me, then ... you will continue to get better and improve (ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι).’ The improvement in Hippocrates will come from Protagoras, and in return for it, Hippocrates is expected to pay money. By contrast the only repayment that Alcibiades is expected to make for his continued improvement is that continued improvement itself. **d4** ὁ οὐκ ἀπιῶν is the person already identified (at 103a2–3) as not going to leave; ὁ μὴ ἀπιῶν would be whoever is not going to leave. **d6** εὖ γε ποιῶν ‘And it’s just as well you are [the one who is not going to leave].’ Other variants of the idiom have καλῶς instead of εὖ (e.g. *Smp.* 174e καλῶς γε ... ποιῶν σύ), or use ποιῶ as a main verb (e.g. *Phd.* 60c εὖ γ’ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με). The idiom must not be translated as ‘It’s good of you.’ It does not indicate any benevolence in the agent; it indicates rather that, by design or not, things have turned out conveniently for the speaker. Thus Lys. 28.8 ‘It’s just as well that Thrasylbulus died as he did (καλῶς ἐποίησεν οὕτως τελευτήσας τὸν βίον); he didn’t deserve to live ... but he didn’t deserve to be executed by you either’; Eur. *Medea* 467–74 ‘You’ve come to me, have you, although you are now so hostile? ... To do one’s dearest down, and then look them in the face, is utter impudence ... But it’s just as well you’ve come (εὖ δ’ ἐποίησας μόλων). It means I can unburden my soul by reviling you.’ **d7** προθυμοῦ τοίνυν ὅτι κάλλιστος εἶναι: ‘What is Socrates saying to Alcibiades? “Curl your hair and pluck your legs”? Heaven forbid. Instead, it’s “Give your will a make-over;

get rid of your worthless convictions (κόσμει σου τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἔξαιρε τὰ φαῦλα δόγματα)'' (Epictetus, *Enchiridion* 3.1.42).

**ει Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ Κλεινίου . . . 3–4 Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ Φαιναρέτης:** 'The implication is that Alcibiades has not benefited from his high birth, nor has Socrates' wisdom been harmed by his low birth' (Olympiodorus). The implication is reinforced by the etymologies of the names of Socrates' parents: humble though they might have been, one was 'The sensible little man', and the other was 'She who brings virtue to light'. When Socrates speaks of both himself and his addressee in the third person, using their names and their fathers', he gives his utterance something of the status of a public and official record (cf. 113b8–9n.). The reference to Socrates as the son of his mother Phaenarete is sufficiently bizarre to have as an exact parallel only what seems to be a direct imitation (Ael. *VH* 2.1; cf. 105d1–2n.). **ε2–3 μόνος, καὶ οὗτος ἀγαπητός** alludes to Hom. *Od.* 2.365 μῶνός ἐὼν ἀγαπητός, said of Telemachus, the only child of Odysseus and Penelope. There is some hint of the reversal of rôles that will become explicit in 135d8–e3, when Socrates will come to be the object of Alcibiades' love, and come to receive from his intellectual offspring something like parental care. Cf. 106b4n., for an earlier anticipation of this reversal. **ε6 ἔφησθα μικρὸν φθῆναί με προσελθόντα σοι:** at 104d1–6. **ε7 προσελθεῖν** is an infinitive governed by ἔφησθα in 131e6. It is common, but not mandatory, for the infinitive construction after φημί to be used not only for the main verb of the remark reported (φθῆναι 131e6), but also for verbs within its subordinate clauses (*MT* §755). **ε7–8 βουλόμενος πυθέσθαι δι' ὅτι μόνος οὐκ ἀπέρχομαι:** this description of what Alcibiades wanted to know corresponds more closely to Socrates' account at the start of the dialogue (especially 103a2–3 μόνος οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι), than it does to anything that Alcibiades was prepared to confess at 104d1–6; Alcibiades confessed then to wondering why Socrates is always stalking him, but did not say anything of the fact that he had been abandoned by all his other lovers. The fact that Alcibiades is now prepared to acknowledge the truth of this description shows him to be losing some of the evasiveness (106a5–7n.) that has hitherto marked his answers. **ει1 τὰ δὲ σὰ λήγει ὥρας,**

**σὺ δ' ἄρχῃ ἀνθεῖν:** this delicately reminds Alcibiades of the more usual pattern of courtship, as in *An. Pal.* 5.74.5–6: 'Wear this garland and stop being haughty (μεγάλυχος; cf. 104c3 μεγαλυχούμενος): both you and the garland are flowering and fading (ἀνθεῖς καὶ λήγεις καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ στέφανος).' But instead of arguing 'Yield while you can; your beauty definitely won't last', Socrates argues 'Yield while you can; your beauty may or may not last; and it will last if you do yield.'

**132a1** ἄν μὴ διαφθαρῆις ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου: Socrates turns the tables on his accusers: one of the charges on which the Athenian people had him executed was that 'he corrupts (διαφθείρει) the young men' (*Ap.* 26b; *Xen. Mem.* 1.1.1), and Alcibiades was cited as a prime example of the young men whom he had corrupted (*Xen. Mem.* 1.2.12). For some account of how the Athenian people corrupted Alcibiades, see 114c1n. on ἓνα ... κατὰ μόνας, 120e3–4n., and the whole of *Rep.* 490a–495c. **a3** **δημεραστής** is an odd word, apparently coined just for the occasion. Unlike the more common φιλόδημος, its meaning is much less dignified than 'friend of the people' (the translation given in LSJ). It indicates someone who has for the favours that the people can bestow a passion akin to that of an older man for the sexual favours of a beautiful youth. The conceit that the democratic politician suffers from such a passion is developed in *Grg.* 481d–e: in particular, he will adapt himself to all the fickle changes of public opinion as the lover does to all the moods of his beloved. The conceit is elaborated at length in *Ar. Kn.* 710–1408. **a5** **εὐπρόσωπος** ... **6** **ἀποδύντα** ... **θεάσασθαι:** to elaborate the sexual image introduced by δημεραστής in 132a3, Socrates uses the vocabulary of men who are ogling youths. See *Chrm.* 154d–e, for another application of this vocabulary to the inspection of character: Socrates, having agreed that Charmides is εὐπρόσωπος, is told 'If he's willing to strip (ἀποδύναί), you won't notice his face, he's got such an utterly beautiful figure'; Socrates then asks if the boy's soul matches his looks; on being told that it does, he says 'So why don't we strip (ἀποδύσμεν) his thingummy [αὐτὸ τοῦτο; though used here for the soul, the expression can of course also be used for the phallus, as in *Ar. Wasps* 1062], and take a look at it

(ἐθεασάμεθα), before we look at his figure? After all, at his age, he should definitely be willing to engage in dialectic (διαλέγεσθαι).’ The political counterpart to ogling a boy’s soul is an inspection of the law by which Alcibiades’ beloved Athenians live: it was a recurrent thought that the constitution (πολιτεία) or laws (νόμοι) of a city constitute its character (τρόποι), its lifestyle (βίος), or its soul (ψυχή); see Isoc. 7.14, 12.138, Arist. *Pol.* 1295a40–b1, Demos. 24.210, Demos. in Stobaeus 4.1.144. **a5** *μεγαλήτορος δῆμος Ἐρεχθέως* alludes to Hom. *Il.* 2.547 δῆμον Ἐρεχθῆος μεγαλήτορος. ‘Great-hearted Erechtheus’ was a legendary king of Athens.

**b1** *γύμνασαι* ‘get yourself in training’. Alcibiades earlier invoked athletic metaphors for political competition, and Socrates here is alluding to that passage (with μάθε and μαθόντα 132b1–2, cf. μαθόντα 119b6 and μανθάνοντα 119b9; with ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως 132b2, cf. ἰέναι ὡς ἐπ’ ἀθλητάς 119b6–7 and ἐληλύθασιν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως 119b8). However, Alcibiades had earlier used the word ἀσκεῖν for training (119b6, b8). By using γυμνάζεσθαι here instead, Socrates reminds us, appropriately enough, that Greek athletes trained naked (γυμνοί). Thus it is not only the Athenian people, but also Alcibiades himself, who must be stripped naked if he is to get a proper view of them. Cf. *Grg.* 523c–e, 524d on judgement after death, explaining how it is best for souls to be judged when they are naked, and by judges who are themselves naked, where ‘naked’ means stripped of everything bodily. Cf. also 130d10. on τῇ ψυχῇ. **ὦ μακάριε:** see 124a8n.

**b2–3** *ἀλεξιφάρμακα* are magic charms intended to ward off the effects of poison and drugs (see the definitions in *Plt.* 279c, 280e). Socrates often describes his arguments, in similarly self-deprecating terms, as ‘incantations’ (ἐπωιδαί; e.g. *Rep.* 608a, *Chrm.* 157c). The most exact parallel is however *Laws* 957d, where the Athenian stranger says that a good judge is rendered immune to the ill effects of such things as poetry and rhetoric by having internalised, ‘as ἀλεξιφάρμακα against other kinds of discourse’, ‘what the legislator put in writing’ (τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου γράμματα; note that γράμμα may itself be used for written charms, as in *Grg.* 484a γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπωιδάς).

**b4–5** *πειρῶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι ὄντινα τρόπον ἐπιμεληθεῖμεν:* on ἐξηγεῖσθαι see 124b8n. The opta-

tive ἐπιμεληθεῖμεν without ἄν, subordinated to the present πειρῶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι, violates the grammarians' rules for these matters (*MT* §667). If that is found intolerable, then the text can be emended to ὄντιν' ἄν. Emendations will also remove the various parallels for the violation, like *Rep.* 428d βουλεύεται ... ὄντινα τρόπον ... ἄριστα ὁμιλοῖ, *Grg.* 448e οὐδεὶς ἔρωται ποία τις εἶη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν Γοργίαν, *Euthd.* 296e οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖην. It is however easier to accept that the optative was not in fact governed by rules so hard and fast. **b7 ὁ γὰρ ἐσμέν, ἐπεικῶς ὡμολόγηται** 'since we have come to a pretty fair agreement on what we are'. Reasons given in 130c8–d7 explain why the agreement can be praised as 'pretty fair', but cannot be given higher praise than this.

**c1 ὅτι:** i.e. 'it has been agreed that'. This clause is subordinate to ὡμολόγηται in 132b7. **ψυχῆς ἐπιμελητέον ... 4–5 σωμάτων δὲ καὶ χρημάτων τὴν ἐπιμελείαν ἑτέροις παραδοτέον:** in *Ap.* 30a–b, Socrates says 'I go about, doing nothing other than urging both the older and the younger among you not to care for your bodies or property (μῆτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μῆτε χρημάτων) in preference to, or even as much as, the soul and how to make it as good as possible (τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἄριστη ἔσται).' In *Ap.* 36c (quoted in 128a2–3n.) this care for one's soul is called 'care for oneself', in contrast to 'care for what belongs to oneself'. **c7 τίς οὖν ἄν τρόπον γνοῖμεν αὐτὰ ἐναργέστατα;** 'How then might we know them most clearly?' The 'them' would include not only the soul (132c1), but also the body and external possessions (132c4). We need not emend from αὐτὰ 'them' to αὐτὸ 'it', i.e. the soul. For the clearest knowledge of them all is bound to be the clearest knowledge of it in particular; and if 133d1–e5 is correct, then without knowledge of the soul in particular, there can be no knowledge of any of these other things. **c8–9 ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο γνόντες, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς γνωσόμεθα** 'For once we have come to know this [i.e. the answer to the methodological question just asked], then it seems that we will also come to know ourselves.' With the use of ἐπειδὴ here, more as connecting two coordinate sentences than as subordinating one clause to another, cf. the similar use of ἐπεὶ in e.g. 123b4, 123d5.



**132c9–133c17: The eye and the soul**

*How a soul can know itself is explained by thinking of how an eye can see itself. An eye can see itself by looking at its reflection in the pupil of another eye; similarly, a soul can know itself by contemplating its ‘reflection’ in the intellect of another soul. Moreover, an eye can see itself best by looking at its reflection in a mirror; similarly, a soul knows itself best when it uses the best of intellectual mirrors, and contemplates the way that it is reflected in God.*

Glaringly absent from this passage (though not from *Phdr.* 255c–e, quoted in 135e1–2n. on ὁ ἑμὸς ἔρωσ κτλ.) is explicit mention of how erotic are looks from, or into, someone’s eyes. The poets made a great deal of this, sometimes tastefully (e.g. Ibycus, *PMG* 287.2, Anacreon, *PMG* 360.1, Sappho fr. 138 Voigt, Pind. fr. 123.2 Maehler), sometimes not (Licymnius, *PMG* 771.2: Hypnos makes Endymion sleep with open eyes, so that he can continue to have the pleasure of looking into them). *Cra.* 420a–b gives an etymology of ἔρωσ as what ἔσπεῖ, ‘flows in’, through the eyes. Later literature turns the eroticism of the eyes into a twee conceit; thus, in a poem ascribed to Plato (*An. Pal.* 7.669, D.L. 3.29), the speaker says to his beloved ‘You’re gazing at the stars, my star. How much I wish I were the skies, To gaze on you with many eyes’; and in Achilles Tatius 1.9.4–5, a young man who so far can only look, not touch, is consoled with the words: ‘When eyes are reflected in one another, they receive, as if in a mirror, impressions of the body; and this emanation of beauty [an allusion to *Phdr.* 251b], which flows through the eyes down into the soul [an allusion to *Phdr.* 255c], contains a sort of union at a distance, and is sweeter than a bodily union, for it is a new sort of bodily embrace.’ In Plato’s day however, the eyes can be the place, or route, of most horrible lusts: Leontius gets angry with his eyes when he cannot restrain himself from going to look at some corpses (*Rep.* 439e–440a; Theopompus fr. 25 *PCG* derided him for necrophilia); and when Oedipus realises that he has married his own mother, he puts out his eyes (Soph. *OT* 1270–9).

**132c9** ψυδῆ: at 124b1, 129a2.

**δι** ὑποπτεύω is derived from a word meaning ‘I see’, and yet is customarily used for ‘I am inclined to think’. It is therefore a felicitous word to use when introducing an analogy between vision and the intellect. **δι**–2 λέγειν καὶ συμβουλευεῖν recalls the phrase used of Alcibiades himself at 108e6–7 σε λέγοντα καὶ συμβουλευόντα; cf. 132d7n. **δι**–3 οὐδὲ πολλαχού ‘not at all frequent’, i.e. very rare. For this use of οὐδέ, cf. *Rep.* 328c οὐδὲ θαμίζεις . . . καταβαίνων (‘you don’t come down at all often’, i.e. you hardly ever come down), 587c οὐδὲ πάνυ ῥάϊδιον (‘not at all terribly easy’, i.e. really rather difficult). **δι**3 παράδειγμα ‘analogue’. When you reach conclusions about something obscure, on the basis of its presumed similarity to something clear, you are using the clear thing as a παράδειγμα for the obscure one. *Plt.* 277d–278e cites the way that children are taught their letters as itself a παράδειγμα for the use of παραδείγματα in philosophy. Once children are good at guessing which letter is which in short and easy syllables, they can be taught to recognise those same letters in long and difficult words, by comparing the long and difficult words with the short and easy syllables. Likewise, we can come to appreciate something harder to understand (in the *Plt.*, the art of politics; here, what it is to know oneself) by comparing it with something easier (in the *Plt.*, the art of weaving; here, what it is for an eye to see itself); for the comparison will enable us to notice in the harder thing features and properties that we have already noticed in the easier. Arist. *Rh.* 1393a23–1394a18 describes and classifies the different ways in which one might argue from παραδείγματα; and 1356a34–1357b36 contrasts παραδείγματα with other styles of argument, in particular with those that approximate more closely to rigorous proof. Rigorous proof however would be out of place in reasoning addressed to a beginner; cf. 130d6n. κατὰ τὴν ὁψιν μόνον: vision was found a particularly fertile source for analogies with knowledge. *Rep.* 507c–d itself points out that no other sense could provide the rich and detailed model for knowledge that is developed at 507b–509c. Aristotle (*Ptp.* fr. 7 Ross) argues that vision is the clearest of all our senses, and thus the sense that is most akin to knowledge; ‘for by comparison with the others, it simply is a sort of knowledge (ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμη τις ἀτεχνῶς)’. And when it comes to providing an analogy, not just for knowledge generally, but

for self-knowledge in particular, vision has a special advantage: the eyes do have a distinctive look, and so are visible; but the ears, for example, do not make a distinctive noise (cf. *Chrm.* 167b–d, 168d–e). **d6 ἴδε σαυτόν:** comparing the Delphic inscription to ‘see yourself’ means comparing the high-minded to the naughty. Wanting to see, and to be seen, and trying to do both at once by looking at herself, are among the most striking features of Vice in Prodicus’ allegory: ‘she held her eyes wide open; she wore a gown through which her charms could most easily shine forth; she kept looking down at herself; she looked out also to see whether anyone was gazing at her; and often she would even inspect her own shadow’ (DK 84 B 2.22 = *Xen. Mem.* 2.1.22; Vice evidently sees her shadow (σκιᾶ) as somehow surrogate for a mirror-image (εἰδωλον), as in e.g. *Aesch. Ag.* 839, *Soph. Ajax* 126, *Philoctetes* 946–7). Ovid gives a delicious variant on this analogy between gazing at oneself erotically and high-minded self-knowledge: Narcissus was so enthralled by his own reflection that he wasted away, thus bearing out the oracle that he would live to a ripe age ‘so long as he does not know himself’ (*Metamorphoses* 3.348). **d7 παραινεῖν:** the very activity in which Alcibiades will soon be engaged (107b12); cf. 132d1–2n.

**e3 κάτοπτρα** continues the theme of comparing the high-minded to the naughty. Mirrors are an oriental luxury, like scented unguents (*Eur. Or.* 1110–14; cf. 122c2n.). They are therefore decidedly unmanly: thus the epicene Agathon has one, and an onlooker exclaims ‘What’s a mirror got to do with a sword?’ (*Ar. Th.* 140). Not even all females have mirrors: Aphrodite, goddess of sex, has a mirror, but Athena, goddess of wisdom, does not (*Soph. fr.* 334 *TGF*, *Call. H.* 5.17–22); and when the courtesan Lais, on retiring from business, dedicates a typical tool of her trade to an appropriate divinity, she dedicates her mirror to Aphrodite (*An. Pal.* 6.1, a poem traditionally ascribed to Plato). **e4 τοιαῦτα:** only this addition – ‘mirrors and the like’ – saves Alcibiades from the absurdity of claiming that we can see ourselves (that is, our souls) in a mirror. Even then, this addition saves him from that absurdity only if it is given a wider interpretation than he himself at this stage imagines: things ‘like’ mirrors in the relevant respect will have to include, not only bodily things such as still pools, but also the intellect, human and divine (133b7–c7).

**ε5 τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ . . . 6 ἔνεστί τι τῶν τοιούτων:** the immediate point is of course that reflections are visible in the pupil of an eye, as in a mirror. But we should recall also that the mirrors used in ancient Greece had a reflecting surface that was round, like the pupil: see the diagrams in Lenore O. Keene Congdon, *Caryatid mirrors of ancient Greece* (Mainz-am-Rhein 1981) 5. **ε5 ᾧ ὁρῶμεν** is syntactically ambiguous: when we meet this phrase here, we can easily take the grammatical antecedent of the relative pronoun ᾧ to be τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ; in the light of 133a7 however, which tells us that what we see with is the pupil, we can take the antecedent to be τι. This ambiguity over the antecedent of ᾧ, like the ambiguities over ὄψει (133a2n.), κόρην (133a3n.) and τοῦτο (133b4n.), helps make the analogy (an eye seeing itself) somewhat murkier than that for which it is an analogy (a soul knowing itself); for there are no corresponding ambiguities in the description of self-knowledge at 133b7–c7. Such murkiness is just what we should expect, given that our progress towards wisdom consists in moving towards the bright clarity of an intelligible world, which is copied only imperfectly in the murky obscurities of the visible world: see the description of the Cave in *Rep.* 514a–518b, for Plato's most elaborate account of this progress.

**133a2 ὄψει** 'pupil'. That ὄψις is here applied to the pupil is shown by the comparison of the ὄψις with a mirror: the pupil is that part of the eye in which a visible reflection is formed. The word can however be applied, not only to the pupil and other organs of sight (LSJ s.v. ὄψις II.c–d), but also to more or less anything connected with vision: the sensory capacity itself, its operations, and its objects. See 132e5n. on ᾧ ὁρῶμεν for a guess about why so ambiguous a word is used. **α3 ὃ δὲ καὶ . . . καλοῦμεν:** since the mirror is not itself the image, but the place where the image is formed, ὃ here must have for its antecedent, not the single word κατοπτρῷ, but the phenomenon described by entire phrase τὸ πρόσωπον . . . κατοπτρῷ. For this construction, cf *Tht.* 194a, where more than four lines constitute the antecedent of ὃ δὲ καὶ ψεῦδος ἄρα ὠνόμασται ('and this is precisely what is termed falsehood'). **κόρην:** from its original meaning of 'little girl', this word is extended by easy stages, first to 'figurine', 'doll', 'statuette', next to 'image formed in the eye', and finally to 'that part of the eye in which the image is formed, or

pupil'. The first and second of these extensions are the main meanings relevant here. In this context however, it is hard not to be conscious of the final extension, unhelpful though that is. See 132e5n. on ὧι ὁρῶμεν for a guess about why so ambiguous a word is used. **a7 τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ**: as that 'of' the eye 'which is best', the pupil will turn out to be the same as the eye itself (130d6–7nn.), and looking into a pupil will turn out to be the same as looking into an eye. A corollary is that e.g. the iris, and other things that might be thought of as parts of the eye, will in fact be mere adjuncts to it, like e.g. the eyelids and the tear ducts. For such a thought, cf. Arist. *De anima* 413a2–3 'the pupil and the faculty of vision are an eye' (confusingly enough, 'pupil' here is κόρη, and 'faculty of vision' is ὄψις). **ὧι ὁρᾷ**: the pupil is called 'that with which the eye sees', since in most fifth-century theories of vision, 'the image upon the pupil played something of the part that was later to be assigned to the image upon the retina' (Brunschwig (1973) 25, citing DK 59 A 92.27, 64 A 19.42, 67 A 29, 68 A 135.50). Hence, when an eye sees itself by seeing its reflection in a pupil, it is seeing itself by seeing how another eye sees it. This has two consequences. First, the analogy with an eye that sees itself will make self-knowledge particularly attractive to one with Alcibiades' concern for the impression that he makes upon others (cf. 124a5–6n.). Second, the analogy will mean that self-knowledge is gained, not by any inward-looking self-absorption, but by casting the mind outward, to appreciate what others know about oneself. **a11 τυγχάνει ὅμοιον** 'is like'. See 129a2n. for the use of τυγχάνει without participle, in contrast to the construction at 133b10 τυγχάνει ὅμοιον ὄν.

**b4 τοῦτο**: for this pronoun's gender, see 115b6n. Its reference might be either 'the place where the virtue of the eye is' (which would make ὄψις mean 'the pupil', as in 133a2), or 'the virtue of the eye' (which would make ὄψις mean 'sight', as in 126b3, and make the construction exactly parallel to 133b9–10 'the virtue of the soul, wisdom'). See 132e5n. on ὧι ὁρῶμεν for a guess about the motive for using an ambiguous construction here. **b7–8 ψυχὴ εἰ μέλλει γνῶσεσθαι αὐτήν, εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλέπτεον**: cf. Arist. *MM* 1213a15–27: 'We cannot, by ourselves, contemplate ourselves ... Hence, just as when we want to see our own face, we look into a

mirror and see it there, so too, when we want to know ourselves, we look into a friend and see ourselves there. For a friend is, as we say, another I (ἕτερος ἐγώ). So if it is pleasant to know oneself, and if it is not possible to know oneself without another person, who is one's friend, then even the man who is self-sufficient would need friendship in order to know himself.' **bg τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον:** describing the intellect as a 'region of' the soul enables Socrates to avoid committing himself to the unwelcome thought that the intellect is just one part of the soul among others (cf. 133c1–2n.). For talk of a soul's regions is obviously metaphorical; Socrates therefore cannot be held to its implication of parts within the soul, any more than he can be held to its implication that the soul is spatially extended.

**c1–2 ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν;** 'Can we say then that there is anything of the soul which is more godlike than that with which both knowledge and wisdom are connected?' The thought and construction resemble in detail those of 130d6–7 (with the verb εἰπεῖν cf. φήσαιμεν, with the genitive τῆς ψυχῆς cf. ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, with the comparative θειότερον cf. κυριώτερον, and with ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν cf. ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν). 130d6–7 endorsed the principle that had just been applied, in arguing that since the soul controls the body, a human being himself cannot be identified with his body, nor yet with the composite of his body and his soul taken together, but must instead be identified with his soul alone. On this same principle, if the intellect is that of the soul which is most godlike, and 'the godlike is naturally such as to control and govern' (*Phd.* 80a: τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἷον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι), then the soul itself will have to be identified with the intellect alone. Hence, if Alcibiades is to know and take care of himself, he must know and take care of his intellect. For the identification of a human being with his intellect, cf. the images of *Rep.* 588b–e and *Phdr.* 253c–e, in which the unintellectual parts of a human soul are represented by more or less noble beasts, and the intellect is represented by a human being. Cf. also Arist. *Ptp.* fr. 6 Ross: 'That which is by nature more of a ruler and more of a governor (κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχικώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἡγεμονικόν) – as man is to the other animals – is better. The soul therefore is better than the body (for it is more of a ruler), and that

which has reason and thought is better than the soul. For that is what a thing is like, when it commands and forbids, and says what we must or must not do . . . One could maintain, I suppose, that this little part is what we are, either exclusively or mainly (ἤτοι μόνον ἢ μάλιστα ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν τὸ μόνον τοῦτο).’ Aristotle in effect twice applies the principle of the *Alcibiades* that we ourselves are that of us which has the greatest authority; and he reaches more or less the conclusion at which the *Alcibiades* hints, that we ourselves are therefore identical to our intellects. Aristotle however avoids one absurdity (saying that an entire thing is identical to what is just one of its parts: ‘this little part’) only by falling into another (saying that the identity may be true only to some high degree: ‘either exclusively or mainly’). The *Alcibiades*, by contrast, avoids both those absurdities: it does not describe the intellect as the most godlike *part* of the soul, any more than it describes the soul as the most authoritative *part* of the human being; and by saying instead that the intellect is ‘that *of* the soul’ which is most godlike, it allows the unqualified conclusion that the soul itself simply is the intellect, just as, by saying that the soul is ‘that *of* ourselves’ which is most authoritative (130d7n.), it reached the unqualified conclusion that a man himself simply is his soul.

**CI θεϊότερον:** the similarity of the intellect to God is affirmed in e.g. *Rep.* 589d (where the intellect is called τὸ ἑαυτοῦ θεϊότατον) and *Tim.* 90a (where it is described as a δαίμων, and called the κυριώτατον kind of soul; cf. 130d6–7), and perhaps best explained by an elaborate argument in *Laws* 894e–898c: all motion must derive ultimately from a sort of motion that sets and keeps itself going, rather than needing something else to cause it; the soul is to be defined in terms of this sort of motion; in particular therefore the motion of heavenly bodies derives from the wishes, feelings, or other thoughts of a soul or souls; but the motion of heavenly bodies is so perfect and orderly that it must derive from a god, and from the plans of a supremely rational soul. (The variant reading νοερώτερον has Socrates making the pointlessly tautological assertion that there is nothing more intellectual than the intellect.)

**c4 τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ’ ὅμοιον:** from the premiss that nothing of the soul is more divine than the intellect (133c1–2), it is reasonable to infer that the intellect resembles God. It would be rather pointless to infer that the intellect resembles the divine, as the variant reading θείῳ has

Socrates do. The conclusion is too close to the premiss: after noting that the sheets are snowier than the rest of your bedding, would there be any point in inferring that the sheets are like what is snowy? **c4** αὐτῆς: for this construction with the genitive, see 130d7n. **c4–6** τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίῃ μάλιστα ‘by looking into this and getting knowledge of all that is divine, both of God and of wisdom, one could thus get the best possible knowledge of oneself too’. Because the Delphic maxim enjoined us to know our limits and our place in the world (124b1n.), rather than, for example, ‘to be in touch with our emotions’, it is a little less strained than it might at first seem to say that one comes to know oneself by looking outwards, and seeing how one looks from the point of view of some wise person, and above all, from the point of view of God. **c8** ἄρ’ οὖν ... **17** ναί: these lines are extant only in the indirect evidence for our text. They make explicit one final detail of the analogy: the comparison between mirrors (last mentioned at 133a3) and God. Mirrors provide an eye with bigger, brighter and clearer reflections of itself than it could ever get from another pupil. So too, God will provide a human soul with a better understanding of itself than it could ever get from another human intellect. Thus, as in the analogy of the Line (*Rep.* 509d–511e), both vision (with its contrast between reflections in pupils and clearer reflections in mirrors), and the intellect (with its contrast between human wisdom and the clearer wisdom of God), provide analogies for the way that the realm of vision as a whole is like, but inferior to, the realm of intellect (132d3n. on κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον). These lines therefore give a fair exposition of what is already implicit in the analogy. However, as the next five notes will show, the language of these lines makes them unlikely to be by Plato. **c8** ὅθι: if this is an elided form of ὅτι, it would give something like the construction of 115e4 ἄρ’ ὅτι, but it would be the sole elision of ὅτι in Attic. If it is instead an elided form of ὅτε, then there would be more than a dozen Platonic parallels for the elision. However ὅτε would then be expected to introduce a subordinate clause, summarising results so far, before proceeding to a main clause, giving the next point to be made (LSJ s.v. ὅτε B); and that is not the construction here. **c9** ἐνόπτρου: apart from c14



ἐνόπτρῳ, there is no other occurrence of this word in the Platonic corpus. Plato's standard word for a mirror is κάτοπτρον (used seventeen times). In explanation of the use of ἐνοπτρον here, it has been suggested that 'κάτοπτρον was reserved almost exclusively for mirrors, i.e. objects manufactured for that purpose, while ἐνοπτρον means any reflecting surface' (Clark (1955) 239 n. 5). However, both κάτοπτρον and ἐνοπτρον are sometimes applied more widely than just to mirrors alone; and there is no way of telling that such applications of κάτοπτρον are metaphorical extensions of a word that literally means 'mirror', whereas such applications of ἐνοπτρον continue to use it in the one literal sense of 'reflecting surface'. **c10** τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ ψυχῇ βελτίστου: i.e. the intellect (133c1–2). It is some sign of inauthenticity that ἐν plus the dative is used here to express what has previously, and pointedly, been expressed by a simple genitive (130d7n.). **c13–15** εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἄρα βλέποντες ἐκείνῳ καλλίστῳ ἐνόπτρῳ χρώμεθ' ἅν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἰς τὴν ψυχῆς ἀρέτην ... 'So, if we were to look at God, we would be using that most splendid mirror, of human life in particular, in order to make our souls virtuous ...' This translation awkwardly construes the two occurrences of εἰς differently. It is, if anything, even more awkward to give them both the same construction: 'So, if we were to look at God, and, in human life, at the virtue of the soul, we would be using that most splendid mirror ...' **c14** ἐνόπτρῳ: see 133c9n.

### 133c18–133e8: The recipe for success

*If Alcibiades does not know himself, he will hardly know much else. He will therefore be too incompetent to succeed in public or even private life. So long as he continues to act in this ignorance, the upshot to be expected is misery, both for himself, and for any city so foolish as to let him take charge. The remedy for ignorance is not wealth or public office; indeed, such resources can only make ignorance more dangerous. The remedy for ignorance is knowledge, wisdom and virtue; and until Alcibiades attains these things, he will be better off as a slave. Alcibiades says that he accepts all this, and, in the most extravagantly rhetorical style, announces his conversion to Socratic values. Socrates however is not convinced that this conversion will long withstand the charms of a political career in Athens.*

**133c18–19** τὸ δὲ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ὠμολογοῦμεν σωφροσύνην εἶναι: at 131b4, they presupposed, rather than explicitly agreed on, the identity of σωφροσύνη with knowing oneself. That earlier identification has now gained new resonances from the analogy with eyes at 132d–133c. σωφροσύνη is, by common consent, not too far from αἰδώς; for αἰδώς can be described as ‘having the largest part (πλείστον μετέχει)’ of σωφροσύνη (Th. 1.84.3; a Spartan king is speaking), and as ‘making such a contribution (συμβάλλεται)’ to it that people have misdefined the virtue σωφροσύνη as if it were the emotion αἰδώς (Arist. *EE* 1234a30–3). It was moreover proverbial wisdom that ‘the eyes are the place of αἰδώς’ (Arist. *Rh.* 1384a34). The proverb was used in particular to explain the erotic delight of staring into one another’s eyes: ‘lovers look at no other part of their beloved’s body than the eyes, which are where αἰδώς dwells’ (Arist. *Ἐρωτικός* fr. 1 Ross).

**d1–3** ἀδύνατον . . . μὴ γιγνώσκοντα Ἀλκιβιάδην τὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου γιγνώσκειν ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐστίν: cf. Meno’s agreement that it is impossible ‘for someone who doesn’t have the slightest knowledge of who Meno is (ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν), to realise whether he is handsome’ (*Meno* 71b). Meno has a good point; for someone who has not so much as heard of Meno will not even be able to raise questions about him, let alone answer them (cf. *Meno* 80d). In particular, therefore, those who know that something belongs to Alcibiades have at least some knowledge of who Alcibiades is. However, that knowledge is far from the knowledge enjoined by the Delphic maxim; for first, simply knowing who someone is, in the minimal sense needed for being able to think about him, is quite different from knowing what his strengths and weaknesses are; and second, simply knowing what *someone’s* strengths and weaknesses are (as I might when I can say ‘The man you’re describing must be an utter crook’) is quite different from knowing that they are *mine* (as I will when I am told ‘You are the man’; cf. 2 Samuel 12: 1–10). Thus the principle to which Alcibiades so vehemently agrees, sound though it is, does not support his earlier agreement that if we do not obey the Delphic maxim and know ourselves, then we cannot know what is good for us either. **d5–6** οὐδ’ ἄρα τὰ ἡμέτερα ὅτι

**ἡμέτερα, εἰ μὴδ' ἡμᾶς αὐτούς:** if this is to be rightly inferred (as the ἄρα here suggests) from the principle to which Alcibiades has just agreed, then it had better mean no more than that if e.g. I have not the slightest knowledge of who I am, then I will not even know that my hands are mine, rather than yours. If however this is to have the consequences that Socrates will infer from it at 133d10–e12 (as the ἄρα in 133d10 suggests), then it had better mean rather that if e.g. I do not, as the Delphic maxim requires, appreciate my position in the world, then I will not appreciate that my bodily parts are merely my belongings, rather than something to which I should give more care, such as myself. **d8 εἰ δ' ἄρα ...** ‘And if, after all ...’; see 131b4n. **μηδὲ τὰ ἡμέτερα, οὐδὲ τὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων** is ambiguous in much the way, and for much the reasons, that 133d5–6 was. If it is to justify the downgrading of doctors and farmers at 133d10–e2, then it had better mean that if we do not appreciate the comparatively low status of the body, then we will not appreciate that the proper status of foods is even lower. **d11 ἄρτι:** at 131a2–b3. **d12–e1 ἔοικε γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι κατιδεῖν ἑνός τε καὶ μιᾶς τέχνης:** contrast the threefold classification in *Phlb.* 48c–e of those who neglect the Delphic maxim and do not know themselves: many overestimate their property (χρήματα, i.e. τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ); more overestimate the beauty of their bodies (σῶμα, i.e. τὰ αὐτοῦ); and by far the largest number overestimate the virtues in their souls (ψυχᾶς, i.e. αὐτόν). This classification suggests that more people know about their bodies than know about their souls, and that more still know about their property; and this suggestion corresponds to the agreements made earlier and now revoked, that doctors and trainers (who presumably outnumber philosophers) know about the body (131a2–7), and that farmers and other craftsmen (who presumably outnumber doctors and trainers) know about the things that belong to the body (131a8–b2).

**e1 ἑνός τε καὶ μιᾶς τέχνης:** for this construction with the genitive, see 114c1n. on τοῦ αὐτοῦ κτλ. **ἑνός** may be making more than just the point that the knowledge of these different things is not parcelled out among different people; for it may be hinting also that this knowledge is rare, and not the possession of οἱ πολλοί (cf. 110e1n.). **e4–5 καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων που ἂν ἀγνοοῖ κατὰ ταῦτά** ‘presumably would, on the same principle, be ignorant of what belongs to other

people too'. As the *που* and the optative with *ἔν* perhaps acknowledge, there is some bluffing here; at any rate, it is not obvious how to transfer the argument about ignorance of one's own belongings to ignorance of the belongings of others. Relevant perhaps is a principle suggested in *Tht.* 207e–208a: suppose that I, quite correctly, put the letters theta and epsilon when trying to write the first syllable of Theaetetus' name, and that nevertheless, when trying to write the first syllable of Theodorus' name, I put the letters tau and epsilon instead; in that case, I have not mastered my letters, and my correct spelling of the first syllable of Theaetetus' name was more good luck than knowledge. *Chrm.* 167a and *Amat.* 137a–138b apply such a principle to self-knowledge: if what I have of my own strengths and weaknesses is a genuine understanding, then I will be reliably and systematically right about other people too. It is only a small step to extend this principle to knowledge of belongings. Cf. *Clit.* 408a: 'Someone who doesn't know how to handle his own harp plainly won't be able to handle his neighbour's either.'

**134a2 οὐδέ γε:** see 109c6n. **a4 ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰδὼς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται;** in agreeing so readily to this, Alcibiades may seem to have forgotten the lesson of 117c2–118a7: those who are ignorant, but aware of their ignorance, will not make errors, since they will put themselves under the care of others. It is however possible to harmonise the two passages, if we construe ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς here very narrowly as 'whoever does not know *himself*', and suppose that those who lack self-knowledge would be too little aware of their own ignorance to take precautions against acting in error.

**b6 φαίνεται:** the tentativeness of this answer is in marked contrast to the confidence with which Alcibiades has, since 133e7, been accepting that only wisdom can make us happy. While he is keen to accept the general principle, he is hesitant to accept its immediate corollary, that money cannot make us happy. **b7–8 οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τριήρων οὐδὲ νεωρίων δέονται αἱ πόλεις:** the walls, triremes and dockyards of Athens were conventionally regarded as marks of its greatness. Thus Lys. 13.46 invites the audience to remember how, when Athens was defeated, 'the walls were razed, the ships were handed over to the enemy, the dockyards were demol-

ished, the Spartans occupied our acropolis, and all the city's strength was lost, so that it was no different from the smallest city'. Contempt for these conventional marks of Athenian greatness is displayed also in the *Gorgias*, where Socrates acknowledges that earlier Athenian statesmen were clever at providing Athens with 'ships and walls and dockyards' (517c); then complains that nobody realises the harm these statesmen did, 'for, without moderation and justice, they have filled the city with harbours and dockyards and walls and tribute and suchlike flummery' (519a); and adds that once the harm becomes evident, Alcibiades might be blamed for it, although he will be at most partly responsible (519a–b).

**ci** εἰ δὴ μέλλεις 'if you *do* intend'. The δὴ sounds a note of caution (cf. 119e2–3n.). **c10** ἐξουσίαν ... ἀρχήν: ἐξουσία is the more general term, indicating power, right, or capacity (as at 135a1–6); ἀρχή by contrast indicates a formal public position. Thus Arist. *Pol.* 1275b18–9 describes a citizen as 'someone who has the ἐξουσία of taking part in deliberative and judicial ἀρχή'. Similarly, the ἐξουσία of an entire community would be its power generally, while its ἀρχή would be a more formally and precisely defined empire. Thus Isocrates says 'we [Athenians] held τὴν ἀρχήν for sixty-five years [from the formation of the Delian League in 478 until the failure of the Sicilian expedition, and mass revolt of the subject cities, in 413]' (12.56); and adds that when the Spartans were in control, the barbarians 'not only had ἐξουσίαν to go wherever they liked, on land or sea, but also became masters of many Greek cities' (12.59). (LSJ s.v. ἐξουσία II are wrong to say that the word has here the sense 'office', 'magistracy'; there is no clear sign that the word ever bore such a sense until later, when it came to be used in rendering such Latin idioms as *potestas consularis*.) **c11** ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν βούληται: at 104b7 it was said, in apparent praise of Pericles, that he had the power to do whatever he wanted. Cf. 134e8–9n.

**d4** ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν: at whatever is authentic of 133c1–17. **d7** ἀλλὰ μὴν: see 106c4n.

**ei** ἀλλὰ μὴν: see 106c4n. **e1–2** οὕτω γε πράττοντας ὑμᾶς ἐθέλω ἐγγυῆσασθαι ἢ μὴν εὐδαιμονήσειν 'if you act in this way [i.e. cor-

rectly and well: 134d10], I am prepared to guarantee that you will be happy'. ἡ μὴν 'introduces a strong and confident asseveration', and its main use in prose is, as here, in a formal oath or pledge, reported in indirect speech (*GP* 350–1). But why a pledge? Why should Alcibiades need to take Socrates' word for it that he will be happy if he ὁρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ πράττει? After all, at 116b5–6 Alcibiades was able to see for himself that οἱ εὖ πράττοντες εὐδαίμονες. There, however, εὖ πράττειν meant living a life in which all went well, and it is obvious that εὖ πράττειν in that sense implies being happy. Here, by contrast, Socrates is asking Alcibiades to accept something much less obvious: that he will be happy if he acts correctly. To accept so unobvious a claim, Alcibiades must either take it on trust from Socrates, or be presented with some argument for it. But the only brisk argument that Socrates has for his unobvious claim is more suited to perplexing people than persuading them. Thus in *Grg.* 507a–c Socrates argues that anyone of good sense (σώφρων) does what he ought (τὰ προσήκοντα) in all circumstances; that he is therefore bound to have all the virtues, and so be a perfectly good man (ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως); that a good man is bound to do whatever he does in a good and fine manner (εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ὃ ἂν πράττηι); and that someone who does things in a good manner (εὖ πράττοντα) is bound to be blissfully happy (μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα). Likewise in *Chrm.* 172a Socrates argues that those who put themselves in the hands of experts are bound in their every action to be acting in a good and fine way (ἐν πάσῃ πράξει καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν), and that people who act in a good way (εὖ πράττοντας) are bound to be happy (εὐδαίμονας). This argument is too brisk, since it is possible to act well even under grim circumstances (e.g. it is possible to remain loyal, even under torture), and since grim circumstances are widely thought to make one unhappy even when they don't make one act badly (e.g. it seems that nobody is happy when tortured, even if he remains loyal). In particular, this argument might be charged with equivocating: the claim that good people always εὖ πράττουσιν is obvious only when εὖ πράττειν is contracted to 'do the right thing'; yet the claim that those who εὖ πράττουσιν are always happy is obvious only when εὖ πράττειν is expanded to 'have a life in which all goes well'. To see off the charge of equivocation would require e.g. defining εὖ πράττειν throughout as leading a life in which all

that is important goes well; and then arguing that having the virtues and acting on them is the only thing that is important. **e5** ὥς τὰ εἰκότα ‘quite likely’; and therefore, perhaps, not certainly (120d9–10n.). Socrates presumably wants to leave open the possibility of lucky accidents: ignorance does not guarantee failure in the way that knowledge guarantees success. Cf. 134e9 τὸ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν, 135a3 τὸ συμβησόμενον, again to allow for the possibility of lucky accidents. **e8–9** ὥι γάρ . . . ἐξουσία μὲν ἦι ποιεῖν ὁ βούλεται, νοῦν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ ‘If anyone has the power to do what he wants, but has no sense’. According to *Grg.* 468d–e, nobody could meet this description; for somebody who does something bad for him, which he does not have the sense to realise is bad for him, is not in fact doing what he wants (ἂ βούλεται), but only what he thinks is good (ἂ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ). Contrast 135a6, where ποιεῖν ὁ δοκεῖ is used as a mere elegant variation on ποιεῖν ὁ βούλεται here. The contradiction between the two dialogues is however more verbal than real. For both dialogues are agreed on the important point that if the power to do what one wants is to be something worth having, then it can belong only to those who have enough sense to distinguish the good from the bad. **e8** ὥι is dative, as required by the verb ἦι (lit. ‘anyone for whom there is the ability . . .’), but it also provides the subject for the verb ἔχῃ later in the clause. English idiom, unlike Greek, splits such relative clauses into two, each introduced by the appropriate case of the relative pronoun: cf. e.g. *Phd.* 65a ὥι μὴδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μὴδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν (‘for whom no such thing is pleasant, and who has no share in them’). **e8** ἦι . . . **e9** ἔχῃ: these subjunctives indicate that this relative clause is to be taken generally: Socrates is asking, not about a particular identified case of stupidity combined with power, but about the general rule that covers all such cases. When the subjunctive is used in a relative clause to indicate generality, it is idiomatic to add ἄν. But the ἄν certainly can be omitted in verse (e.g. Eur. *IT* 1064 καλὸν τοι γλῶσσ’ ὅτῳ πίστις παρῇ), and Plato’s prose provides at least four other places where it seems to be omitted (*Rep.* 508d, *Laws* 737b, 848a, 873e).

**135a2** νοῦν ἱατρικὸν μὴ ἔχοντι ‘if he has no medical sense’; an adaptation, to this special context, of the standard and general phrase νοῦν ἔχειν ‘have some sense’. Because this participial phrase

is in effect the start of the protasis of a conditional, it needs no particle to link it to the previous participle νοσοῦντι. **a2–3 τυραννοῦντι δὲ ὥς μηδὲν ἐπιπλήττοι τις αὐτῷ** ‘but acts the dictator and won’t have anyone criticising him’. τυραννεῖν is used of issuing arbitrary instructions (e.g. *Meno* 76b); ἐπιπλήττειν can be used especially of constructive criticism (Isoc. 2.3–4 says that in private life, it is possible for friends to ἐπιπλήξαι and enemies to ἐπιθέσθαι one another’s mistakes, and that being exposed to such criticism is one great advantage of the private individual over the tyrant). The sick man who has the power to do what he likes, but who has no medical sense, is behaving, we are to suppose, like King Menelaus: Menelaus comes third in a chariot race, gets angry with the man who, although of lower status, has come second, charges him with cheating, and says ‘Come, I’ll try this charge myself, and I declare that no one else among the Greeks will criticise me (καί μ’ οὐ τινά φημι | ἄλλον ἐπιπλήξειν Δαναῶν)’ (Hom. *Il.* 23.579–80). The ὥς clause is perhaps best classified as indirect speech (‘issuing dictates that no one is to criticise him’), reporting some remark like that of Menelaus. The direct speech would then be the optative μηδὲν ἐπιπλήττοι τίς ἐμοι (contrary to *MT* §725, it is not only in poetry that one may use this construction to formulate a wish; cf. *Phdr.* 279b–c δοίητε ... νομίζοιμι ... εἴη). **a3 τί τὸ συμβησόμενον** ‘what is it that’s going to happen’, i.e. can be expected to happen in the ordinary course of events. This is tantamount to τί τὸ εἶκός συμβαίνειν at 134e9. The future indicative τί συμβήσεται would ask instead the question ‘what will actually happen?’ – to which of course the only sensible answer would be ‘It all depends on further details of the case.’ **a6 ὁ δοκεῖ**: here equated with ὁ βούλεται. See 134e8–9n. **a9 ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ...** ‘I certainly can [sc. see what would happen to them]; at any rate, I can see that ...’ For this use of γε, in elaborating an answer, cf. *La.* 195e, where ‘Can you tell what he means?’ is answered by ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ..., and *Rep.* 578d, where ‘Can you think of the reason?’ is answered by ναί, ὅτι γε ...

**b3 ὦ ἄριστε**: cf. 119c2n. **τυραννίδα**: in their new-found intimacy, Socrates is now able to give Alcibiades’ ambition the blunt name ‘tyranny’. Contrast the blander descriptions earlier: e.g. ‘to fill the world with your name and power’ (105c3–5), ‘to show yourself



worthy of all honour' (105e1). **b4** τῇ πόλει: the Athenian empire is described as a tyranny by the Corinthians (Th. 1.122.3), and even by Athenians, when reminding one another that they need to be ruthless (Th. 2.63.2, 3.37.2).

**c2** πρέπει ἄρα τῷ κακῷ δουλεύειν· ἄμεινον γάρ: cf. *Rep.* 590c–d: 'In order then that even a man like this [i.e. too stupid to be capable of governing himself] should be governed (ἄρχηται) by the same sort of thing as the man who is best (τοῦ βελτίστου), we declare that he must be the slave (δοῦλον ... δεῖν εἶναι) of the man whom we have described as best, and who has within himself the divine and ruling element. It is not that we think the slave should be governed to his own detriment ...; rather, we say this on the grounds that it is better (ἄμεινον) for everyone to be governed by what is divine and wise. For preference, one should have such a governor of one's own within oneself; failing that, it should be imposed from outside. The point is that, so far as is possible, we should all resemble one another, and be friends, by all being subject to the same command.' Cf. also the defence of natural slavery in Arist. *Pol.* 1253b1–1255b40. Not being addressed to Alcibiades, neither of these passages commends slavery as πρέπον (cf. 108c6n. on πρέποι). **c8** φεύγειν χρή ... τὴν δουλοπρέπειαν: Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν), realising that it is slavish to suffer from his ignorance of the fine, the good and the just, agrees 'we must extend every effort to escape being slaves (δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ διατεινομένους φεύγειν ὅπως μὴ ἀνδράποδα ὦμεν)' (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.22–3). **ω̑** ἑταῖρε: cf. 124d8n. **c12** τὸ περὶ σέ νῦν: cf. 109e8n. for similar squeamishness about naming Alcibiades' ugly state of ignorance.

**d6** ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ: this is the third time that Socrates has made such a caveat (the two others were 105e6, 127e5). Alcibiades has never yet made such caveats; his frequent invocations of the gods (107a4, 110c1, 110c11, 112a3, 116e3, 117b7, 119a7, 127d6, 130c7, 133d4), have always been rather to give his remarks emphasis. Socrates by contrast has much less often sworn by the gods (109d7, 129b5, 132c9); indeed, he is almost as likely to emphasise his remarks by βαβαῖ (118b5, 119c2), a term too humdrum for Alcibiades ever to use. **d7** λέγω δὴ 'All right, I'll say that.' Cf. *Grg.* 462d (with Dodds' text

and note), where a reluctant Polus uses φημί δή, in order to adopt as his own a question that has just been formulated on his behalf by Socrates.

**d8–g μεταλαβεῖν τὸ σχῆμα . . . τὸ μὲν σὸν ἐγὼ, σὺ δὲ τοῦμόν** ‘to swap rôles . . . so that I take yours and you take mine’. The same meaning could be expressed by a phrase along the lines of *Rep.* 434a τὰ ὄργανα μεταλαμβάνοντες τἀλλήλων (‘swapping tools with one another’); but Alcibiades cannot resist the opportunity for an ornamentally chiasmic (104a4n.) arrangement of personal pronouns. Cf. Gorgias DK 82 B 11(a).7–8: in order to say ‘we are together’, he puts σύνειμι καὶ σύνεστι κάκεϊνος ἐμοὶ κάκεϊνω ἐγώ; and in order to say ‘that would have given us great confidence in one another’, he puts πιστότατα γὰρ ἂν ἦν οὕτως ἐμοὶ τε παρ’ ἐκείνου ἐκείνω τε παρ’ ἐμοῦ. There is an ominous irony in the way that, even while professing his new allegiance to Socrates, Alcibiades resorts again (cf. 113d6–8) to the prose style of sophistic oratory.

**d9 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπως οὐ**: this double negation cancels out (contrast Socrates’ οὐδεὶς ὃς οὐχ in 103b5, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ in 105e2, which are equivalent to ‘everyone’ and ‘everything’, and his emphatic negatives οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδέ 107a7, οὐ μὴν οὐδέ 133e12, οὐκ ἄρα οὐδέ 134b4). Alcibiades is therefore resorting to his old trick of pleonastic wordiness (116d6n.). Moreover, after cancelling out, οὐχ ὅπως οὐ would leave behind at most an air of emphatic assertion (LSJ s.v. ὅπως 1.3); but here, it cannot leave even that, without contradicting the tentativeness in κινδυνεύσομεν at 135d8. Alcibiades is therefore resorting also to another of his old stylistic tricks: an inscrutable evasiveness (106a5–7n.).

**d9–11 παιδαγωγῆσω σε . . . σὺ δ’ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ παιδαγωγῆσιν** ‘I’ll attend on you, and you’ll be attended on by me.’ On the office of a παιδαγωγός, see 121e5n. This blatantly ornamental pleonasm (116d6n.), using both active and passive versions of exactly the same sentence, has no clear parallel in even the most extravagant epideictic (114d6n.) of Gorgias. There are frequent approximations to this figure: e.g. πέφυκε . . . τὸ μὲν κρεῖσσον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἥσσον ἔπεσθαι (‘the natural thing is . . . for the stronger to lead, and the weaker to follow’; DK 82 B 11.6); ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινά, ἡ δὲ ἔπαθε (‘He did dreadful things [sc. to her], and she suffered them [sc. at his hands]’; DK 82 B 11.7). However, the only exact parallel depends on emendation: <πάντες> πάντα<ς> ὁρῶσι καὶ πάντες ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρῶνται (‘Everyone sees everyone and everyone is seen by everyone’;

DK 82 B11(a).12). With the hypergorgianism here, cf. Agathon's words in *Smp.* 196c: κρατοῖντ' ἄν ὑπὸ Ἔρωτος, ὁ δὲ κρατοῖ ('they would be mastered by Eros, and he would master them'). **διο-  
ii παιδαγωγῆσθαι** is, like θεραπεύσεται (135e3), middle in form but needs to be translated as if it were a passive. This is a fairly common use of the future middle, and there seems to be no special nuance attached to the choice of a middle rather than a passive form for such a purpose: compare the two middles in *Cri.* 54a βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται μὴ συνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; ('Will they be reared and educated any better if you're not with them?') with the middle and the passive in *Rep.* 376c θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα τρόπον; ('How will we have them reared and educated?').

**ει ὧ γενναῖε**: now that Alcibiades is about to start treating Socrates in the way that storks treat their parents, there is a special incongruity in reminding him of his ancestry; cf. 111a5n. **πελαργοῦ** 'stork'. Popular ornithology held that once storks had brought their offspring to an age at which they could fly, rôles were then reversed, and the offspring tended their parents. See Ar. *Birds* 1353–7, Arist. *HA* 615b23–4, Ael. *NA* 3.23. **ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρωσ . . . 2 παρὰ σοὶ ἐννεο-  
τεύσας ἔρωτα** 'my love, having hatched a love in you'. In view of Socrates' earlier suggestions about looking into one another's eyes (132d5–133b6), we are perhaps to think that his love for Alcibiades has produced in Alcibiades a love for him by something like the mechanism described in *Phdr.* 255c–e: 'As a gust of wind, or an echo, bounces off smooth hard surfaces and is carried back to whence it came, so too the stream of beauty goes back [from the lover] to the beautiful boy. It passes through his eyes, which are the natural route to the soul. When it arrives, . . . it fills the soul of the beloved in its turn with love. He is in love; but he does not know with what; . . . he has not realised that he has seen himself in his lover, as if in a mirror; . . . he contains an image of love, a counterlove, but he says, and thinks, that it is not love, but friendship.' This reversal of rôles, whereby a beautiful youth is transformed into the lover of an older man who has pursued him, was the common experience of those pursued by Socrates. According to Alcibiades in *Smp* 222b, 'I am not the only one that Socrates has done this to. He's done it to Char-

mides the son of Glaucon, to Euthydemus (103a1n. on θαυμάζειν) the son of Diocles, and to lots and lots of others. He tricks them by pretending to be their lover (ἐραστής), but ends up instead as the one that they love (παιδικά).’ **ὑπόπτερον:** Love was usually represented as a boy with wings. Poets variously suggested that the conceit is apt (love sets one all aflutter: Sappho fr. 47 Voigt, Anacreon fr. 378 *PMG*) or inept (the sufferer cannot get love to fly away: Eubulus fr. 40 *PCG*). In *Rep.* 573d–e, Plato develops the conceit of winged Love, and represents Love as responsible for a brood of nestling desires (ἐπιθυμῖαι) that clamour to be fed. Here we have a slightly different development: Socrates’ love produces a single offspring, instead of an entire brood; the offspring is itself another love, instead of a desire; and the offspring repays the care it has been given, instead of demanding more. *Anacreontea* 25.11–16 combines features from both Platonic developments of the conceit: there is a whole nestful of little Loves (Ἐρωτιδεῖς), the bigger feed the smaller, and those that have been reared go on to produce other Loves in their turn. **ε3 θεραπεύσεται** is middle for passive; see 135d10–

11n. **ε4 ἄρξομαι γε ἐντεῦθεν** indicates no great urgency or commitment. The future tense of ἄρξομαι suggests that the start has yet to be made; γε acknowledges that Alcibiades may do no more than start (hence Socrates’ wish in 135e6 that Alcibiades finish the job too); and ἐντεῦθεν is ‘hereafter’ not ‘immediately’ (cf. *Laws* 682e, where ἐντεῦθεν is, in effect, ‘from this generation’). Contrast *Chrm.* 176c ποιήσω τοίνυν, ἀπὸ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρξάμενος (‘I will then, starting this very day’), the words with which the young Charmides, at the end of his first meeting with Socrates, confirms that he will obey his guardian’s instruction to continue their association.

**ε6 βουλοίμην ἂν σε καὶ διατελέσαι· ὀρρωδῶ δέ . . . :** cf. *Euthphr.* 3a βουλοίμην ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ’ ὀρρωδῶ μὴ τούναντίον γένηται, *Phd.* 76b βουλοίμην μεντᾶν· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ κτλ. Alcibiades’ failure to finish the job would contrast with the resolution that Socrates has been displaying: cf. 104d4 ἐπιμελέστατα, 105a3 διατετέλεκα.

**ε7 τὴν τῆς πόλεως . . . ῥώμην:** not so much the material resources at the command of Athens, as that aspect of its power which consists in self-confidence and high morale. Cf. *Mx.* 241b ‘they were thought to be invincible at sea, because of their numbers, wealth, skill and ῥώμη’, and *Mx.* 243b–c, *Tim.* 25b, on

how the city of Athens displayed its *ῥώμη* and *ἀρετή* by victory against enormous odds. **ε8 κρατήσηι** is the word used in 104c3–4 for the control that Alcibiades has come to have over those who courted his favours. Socrates therefore expects some reversal of rôles, but fears that it will differ from the one Alcibiades foretold at 135d8–11; cf. his fear in 132a3 that Alcibiades will turn into a *δημεραστής*.

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